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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE PRASENJIT BISWAS
CRA 97 of 1994
Jharna Sarkar @ Bulu & Ors.
-VsState of West Bengal
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Dhananjay Banerjee,
Mr. Pralay Hatra,
Mr. Parth Sarathi Mishra.
For the Petitioner
:
Ms. Faria Hossain, Ld. APP,
Ms. Trina Mitra.
Hearing concluded on
:
30.01.2026
Judgment on
:
30.01.2026
(In Court :-)
PRASENJIT BISWAS, J.: –
1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order of
conviction dated 30.03.1994 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, 3rd Court, Bankura in connection with the Sessions Case 5(3)/90
corresponding to Sessions Trial No.2(7)91 at the instance of the
appellants.
2. By passing the impugned judgment, these appellants were found guilty
for commission of offence punishable under Section 498A and under
Section 306 of the I.P.C. The appellant No.3 Joydeb Sarkar was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for six years along with a fine of Rs.3000/- and in
CRA 97 of 1994
default of payment of fine to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three
months for the offence committed under Section 306 of the IPC. He was
also sentenced to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a
fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer further
rigorous imprisonment for two months for the offence committed under
Section 498A of I.P.C. The appellant No.1 was sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for three years along with a fine of Rs.3000/- and in default
of payment of fine to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months for
the offence committed under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code and she
was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years along
with a payment of fine of Rs.2000/- and in default of payment of fine to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable
under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.
3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and order of
conviction, the present appeal is preferred at the behest of the appellants.
4. During the pendency of this appeal, the appellant No. 2 was expired and
the present appeal was stood abated against him.
5. In a short compass, the prosecution story, as unfolded from the records,
may be delineated thus:
“The victim, being the sister of the de facto complainant,
was married to appellant no. 3 on the 18th day of Joishtho,
1392 B.S. Initially, the marital relationship between the
deceased and the members of her matrimonial family was
stated to be cordial and normal. However, according to the
CRA 97 of 1994
prosecution, such normalcy did not last long. After about
seven to eight months of the marriage, the husband of the
victim and his family members allegedly began subjecting
her to both mental and physical cruelty. It is the further
case of the prosecution that due to such alleged torture
and ill-treatment, a village ‘salish’ (local mediation) was
convened with the intervention of the local Panchayat in an
attempt to resolve the disputes between the parties.
However, the said mediation reportedly did not yield any
fruitful result, and the alleged acts of cruelty continued.
The prosecution version further discloses that on the 31st
day of Aashar, 1395 B.S., the defacto complainant, who is
the brother of the victim, came to learn about the death of
his sister. He allegedly received such information from one
Sunil Pal. Significantly, it is alleged that no intimation
regarding the death of the victim was sent by the
members of her matrimonial household to her parental
family.
Upon
receiving
the
information,
the
defacto
complainant immediately rushed to the village where the
victim’s matrimonial home was situated. On arrival, he
found his sister lying dead inside the house. Thereafter,
the de facto complainant approached the concerned police
station and lodged a written complaint narrating the
alleged incidents. On the basis of the said complaint,
Joypur Police Station Case No. 2 dated 16.08.1988 was
CRA 97 of 1994
registered against the present appellants, thereby setting
the
criminal
law
into
motion.
Upon
completion
of
investigation, the investigating agency submitted chargesheet against the appellants under Sections 498A and 306
of the Indian Penal Code. Subsequently, the learned Trial
Court
framed
charges
against
the
appellants
under
Sections 498A and 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC,
and
in
the
alternative
under
Section
IPC,
on
12.07.1991, to which the accused persons pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.”
6. In the present case, the prosecution, in order to substantiate the charges
brought against the accused persons, examined as many as ten witnesses
and also caused several documents to be marked as exhibits in support of
its
case.
Through
these
witnesses
and
documentary
exhibits,
the
prosecution sought to establish the allegations forming the foundation of
the charge and to bring home the guilt of the accused.
7. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the defence did not adduce any
evidence whatsoever, either oral or documentary. No witness was
examined on behalf of the defence, nor was any document brought on
record in support of the defence version. Thus, the defence case rested
solely on cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and on the
suggestions put to them during trial, without leading any independent
evidence in rebuttal.
CRA 97 of 1994
8. This aspect of the matter is relevant while appreciating the overall
evidentiary scenario on record, as the entire adjudication primarily turns
upon the quality, credibility and sufficiency of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
9. Mr. Dhananjay Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant,
has strenuously contended that the prosecution case suffers from material
omissions and contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses, thereby
rendering
the impugned
judgment
and order of conviction legally
unsustainable. According to him, the conviction has been recorded on the
basis of evidence which is neither consistent nor trustworthy, and hence
the same cannot be upheld in the eye of law.
10.
It is submitted that from the evidence of PW1 it transpires that he
allegedly received information regarding the death of his sister from one
Sunil Pal. However, in a case of such serious nature, the said Sunil Pal,
being the first informant as per PW1’s own version, was neither cited nor
examined as a prosecution witness. The deliberate non-examination of
such a material witness, who could have thrown light on the circumstances
under which the information was conveyed and the nature of the incident,
gives rise to a legitimate adverse presumption against the prosecution
under the settled principles of evidence law.
11.
The learned Advocate further submits that PW1, PW6, PW7 and PW8
are all related to the victim and, therefore, their testimonies require
careful scrutiny. It is contended that their depositions are not only
interested in nature but also doubtful with regard to the cause of death of
CRA 97 of 1994
the
victim.
Their
statements
do
not
inspire
confidence
and
lack
independent corroboration on material particulars.
12.
It is emphatically argued that there is no reliable evidence on record to
establish that the victim was subjected to torture or cruelty at the hands of
the appellants which could have led to her unnatural death. The allegation
of torture at the matrimonial home remains a bald assertion, unsupported
by any cogent, independent or contemporaneous evidence. Although some
witnesses made vague references to a purported ‘salish’ at the Panchayat,
not a single Panchayat member was examined to prove that any such
‘salish’ was actually held or to disclose the reason and outcome of the
same. This omission, according to the learned Advocate, significantly
weakens the prosecution case.
13.
Drawing attention to the medical evidence, the learned Advocate
submits that as per the deposition of PW14, the post-mortem doctor, the
cause of death was opined to be due to “unknown poison.” The autopsy
surgeon had preserved certain viscera for chemical examination, but
candidly admitted in cross-examination that he did not receive any
chemical
examiner’s
report.
Thus,
the
medical
evidence
remains
inconclusive. In the absence of the viscera report and in the absence of the
post-mortem report being duly proved and brought on record, the precise
cause of death remains shrouded in mystery, thereby creating a serious
dent in the prosecution case.
14.
It is further contended that the depositions of PW6 and PW7, who are
the parents of the victim, are materially contradictory. PW6 stated that he
received information about his daughter’s death from Sunil Pal, who, as
CRA 97 of 1994
noted earlier, was not examined. On the other hand, PW7, the mother of
the victim, introduced an altogether different version by stating that her
daughter was killed by administering poison in food. This allegation was
neither supported by medical evidence nor corroborated by any other
witness. Such inconsistent and uncorroborated statements, it is argued,
cannot form the basis of a conviction.
15.
With regard to PW8, the maternal uncle (‘mesomoshai’) of the victim, it
is pointed out that he claimed to have been informed about the incident by
one Basudeb Kaibarta, a member of the Gram Panchayat. Yet again, the
said person was not examined by the prosecution. PW8 further stated that
the victim fell ill after taking a meal and that no doctor was called for her
treatment. Interestingly, he also deposed that the victim initially received
good treatment at her matrimonial home and the situation allegedly
deteriorated only later. Such statements, according to the learned
Advocate, dilute the allegation of continuous cruelty or torture.
16.
On the cumulative assessment of these testimonies, it is argued that
the learned Trial Court committed errors of law in appreciating the
evidence of PW1, PW6, PW7 and PW8, particularly on the aspect of alleged
torture upon the victim at the matrimonial home. The findings, it is
submitted, are based on conjectures rather than legally admissible and
reliable evidence.
17.
In support of his submissions, the learned Advocate has relied upon the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Pyari vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 71) and Lolita vs. Vishwanath
& Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 173). Placing reliance on these
CRA 97 of 1994
authorities, he submits that in the absence of cogent evidence of
harassment, instigation, or intentional aid, the Court cannot mechanically
invoke the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act to hold
that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.
18.
Referring particularly to the decision in Lolita (supra), it is contended
that the Apex Court has categorically held that mere harassment or
cruelty, by itself, is insufficient to infer abetment of suicide. There must be
credible and proximate evidence showing that the accused had actively
aided, instigated or created such circumstances as would drive the victim
to take the extreme step. In the absence of such evidence, a conviction
under the relevant provisions cannot be sustained.
19.
On these premises, Mr. Banerjee submits that the impugned judgment
and order of conviction are vitiated by improper appreciation of evidence
and misapplication of legal principles. Consequently, the same are liable to
be set aside by extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants.
20.
Ms. Faria Hossain, learned Advocate appearing for the State, has
contended that the impugned judgment and order of conviction suffer from
no infirmity, either on facts or in law, so as to warrant interference by the
appellate court. According to her, the learned Trial Court has properly
appreciated the evidence on record and arrived at a just and reasoned
conclusion, and therefore the conviction calls for affirmation rather than
interference.
21.
It is submitted by the learned Advocate that the core prosecution
witnesses, namely PW1, PW6, PW7 and PW8, have consistently deposed
about the physical and mental torture to which the victim was subjected at
CRA 97 of 1994
her matrimonial home. Their testimonies, according to the State, clearly
disclose a pattern of cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim,
which ultimately drove her to commit suicide. It is argued that nothing
material has been elicited in their cross-examinations to discredit their
versions or to render their evidence unreliable. Merely because these
witnesses are related to the victim does not, by itself, make their
testimonies suspect, particularly when their statements are found to be
natural, consistent, and in consonance with the prosecution case.
22.
The learned Advocate for the State has further drawn attention to the
medical evidence adduced through PW14, the autopsy surgeon. It is
contended that the doctor’s evidence supports the prosecution case insofar
as it establishes that the death of the victim was unnatural and ante
mortem in nature. The opinion regarding death due to poisoning, even if
described as caused by “unknown poison,” nonetheless points to an
unnatural death and lends assurance to the prosecution narrative that the
victim did not die a natural death. According to the State, this medical
evidence corroborates the oral testimonies regarding the victim’s suffering
and the circumstances leading to her death.
23.
It is further argued that the prosecution has successfully proved the
substratum of the written complaint through the consistent and cogent
testimonies of its witnesses. The narrative of cruelty and torture preceding
the death of the victim has been spoken to by multiple witnesses, and
their depositions, when read as a whole, form a coherent and credible
chain. The learned Advocate emphasizes that minor discrepancies, if any,
CRA 97 of 1994
are natural in human testimony and do not go to the root of the matter so
as to demolish the prosecution case.
24.
The State’s counsel has stressed that PW1, PW6, PW7 and PW8 have all
unequivocally stated about the torture inflicted upon the victim by the
appellants and have linked such cruelty to the victim’s eventual unnatural
death. Their evidence, according to the State, clearly establishes the
circumstances that compelled the victim to take the extreme step. The
learned Trial Court, after careful evaluation of the entire evidence, has
rightly relied upon these testimonies and recorded the finding of guilt.
25.
On these premises, it is submitted that the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and
settled principles of law. No perversity, illegality, or material irregularity
has been shown in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the learned
Advocate for the State has urged that the appeal preferred by the
appellant, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed outright and the
conviction and sentence be upheld.
26.
I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions advanced by the learned Advocates appearing for the
respective parties. I have also carefully and meticulously gone through the
entire materials available on record, including the oral and documentary
evidence, the depositions of the witnesses, the exhibits proved in the case,
and the reasoning assigned by the learned Trial Court in the impugned
judgment.
27.
Upon a comprehensive examination of the record, I have assessed the
submissions of both sides in the light of the evidence adduced and the
CRA 97 of 1994
settled principles of law governing appreciation of evidence in criminal
cases. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant as well as those
advanced by the State have been evaluated in their proper perspective,
with due regard to the cumulative effect of the materials on record.
28.
Such
consideration
has
been
undertaken
with
the
caution
and
circumspection required in an appellate court, particularly in an appeal
against conviction, where the court is duty-bound to reappraise the
evidence to ascertain whether the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court are supported by the evidence on record and are in accordance with
law.
29.
PW 1, Sahadeb Mondal, defacto complainant and brother of the victim
in his deposition before the learned Trial Court, stated that upon receiving
information, he immediately rushed to the house of the victim at Ashurali
village and, after reaching there, personally noticed the victim lying dead
inside the house. This assertion of direct and personal knowledge,
however, stands in stark, material, and irreconcilable contradiction to the
contents of the written complaint lodged by PW-1 himself, which
constitutes the foundation of the prosecution case.
30.
In the written complaint, PW-1 did not claim to have personally
witnessed the dead body of the victim. On the contrary, he categorically
stated that he heard that his sister’s dead body was lying in the house of
her father-in-law. Thus, in the earliest and most contemporaneous version
of events, PW-1 projected his knowledge as being purely hearsay in nature
and not derived from any personal observation. This divergence between
the written complaint and the sworn testimony before the Court is not
CRA 97 of 1994
merely a semantic variation but a substantive contradiction touching upon
the very source of the witness’s knowledge and his presence at the place
of occurrence.
31.
The written complaint, being the first version of the prosecution story,
is expected to reflect a natural, spontaneous, and truthful account of the
informant, uninfluenced by deliberation, tutoring, or afterthought. Any
subsequent departure from such an account, particularly on a material
aspect such as the informant’s presence at the scene and his direct
perception of the alleged occurrence, seriously undermines the credibility
of the witness. The later statement of PW-1 in Court, wherein he claimed
to have rushed to the spot and personally seen the dead body, is a clear
improvement
and
embellishment
upon
a
vital
fact,
which
was
conspicuously absent in the written complaint.
32.
Further, PW-1 deposed in his examination-in-chief that cash and other
presents were given at the time of marriage and that there was a normal
relationship between the victim and the inmates of her matrimonial home.
However, in his cross-examination, he stated that he had narrated the
factum of giving cash and other presents in the written complaint. This
assertion
is
demonstrably
incorrect,
as
the
written
complaint
is
conspicuously silent on any such allegation. This self-contradiction and
incorrect assertion further erodes the credibility of PW1 and creates
serious doubt about his truthfulness and reliability as a witness. Such
inconsistencies cannot be brushed aside as minor discrepancies or lapses
of memory. They go to the root of the prosecution case and strike at the
credibility
of
PW1
as
a
whole.
When
a
witness
makes
material
CRA 97 of 1994
improvements on crucial facts and attempts to introduce allegations which
are absent in the earliest version of the case, the Court must approach
such testimony with extreme caution.
33.
Moreover, PW1 further deposed that he received information about the
death of the victim from one Samir Pal. Strikingly; the prosecution has not
examined the said Samir Pal, who was the alleged source of information
and the first person to inform PW1 about the death. No explanation has
been offered for his non-examination. Samir Pal was a vital and material
witness, whose testimony could have clarified when, how and under what
circumstances the information regarding the death was conveyed to PW1.
The deliberate or unexplained omission to examine such a crucial witness
gives rise to a strong adverse inference against the prosecution. When the
informant himself admits that he received information from a particular
person, failure to examine that person deprives the Court of an
opportunity to test the veracity of the informant’s claim and the
authenticity of the prosecution narrative.
34.
Therefore, the contradictory stand of PW1 regarding his source of
knowledge whether he merely heard about the dead body or actually saw
it himself coupled with the non-examination of the person who allegedly
supplied the information, creates a serious dent in the prosecution case.
These infirmities strike at the very root of the prosecution story and render
the testimony of PW1 unsafe to be relied upon.
35.
PW6, the father of the deceased victim, has deposed that he received
information in the afternoon of 30th Sravan that his daughter had died
after taking poison, whereupon his son, PW1, proceeded to Ashureli
CRA 97 of 1994
village. At the outset, PW6 has categorically admitted in his evidence that
he was disclosing the incident for the first time before the Court. He has
further stated that, except for narrating the incident to his para people, his
family members, and at the bazaar of Rough Khanda, he did not disclose
the occurrence to any other person. Such an admission strikes at the very
root of spontaneity and credibility of his version. A witness who claims
knowledge of an unnatural death of his own daughter but fails to report
the matter to any authority, police, village elders, or responsible persons,
and admits that he is narrating the incident for the first time before Court,
cannot be treated as a natural, reliable, or truthful witness.
36.
More importantly, PW6 has specifically deposed that Samir Pal was the
person who gave him the information regarding the death and that Samir
Pal was deputed by the Panchayat to convey such information. This is a
crucial piece of evidence. If Samir Pal was indeed the source of information
and was acting under the authority of the Panchayat, then he becomes a
most vital, natural and independent witness to the genesis of the
prosecution story.
37.
However, it is an admitted position that Samir Pal has not been cited as
a prosecution witness, nor examined before the Court. No explanation
whatsoever has been offered by the prosecution for withholding such a
material witness. This deliberate non-examination attracts the settled
principle of law that withholding the best available evidence gives rise to
an adverse inference, that had such witness been examined, his evidence
would not have supported the prosecution case.
CRA 97 of 1994
38.
The conduct of PW6 is also wholly unnatural. A father who is informed
that his daughter has died after consuming poison would ordinarily rush to
the place of occurrence, lodge a complaint, inform the police, or at least
approach local authorities. Instead, PW6 claims that he merely sent his
son (PW1) to Ashureli village and he did not take any immediate legal or
social steps. Such conduct is inconsistent with normal human behavior and
renders his testimony doubtful.
39.
Further, his admission that he narrated the incident casually to villagers
and at a bazaar, but did not report it to any competent authority, creates
serious doubt about the authenticity and truthfulness of his version. This
conduct
clearly
indicates
that
the
narrative
is
post-occurrence
reconstruction, rather than a spontaneous and truthful disclosure.
40.
Thus, the evidence of PW6 suffers from lack of spontaneity, absence of
contemporaneous disclosure, non-examination of the material informant
Samir Pal, unnatural conduct of the father, and first-time disclosure before
Court, all of which cumulatively destroy the credibility of his testimony.
Such a witness cannot be treated as reliable or trustworthy, particularly
when his version is not corroborated by independent, natural, or
documentary evidence. His testimony, being uncorroborated, belated, and
unsupported by the primary source of information, remains a weak,
hearsay based and legally infirm piece of evidence, incapable of sustaining
the prosecution case.
41.
Accordingly, the evidence of PW6 does not advance the prosecution
case in any manner and, on the contrary, creates serious doubt about the
CRA 97 of 1994
genesis, authenticity, and truthfulness of the prosecution version, thereby
entitling the accused to the benefit of doubt.
42.
PW7, the mother of the deceased victim and the wife of PW6, has
deposed before the learned Trial Court in a manner substantially similar to
the
testimony
of
PW6,
thereby
not
adding
any
independent
or
corroborative dimension to the prosecution case. Her evidence appears to
be a mere repetition of what has already been stated by PW6.
Significantly, PW7 has categorically admitted in her deposition that she
was narrating the incident in question for the first time before the Court.
This clear and unambiguous admission is of considerable importance, as it
conclusively establishes that PW7 had not made any prior statement to the
police or to any other authority regarding either the alleged torture of her
daughter at her matrimonial home or the circumstances allegedly leading
to her death. Such an unexplained silence at the earliest opportunity casts
a serious doubt on the credibility and spontaneity of her testimony and
renders her version suspect.
43.
PW7 further stated in her deposition that her daughter was killed by
administering poison and asserted that she was certain that her daughter
had been put to death in such a manner. However, this assertion is wholly
unsupported by, and uncorroborated with, any other oral or documentary
evidence on record. No independent witness has supported her version,
nor has any medical or forensic evidence conclusively established death by
administration of poison at the instance of the accused. On the contrary,
the medical evidence on record does not lend assurance to such a
categorical claim.
CRA 97 of 1994
44.
A witness’s mere belief or suspicion, however strongly expressed,
cannot take the place of legal proof. PW7’s assertion that she was “sure”
that her daughter was killed by poisoning is clearly based on conjecture
and surmise rather than on any direct knowledge or admissible evidence.
In the absence of corroboration from medical findings, forensic reports, or
independent witnesses, such a statement remains a bare allegation devoid
of
probative
value.
Thus,
the
testimony
of
PW7,
being
belated,
uncorroborated, and founded on assumption rather than established facts,
does not inspire confidence and fails to advance the prosecution case in
any meaningful manner. On the contrary, her own admission that she was
deposing for the first time before the Court further weakens the
prosecution version and entitles the accused to the benefit of doubt.
45.
PW7 further stated that after her marriage, the victim visited the
parental house on three occasions, including during Asthamangala. During
those visits, the victim allegedly reported to PW7 that the appellants used
to inflict torture upon her. On the face of it, this assertion is sought to be
relied upon by the prosecution to establish cruelty or harassment.
However, when examined in the light of the overall conduct of PW7 and
PW6, this evidence appears highly improbable and unworthy of reliance.
46.
Admittedly, PW6 and PW7 are the parents of the victim. If, as claimed
by PW7, their daughter had repeatedly complained of being subjected to
torture by the appellants during her visits to the parental home, the
normal and expected human conduct would have been to take immediate
and effective steps to protect their daughter. Such steps could have
included lodging a complaint before the police, informing the matrimonial
CRA 97 of 1994
family, or at least making some contemporaneous protest or intervention.
However, neither PW6 nor PW7 took any such step at any point of time.
47.
The complete inaction on the part of PW6 and PW7, despite being
allegedly informed on more than one occasion about serious acts of torture
inflicted upon their daughter, is wholly abnormal and contrary to ordinary
human behaviour.
This
unexplained
silence and
passivity seriously
undermines the credibility of their testimony and raises a strong inference
that the allegations of torture were not made at the relevant time and
have been introduced subsequently as an afterthought.
48.
It is also noteworthy that both PW6 and PW7 have admitted that they
were disclosing the facts of the incident for the first time before the Court.
Such belated disclosure, unaccompanied by any prior complaint or
contemporaneous record, renders their evidence inherently weak and
unsafe to act upon, particularly in a case involving serious penal
consequences.
49.
In the absence of any contemporaneous complaint, corroborative
evidence, or independent testimony, the Court would be justified in
drawing an adverse inference against the prosecution for the abnormal
conduct of the parents and for their failure to take any action despite
alleged repeated complaints of torture. The cumulative effect of the
evidence of PW6 and PW7, therefore, creates a serious dent in the
prosecution case and entitles the appellants to the benefit of doubt.
50.
The prosecution case, insofar as it seeks to establish cruelty or ill-
treatment of the victim at the hands of the appellants, rests primarily upon
the oral testimonies of PW6, PW7, and PW8, all of whom are closely
CRA 97 of 1994
related to the victim. A careful and conjoint reading of their evidences,
however, unmistakably reveals serious infirmities, material contradictions,
unexplained
omissions,
and
withholding
of
vital
witnesses,
which
collectively demolish the substratum of the prosecution case.
51.
At the outset, it is of great significance that PW6 (father of the victim)
and PW7 (mother of the victim) have both categorically admitted that they
were narrating the incident for the first time before the Court. Neither of
them made any contemporaneous statement to the police or to any
authority regarding the alleged cruelty or harassment of their daughter.
Such first-time disclosure at the stage of trial, without any prior complaint
or record, is inherently weak and unsafe to rely upon.
52.
PW7 has deposed that during three visits of the victim to the parental
house after marriage, including Asthamangala, the victim complained of
being ill-treated by the appellants. PW6 has broadly supported this
version. PW8, a relative of the victim, on the other hand, stated that the
victim disclosed the alleged ill-treatment to him when she visited his
house. These versions, far from being corroborative, disclose inherent and
material differences as to where, to whom, and on which occasion the
alleged disclosures were made.
53.
PW 8 Sukumar Nandi, who is a close relative of the victim, deposed
that he had received information regarding the incident from one Basudeb
Kaibarta, stated to be a member of the concerned Gram Panchayat.
However, it is significant to note that the said Basudeb Kaibarta,
admittedly the first informant to this witness and a crucial link in the chain
of events, was neither cited nor examined as a prosecution witness in the
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present case. The non-examination of such a vital witness, without any
explanation from the prosecution, casts a serious doubt on the veracity of
the version put forth by this PW8 and amounts to withholding of the best
available evidence.
54.
Further, PW8 made a statement which stands in complete aberration
and material contradiction to the depositions of the other prosecution
witnesses. He stated that after taking her meal, the victim suddenly
became ill and that no doctor was called for her treatment. This version is
not only inconsistent with the evidence of the other witnesses but also
creates serious uncertainty regarding the actual circumstances preceding
the death of the victim. Such a contradictory narrative strikes at the root
of the prosecution case and renders the testimony of this witness
unreliable.
55.
This PW8 further claimed that the victim had narrated to him about the
alleged ill-treatment meted out to her about seven days prior to her death.
However, in his cross-examination, he candidly admitted that he did not
disclose or report this alleged disclosure to the police at any point of time.
This material omission assumes grave significance, particularly when the
witness seeks to introduce allegations of cruelty or ill-treatment as a
precursor to the victim’s death. The unexplained silence and failure to
inform the police immediately or at any subsequent stage substantially
weakens the credibility of his testimony and gives rise to a reasonable
inference that such statements are afterthoughts, introduced at a belated
stage to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case.
CRA 97 of 1994
56.
Thus, the deposition of PW8, riddled with contradictions, material
omissions, and unsupported assertions, does not inspire confidence and
falls far short of the standard of proof required in a criminal trial. His
evidence,
therefore,
cannot
be
safely
relied
upon
to
sustain
the
prosecution case.
57.
If the victim had in fact been subjected to persistent cruelty, and if
such cruelty had been disclosed to multiple close relatives on different
occasions, the testimonies of PW1, PW6, PW7, and PW8 ought to have
been consistent and natural. Instead, the prosecution witnesses have
given varying and shifting accounts, which strike at the root of their
credibility. Such contradictions are not minor discrepancies but go to the
core issue of alleged cruelty itself.
58.
More
importantly,
despite
claiming
that
the
victim
repeatedly
complained of torture, PW6 and PW7 admittedly did not take any step
whatsoever neither lodging a complaint nor confronting the matrimonial
family. This complete inaction on the part of the parents is wholly
abnormal and contrary to ordinary human conduct.
59.
PW4, in his deposition before the learned Trial Court, has referred to a
‘salish’ allegedly held in the village concerning the affairs of the deceased
victim. While he spoke about the occurrence of such a meeting, it is crucial
to note that he himself admitted that his knowledge regarding the death of
the victim was entirely hearsay in nature. Specifically, PW4 stated that he
heard that the victim had died due to heart failure, rather than having
personally witnessed or ascertained the circumstances surrounding her
death.
CRA 97 of 1994
60.
This admission is of substantial significance, as it underscores that
PW4’s testimony lacks firsthand knowledge of either the cause of death or
any alleged incidents of torture or cruelty purportedly preceding the death.
In criminal jurisprudence, evidence based purely on hearsay, especially
concerning a critical fact such as the cause of death, cannot be accorded
any independent probative value. A witness who merely recounts what he
has heard does not satisfy the legal threshold of direct evidence required
to establish culpability in criminal proceedings.
61.
Moreover, the mere reference to a village ‘salish’, without any
independent corroboration or details from the actual participants of the
meeting, cannot serve as proof of any misconduct or torture. Since PW4
had no personal knowledge of the discussions or findings of the ‘salish’,
and his statement regarding the cause of death is purely based on what he
heard, his deposition is inherently unreliable and cannot be taken into
consideration to support the prosecution case.
62.
PW-14,
the
autopsy
surgeon,
has
categorically
deposed
in
his
examination-in-chief that, according to his opinion, the death of the victim
was due to unknown poison, and that the said poisoning was ante-mortem
in nature. He further stated that, in the course of post-mortem
examination, he preserved the kidney, a portion of the liver and stomach
contents for the purpose of chemical examination, which was the only
scientific method to ascertain the exact nature of the poison and to
conclusively determine the cause of death.
63.
However, in his cross-examination, PW-14 admitted a crucial fact,
namely, that although he had preserved the viscera, he did not receive
CRA 97 of 1994
any report of viscera or chemical examination. This admission strikes at
the root of the prosecution case. Once the medical witness himself admits
that the cause of death was due to “unknown poison” and that no chemical
examiner’s report was available, the opinion as to the cause of death
remains inconclusive and incomplete. More significantly, the post-mortem
report itself was not brought on record by the prosecution. No explanation
whatsoever has been offered for such non-production of a vital and
foundational document. The post-mortem report is the primary medical
document which forms the basis of the doctor’s opinion and enables the
Court to independently assess the correctness, consistency and reliability
of the medical evidence. Suppression or non-production of such a crucial
document, without any plausible explanation, gives rise to an adverse
inference against the prosecution and renders the medical evidence
doubtful.
64.
In the absence of the post-mortem report, and the chemical examiner’s
report on the preserved viscera, the exact cause of death remained
shrouded in mystery. The Court is left only with an oral assertion of PW14
that death was due to “unknown poison”, which, by its very nature, is
vague, uncertain and uncorroborated by scientific evidence. When medical
evidence is inconclusive and incomplete, it cannot be used to conclusively
establish the cause of death, particularly in cases where the prosecution is
required to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.
65.
In such a factual backdrop, the prosecution’s reliance on the oral
testimony of PW14 to establish the cause of death becomes wholly unsafe.
Oral evidence, howsoever strong, cannot substitute or cure the absence of
CRA 97 of 1994
cogent medical and scientific evidence, especially when the death is
alleged to have occurred due to poisoning. The unexplained nonproduction of the post-mortem report and the viscera examination report
creates a serious dent in the prosecution case and casts a cloud of doubt
over the entire prosecution version.
66.
Therefore, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to establish the
cause of death of the victim with certainty. This fundamental lacuna goes
to the root of the matter and vitiates the prosecution case, entitling the
accused to the benefit of doubt.
67.
To bring home a charge under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code,
the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
had abetted the commission of suicide within the meaning of Section 107
IPC. Abetment, as defined under Section 107 IPC, consists of instigation,
conspiracy, or intentional aid to the act of suicide. Mere allegations of
harassment, quarrels, or strained relations, without more, do not satisfy
the statutory requirements of abetment.
68.
The abetment to commit suicide involves a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person to commit suicide.
There must be a clear mensrea on the part of the accused to push or
compel the victim to take the extreme step. In the absence of such
intention, no offence under Section 306 IPC is made out.
69.
It is further well settled that there must be a direct or proximate act of
instigation or intentional aid on the part of the accused, which has a live
and close nexus with the act of suicide. Remote acts, past incidents, or
general allegations of cruelty or harassment, howsoever reprehensible,
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cannot by themselves constitute abetment unless they are shown to be of
such a nature that they left the victim with no option but to commit
suicide.
70.
Thus, in order to sustain a conviction under Section 306 IPC, the
prosecution must prove:
(i)
a clear case of instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid as
defined under Section 107 IPC;
(ii)
the existence of a positive, proximate, and active act on the part
of the accused leading directly to the suicide;
(iii)
a clear mensrea on the part of the accused to abet the
commission of suicide.
71.
The courts have repeatedly emphasised that mere harassment,
ordinary domestic discord, or differences arising out of matrimonial life are
not sufficient to attract Section 306 IPC. The prosecution must prove that
the accused, by words or conduct, had actively goaded, provoked, or
encouraged the victim to commit suicide, or had intentionally facilitated
the act. In the absence of such proof, conviction under Section 306 IPC
cannot be sustained.
72.
In the absence of such essential ingredients, mere allegations of
harassment, cruelty, or domestic discord even if assumed to be true
cannot automatically be stretched to constitute abetment to suicide. Any
conviction based on conjectures, inferences, or generalized allegations
would be contrary to settled legal principles and unsustainable in law.
73.
The presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act is not
automatic and cannot be mechanically invoked merely because the death
CRA 97 of 1994
of
a
married
woman
has
occurred
otherwise
than
under
normal
circumstances. Such a presumption arises only when the foundational facts
namely, cruelty, harassment, or abetment in the nature of instigation or
intentional aid are first established by cogent and credible evidence.
74.
From a careful and conjoint reading of the depositions of the relative
witnesses of the victim, it clearly emerges that there exists serious and
unresolved doubt as to the actual cause of death of the victim. The
evidence adduced by these witnesses does not conclusively establish
whether the victim died as a result of food poisoning or whether she
committed suicide. Such ambiguity on a fundamental aspect of the
prosecution case strikes at its very root and renders the prosecution
version inherently doubtful. In a criminal trial, where the burden squarely
lies upon the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt,
such uncertainty regarding the cause of death is fatal.
75.
Further, the allegation of torture or cruelty upon the victim at her
matrimonial home is not supported by any cogent, consistent, or reliable
evidence. The relative witnesses have made only vague and omnibus
allegations, without specifying the nature, extent, or frequency of the
alleged torture, the persons responsible there for, or any proximate
incident having a live link with the death of the victim. Such bald
assertions, unsupported by independent evidence, are wholly insufficient
to establish cruelty or harassment in the eye of law.
76.
It is also the consistent version of these relative witnesses that a village
‘salish’ was allegedly held at the Gram Panchayat in connection with the
matrimonial affairs of the victim. However, it is an admitted position that
CRA 97 of 1994
no member of the concerned Panchayat, nor any independent villager who
allegedly participated in such ‘salish’, was cited or examined by the
prosecution to prove either the factum of holding such a meeting or the
reasons which necessitated the same. The non-examination of these
natural and independent witnesses, without any explanation, gives rise to
an adverse inference against the prosecution and further weakens its case.
77.
Mere reference to the holding of a village ‘salish’ at the Panchayat does
not, by itself, establish that the victim was subjected to torture or cruelty.
A ‘salish’ may be convened for a variety of reasons, including routine
domestic discord, misunderstandings, or efforts at reconciliation, and its
mere existence cannot be equated with proof of harassment or cruelty
unless the specific allegations and outcomes thereof are established
through reliable evidence. In the absence of any proof as to what
transpired in such a ‘salish’, who raised complaints, and what findings, if
any, were arrived at, the prosecution cannot seek to draw an adverse
inference against the accused.
78.
The factum of torture or cruelty alleged to have been inflicted upon the
deceased at her matrimonial home has not, in any manner, been
established from the depositions on record. The evidence of the relative
witnesses, who are central to the prosecution case, is vague, inconsistent,
and bereft of any precise details regarding the nature, frequency, or
perpetrators of the alleged harassment. These witnesses have failed to
specify when, how, or by whom the victim was purportedly subjected to
torture, and no independent or corroborative evidence has been brought
on record to substantiate their assertions.
CRA 97 of 1994
79.
The depositions of these witnesses are riddled with omissions and
inconsistencies. Material facts, such as the actual circumstances of the
victim’s death, the alleged incidents of ill-treatment, or the identities of
those responsible, have either been left unexplained or have been
contradicted by other evidence on record. For instance, while some
witnesses speak vaguely of a village ‘salish’ or complaints made regarding
domestic discord, no member of the Panchayat was examined, and there is
no independent evidence to show that such meetings in any way
demonstrated cruelty or harassment. Similarly, assertions regarding the
cause of death, including claims of poisoning, remain uncorroborated and
speculative, with no medical or forensic evidence to support them.
80.
The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is highly significant. The
prosecution has not been able to discharge its primary burden of proof to
establish that the victim was subjected to torture or cruelty, or that such
conduct had a proximate link to her death. In the absence of cogent,
consistent, and credible evidence, the story projected by the prosecution is
replete with gaps and uncertainties. As a matter of settled criminal law,
where the evidence on record suffers from such material omissions and
inconsistencies, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
81.
In this context, reliance is placed on the authoritative pronouncement
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram Pyarey (supra), wherein at
paragraph 13, the Court categorically observed that in the absence of
reliable and substantive evidence demonstrating harassment or any form
of abetment, the court cannot straightway draw a presumption under
Section 113A of the Evidence Act. The Court underscored that the
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statutory presumption is discretionary in nature and must be exercised
with great circumspection, only after the prosecution discharges its
primary burden of proving conduct amounting to cruelty or abetment
having a proximate nexus with the act of suicide.
82.
Similarly, in case of Lalita (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, at
paragraph 22, reiterated that mere allegations, omnibus statements, or
vague assertions of ill-treatment are wholly insufficient to attract the
presumption under Section 113A. The Court held that unless there is clear,
convincing, and credible evidence to show that the accused persons had
either aided, abetted, or instigated the deceased to take the extreme step
of ending her life, the presumption cannot be invoked. The existence of
some form of marital discord or routine domestic differences, without
more, does not satisfy the legal threshold required for drawing such a
presumption.
83.
The law, as crystallized by the aforesaid decisions, makes it abundantly
clear that there must be positive and proximate evidence establishing a
direct link between the conduct of the accused and the suicide of the
deceased. Abetment involves a mental process of instigation or intentional
aid, and such culpable conduct cannot be inferred in the absence of
credible material on record. To presume abetment without foundational
proof would amount to reversing the burden of proof in a criminal trial,
which is impermissible in law.
84.
Therefore, in the absence of cogent, consistent, and trustworthy
evidence demonstrating harassment or abetment in any form, the
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invocation of Section 113A of the Evidence Act is wholly unwarranted, and
no adverse presumption can be drawn against the accused.
85.
Accordingly,
where
the
prosecution
evidence
fails
to
establish
instigation, proximate conduct, or intentional aid with the requisite
mensrea, the accused is entitled to acquittal.
86.
In view of the above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that
there is no illegality and material irregularity in the judgement and order of
conviction passed by the learned trial court which is not sustainable in law.
87.
Accordingly, the instant appeal be and the same is allowed.
88.
The impugned judgement and order of conviction passed by the learned
trial court dated 30.03.1994 in connection with Sessions Case No. 5 (3)/90
(Sessions Trial No. 2(7)/ 91) arising out of Jaypur Police Station Case No.2
dated 16.08.88 is hereby set aside.
89. The appellant nos. 1 and 3 are on bail.
They are to be discharged
from their respective bail bonds and be set at liberty, if they are not
wanted in connection with other cases.
90.
In accordance with the mandate of Section 437A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023) it is incumbent upon the appellants to furnish bail bonds,
accompanied by suitable sureties. Such bonds, once executed, shall
remain in full force and effect for a period of six months, ensuring the
presence of the appellant as required by law and securing the due
administration of justice.
91. Let a copy of this judgement along with trial court record be sent
down to the learned trial court immediately.
CRA 97 of 1994
92. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be
given to the parties, upon compliance with the requisite formalities.
(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)
Sl.1 30.01.2026
SwD Ct No. 655
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