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28.09.2026
Court No. 12
Item No.45
GB /Sandip
MAT 1661 of 2026
With
CAN 1 of 2026
Ishaan Metplast Synergy Limited & Ors.
Vs.
Union of India & Ors.
Mr. Soumya Majumdar, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Pratik Majumder,
Mr. Aditya Mondal,
Mr. Snehasish Dey
…for the appellants.
Mr. Debashis Saha,
Mr. Sanjoy Ghosh,
Mr. Avirup Roy Sanyal,
Ms. Sucheta Pal,
Mr. Jyotishman Sarkar
…for the Bank of India.
Mr. Subhojit Saha,
Ms. Ruchira Chatterjee,
Ms. Srijani Mukherjee
Mr. Aman Agarwal,
Ms. Rupal Singh,
Ms. Rijata Ghosh,
Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh
…for the respondent no. 3.
…for the respondent no. 4.
1. The cardinal principle of filing a writ petition is that,
the petitioners should approach the writ court with
clean hands. On this principle, the learned Single
Judge refused to extend the interim order by passing
the order impugned dated September 24, 2026, in
WPA 12205 of 2026 with WPA 22673 of 2026. His
Lordship recorded as follows:“1.
Affidavit-in-reply
filed
by
the
respondent no.3 in WPA 12205 of 2026
be taken on record.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that similar matter is pending
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
accordingly, this Court finds that the
petitioner has taken a chance to obtain
the interim order before this Court by
pending
SLP
before
the
Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
3. In view of the above, interim order is
not extended.”
2. Mr. Majumdar, learned senior advocate for the
appellants submits that the learned court refused to
extend the interim order on a misconception that the
Special Leave Petition (SLP) pending before the
Hon’ble Apex Court was on the self-same cause of
action although, the proceedings were distinct and
separate. The interim order was first passed by a
learned Judge sitting in the vacation Bench. The same
was extended by His Lordship earlier. The order dated
September 24, 2026 is perverse, as His Lordship
completely changed his approach to the matter, in the
absence of any changed circumstances.
3. Before dealing with the submissions of Mr. Majumdar,
we would like to point out the interim order that was
passed by a learned Single Judge, during vacation.
The learned Single Judge by the order dated May 29,
2026 recorded that the writ petition was filed
challenging a notice dated May 20, 2026. By the said
notice, the bank account of the petitioner maintained
with the Bank of India, had been declared as a ‘Non
Performing Asset’. Upon appreciating the facts placed
before Her Lordship, it was recorded that the writ
petitioners had already challenged an order of debit
freeze passed under Section 17(1A) of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA Act) dated
September 10, 2025. The SLP was filed from the order
passed by a learned Single Judge in WPA 1492 of
2026.
4. Learned senior advocate also submitted before Her
Lordship that, while the interim order passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court was still in force and the matter
was sub judice before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
respondent Bank had proceeded to declare the bank
account of the petitioner as NPA on May 26, 2026.
Accordingly, Her Lordship directed that any NPA
order passed by the respondent bank after the order
dated March 9, 2026 passed in the SLP, shall remain
stayed till July 30, 2026 or until further orders
whichever was earlier. The declaration of NPA was
made subject to the direction of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. The writ petition was directed to be heard by
the regular Bench. Paragraph 6 of the order is quoted
below:“Any
NPA
order
passed
by
the
respondent bank after the order dated
09.03.2026 in the SLP, shall remain
stayed till 30.07.2026 or until further
orders, whichever is earlier.”
5. The matter went back to the regular Bench and by the
order dated September 3, 2026, His Lordship
recorded that affidavit-in-opposition had been filed by
the respondent no.4, but due to paucity of time, the
matter could not be taken up for hearing. Thus, His
Lordship extended the interim order on the prayer of
the writ petitioner till September 24, 2026.
6. Thus, the first contention of Mr. Majumdar that, if His
Lordship had consciously extended the interim order
on the first occasion, there was no reason for not
extending the same on the next date, is not
appreciated by us. On September 3, 2026, affidavit-inopposition was filed by the respondent no.4. His
Lordship granted liberty to file a reply. Due to paucity
of time, the matter could not be heard. The stand of
the respondent was not clear. On the day the order
impugned was passed, the vacating application filed
by the Bank of Maharashtra was before His Lordship
and the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent no.4
was also before His Lordship.
7. The submission of the learned advocate before His
Lordship was that, a similar matter was pending
before the Hon’ble Apex Court. His Lordship recorded
that, the writ petitioner had taken a chance to obtain
an interim order from the writ court, by showing
pendency of the SLP before the Hon’ble Apex Court.
8. Although, the order impugned does not record further
reasons, we find from the order sheet that a connected
application, that is, the vacating application filed by
the Bank of Maharashtra was before His Lordship and
the facts were available.
9. Question with regard to propriety and legality of the
order of His Lordship have been raised by Mr.
Majumdar.
10. First of such ground being that the definition of
‘default’ under the Securitization and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security
Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code (IBC) and the Directions issued by
the Reserve Bank of India in exercise of power under
Sections 12 and 35A of the Banking Regulation Act
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) were the
same. Thus, banks could not have issued the demand
notice and allowed the accounts of the writ petitioner
to be classified as ‘NPA’ without considering the
provision of the Reserve Bank of India (Commercial
Banks – Income Recognition, Asset Classification and
Provisioning) Directions, 2025, Reserve Bank of India
(Commercial Banks – Resolution of Stressed Assets)
Directions, 2025, and the Reserve Bank of India
(Commercial Banks – Treatment of Willful Defaulters
and Large Defaulters) Directions, 2025 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘said directions’).
11. According to Mr. Majumdar, the banks were required
to follow the guidelines on income recognition, asset
classification and provisioning of advances for
restructured accounts as prescribed in the Reserve
Bank of India (Commercial Banks – Resolution of
Stressed Assets) Directions 2025.
12. According to Mr. Majumdar, such guidelines were not
followed although they have statutory force. The sum
and substance of Mr. Majumdar’s contention before
us is that, any demand notice asking the borrower to
pay prior to the accounts slipping into NPA, leads to
various consequences of sale, creation of third party
rights, recovery of the amount due and declaration of
fraud and willful default.
13. As such, the writ petitioner did not have any other
option, but to approach the writ court alleging the
highhandedness and illegality in the procedure
followed by the bank, without resorting to the steps to
be taken as per the circulars of the RBI and the
provisions of the IBC. He further submits that
although the demand notice which was challenged in
the writ petition may be innocuous, the consequences
of such notice would lead to a cascading effect,
thereby frustrating the protective order that was
granted by the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is contended by
Mr. Majumdar that the actions of the bank have been
taken in the teeth of the order of the Hon’ble Apex
Court and the learned Single Judge on the first
occasion was right in passing such protective order.
14. Mr. Majumder next contends that the order of stay of
proceedings under the PMLA Act amounted to an
automatic injunction on all banks from proceeding in
respect of the loan accounts.
15. We are unable to agree with such submission. The
order of the Hon’ble Apex Court is quoted below :-
“7. Meanwhile, operation of the impugned
judgments and orders dated 17.10.2025 and
03.11.2025 as well as that of the learned Single
Judge dated 19.07.2022 and 24.01.2023, shall
remain stayed subject to the condition that the
petitioners will furnish an undertaking before this
Court within two days to the effect that they will
not alienate the subject properties in any manner
and shall not create any third party rights in such
properties without prior permission of this Court.
However, status quo re: further proceedings
before the Adjudicating Authority
shall
be
maintained.”
16. The adjudication proceeding under the PMLA Act had
been stayed, subject to the condition that the appellants
would furnish an undertaking that the subject properties
involved in that proceeding would not be alienated by
creating third party interest, without prior permission of
the Hon’ble Apex Court. This order in no way prohibits
any bank/financial creditor from proceeding in respect of
any account of the borrower in respect of which default
has occurred. We record that the SARFAESI Act provides
the consequence of default and we disagree with Mr.
Majumder’s contention that default and wilful default are
analogous terms and unless the Circulars of the RBI with
regard to declaration of wilful default are followed, the
account cannot be classified as NPA. This submission is
contrary to law. The SARFAESI Act has an overriding
effect over all other statutes, the section is quoted
below:“35. The provisions of this Act to override
other laws.—The provisions of this Act shall
have
effect,
notwithstanding
anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other
law for the time being in force or any instrument
having effect by virtue of any such law.”
17. The steps to be taken by a bank under the 13 (4) of the
SARFAESI Act is bound by a stipulated time under the
Act. Section 36 of the said Act is quoted below :“36. Limitation.—No secured creditor shall be
entitled to take all or any of the measures under
sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his claim in
respect of the financial asset is made within the
period of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).”
18. The further contention of Mr. Majumder is that the
natural consequence of issuance of a demand notice will
result in taking over possession of the property under
Section 14, and selling the same for recovery of the
amount, in terms of the Security Interest (Enforcement
Rule) 2002. Such step offends the order passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court. This contenton is misconceived.
19. The writ petition was filed by challenging a demand
notice. By the said notice the Indian Bank had asked the
borrower to pay up the amount mentioned in the notice,
in order to prevent the loan account from slipping into a
non-performing asset. At that point, no notice under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act had been issued and
we find at least four e-mails from the appellants that they
were agreeable to pay the money and negotiations were
going on. In view of the long standing relationship
between the Indian Bank and the appellants, the
appellants had committed to fulfil their obligations.
Thus, it cannot be said at this juncture that the bank had
acted illegally in issuing the demand notice. Most
significantly,
the
Bank
of
Maharashtra
and
the
respondent no. 4, Small Industries Development Bank of
India, were made parties to the said writ proceeding
without any cause of action being pleaded against them.
No prayer had been made in respect of these banks. A
blanket order was passed by taking note of the pendency
of the SLP on the basis of the submissions made before
the learned single Judge that the SLP was on a similar
cause of action. When the matter went back to the
regular Bench from the vacation Bench, an application
for vacating was filed. His Lordship found that originally,
the interim order was passed upon misappreciation of
the facts.
20. There is no quarrel with the proposition that the Reserve
Bank of India can determine the policy and issue
directions to commercial and schedule banks. However,
we disagree with Mr. Majumder’s contention that action
under the SARFAESI Act could not stand independently
and were intrinsically linked to actions under the IBC
and the Master Directions issued by the Reserve Bank of
India on Wilful Default.
21. The effect of the interim order was that all the
respondent banks were restrained from proceeding
under the SARFAESI Act on an understanding by the
Court that a similar question was pending before the
Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court had not
stayed any proceeding under the SARFAESI Act and
none of the bank were parties to the proceeding.
22. The law is well-settled. A writ petition should not be
entertained, thereby, injuncting the banks, financial
institutions and secured creditors from proceeding under
the SARFAESI Act, for recovery of public money. All the
three banks deal with public money, and as such, in our,
prima facie view, the writ Court should have been slow to
entertain the writ petition. The case made out by the
appellants for interference by the writ Court was the
pendency of the Special Leave Petition before the
Hon’ble Apex Court. However, we are of the, prima facie,
view that the cause of action is not the same and as such
the learned writ Court should have been more conscious
and cautious while passing a blanket injunction on any
proceeding under the SARFAESI Act.
23. We refer to the following decisions.
24. In the matter of United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Hon’ble
Apex Court held as follows:“55. It is a matter of serious concern that
despite repeated pronouncement of this Court,
the High Courts continue to ignore the
availability of statutory remedies under the DRT
Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders
which have serious adverse impact on the right
of banks and other financial institutions to
recover their dues. We hope and trust that in
future the High Courts will exercise their
discretion in such matters with greater caution,
care and circumspection.”
25. In the matter of South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen
Mathew Philip reported in (2023) 17 SCC 311, the
Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows:“17. We shall reiterate the position of law
regarding the interference of the High Courts in
matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting
a few of the earlier decisions of this Court wherein
the said practice has been deprecated while
requesting the High Courts not to entertain such
cases.
17.1.Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [Federal
Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733] :
(SCC pp. 748, 755-56, paras 18 & 26-27)
“18. From the decisions referred to above, the
position that emerges is that a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be
maintainable against : (i) the State (Government);
(ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an
instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a
company which is financed and owned by the
State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State
funding; (vii) a private body discharging public
duty or positive obligation of public nature; and
(viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge
any function under any statute, to compel it to
perform such a statutory function.
***
26. A company registered under the Companies
Act for the purposes of carrying on any trade or
business is a private enterprise to earn livelihood
and to make profits out of such activities. Banking
is also a kind of profession and a commercial
activity, the primary motive behind it can well be
said to earn returns and profits. Since time
immemorial, such activities have been carried on
by individuals generally. It is a private affair of the
company though the case of nationalised banks
stands on a different footing. There may well be
companies, in which majority of the share capital
may be contributed out of the State funds and in
that view of the matter there may be more
participation or dominant participation of the
State in managing the affairs of the company. But
in the present case we are concerned with a
banking company which has its own resources to
raise its funds without any contribution or
shareholding by the State. It has its own Board of
Directors elected by its shareholders. It works like
any other private company in the banking
business having no monopoly status at all. Any
company carrying on banking business with a
capital of rupees five lakhs will become a
scheduled bank. All the same, banking activity as
a whole carried on by various banks undoubtedly
has an impact and effect on the economy of the
country in general. Money of the shareholders and
the depositors is with such companies, carrying on
banking activity. The banks finance the borrowers
on any given rate of interest at a particular time.
They advance loans as against securities.
Therefore, it is obviously necessary to have
regulatory check over such activities in the
interest of the company itself, the shareholders,
the depositors as well as to maintain the proper
financial equilibrium of the national economy. The
banking companies have not been set up for the
purposes of building the economy of the State; on
the other hand such private companies have been
voluntarily established for their own purposes and
interest but their activities are kept under check
so that their activities may not go wayward and
harm the economy in general. A private banking
company with all freedom that it has, has to act in
a manner that it may not be in conflict with or
against the fiscal policies of the State and for such
purposes, guidelines are provided by Reserve Bank
so that a proper fiscal discipline, to conduct its
affairs in carrying on its business, is maintained.
So as to ensure adherence to such fiscal
discipline, if need be, at times even the
management of the company can be taken over.
Nonetheless, as observed earlier, these are all
regulatory measures to keep a check and provide
guidelines and not a participatory dominance or
control over the affairs of the company. For other
companies in general carrying on other business
activities, maybe manufacturing, other industries
or any business, such checks are provided under
the provisions of the Companies Act, as indicated
earlier. There also, the main consideration is that
the company itself may not sink because of its own
mismanagement
or
the
interest
of
the
shareholders or people generally may not be
jeopardised for that reason. Besides taking care of
such interest as indicated above, there is no other
interest of the State, to control the affairs and
management of the private companies. Care is
taken in regard to the industries covered under
the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act,
1951 that their production, which is important for
the economy, may not go down, yet the business
activity is carried on by such companies or
corporations which only remains a private activity
of the entrepreneurs/companies.
27. Such private companies would normally not be
amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a
writ may issue to such private bodies or persons
as there may be statutes which need to be
complied with by all concerned including the
private companies. For example, there are certain
legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the
Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for
maintaining proper environment, say the Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1974, etc. or statutes of the like nature which
fasten
certain
duties
and
responsibilities
statutorily upon such private bodies which they
are bound to comply with. If they violate such a
statutory provision a writ would certainly be
issued for compliance with those provisions. For
instance, if a private employer dispenses with the
service of its employee in violation of the
provisions contained under the Industrial
Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court
interfered and has issued the writ to the private
bodies and the companies in that regard. But the
difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there
may not be any non-compliance with or violation
of any statutory provision by the private body. In
that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other
remedies, as may be available, may have to be
resorted to.”
17.2.United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon
[United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010)
8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] : (SCC pp.
123 & 128, paras 42-45 & 55)
“42. There is another reason why the impugned
order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any
tangible grievance against the notice issued under
Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14,
then she could have availed remedy by filing an
application under Section 17(1). The expression
“any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide
import. It takes within its fold, not only the
borrower but also the guarantor or any other
person who may be affected by the action taken
under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are
empowered to pass interim orders under Sections
17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters
within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that
the remedies available to an aggrieved person
under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and
effective.
43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the
settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective remedy is available to
the aggrieved person and that this rule applies
with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of
taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and
the dues of banks and other financial institutions.
In our view, while dealing with the petitions
involving challenge to the action taken for recovery
of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep
in mind that the legislations enacted by
Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of
such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch
as they not only contain comprehensive procedure
for recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal
of the grievance of any aggrieved person.
Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must
insist that before availing remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust
the remedies available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are
conscious that the powers conferred upon the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, directions,
orders or writs including the five prerogative writs
for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide
and there is no express limitation on exercise of
that power but, at the same time, we cannot be
oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint
evolved by this Court, which every High Court is
bound to keep in view while exercising power
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not
one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any
reason why the High Court should entertain a
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the
petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by
filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the
particular
legislation
contains
a
detailed
mechanism for redressal of his grievance.
***
55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite
repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High
Courts continue to ignore the availability of
statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the
SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 for passing orders which have serious
adverse impact on the right of banks and other
financial institutions to recover their dues. We
hope and trust that in future the High Courts will
exercise their discretion in such matters with
greater caution, care and circumspection.”
17.3.State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.
[State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3
SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] : (SCC pp. 89-91
& 93-94, paras 5, 8-9 & 15)
“5. We have considered the submissions on behalf
of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution
is loath to interfere with an interim order passed
in a pending proceeding before the High Court,
except in special circumstances, to prevent
manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the
court. In the present case, the facts are not in
dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised
judiciously in the given facts of a case and in
accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory
remedies are available, except in cases falling
within the well-defined exceptions as observed in
CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass
Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603] , as follows : (SCC p.
611, para 15)
„15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has
recognised some exceptions to the rule of
alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory
authority has not acted in accordance with the
provisions of the enactment in question, or in
defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions
which are repealed, or when an order has been
passed in total violation of the principles of natural
justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh
Nathmal case [Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of
Taxes, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13 : AIR 1964 SC
1419] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper
Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433]
and other similar judgments that the High Court
will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy
is available to the aggrieved person or the statute
under which the action complained of has been
taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of
grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a
statutory forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.‟
***
8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
SARFAESI Act states that the banking and financial
sector in the country was felt not to have a level
playing field in comparison to other participants in
the financial markets in the world. The financial
institutions in India did not have the power to take
possession of securities and sell them. The existing
legal
framework
relating
to
commercial
transactions had not kept pace with changing
commercial practices and financial sector reforms
resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and
mounting non-performing assets of banks and
financial institutions. Narasimhan Committee I
and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee
constituted by the Central Government Act had
suggested enactment of new legislation for
securitisation and empowering banks and
financial institutions to take possession of
securities and sell them without court intervention
which would enable them to realise long-term
assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability
mismatches
and
improve
recovery.
The
proceedings under the Recovery of Debts and
Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as
“the DRT Act”) with passage of time, had become
synonymous with those before regular courts
affecting expeditious adjudication. All these
aspects have not been kept in mind and
considered before passing the impugned order.
9. Even prior to the SARFAESI Act, considering the
alternate remedy available under the DRT Act it
was held in Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan
[Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6
SCC 569] that : (SCC p. 570, para 6)
„6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide
a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the
banks and the financial institutions. There is a
hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely,
filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fasttrack procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed
either by taking recourse to proceedings under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by
filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even
though a provision under an Act cannot expressly
oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless,
when there is an alternative remedy available,
judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains
from exercising its jurisdiction under the said
constitutional provisions. This was a case where
the High Court should not have entertained the
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and
should have directed the respondent to take
recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the
Act.‟
***
15. It is the solemn duty of the court to apply the
correct law without waiting for an objection to be
raised by a party, especially when the law stands
well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to
be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under
a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing
the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex
parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect
and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved
has the remedy to move for vacating the interim
order. Loans by financial institutions are granted
from public money generated at the taxpayer's
expense. Such loan does not become the property
of the person taking the loan, but retains its
character of public money given in a fiduciary
capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely
repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan
to another in need, by circulation of the money
and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous
litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the
same. The caution required, as expressed in
Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v.
Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3
SCC (Civ) 260] , has also not been kept in mind
before passing the impugned interim order : (SCC
pp. 123-24, para 46)
„46. It must be remembered that stay of an action
initiated
by
the
State
and/or
its
agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes,
cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of
projects of public importance and disables them
from discharging their constitutional and legal
obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating
to recovery of the dues of banks, financial
institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by
the High Court would have serious adverse impact
on the financial health of such bodies/institutions,
which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the
economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court
should be extremely careful and circumspect in
exercising its discretion to grant stay in such
matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show
that its case falls within any of the exceptions
carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra
Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [Baburam
Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila
Parishad, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 45 : AIR 1969 SC
556] , Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks
[Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar, Trade Marks, (1998)
8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] and some other
judgments, then the High Court may, after
considering all the relevant parameters and public
interest, pass an appropriate interim order.‟ ”
17.4.Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya
Mandir [Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati
Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345 : (2022) 3 SCC
(Civ) 153] : (SCC pp. 359-61, paras 18 & 21)
“18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that
a writ petition against the private financial
institution — ARC — the appellant herein under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the
proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable.
In the present case, the ARC proposed to take
action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover
the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The
ARC as such cannot be said to be performing
public functions which are normally expected to be
performed by the State authorities. During the
course of a commercial transaction and under the
contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the
borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of
the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing
a public function which is normally expected to be
performed by the State authorities. If proceedings
are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any
proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is
aggrieved by any of the actions of the private
bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy
under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would
lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable.
Therefore, decisions of this Court in Praga Tools
Corpn. [Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, (1969)
1 SCC 585] and Ramesh Ahluwalia [Ramesh
Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 :
(2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 456 : 4 SCEC 715] relied upon
by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
borrowers are not of any assistance to the
borrowers.
***
21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in
Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew
K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] to
the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing
of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is an abuse of process of the court. The writ
petitions have been filed against the proposed
action to be taken under Section 13(4). As
observed hereinabove, even assuming that the
communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice
under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of
the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way
of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the
High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the
High Court directing to maintain the status quo
with respect to the possession of the secured
properties on payment of Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs
3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are
to the extent of approximately Rs 117 crores. The
ad interim relief has been continued since 2015
and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding
further with the action under the SARFAESI Act.
Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before
the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process
of court. It appears that the High Court has
initially granted an ex parte ad interim order
mechanically and without assigning any reasons.
The High Court ought to have appreciated that by
passing such an interim order, the rights of the
secured creditor to recover the amount due and
payable have been seriously prejudiced. The
secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right
to recover the amount due and payable to it from
the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court
would have serious adverse impact on the
financial health of the secured creditor/assignor.
Therefore, the High Court should have been
extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its
discretion while granting stay in such matters. In
these circumstances, the proceedings before the
High Court deserve to be dismissed.”
17.5.Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu
[Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023)
2 SCC 168 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 58] : (SCC p. 183,
para 36)
“36. In the instant case, although the respondent
borrowers initially approached the Debts Recovery
Tribunal by filing an application under Section 17
of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but the order of the
Tribunal indeed was appealable under Section 18
of the Act subject to the compliance of condition of
pre-deposit and without exhausting the statutory
remedy of appeal, the respondent borrowers
approached the High Court by filing the writ
application under Article 226 of the Constitution.
We deprecate such practice of entertaining the writ
application by the High Court in exercise of
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
without exhausting the alternative statutory
remedy available under the law. This circuitous
route appears to have been adopted to avoid the
condition of pre-deposit contemplated under 2nd
proviso to Section 18 of the 2002 Act.”
18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact
that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are rather wide but are
required to be exercised only in extraordinary
circumstances
in
matters
pertaining
to
proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a
statute, more so in commercial matters involving a
lender and a borrower, when the legislature has
provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate
redressal.
26. The writ petition will be heard on its own merits and the
appeal is dismissed having been found to be devoid of
merits. Cost of Rs. 1.5 lakhs shall be paid by the
appellants
and
be
shared
equally
by
the
three
banks/respondents, for wastage of judicial time. All
actions shall abide by the result of the writ.
27. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied
for, be given to the parties, upon usual undertakings.
(Shampa Sarkar, J.)
(Arjun Ray Mukherjee, J.)
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