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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(Crl.) No.01 of 2025
Jabbar Ali,
Son of Lt. Sona Miya, Resident of Vill Dhanpur, P.O Dhanpur, P.S.
Sonamura, Sub-Div Kathalia, Dist Sepahijala Tripura, 799131.
……… Petitioner(s)
On behalf of
Anowar Hossain,
Son of Jabbar Ali, Resident of Dhanpur,
Sonamura, P.O Dhanpur, Sepahijala, Tripura
Majidabari,
P.S.
……… Accused Person(s)
–Versus–
1.
The State of Tripura
Represented by the Principal Secretary (Home) to the
Government of Tripura.
2.
The Investigating Officer,
Of Lefunga PS Case No.30/2023, Tripura(W)
……..Respondent(s)
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. D. Biswas, Advocate.
Mr. Abir Baran, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
Date of hearing
:
21st February, 2025.
Date of delivery
Of Judgment & Order
:
28th February, 2025.
Whether fit for reporting
:
YES
NO
√
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
JUDGMENT & ORDER
Heard Mr. D. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner. Also heard Mr. Rajib Saha, learned Addl. P.P. appearing
for the respondents.
[2]
This writ petition is submitted by one Jabbar Ali on
behalf of his son Anowar Hossain challenging the orders dated
11.11.2024 and 12.11.2024 passed by learned Special Judge
(NDPS), Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala.
[3]
An FIR was lodged by Sub-Inspector of Police namely,
Sanjoy Debbarma of Lefunga PS on 06.05.2023 alleging, inter alia,
that on the basis of a secret information, he along with SDPO,
Mohanpur and OC of Lefunga PS with a police team raided the
house of one Ratan Deb @ Mona and on search recovered 6(six)
Nos. of cartons containing total 960 Nos. of “Phensedyl” cough
syrup from the said house complex and seized the same and also
found one Maruti Suzuki “Zen Esteilo” vehicle bearing No.TR-01 AK
0273 parked in the garage of said Ratan Deb and on further search
they also found one person namely, Md. Eusuf Miah was hiding on
the back seat of said vehicle along with 2(two) Nos. of cartons and
from said cartons further total 320 Nos. of “Eskuf” syrup were also
recovered. Said Md. Eusuf Miah, according to the informant, also
disclosed that he and his business partner namely, Anowar Hossain
came there to purchase said contraband syrups from said Ratan
Deb and bought 500 Nos. of bottles of cough syrups for
Rs.1,50,000/- and when they were about to depart from that place,
meanwhile the police arrived and they could not shift all the cough
syrup bottles in their car and also could not manage to flee away,
though his business partner namely, Anowar Hossain managed to
flee away from that place along with Ratan Deb and the owner of
the said vehicle was Anowar Hossain. Said vehicle along with those
recovered cough syrups were seized by police and the FIR was
lodged against three persons namely, Ratan Deb @ Mona, Md.
Eusuf Miah and said Anowar Hossain. The FIR was lodged on
06.05.2023 but police arrested Anowar Hossain on 15.05.2024 i.e.
after more than 1 year from Bamutia, Rangutia and was produced
before the Court on 16.05.2024 and it is submitted that since then
he is in custody.
[4]
During his incarceration in the custody and before
completion of 180 days of his detention period, on 08.11.2024, a
petition was filed by learned Addl. Public Prosecutor under Section
36-A(4) of NDPS Act praying for extension of time for investigation
period for one year and for detention of the accused person in
judicial custody or till the investigation of the case was complete.
Learned Special Judge on that day directed the prosecution to
furnish copy of the said application to the accused and fixed the
date on 10.11.2024 for hearing. Learned Special Judge also
directed the Investigating Officer to produce the case diary on that
day.
[5]
On 10.11.2024, the matter came up before learned
Judicial Magistrate, First Class who fixed the next date on
11.11.2024. On 11.11.2024, the regular Presiding Judge was not
available and matter was taken up by the In-Charge Special Judge.
On that day, Mr. M.K. Biswas, learned counsel of the accused
submitted one bail application on behalf of the accused and also
submitted another petition seeking adjournment on the ground that
Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned senior counsel was ill and therefore, was
unable to participate in bail hearing and urged for fixing the matter
on 12.11.2024. As it appears, the learned Special Judge granted
time enabling the learned counsel of the accused to participate in
the hearing remanding the accused till 12.11.2024 and fixing the
next date for hearing on 12.11.2024 itself. Simultaneously, said
learned In-Charge Special Judge also observed that he found
justified grounds for authorizing detention of the accused Anowar
Hossain beyond the period of 180 days as provided under proviso
to sub-section (4) of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act.
[6]
On 12.11.2024, when the regular Presiding Judge joined
and took up the matter for hearing, it was observed by him that
learned In-Charge vide order dated 11.11.2024 already allowed the
petition of the IO and learned Special PP indicating the progress of
investigation and specific reason for detention and therefore,
nothing was left further by learned In-Charge, Court No.2 for
consideration of the petition of learned Special P.P. It was also
observed by learned Special Judge that since the learned advocate
for accused Anowar Hossain was absent, further agitation of the
matter would cause miscarriage of justice. In the order dated
12.11.2024, it is also mentioned that on that day, none appeared
for said accused Anowar Hossain.
[7]
During
hearing,
Mr.
D.
Biswas,
learned
counsel
challenged both the orders dated 11.11.2024 and 12.11.2024 on
the grounds that there was no independent application of mind by
learned Special P.P. while submitting the petition under Section 36A(4) of NDPS Act and twin conditions as enumerated in said
provision of Section 36-A(4) regarding reporting by the Prosecutor
about the progress of the investigation and mentioning of specific
reasons justifying application for further detention of the accused
beyond 180 days, were not satisfied. The next point of argument of
Mr. Biswas, learned counsel was that contradictory findings were
rendered by the learned Special Judge by above said both the
orders inasmuch as the learned In-Charge Special Judge though
deferred the matter of hearing of the petition submitted by learned
Special PP on 08.11.2024 but on 11.11.2024 itself, he himself
observed that there were grounds for further detention of the
accused under Section 36-A(4) of the Act which otherwise, means
that the petition itself was indirectly allowed by learned In-Charge
Special Judge. Simultaneously, when again date was fixed on
12.11.2024 for hearing of the said petition of learned Prosecutor,
Mr. Biswas, learned counsel submits, it was incumbent upon the
learned Trial Court to take a fresh decision on the said petition after
hearing the parties. Therefore, according to Mr. Biswas, learned
counsel,
both
the
orders
were
self
contradictory
and
self
condemning. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel also argues that the order
for further detention was passed when detention period of 180 days
was already over and moreso, the prosecution did not file said
petition within 14 days prior to the completion of 180 days of the
detention. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel also relies on following
decisions:
(i) Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya vs. State of
Gujarat, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 794.
(ii) Sanjay
Kumar
Kedia
alias
Sanjay
Kedia
vs.
Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau and another,
(2009) 17 SCC 631.
(iii) Sanjay Dubey vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh
and another, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 435.
(iv) Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vs. The State of
Maharashtra and others, (Criminal Appeal No.742 of 2020
arising out of SLP(Crl) No.5598 of 2020).
(v) Mohamed Asaruthin vs. The State of Tamil Nadu,
(Crl.R.C. No.1847 of 2024).
[8]
Mr. Rajib Saha, learned Addl. P.P., on the other hand,
submitted that the 180 days detention period of the said accused
expired on 10.11.2024 whereas learned Special PP filed the petition
under Section 36-A(4) of the Act on 08.11.2024. According to Mr.
Saha, learned Addl. P.P., the accused was absconding for a long
period and even more than one year and somehow after exhaustion
of much toil, the police could be able to apprehend him and till date
another accused person is absconding. Learned Addl. P.P. also
relies on the following decisions:
(i) Subhas Yadav vs. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC
OnLine Cal 313.
(ii) M. Ravindran vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate
of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485.
[9]
For effectively dealing with the issues raised by the
petitioner, the relevant portion of the orders dated 11.11.2024 and
12.11.2024 are reproduced hereunder:
Order dated 11.11.2024
“......................The proviso to sub-section 4 of Section
36-A of the NDPS Act provides that if it is not possible to
complete the investigation within the period of one
hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the
said period up to one year on the report of the Public
Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and
the specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.
It is pertinent, at this juncture, to refer to the decision of
the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of
Ajay Jain Vs. State of Punjab (CRM M-24715 of 2014)
wherein the High Court held as follows:“............... The accused has a statutory right to be
released on bail in case the challan is not presented within
a period of 180 days in case of recovery of commercial
quantity in cases under NDPS Act. The said absolute and
indefeasible right can be defeated by the prosecution
agency by moving an application under Section 36-A(4) of
the NDPS Act prior to the expiry of 180 days. The statutory
right is defeated on moving an application under Section
36-A(4) of the NDPS Act within a period of 180
days............”
In the present case, as already stated, the accused
Anuwar Hossain was forwarded before this court on
16.05.2024 and prior to completion of statutory period of
180 days the IO as well as Ld. Special PP, on 08.11.2024,
filed application u/s.36-A(4) of the NDPS Act praying for
extension of time for investigation for 1(one) year and for
detention of the accused Anuwar Hossain in J/C till
completion of investigation of this case citing specific
reasons as aforementioned.
I have perused the CD.
Considering the above-stated circumstances and after
having perused the CD I find justified grounds for
authorizing detention of the accused Anuwar Hossain
beyond the period of 180 days as provided under proviso to
sub-section 4 of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act.
The bail petition, thus, stands rejected.
As stated herein-before Ld. Counsel Mr. M.K Biswas
appearing for the accused had sought time by filing petition
praying for fixing 12.11.2024 for hearing.
As far as hearing on the applications filed u/s.36-A(4) of
the NDPS Act is concerned, I am of the opinion that defense
side be given opportunity to confute the assertions made
therein.
The accused Anuwar Hossain is remanded to J/C till
12.11.2024.
Return the CD to the IO.
Fix 12.11.2024 for production/further hearing.”
Order dated 12.11.2024
“...................It appears that on 11.11.2024, the learned
in charge(Court No.2) has passed a reasoned order
allowing the petition of IO and learned Special P.P.
recommending the accused person in J/C beyond 180 days
for the purpose of investigation.
It appears that the accused Anuwar Hossain has already
been apprised of the said petition filed by IO and learned
Special P.P. and hearing was concluded in presence of the
accused Anuwar Hossain.
However, learned in charge (Court No.2) gave an
opportunity to learned Advocate of the accused Anuwar
Hossain to complete the assertion made therein.
Proviso to Sub-section 4 of Section 36A is very much
clear in regard to remanding the accused person in J/C
beyond 180 days during investigation for the investigation
purpose. The special court may extend the said period of
180 days up to one year on the report of the public
prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and
specific reason for the detention of the accused beyond the
said period of one hundred and eighty days.
Learned in charge vide order dated 11.11.2024 allowed
the petition of IO and learned Special P.P. indicating the
progress of investigation and specific reason for detention.
Nothing has been left by learned in charge Court No.2 for
further consideration in the matter which was held in
presence of accused Anuwar Hossain.
Since the learned Advocate for accused Anuwar Hossain
is absent further agitation of the matter will cause
miscarriage of justice.
Accused Anuwar Hossain is further remanded to JC till
25-11-2024.
Fix 25-11-2024 for production of accused person and
report.”
[10]
On plain reading of the order dated 11.11.2024, it gives
the impression that learned In-Charge Special Judge was more
anxious as to whether it was permissible at law to remand the
accused person when already 180 days was expired without
deciding the petition under Section 36-A(4) of the Act and
simultaneously was also of the mind that an adjournment should be
granted to the accused enabling his engaged learned senior counsel
to appear and participate in the hearing of the said petition and for
that reason he fixed the next date on 12.11.2024 for hearing of
said petition with specific observation that „the accused person
should be given opportunity to confute the assertions made in the
petition‟ but to justify the remand till 12.11.2024 when already 180
days was over, learned In-Charge Special Judge observed that after
taking into consideration of the circumstances and after having
perused the CD, he found justified grounds for authorizing the
detention of the accused Anowar Hossain beyond the period of 180
days as provided under proviso to sub section (4) of Section 36-A
of the NDPS Act as underscored in the extracted portion of the said
order
dated
11.11.2024
earlier.
It
also
appears
that
such
mentioning of the words „under proviso to sub section (4) of
Section 36-A of the NDPS Act‟ created confusion in the mind of
learned regular Special Judge that perhaps his predecessor had
already disposed of the said petition and passed the order on
12.11.2024 in that line. But, nowhere in the impugned order dated
11.11.2024, learned In-Charge Special Judge mentioned that to
justify remand till the next date fixed on 12.11.2024 he was
allowing the petition submitted by learned Prosecutor under Section
36-A(4) of the Act. The Calcutta High Court (3-Judge Bench) in the
case of Subhas Yadav vs. State of West Bengal reported in
2023 SCC OnLine Cal 313 as relied on by learned Special P.P.
held that the right to statutory benefits stands extinguished once
the report of the Public Prosecutor seeking extension is filed and
hence, remand of the accused till the prayer of the prosecutor is
disposed of is traceable to section 167(2) Cr.P.C. read with section
36-A(4) of the NDPS Act. It was also further observed that in the
event, the application for extension is dismissed or an order
extending the detention is set aside by a superior court right to
statutory bail revives in favour of the accused. The entire relevant
paragraph 31 of the judgment is extracted hereunder:
“31. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the issues are
answered as follows:1. Right of an accused to statutory bail upon expiry of the
period of detention prescribed under section 36A(4) of
NDPS Act is an inchoate one till he avails of his right by
seeking statutory bail either by way of an application or
even orally. Hence, he cannot be released automatically
on statutory bail on the mere expiry of 180 days even if
the prosecutor has failed to submit report seeking
extension of detention in terms of the proviso to section
36A(4) of the Act before expiry of the said period;
2. Order extending the period of detention under proviso to
section 36A(4) of NDPS Act on a report of the Public
Prosecutor submitted after expiry of 180 days but prior
to the accused availing of his right does not envisage
retrospective operation but the total period of detention
under the aforesaid provision cannot exceed one year in
the whole;
3. As per Para 25.3 of M. Ravindran (supra) the right to
statutory bail stands extinguished once the report of the
Public Prosecutor seeking extension is filed. Hence,
remand of the accused till the prayer of the prosecutor is
disposed of is traceable to section 167 (2) Cr.P.C. read
with section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act. In the event, the
application for extension is dismissed or an order
extending detention is set aside by a superior court right
to statutory bail revives in favour of the accused;
4. Upon expiry of 180 days of detention, Special Court as a
cautionary measure ought to inform the accused
(particularly if he is from an underprivileged section of
society and in unrepresented by a counsel) of his right to
statutory bail. However, failure to intimate the accused
of his right by itself would not entitle him to statutory
bail unless he avails of such relief;
5. Prayer for extension of period of detention must be on
the basis of a report of Public Prosecutor which must
record progress of investigation and spell out specific
reasons to justify further detention beyond 180 days
pending investigation;
6. Special Court on the basis of the report of Public
Prosecutor and materials in support of such plea must be
satisfied of the twin requirements, i.e., (a) there is
appreciable progress in the investigation and (b) there
are specific/compelling reasons to justify further
detention pending investigation. Each case has to be
decided on its own merits. For example, failure to
complete investigation solely on the score of nonsubmission of FSL report of the samples drawn from the
contraband is an institutional shortcoming. This by itself
may not justify further detention pending completion of
investigation. But if the aforesaid fact situation is
coupled with compelling circumstances like complexities
in investigation in an organized crime racket or interstate/trans-border trafficking, criminal antecedents of
the accused giving rise to possibility of recidivism,
abscondence of co-accused, etc., constituting ‘specific
reason’ justifying further detention, the Court may be
inclined to extend the period of detention and deny
liberty;
7. Prayer for extension of period of detention must be
decided at the earliest without undue delay preferably
within 7 days from making such application. Reasons for
adjournment must be specifically stated;
8. No written notice or copy of report of Public Prosecutor
requires to be served upon the accused or his counsel
but the accused or his counsel must be present
personally or through video linkage at the time of
consideration of the application. Accused and/or his
counsel must be aware of such consideration and may
raise objection, if any, with regard to compliance of
mandatory requirements of law.”
[11]
In view of above, the order dated 12.11.2024 is required
to be set aside to the extent of refusal by learned Special Judge in
deciding the petition submitted by learned Special P.P. under
Section 36-A(4) of the Act which is hereby done accordingly.
Learned Special Judge will hear the parties and decide the petition
submitted by learned Special P.P under Section 36-A(4) of the
NDPS Act finally. Needless to say, while deciding the petition
submitted by learned Special Judge, said Court will keep in mind
the established principles of law with regard to Section 36-A(4) of
the Act and will examine whether such twin conditions as
enumerated in Section 36-A(4) of the Act are satisfied or not.
[12]
The case references as made by both the parties in this
Court are not being discussed in details herein as this Court is not
entering into the merits of the petition submitted by learned Public
Prosecutor as the said petition is practically still pending before the
learned Special Judge without any final decision. Parties will be at
liberty to argue on all points on the merit of the petition filed by
learned Special P.P. under Section 36-A(4) of the Act which were
raised before this Court.
[13]
The Trial Court will make all endeavour to dispose of the
said petition of learned Special P.P. within 7(seven) days of receipt
of the copy of this order after hearing the parties.
Return the Trial Court record immediately.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
JUDGE
Rudradeep
signed by RUDRADEEP BANERJEE
RUDRADEEP BANERJEE Digitally
Date: 2025.02.28 16:17:38 +05'30'
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