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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE:
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL)
WPA 27880 of 2025
Jaya Shree Textiles
Vs.
Prabhu Nath Yadav & Anr.
For the Petitioner
:Mr. Soumya Majumder, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Dwaipayan Sengupta, Adv.
Ms. Sanjukta Dutta, Adv.
Mr. Balaram Patra, Adv.
Mr. Suvadip Bhattacharya, Adv.
For the Respondent No. 1
:Mr. Asim Datta, Adv.
Ms. Tina Biswas, Adv.
Judgment reserved on
: 15.09.2026
Judgment delivered on
: 08.10.2026
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J.:-
1.
The present writ application has been preferred challenging an award
dated 19th September, 2025 passed by the learned 3rd Industrial
Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. 01 of 2016 under Section 2A(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and published by the State Government
on 09.10.2025.
2.
The petitioner’s case is that the said award has been passed on remand
as directed by the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 10th March,
2025, restricting the scope of remand to reappraisal of evidence on
the materials already available on record.
3.
The charge against the respondent workman (security guard-jamadar at
the factory) was of theft of cables coupled with loss of confidence and
acts subversive of discipline.
4.
The charge sheet is dated 27th November, 2014. The said charge sheet
was
amended
with
reference
to
typographical
errors
before
commencement of regular hearing at the enquiry proceeding, on 7th
May, 2015. Apart from the departmental enquiry, a criminal proceeding
is continuing and there has been a seizure of the goods recovered from
the possession of the respondent – workman.
5.
One important aspect in the entire gamut of evidence at the domestic
enquiry was that although the workman had made various statements
and taken different stand as regards the location of his family at various
railway stations before the alleged boarding of the train to native place,
the workman had only stated that he was in the rail premises (Rishra)
at around 10 am. He has suppressed his travel at any other railway
station during the entire occurrence of event.
6.
It is the case of the petitioner that if the workman was to travel to Uttar
Pradesh on the day of incident, he would normally and reasonably
travel to the railway station along with his family members. The
workman's allotted quarter was at Rishra, whereas his family allegedly
stayed at Bandel. The stolen cables were recovered from the workman's
possession near Serampore railway station, the very fact that the
workman never disclosed his location after 10.30 a.m. is sufficient to
treat him as an untrustworthy witness.
7.
It is further argued that if the workman had booked a railway ticket at
11.55 hours from Barrackpore railway station, under no circumstance
could he support the factual position as to why his family would be at
Bandel railway station at 12.20 p.m.
8.
Mr. Majumder, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that in
an allegation of theft, there would hardly be any eyewitness. The
allegation is to be proved mainly on the basis of circumstantial evidence
and trustworthiness of witnesses.
9.
It is stated that the learned tribunal, while adjudicating an industrial
dispute and deciding the allegation of theft vis-à-vis lack of confidence,
is not to follow the strict rules of evidence or conduct a criminal trial to
test the veracity of the charge by applying the test of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, it is submitted that the scope of interference of an
industrial tribunal to reappraise evidence should be like that of judicial
review, and not an appellate jurisdiction. By laying much stress on
investigation by the police, the learned tribunal completely erred in law
and returned a perverse conclusion.
10.
Mr. Majumder relies upon the judgment in State Bank of Bikaner
and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584
(Para 7) and Sankha Dutta vs. The Union of India & Ors. [WPA
105556 of 2028].
11.
Parties have filed written notes in the present case.
The respondent
no.1/workman on filing written notes has argued that the petitioner is a
company carrying on business of manufacturing textile and textile
products. The respondent no. 1/workman is an employee under the
petitioner in the post of "Jamadar" under the category of Security
Guard.
12.
It is stated that the petitioner company had purchased certain quantity
of cables, which were kept in the Administrative building of the factory
on and from 4th September 2014. On 30th October, 2014 the workman
applied for leave from 10th November, 2014 to 30th November, 2014 for
visiting his native place at 'Rasra', Uttar Pradesh and such leave was
sanctioned on 31.10.2014 by the company through its Administrative
Manager, Mr. Rakesh Pandey, Management witness no.2 (MW-2) herein.
On 3rd November, 2014 the said cables were reported to be missing.
On 27th November, 2014 the petitioner company issued a Charge Sheet
(Exbt. 11) to the workman whereby it was stated inter-alia, as follows:“.... It has been reported against you that on 10.11.2014 at
about 2.15 P.M. you were caught red handed in Sreerampur
area by our Administrative Manager, Shri Rakesh Pandey
and one of our Security guard Shri Kajal Dutta with a make
shift gunny bag in your possession. On enquiry the stolen
electrical cable weighing about 80 kgs belonging to the
company was found inside the said gunny bag. You were
taken to the Sreerampur Police Station along with the said
electrical cable recovered from your possession. Somehow,
you made yourself free and fled away. Incidentally, the
said electrical cable was missing from the factory since
03.10.2014 and could not be traced out anywhere.
A FIR was lodged with the Serampore Police Station and as
report received, you were arrested by the Police personnel of
Serampore Police Station. The stolen material was also
seized and taken by the police personnel in their custody.
The aforesaid act of theft of the company's property on your
part is major misconduct. Your such act of theft cast an
adverse effect upon the discipline of the company. You are,
therefore, charged with the following charges :a)
Theft and dishonesty in connection with the employer's
business or Property.
13.
b)
Loss of confidence
c)
Acts subversive of discipline……..”
The workman in his reply to the said Charge Sheet on 06.12.2014
denied all allegations contained therein in particular, the allegations of
theft of the cables and subsequent recovery of the same from the
custody of workman. The workman contended he took leave from his
duty on 10th November, 2014 to visit his native village 'Rasra' Uttar
Pradesh. Pursuant thereto on 10th November, 2014 the workman, his
wife and son went to Bandel Station to avail the Azamgarh Express. The
workman went to the Ticket Counter to purchase return ticket for his
son, who came to see them off, leaving his wife and son waiting at the
platform.
14.
At that point of time suddenly two unknown persons came to the place
wherein his wife the son were sitting and kept a gunny bag under
sealed cover near the luggage of the workman and they told that it
belong to the workman and thereafter they left the place. Immediately
thereafter some staff of GRP/RPF attacked the workman's wife and son
allegedly stating inter-alia, that the workman had stolen out article in
the bag and they also took away them before the GRP office at Bandel
Station wherefrom the workman was intimated by his son not to come
to the Station. Subsequently without lodging any case the wife and son
of the workman had been released and they came back to the quarter.
Later, the workman came back to the quarter and the Police personnel
arrested the workman from the quarter at night on 10th November,
2014.
15.
The workman further pointed out since the cables were stolen from
factory on 3rd October, 2014 then why the matter was not referred to
the local Police Station or the workman was not asked about such
missing from 3rd October, 2014 to 9th November, 2014 ie more than
one month ? Besides, why the gate keeper did not catch him at the
gate? He also pointed out whether it is possible to carry 80 kg of cables
in a gunny bag? Moreso, he complained about the integrity of Kajal
Dutta who was earlier suspended for more than one month for theft in
the factory. The workman therefore, submitted that he had been falsely
implicated in a criminal case with concocted story.
16.
It is stated that the company did not consider the submission of the
workman and on conducting the enquiry dismissed the respondent no.1
from his service by a letter dated 15th June, 2016.
Hence the
proceeding before the tribunal to pass the order impugned in the
present case. The respondent herein has denied the contention of the
petitioner and stated that the tribunal rightly passed the impugned
order relied upon the evidence on record and the tribunal rightly took
into consideration the non-functioning of the CCTV.
17.
In Airports Authority of India vs Pradip Kumar Banerjee, in Civil
Appeal No(s). 8414 of 2017, decided on February 04, 2025, the
Supreme Court held:“32. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not
necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and
every ground raised by the delinquent officer in the
representation against the proposed penalty and detailed
reasons are not required to be recorded in the order imposing
punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by the Enquiry
Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this Court
in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank, (2021) 3
SCC 806, wherein it was held:“11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary
authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry officer
and passes an order, no detailed reasons are required to be
recorded in the order imposing punishment. The punishment is
imposed based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report,
as such, no further elaborate reasons are required to be given
by the disciplinary authority. . . .”
33. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority
is that it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary
proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the
material placed on record during the course of enquiry
establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle
of preponderance of probabilities. This is precisely what was
done by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority
while dealing with the case of the respondent.
39. In the wake of the above discussion, we hold that the
Division Bench, while exercising the intra-court writ appellate
jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering with the concurrent
findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, the
Appellate Authority as affirmed by the learned Single Judge.”
18.
The Supreme Court in the State of Rajasthan and others – vs –
Heem Singh, in Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020 decided on 29th
October, 2020 held :“33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary
matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The
first embodies a rule of restraint. The second
defines when interference is permissible. The rule
of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review.
This is for a valid reason. The determination of
whether a misconduct has been committed lies
primarily within the domain of the disciplinary
authority. The judge does not assume the mantle
of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge
wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a
finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a
recognition of the idea that it is the employer who
is responsible for the efficient conduct of their
service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the
rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by
strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial
proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the
strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard
governed by a preponderance of probabilities.
Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying
approaches based on context and subject. The first end
of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy –
deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as
a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in
maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At
the other end of the spectrum is the principle that
the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the
findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or
when they suffer from perversity. A failure to
consider vital evidence is an incident of what the
law regards as a perverse determination of fact.
Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our
jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it
for long years in allowing for the authority of the
court to interfere when the finding or the penalty
are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence
or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a
steady sail between the banks of these two shores
which have been termed as the two ends of the
spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of
the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review.
To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary
enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or
threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is
to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is
some evidence to support the charge of misconduct
and to guard against perversity. But this does not
allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a
disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which
appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so
would offend the first principle which has been outlined
above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust
common sense without which the judges‟ craft is in
vain.”
19.
In B. C. Chaturvedi – vs – Union of Indian and others [(1995) 6
Supreme Court Cases 749 in Civil Appeal No. 9830 of 1995], the
Supreme Court held that :“18. A review of the above legal position would establish
that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the
appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have
exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to
maintain discipline. They are invested with the
discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The
High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of
judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own
conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If
the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or
the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief,
either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the
litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases,
impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in
support thereof.
23. It deserves to be pointed out that the mere fact that
there is no provision parallel to Article 142 relating to the
High Courts, can be no ground to think that they have
not to do complete justice, and if moulding of relief would
do complete justice between the parties, the same cannot
be ordered. Absence of provision like Article 142 is not
material, according to me. This may be illustrated by
pointing out that despite there being no provision in the
Constitution parallel to Article 137 conferring power of
review on the High Court, this Court held as early as
1961 in Shivdeo Singh case that the High Courts too can
exercise power of review, which inheres in every court of
plenary jurisdiction. I would say that power to do
complete justice also inheres in every Court, not to speak
of a court of plenary jurisdiction like a High Court. Of
Course, this power is not as wide as which this Court
has under Article 142. That, however, is a different
matter.
24. What has been stated above may be buttressed by
putting the matter a little differently. The same is that in
a case of a dismissal, Article 21 gets attracted, and, in
view of the interdependence of fundamental rights,
which concept was first accepted in the case commonly
known as Bank Nationalisation case, which thinking
was extended to cases attracting Article 21 in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, the punishment/penalty
awarded has to be reasonable; and if it be
unreasonable, Article 14 would be violated. That Article
14 gets attracted in a case of disproportionate
punishment was the view of this Court in Bhagat Ram v.
State of H.P. also. Now if Article 14 were to be violated, it
cannot be doubted that a High Court can take care of the
same by substituting, in appropriate cases, a
punishment deemed reasonable by it.”
20.
In Civil Appeal No. 5848 of 2021 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Dalbir
Singh)
the
Supreme
reproduced herein):-
Court
held
(relevant
paragraphs
are
“25. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General
Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia &
Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 764 held that the degree of
proof which is necessary to order a conviction is
different from the degree of proof necessary to
record the commission of delinquency. In criminal
law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and
unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of
the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot
be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental
enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be
imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding
recorded on the basis of “preponderance of
probability”.
It was held as under:“11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal
court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does
not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is
otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly
well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not
debar an employer from exercising power in accordance
with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two
proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely
different. They operate in different fields and have
different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial
is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the
purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in
accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial,
incriminating statement made by the accused in certain
circumstances or before certain officers is totally
inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence
and procedure would not apply to departmental
proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to
order a conviction is different from the degree of proof
necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The
rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden
of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution
is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond
reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of
law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand,
penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a
finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of
probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial
Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him
from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the
contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted
by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him
from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
26. This Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association v.
NOIDA & Ors. (2007) 10 SCC 385, held that the
criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for
violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the offender shall
make satisfaction to the public, whereas, the
departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline in the
service and efficiency of public service. It was held as
under:
“11. A bare perusal of the order which has been quoted
in its totality goes to show that the same is not based on
any rational foundation. The conceptual difference
between a departmental inquiry and criminal
proceedings has not been kept in view. Even orders
passed by the executive have to be tested on the
touchstone of reasonableness. [See Tata Cellular v.
Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 651] and Teri Oat Estates
(P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh [(2004) 2 SCC 130] .] The
conceptual difference between departmental proceedings
and criminal proceedings have been highlighted by this
Court in several cases. Reference may be made to
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas [(2004) 7
SCC 442 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1011], Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry [(2005) 10 SCC 471 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1605] and Uttaranchal RTC v. Mansaram
Nainwal [(2006) 6 SCC 366 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1341] .
“8. … The purpose of departmental inquiry and of
prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The
criminal prosecution is launched for an offense for
violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for
breach of which law has provided that the offender shall
make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of
commission in violation of law or of omission of public
duty. The departmental inquiry is to maintain discipline
in the service and efficiency of public service. It would,
therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings
are conducted and completed as expeditiously as
possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any
guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental
proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in
the criminal cases against the delinquent officer. Each
case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own
facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to
proceed simultaneously with departmental inquiry and
trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal
trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of
fact and law. Offense generally implies infringement of
public duty, as distinguished from mere private rights
punishable under criminal law. When the trial for a
criminal offense is conducted it should be in accordance
with proof of the offense as per the evidence defined
under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in
short „the Evidence Act‟]. The converse is the case of
departmental inquiry. The inquiry in a departmental
proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct
defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That
the strict standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position.
… Under these circumstances, what is required to be
seen is whether the departmental inquiry would
seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defense at the
trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to
be considered in each case depending on its own facts
and circumstances.”
27. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road
Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya &
Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 699, held that in the disciplinary
proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is
guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from
service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under:
“7. …There is yet another reason. The approach and the
objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary
proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the
disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the
respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his
removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case
may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the
question is whether the offences registered against him
under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal
Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established,
what sentence should be imposed upon him. The
standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules
governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are
entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary
proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat,
should not be a matter of course but a considered
decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may
require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly
delayed.” (Emphasis Supplied)
28. Mr. Yadav, learned counsel for the writ petitioner
has submitted that during the pendency of the writ
petition before the High Court, 9 (1997) 2 SCC 699 the
appellants were given opportunity to produce the
registers of the entrustment of S.L.R. to the writ
petitioner. But it was stated that record was not
available being an old record as the incident was of
1993. The enquiry was initiated in 2013 after the
acquittal of the writ petitioner from the criminal trial.
Therefore, in the absence of the best evidence of
registers, the oral evidence of use of official weapon
stands proven on the basis of oral testimony of the
departmental witnesses. 29. The burden of proof in the
departmental proceedings is not of beyond reasonable
doubt as is the principle in the criminal trial but
probabilities of the misconduct. The delinquent such as
the writ petitioner could examine himself to rebut the
allegations of misconduct including use of personal
weapon. In fact, the reliance of the writ petitioner is upon
a communication dated 1.5.2014 made to the
Commandant through the inquiry officer. He has stated
that he has not fired on higher officers and that he was
out of camp at the alleged time of incident. Therefore, a
false case has been made against him. His further stand
is that it was a terrorist attack and terrorists have fired
on the Camp. None of the departmental witnesses have
been even suggested about any terrorist attack or that
the writ petitioner was out of camp. Constable D.K.
Mishra had immobilized the writ petitioner whereas all
other witnesses have seen the writ petitioner being
immobilized and being removed to quarter guard. PW-5
Brij Kishore Singh deposed that 3-4 soldiers had taken
the Self-Loading Rifle (S.L.R.) of the writ petitioner in
their possession. Therefore, the allegations in the
chargesheet dated 25.2.2013 that the writ petitioner has
fired from the official weapon is a reliable finding
returned by the Departmental Authorities on the basis of
evidence placed before them. It is not a case of no
evidence, which alone would warrant interference by the
High Court in exercise of power of judicial review. It is
not the case of the writ petitioner that there was any
infraction of any rule or regulations or the violation of the
principles of natural justice. he best available evidence
had been produced by the appellants in the course of
enquiry conducted after long lapse of time.”
21.
A writ Court has the jurisdiction in such proceedings to only ensure
that the person aggrieved has had a fair trial and that principle of
natural justice was followed while deciding the case and as to whether
the punishment given is in proportionate to the offence committed. A
writ Court cannot go into the details of evidence recorded and as to the
discrepancies of the said finding and proceedings conducted by a
disciplinary authority.
22.
In the present case the order of the disciplinary authority is based on
the materials on record. No perversity is seen in the said order and the
principle of natural justice has been followed.
23.
The Division Bench in FMA 54 of 2025 directed as follows:-
24.
“18. In the above circumstances, this Court directs that
the Tribunal shall after giving a fair and appropriate and
comprehensive
opportunity
to
the
workman‟s
representative and that of the Management to
reappreciate the entire evidence that is available on the
record of the Enquiry Officer. Such re-appreciation shall
be independent, impartial and fair. In the process of such
re-appreciation, the Tribunal shall also be entitled to and
the parties shall, if necessary, address the Tribunal on
the quantum of punishment, if at all, to be imposed on the
workmen.”
While doing so, the Bench observed as follows:“14. In the instant case, this Court sees that the workmen
had in extensio cross-examined the Management
witnesses. He had also re-examined himself. The tenor of
cross-examination scrutinized by this Court invariably
indicates, an experienced and seasoned hand in
defending domestic enquiries against the workmen and
the employees.
15. This Court is, therefore, unable to agree with the
Interim Award and the findings of the learned Single
Bench in review that the workmen was seriously
prejudiced in being denied the services of a Lawyer in the
domestic enquiry.”
25.
The tribunal then vide the impugned award dated 19.09.2025 has
passed an elaborate order and his re appreciation of evidence
appears to even more extensively scrutinized than that in a
sessions trial, even though the enquiry proceedings in this case was
extensive, thorough, and following the principles of natural justice.
26.
Admittedly the employee herein was in the security department and
was well aware of the safety and security measures in and around the
factory premises.
27.
Though the tribunal has put his own interpretation by considering
the evidence on record, regarding the functioning of the CCTV,
there appears to be one question which remains unanswered, that
is as to why the employee was in the factory premise at 10.30 a.m.
on the date when his leave had already commenced and when his
train was scheduled to leave within a short time thereafter.
28.
The stolen goods were recovered from the possession of his family
members, who were waiting to board a train and the employee has also
stated in his evidence that the said goods were brought in a Tata Sumo
as informed to him by his family members, which proves that the stolen
goods were put in the Tata Sumo in presence of the employee’s family
members. On careful scrutiny of the entire enquiry proceeding and the
report there after it appears that principles of natural justice was
strictly following giving sufficient opportunity to the delinquent
employee.
29.
The said fact is supported by observations in the order of the Division
Bench also.
30.
The award of the tribunal is a clearly perverse having travelled
beyond the scope of interference permitted in the findings of a
domestic enquiry.
31.
Thus the award dated 19th September, 2025 passed by the learned 3rd
Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal in Case No. 01 of 2016 under Section
2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is set aside.
32.
WPA 27880 of 2025 is allowed.
33.
All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
34.
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( Shampa Dutt (Paul), J. )
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