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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Bail App No.51/2026
Announced on: 04.06.2026
Jaswinder Singh, Aged 53 years
S/o Sh. Darshan Singh,
R/o Dablehar Tehsil Suchetgarh, District
Jammu Presently lodged in District Jail,
Amphalla, Jammu
…..Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. Sunil Sethi, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Navyug Sethi, Advocate
Vs
Central Bureau of Investigation, AntiCorruption Branch, Jammu.
.…. Respondent(s)
Through: Ms. Monika Kohli, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Vivek Gupta, Advocate
Coram: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
1.
Through the medium of instant bail application filed under Section 483 of
BNSS, 2023, the petitioner has sought bail in connection with case FIR
No.RC00420010A0002 dated 31.03.2010 for offences under Sections 120-B,
420, 467, 468, 471 RPC read with Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption act, 1988 registered with Central Bureau of Investigation (ACB),
Jammu.
2.
The facts giving rise to the filing of instant bail application are that on the
basis of a source information, subject FIR came to be registered against Pritam
Singh and Jaswinder Singh, partners of M/s Divya Rice Mill for having entered
into a criminal conspiracy with bank officials of State Bank of India, Zonal
Office, Jammu, namely, A.K.Gupta, Naresh Kumar Gupta and Rajinder singh
Wazir to cheat the bank by using forged revenue documents for obtaining
financial facility amounting to Rs.113.50 lakhs (Cash Credit Limit of Rs.80 lakh
and Term Loan of Rs.33.50 lakh), which were sanctioned on 24.11.2006. During
investigation it has been divulged that the petitioner herein had diverted
Rs.9,50,.705/- from the loan account for setting up another rice mill, namely,
New Pooja Rice Mill.
3.
Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet under Section 120-B, 420,
,467, 468, 471 RPC read with Section 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, came to be filed before the Special Judge Anti-corruption
(CBI Cases), Jammu (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”). All the
accused were charged on 03.04.2012 except Accused K.S.Puri, who stood
discharged vide order dated 16.03.2012. The accused pleaded not guilty;
accordingly the prosecution was asked to adduce its evidence to substantiate the
charges against the accused persons.
4.
The petitioner, who was on bail, after attending the trial for some period
disappeared from the trial and accordingly, proceeded under Section 512 Cr.P.C.
After conclusion of the trial, co-accused, namely, Joginder Singh has been
convicted and sentenced to five years simple imprisonment under Section 120-B
RPC with a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine, simple
imprisonment of six months, under Section 420 RPC he has been sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs.5,000/- with fine of
Rs.2000/-, under Section 467 RPC simple imprisonment of five years with fine
of Rs.5,000/-, under Section 468 RPC simple imprisonment of two years with
fine of Rs.2,000/- and under Section 471 RPC simple imprisonment for one year
with fine of Rs.5,000/-.. All the sentences were directed to be run concurrently.
According to the case of the prosecution, in compliance of the general warrant
of arrest, the petitioner was arrested on 12th March, 2026, on 13th March, 2026,
he was remanded to judicial custody According to the petitioner, out of total 66
witnesses cited by the prosecution, 31 witnesses were examined in his presence.
Initially, the petitioner moved an application for grant of bail before the trial
Court, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 24.03.2026, aggrieved
whereby, the petitioner is before this Court seeking indulgence of this Court to
grant bail.
5.
On being put on notice, the respondent resisted the application by filing
objections. The stand taken by the respondent to oppose the bail application of
the petitioner by supporting the findings recorded by the trial Court in its order
dated 24.03.2026 that the petitioner had absconded during trial, evaded arrest for
almost ten years, ,he does not deserve leniency in view of his conduct. It is
further submitted that plea of illness is unsupported by any documentary
material.
6.
Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would
submit that absence of the petitioner from trial was due to his illness and
medical problems and not otherwise. He would argue that the trial Court has
failed to appreciate that the investigation in the case was completed long back
and charge-sheet filed in the year 2010. Out of total 66 prosecution witnesses,
31 have already been examined in presence of the petitioner, continued
detention would amount to pre-trial punishment, which is contrary to the settled
principles of criminal jurisprudence. He would further argue that it is the
cardinal principle of criminal law the bail is the rule and jail is the exception. It
has submitted that a co-accused, who has been convicted and sentenced by the
trial Court, granted bail by this Court in CRA No.23/2018, as such, on account
of parity, the petitioner is also entitled to concession of bail pending trial. It is
further submitted that although the petitioner has been proceeded under Section
512 Cr.P.C., his bail bond and surety bond were never cancelled/forfeited.
7.
On the other hand, Ms. Monika Kohli, learned Sr. AAG appearing for the
respondent, would argue that the petitioner is involved in a serious economic
offences causing wrongful loss to public financial institutions. Citing his earlier
absence from trial and subsequent declaration as absconder, she would argue
that there is every apprehension that in case of grant of bail, he will abscond,
evade the course of justice and frustrate the proceedings before the trial Court.
8.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perusal the material available on
record.
9.
In case titled Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation
and another, (2022) 10 SCC 51, Supreme Court has laid down certain
guidelines for the courts to be followed while determining the bail applications.
The paragraphs 12 and a portion of paragraph 13 being relevant are reproduced
hereunder:
"BAIL IS THE RULE
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well
recognised through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is
on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This court
in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1, held that:
"19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465], the
purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows: (SCC
pp. 586-88 , paras 27-30)
'27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the
right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an
exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however,
interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re [
Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 :
AIR 1924 Cal 476 : 1924 Cri LJ 732] , AIR pp. 479-80 that the
object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the
trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the
question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it
is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it
is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In
two other cases which, significantly, are the "Meerut
Conspiracy cases" observations are to be found regarding the
right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar
v. Emperor [ K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All
60 : AIR 1931 All 504 : 1932 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while
dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present
Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions
Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497
which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed
by the Court that there was no hard-and-fast rule and no
inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion
conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be exercised
judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L.
Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356 :
1931 Cri LJ 1271] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very
unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules
which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that
the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered.
According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous
to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in
particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes.
It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the
various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant
of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused
person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look
after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in
custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore
entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own
case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to
enable him to establish his innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in
Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. State [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v.
State, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p.
242, para'1)
'1.... the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public
safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which
insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to
a socially sensitised judicial process. ... After all,
personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of "procedure
established by law". The last four words of Article
21 are the life of that human right.'
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [ Gurcharan Singh v.
State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was
observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that: (SCC p. 129,
para 29)
'29. ... There cannot be an inexorable formula in the
matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of
each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion
in granting or cancelling bail.'
30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2 nd, Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39),
it is stated:
'Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the
court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the
object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to
secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the
judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a
recognizance or bond would effect that end.'
It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not
depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the
cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal
validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail."
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It
deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and
personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is
the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along
with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency
[see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is
the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural
rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] ."
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012)
1 SCC 40, has observed that:
"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been
laid down from the earliest times that the object
of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused
person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail.
The object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to
ensure that an accused person will stand his trial
when called upon. The courts owe more than
verbal respect to the principle that punishment
begins after conviction, and that every man is
deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly
found guilty."
10.
It is a well settled proposition of law that every accused is presumed to
be innocent until proven guilty. The approach of the Court in bail matters
should not be punitive but should consider whether presence of the
accused can be secured during trial. The power to grant bail has to be
considered in light of the constitutional guarantees under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India which safeguards the personal liberty of an
individual. Reference in this regard can be made to a judgment rendered
in Jagir Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh & anr. 2012 (2) JKJ 231 (HC). Every
accused has a right to defend his case.
11.
The Supreme Court in the case of Umarmia vs. State of Gujarat, (2017)
2 SCC 731, has granted bail to the accused, who also absconded for ten
years, while observing that the trail may not be completed in near future.
12.
Insofar as the plea of learned counsel for the petitioner that the bail bond
and surety bond furnished by the petitioner before the trial Court at the
time of his release on bail are still in force as the same were never ever
cancelled or forfeited is concerned, suffice it to say that it is mere an
irregularity committed by the trial Court while proceeding against the
petitioner under Section 512 Cr.P.C., which is not of such a magnitude
which can benefit the petitioner.
12.
In this case, the offence charged against the petitioner does not carry the
death penalty or mandatory life imprisonment, but provides for a
minimum sentence of seven years. Even a co-accused, who faced the trial
has been sentenced to simple imprisonment for five years. The
apprehension of the prosecution that the petitioner may again abscond can
be addressed by securing sufficient sureties. Keeping the petitioner in
prolonged detention would amount to pre-trial punishment and infringe
upon his fundamental right to liberty.
13.
In view of the above, this petition is allowed. The petitioners is directed to
be released on bail subject to following conditions:
i)
He shall furnish a personal bond of Rs.5,00,000/- and two sureties
of the like amounts to the satisfaction of the trial Court;
ii)
Additionally he shall also furnish FDR of Rs.3,00,000/- before the
trial Court;
iii)
He shall surrender his Passport before the trial Court;
(iv) he shall not leave the territorial limits of UT of Jammu and
Kashmir without prior permission of the trial Court;
v)
He shall appear before the trial Court on each and every date of
hearing, unless exempted in this regard.
(vi)
he shall not temper with the prosecution evidence directly or
indirectly or induce any person acquainted with the facts of the
case.
Violation of any of the above conditions would entail cancellation
of the concession of bail granted in favour of the petitioner.
Disposed of in the above terms.
(Moksha Khajuria Kazmi)
Judge
Jammu
04.06.2026
Vinod, PS
Whether order is reportable: No
Vinod Kumar
2026.06.04 15:07
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