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Page No.# 1/15
GAHC010271662025
2026:GAU-AS:11941
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Bail Appln./3964/2025
HEMANTA BORDOLOI
S/O LATE HARI PRASAD BORDOLOI, R/O H/NO 108, TARAJAN KAKOTI
GAON, P.S.- JORHAT, DIST.- JORHAT, ASSAM, 785001
VERSUS
THE UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED THROUGH THE STANDING COUNSEL, CUSTOMS
DEPARTMENT
Advocate for the Petitioner
: MR S BORTHAKUR, DEVABRATA SAIKIA,MR. D CHUTIA
Advocate for the Respondent : SC, CUSTOMS,
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 14.08.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 21.08.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
: NA.
operative part of the judgment ?
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
: Yes
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J U D G M E N T & O R D E R (CAV)
Heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S.C.
Keyal, learned Standing Counsel, Customs.
2.
This application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023, praying for allowing the release of the applicant on bail in
connection with Customs Case No. 01/CL/NDPS/LGBIA/GHY/2025-2026 dated
22.09.2025.
3.
A complaint petition was filed by Sri Mippun Kangkan Pegu, Inspector
LGBIA unit, Guwahati Customs Division, Guwahati in the Chief Judicial
Magistrate Court, Guwahati dated 22.09.2025 inter alia alleging that when the
customs officials held the routine checking of the passengers luggage's of
Vientiane (Laos) to Guwahati AirAsia Flight No. FD 124 (Don Mueang to
Guwahati) on 22.09.2025. During the screening of luggage of incoming
international passengers, a suspicious item was detected in the baggage
scanner at the Apron area of LGBI Airport. The suspected bag was kept aside
until its owner came forward to claim it. After some time, one passenger, Shri
Hemanta Bordoloi, came to claim the said bag. Upon initial enquiry, he admitted
that the baggage in question was his and that he had two checked-in luggage
items, namely: a) one olive-green colored trolley bag, b) one hard case dark
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grey coloured trolley bag, and c) one black colored handbag. When questioned
about the contents of the suspected hard case dark grey trolley bag, the
passenger stated that it contained only his personal belongings. However, on
suspicion that the said trolley bag contained contraband items, the Customs
officers issued a spot summons to Shri Hemanta Bordoloi under the provisions
of the NDPS Act, 1985, for carrying out further enquiry regarding the said bag.
With the consent of the passenger, the Customs officers first opened the Olivegreen colored trolley bag and removed all its contents. During the inspection, no
suspicious or prohibited items were found in this bag. However, a Certificate of
Clearance issued by International Finance Corporation in the name of Shri
Hemanta Bordoloi was recovered from the said trolley. Subsequently, the officers
proceeded to examine the dark grey coloured hard case trolley bag. After
removing all visible items from this bag, it was observed that the bag still felt
unusually heavy, raising further suspicion. The passenger was then questioned
as to whether any illegal or prohibited item was concealed within the trolley
bag. He denied having any knowledge of such contents. Following this, and in
the continued presence of the Panchas, the Customs officers began dismantling
the trolley bag using appropriate tools. Upon dismantling, they discovered two
plastic-taped packages concealed inside the structure of the bag, one package
at the top part of the structure and the second package at the bottom part of
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the structure, the details of which are as follows:
(a) One blue plastic package, wrapped with carbon paper and sealed with
yellow tape, containing a white powdered substance, suspected to be an NDPS
substance.
(b) One pouch made of carbon paper, sealed with brown tape, also containing a
white powdered substance, similarly suspected to be an NDPS substance.
4.
The total weight of the suspected heroin was found to be 2540 grams,
which is in the category of commercial quantity.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the arrest of the petitioner
was carried out in the late hours of 22.09.2025, but he was produced before the
learned court only on 24.09.2025, which clearly violates the procedure
contemplated, amounting to an unlawful detention beyond the permissible
period of 24 hours. Such violation strikes at the root of the legality of the arrest
and subsequent remand.
6.
It is also the stated case of the petitioner that the mandatory notice and
safeguards under Section 47 & 48 BNSS, 2023 were not properly served or
followed while effecting the arrest of the petitioner. The procedural lapses vitiate
the entire process of arrest and seizure.
Page No.# 5/15
7.
Mr. S.C. Keyal, learned Standing Counsel representing the Customs
Department submitted that the investigating agency is required to comply with
the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, 1994 Legal Eagle (SC) 287 and Karnail
Singh v. State of Haryana, 2009 Legal Eagle (SC) 1114.
8.
Referring to the aforesaid Section 42 of the NDPS Act, and more
particularly, Sub Section (1)(d) thereof, it is submitted that the authorized officer
is firstly required to detain and search and then only if he thinks it proper, he is
to arrest the person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any
offence punishable under the NDPS Act. It is further submitted that it is only
after the search that the authorized officer can form an opinion as to the
propriety of arrest of the concerned person, and thereafter, upon forming
such an opinion, when the said person is formally arrested, it is the time of the
said formal arrest that is to be regarded as the starting point for the purpose of
determining whether the person was produced before the Magistrate within 24
hours as mandated under Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 58 of the
BNSS.
9.
In that view of the matter, the petitioner having been produced well within
the period of 24 hours as stipulated in the aforesaid provisions, no illegality can
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be said to vitiate the arrest on the petitioner. In support of his aforesaid
submissions, learned counsel has referred to a decision of the Bombay High
Court in Ram Kotumal Issrani v. Directorate of Enforcement and
Ors., 2024 Legal Eagle (BOM HC) 5876 . It is contended, with reference to
the aforesaid decision, that under similar circumstances, the arrest was not held
to be illegal, and the Supreme Court also declined to interfere with the said
order upon a challenge made to it by the petitioner therein. At this stage, the
relevant statutory provisions may be noticed.
10. Section 58 of the BNSS provides as follows:“58. No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without
warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case
is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order
of a Magistrate under section 187, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of
the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the
Magistrate's Court, whether having jurisdiction or not.”
11. Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India also provides that every person
who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the
nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest, excluding the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the
Magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said
period without the authority of a Magistrate.
Page No.# 7/15
12. Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 provides as follows:“483. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.
—(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on
bail, and if the offence is of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of
section 480, may impose any condition which it considers necessary for
the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;”
13. Section 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985 provides as follows:“42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or
authorisation.—(l) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a
peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics,
customs, revenue intellegence or any other department of the Central
Government including para-military forces or armed forces as is
empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central
Government, or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a
peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or
any other department of a State Government as is empowered in this
behalf by general or special order of the State Government, if he has
reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any
person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic
substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence
punishable under this Act has been committed or any document or other
article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence or
any illegally acquired property or any document or other article which
may furnish evidence of holding any illegally acquired property which is
liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture under Chapter VA of this Act is
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kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may
between sunrise and sunset,—
(a) …………
(b) ……….
(c) …………
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom
he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under
this Act:
1 [Provided that in respect of holder of a licence for manufacture of
manufactured drugs or psychotropic substances or controlled substances
granted under this Act or any rule or order made thereunder, such power
shall be exercised by an officer not below the rank of sub-inspector:
Provided further that] if such officer has reason to believe that a search
warrant or authorisation cannot be obtained without affording opportunity
for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender,
he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at
any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his
belief.
(2) ………...”
14. From the above provisions, what can be noticed is that Section 483 of the
BNSS confers power upon the High Court or Court of Session to direct the
release of the person on bail who is “in custody”. Section 58 BNSS prohibits the
police officer from detaining “in custody” a person for a period in excess of 24
hours exclusive of the journey time from the place of arrest to the
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Magistrate's Court. The question therefore is what is the stage or point of time
from which the arrestee can be said to be in custody as contemplated under
the aforesaid provision.
15. In the brief note submitted on behalf of the Customs, it is stated that the
accused was detained in the Guwahati International Airport at around 1:30 a.m.
on 23.09.2025 and was formally arrested on 23.09.2025 at around 4:30 p.m.
under the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. Coming to Subsection (1)
(d), from a plain reading thereof, it confers power on the authorized officer to
“detain” and search and if he thinks proper, arrest the said person, provided he
has
reason
to
believe
that
the
person
has
committed
any
offence punishable under the NDPS Act.
16.
In the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Subhash Sharma
(2025) SCC OnLine SC 240, relied upon by the petitioner side, the arrest of
the petitioner accused was held to be vitiated as he was detained at the IGI
Airport Delhi on 05.03.2022 at 11.00 A.M., though formally arrested on
06.03.2022 at 1.15 A.M. and he was produced before the Court on 06.03.2022
at 3.00 P.M. Calculating the period of 24 (twenty four) hours from 11.00 A.M. on
05.03.2022, the production was held to be beyond 24 (twenty four) hours and
therefore, the arrest and further detention vitiated. The relevant para nos. 6, 8
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and 9 are reproduced here and below:-
“6. This argument cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the LOC was issued at
the instance of the appellant-Directorate of Enforcement. By executing
the LOC, the Bureau of Immigration detained the respondent at IGI
Airport from 4th March 2022 on behalf of the Appellant. The finding of
fact recorded in paragraph 10 is that undisputedly, the physical custody of
the respondent was taken over by the appellant from the Bureau of
Immigration at 11.00 hours on 5th March, 2022. Thereafter, at 1.15 hours
on 6th March 2022, an arrest memo was prepared by ED at Raipur. He
was produced before the Court at 3 p.m. on 6 th March, 2024. The perusal
of the arrest order (Annexure p-1) shows that the typed order was kept
ready. The date and time of arrest were kept blank which appear to have
been filled in by hand. Admittedly, the respondent was not produced
before the nearest learned Magistrate within 24 hours from 11.00 a.m. on
5th March, 2022. Therefore, the arrest of the respondent is rendered
completely illegal as a result of the violation of clause 2 of Article 22 of
the Constitution of India. Thus, the continuation of the respondent in
custody without producing him before the nearest Magistrate within the
stipulated time of 24 hours is completely illegal and it infringes
fundamental rights under clause 2 of Article 22 of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, his arrest gets vitiated on completion of 24 hours in
custody. Since there is a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution,
even his fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 has
been violated.
8. Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds that the
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fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India have been violated while arresting the accused or
after arresting him, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the bail
application to release the accused on bail. The reason is that the arrest in
such cases stands vitiated. It is the duty of every Court to uphold the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution.
9. Therefore, when arrest is illegal or is vitiated, bail cannot be denied on
the grounds of non-fulfillment of twin tests under clause (ii) of subsection 1 of Section 45 of PMLA.”
17. Similarly, in the earlier case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Dinesh
Kumar (2008) 3 SCC 222, the Court dealt with a similar issue and in
paragraph-23, approved the principle laid down in a yet earlier decision of
Niranjan Singh Vs Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote, (1980) 2 SCC 559 . The
relevant para-7 of Niranjan Singh (Supra) may be reproduced here and
below:-
“7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of S. 439 Cr. P. C.?
When he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating
agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the
court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself
to the Courts jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical
presence. No lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to
come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the
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court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in
custody for the purpose of S. 439. This word is of elastic semantics but its
core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The
equivocatory quibbling and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in
court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not
arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into
formal custody and other like terminological dubiotics are unfair evasions
of the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady
facet here because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit
before the Sessions Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.”
18. In the case of Subhash Sharma (Supra), though the Hon’ble Apex Court,
in my view, did not lay down in so many words the principle that the time frame
of 24 hours under Article 22 of the Constitution has to be calculated from the
time of detention, even if formal arrest is later - however, in effect, such a
principle was applied to the facts of that case in holding the arrest to be
vitiated.
19. In Niranjan Singh (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has explained that
ultimately the meaning of the term ‘custody’ is that the law has taken control of
the person and that interpreting the term custody in any other manner would be
what
the
Hon’ble
Apex
Court
straightforwardness of the law.”
held
as
–
“unfair
evasions
of
the
Page No.# 13/15
20.
It is contended on behalf of the customs that if a person is merely
required to remain at the spot during the enforcement of Section 42 or 43 of the
NDPS Act and is free to leave once the search is over, the same does not
constitute arrest. I am unable to accept the aforesaid submission, inasmuch as,
Subsection (1)(d) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act specifically empowers the
authorized officer to first detain and then conduct search and thereafter, to
formally arrest the person if the authorized officer thinks it proper. Therefore,
once a person is formally arrested pursuant to the aforesaid provision of Section
42 of the NDPS Act, it is a continuation of the initial detention under the same
provision and during this entire period, the arrestee/person could hardly have
been free to leave had he so wished. In other words, the person concerned was
effectively in custody from the moment of his detention and no other
interpretation is possible in view of the meaning of the term custody as
explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Niranjan Singh (Supra) and as applied
and followed in Dinesh Kumar (Supra) and Subhash Sharma (Supra).
21. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Ram Kotumal Issrani (Supra)
apart from being distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as, the accused therein
appeared before the I.O. in response to a summoning, cannot aid the
respondent in view of the above decisions of the Apex Court.
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22. There is no dispute to the fact that the petitioner was detained at least no
later than 1:30 am on 23.09.2025 and the period of 24 hours expired at 1:30
am on 24.09.2025. But, the petitioner was produced much later i.e., at least
after 10:30 am on 24.09.2025 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M)
even accounting for a travel time of about one hour from LGBI airport to the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati.
23. In terms of the principles of law discussed above, in the instant case, the
production being interpreted to be beyond the period of 24 (twenty four) hours
of arrest, would have the effect of vitiating the arrest and making further
detention untenable, entitling the petitioner to bail.
24.
Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances and in view of the above
discussion, this bail petition stands allowed and the accused person is allowed
to go on bail of Rs.1,00,000/- lakh with two sureties of the like amount, one
of whom has to be from the State of Assam - to the satisfaction of the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup(M). The following conditions are
imposed:-
(i) The accused person shall not abscond and he shall be available
for the remaining trial;
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(ii) He shall not hamper or tamper with the evidence;
(iii) He shall not commit any illegal activities or offences, including
any offences under the NDPS Act,
(iv) He shall not in any manner intimidate, harass or try to influence
any witnesses.
25. The bail petition stands allowed and disposed of.
JUDGE
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