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SHOUGRAKPAM
DEVANANDA
SINGH
SHOUGRAKPAM DEVANANDA
SINGH
Date: 2025.05.16 15:13:18
+05'30'
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WP(C) No. 258 of 2025
Heikrujam Debeswar Singh, aged about 51 years old, S/o (L)
H. Ibohal Singh, a permanent residence of Porompat
Thawanthaba Leikai, P.O. & P.S. Porompat, Imphal East
District, Manipur – 795005.
... Petitioner
-Versus1. The State of Manipur through the Principal Secretary/
Commissioner/ Secretary (Power), Government of
Manipur, Manipur Secretariat, Babupara, Imphal West –
795001.
2. The Manipur State Power Company Limited through its
Managing Director, Keishampat Junction, Imphal, Imphal
West District, Manipur – 795001.
… Respondents
3. Shri Gurumayum Tapankumar Sharma, Deputy General
Manager (Elect.), MSPCL, c/o MD, MSPCL, Keishampat
Junction, Imphal, Imphal West District, Manipu – 795001.
4. Khumukcham David Kumar Singh, DGM (Elect.), (TD-1),
… Private Respondent
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH
For the petitioner
::
For the respondents
::
::
Date of hearing
Date of judgment & order ::
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Mr. H.S. Paonam, Senior Advocate;
Mr. Sushruta, Advocate
Mr. S. Nepolean, GA;
Mrs. R.K. Emily, Deputy GA;
Mr. N. Ibotombi, Senior Advocate &
Mr. Ningtamba, Advocate
28-04-2025
16-05-2025
Contd…/-
[2]
JUDGMENT & ORDER
[1]
Heard Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. Sushruta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Mr. S.
Nepolean, learned GA assisted by Mrs. R.K. Emily, learned Deputy GA
appearing for the respondents No. 1 and 2 and Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned
senior counsel assisted by Mr. Ningtamba, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent No. 3. None appeared for the respondent No. 4,
despite service of notice.
The present writ petition has been filed with the prayer for
quashing and setting aside the impugned transfer order dated
27-03-2025 in respect of the petitioner and the private respondent No. 3
only.
[2]
Mr. H.S. Paonam, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner raised the following grounds in assailing the impugned
transfer order:(i) The impugned transfer order had been issued by the
authorities arbitrarily and with malafide intention to oust the
petitioner from his present place of posting in order to bring
another person of their choice; and
(ii) The impugned transfer order had been issued in violation of
the transfer policy of the State Government as notified on
12-05-2022 and as such, the impugned transfer order is a
nullity in the eyes of law.
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[3]
[3]
Elaborating the first ground, it has been submitted by the
learned senior counsel that the petitioner has been sincerely discharging
his duties and sincerely looking after 10 (ten) projects under his present
place of posting. However, a junior who is under probation had been
transferred and posted in his place and that transferring out an
experienced officer and bringing in an inexperienced officer, who is
under probation and that too on the verge of completion of the ten
projects executed by the petitioner lacks rationality and that the same
had not been issued in public interest but with an ulterior motive.
3.1
It has been submitted that from the chain of events as
narrated in the writ petition regarding the hostile attitude shown by
the respondent No. 2, viz., MD, MSPCL towards the petitioner for his
acts and omissions, such as –
(a) The petitioner's alleged involvement in litigation against the
respondent No. 2;
(b) Writing
a
letter
dated
04-03-2025
requesting
the
Commissioner (Power), Government of Manipur, pointing out
the deficiency and non-inclusion of three sub-stations under
the SSD-II in the report submitted by the respondent No. 2;
(c) Declining to accede to the request made by the respondent
No. 2 to the petitioner to put up liability for an amount of
about Rupees 2 crore under the SASCI;
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[4]
(d) Request made by the petitioner for engagement of manpower
on daily wages basis to fill up the shortage of manpower;
(e) Request made by the petitioner with regard to the non-release
of reimbursement fund and for raising objection with regard
to the transferring out staff serving under the petitioner, etc.,
has clearly revealed the arbitrariness and malafide intention on the
part of the authorities in issuing the impugned transfer order and that
the same had been issued with an ulterior motive to victimize the
petitioner and to bring in a person of their choice in place of the petitioner.
[4]
With regard to the other ground raised by the learned senior
counsel, it has been submitted that under the policy for transfer and
posting of the Government employees of the State of Manipur as
notified on 12-05-2022, it has been, inter alia, provided that –
"III General Conditions:
"(ii) No transfer may be effected unless the concerned employee
has completed 1 (one) year and 6 (six) months in a post,
unless there are compelling reasons/ circumstances to do
so.”
(viii) Transfers shall normally be effected in the month of April/
May after the financial year is over so that disruption of work
is minimal”
(xi) All transfer orders will indicate the first-mover and charge
shall be handed over by the relieved officer to the relieving
officer after briefing him/ her of the priority/ sensitive issues
connected with the post.”
[4.1]
According to the petitioner, the private respondent No. 3 was
promoted to the post of Deputy General Manager (Elect.) in the MSPCL
along with two other Manager (Elect.) by an order dated 30-10-2024 and
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[5]
was allowed to continue in their place of posting. It has been contended
that the private respondent No. 3 was transferred out by the impugned
order from his earlier place of posting before completion of five months
and as such, transferring out an Officer under probation and before
completion of five months from the date of promotion is violative of the
transfer policy dated 12-05-2022 as contained in Clause-III (i) and (ii) of
the said transfer policy. Accordingly, such impugned transfer is liable to
be interfered with by this court.
[4.2]
The learned senior counsel submitted that there is no cogent
reason for effecting transfer and posting of the petitioner just when the
financial year is coming to an end, therefore, the impugned order dated
27-03-2025 having been issued without spelling the compelling reason
for issuance of the said impugned transfer and posting order will be a
nullity in the eyes of law as the same having been issued in contravention
of the transfer policy dated 12-05-2022 contained in Clause-III (viii).
Accordingly, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside.
[4.3]
Lastly, it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that in
the impugned transfer and posting order dated 27-03-2025, nothing has
been mentioned or indicated as to who will be the first mover and as
such, the petitioner is yet to hand over the charge formally and the
petitioner has not been released from his place of posting. According to
the learned senior counsel, such omission on the part of the authorities
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[6]
while issuing the impugned transfer and posting order is violative of the
transfer policy as contained in Clause-III (xi) of the said transfer policy
and on this ground also, the impugned transfer order is liable to be
quashed and set aside.
[5]
In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel relied
on the following case laws:(a) "Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) & ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ors." reported
in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659. wherein it has been held at para. 4
as under –
“4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order
which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons
unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory
statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant
holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted
at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one
place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent
authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer
order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the
courts ordinarily should not interfere with the order instead
affected party should approach the higher authorities in the
department. If the courts continue to interfere with day-to-day
transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate
authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration
which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court
overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders.”
(b) "Union of India & ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas" reported in (1993) 4 SCC
357 wherein it has been held at para. 7 as under
“7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate
authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala
fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court
cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no
doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by
the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any
representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate
authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies
of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible,
husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[7]
guideline however does not confer upon the Government
employee a legally enforceable right.”
(c) "State of UP & ors. Vs. Gobardhan Lal" reported in (2004) 11
SCC 402 wherein it has been held at para. 7 as under –
“7. It is too late in the day for any government servant to contend that
once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he
should continue in such place or position as long as he desires.
Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the
terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of
service in the absence of any specific indication to the contra, in
the law governing or conditions of service. Unless the order of
transfer is shown to be an outcome of a mala fide exercise of
power or violative of any statutory provision (an Act or rule) or
passed by an authority not competent to do so, an order of
transfer cannot lightly be interfered with as a matter of course or
routine for any or every type of grievance sought to be made. Even
administrative guidelines for regulating transfers or containing
transfer policies at best may afford an opportunity to the officer or
servant concerned to approach their higher authorities for redress
but cannot have the consequence of depriving or denying the
competent authority to transfer a particular officer/servant to any
place in public interest and as is found necessitated by exigencies
of service as long as the official status is not affected adversely
and there is no infraction of any career prospects such as
seniority, scale of pay and secured emoluments. This Court has
often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in
transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be
interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable
rights, unless, as noticed supra, shown to be vitiated by mala fides
or is made in violation of any statutory provision.”
(d) "Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union of India & ors." reported in (2009) 2
SCC 592 wherein it has been held at para. 16 as under –
“16. Indisputably an order of transfer is an administrative order.
There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that transfer, which is
ordinarily an incident of service should not be interfered with,
save in cases where inter alia mala fide on the part of the
authority is proved. Mala fide is of two kinds—one malice in fact
and the second malice in law. The order in question would attract
the principle of malice in law as it was not based on any factor
germane for passing an order of transfer and based on an
irrelevant ground i.e. on the allegations made against the
appellant in the anonymous complaint. It is one thing to say that
the employer is entitled to pass an order of transfer in
administrative exigencies but it is another thing to say that the
order of transfer is passed by way of or in lieu of punishment.
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[8]
When an order of transfer is passed in lieu of punishment, the
same is liable to be set aside being wholly illegal.”
[6]
Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA appearing for the official
respondents submitted that the petitioner has been posted as Deputy
General Manager, Sub-Station, Division No. II, MSPCL by an order
dated 20-07-2022 till the issuance of the impugned transfer order dated
27-03-2025 and as such, the petitioner had already completed more
than two and half years at the said place of posting. Accordingly, the
authorities have not violated any transfer policy in effecting the new
transfer and posting of the petitioner in the impugned order. The learned
GA further submitted that the respondent No. 3 was promoted from
Manager (Elect.) to Deputy General Manager (Elect.) by an order dated
30-10-2024 along with two other officers and that the impugned transfer
order dated 27-03-2025 is the transfer and posting of the said
respondent No. 3 after his promotion as Deputy General Manager
(Elect.) and as such, there is no merit or basis in the contention made
on behalf of the petitioner that by effecting the transfer and posting
of the private respondent No. 3, the authorities have violated the transfer
policy of the State Government. The learned GA further submitted that
the petitioner is not the competent authority to state that the private
respondent No. 3 lacks experience and competency and that the
petitioner is more competent and efficient than the private respondent
No. 3. Accordingly, it has been submitted that such allegations and
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[9]
contentions made by the petitioner in challenging the impugned transfer
order is without any merit or substance and the same are liable to be
rejected as devoid of merit.
[7]
Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA submitted that the petitioner has
not been given any DDO power in his earlier place of posting and the
nature of his work is not at all related with the end of financial year and
there is no disruption of work relating to the end of financial year.
Accordingly, the impugned transfer order cannot be considered to have
been issued in violation of the transfer policy of the State Government.
Mr. S. Nepolean, learned GA submitted that as per the MSPCL
Office Order No. 171 dated 18-12-2023, every transfer and posting
issued by the competent authority i.e., Managing Director, MSPCL as
per power conferred under Part-III Clause 6(b) of the delegation of power
of MSPCL, should be treated as both transfer and release order. The
learned GA also submitted that till date, the petitioner and private
respondent have not yet perform handing over and taking over of
charges and the same can be effected after the authorities issued
necessary orders in this regard and as such, the allegations raised by
the petitioner that the impugned transfer order had been issued in
violation of the transfer policy as contained in Clause-III(xi) is without
any substance or merit and accordingly, liable to be rejected.
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[10]
[8]
With regard to the petitioner’s allegations of mala fide and
ulterior motive on the part of the authorities in issuing the impugned
transfer and posting order, the learned GA submitted that the so called
elaboration and contentions made on behalf of the petitioner in support
of such ground are nothing but mere allegations and imaginary story
concocted by the petitioner with the intent of showing that the transfer
order was issued with mala fide intention and ulterior motive and to
victimize the petitioner, in order to obtain sympathy and favourable order
from this court. According to the learned GA, such allegations and
contentions made on behalf of the petitioner are all bereft of truth and
without any substance. The learned GA further submitted that all such
allegations have been specifically and elaborately refuted by the official
respondents in their counter affidavit and that such unfounded and
baseless allegations cannot be a ground for interfering with the
impugned transfer order.
[9]
The learned GA submitted that the impugned transfer and
posting order dated 27-03-2025 is a general transfer order issued in
public interest and that no Government employee, who is holding a
transferable post, can insist on being posted at a particular place of his
choice. It has also been submitted that who should be transferred and
where is a matter for the competent authority to decide and that transfer
and posting is not only an incident of service but also a condition of
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[11]
service and one cannot make a grievance against such decision of the
competent authority if the same has been done in public interest. The
learned GA submitted that there is no illegality or irregularity in the
impugned transfer order and as such, a prayer has been made to
dismiss the present writ petition as being devoid of merit.
In support of his contentions, the learned GA cited the
following case laws:(a) “National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri
Bhagwan & anr.” reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574 wherein it has
been held at para. 5 as under –
“5. On a careful consideration of the submissions of the learned
counsel on either side and the relevant Rules to which our
attention has been invited to, we are of the view that the High
Court was not justified in interfering with the impugned orders of
transfer. It is by now well settled and often reiterated by this Court
that no government servant or employee of a public undertaking
has any legal right to be posted forever at any one particular place
since transfer of a particular employee appointed to the class or
category of transferable posts from one place to other is not only
an incident, but a condition of service, necessary too in public
interest and efficiency in the public administration. Unless an
order of transfer is shown to be an outcome of mala fide exercise
of power or stated to be in violation of statutory provisions
prohibiting any such transfer, the courts or the tribunals cannot
interfere with such orders as a matter of routine, as though they
are the appellate authorities substituting their own decision for
that of the management, as against such orders passed in the
interest of administrative exigencies of the service concerned. On
the facts and circumstances of the cases before us, we are also
unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that
Rule 4.1.1 of the Seniority Rules interdicts any transfer of the
employees from one office or project or unit to any one of the
other as long as the seniority of such an employee is protected
based on the length of service with reference to the date of
promotion or appointment to the grade concerned irrespective of
the date of transfer. We also consider it to be a mere submission
in vain, the one urged on the basis of alleged adverse
consequences detrimental to their seniority resulting from such
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[12]
transfer. In the facts of the present cases, at any rate, no such
result is bound to occur since the Project undertaken to which the
respondents have been transferred is itself a new one and,
therefore, we see no rhyme or reason in the alleged grievance.
(b) “Union of India & ors. Vs. Janardhan Debanath & anr.”
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 245 wherein it has been held at paras.
12 and 14 as under –
“12. That brings us to the other question as to whether the use of the
expression “undesirable” warranted an enquiry before the
transfer. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the
respondents on a decision of this Court in Jagdish
Mitter v. Union of India (AIR p. 456, para 21) to contend that
whenever there is a use of the word “undesirable” it casts a
stigma and it cannot be done without holding a regular enquiry.
The submission is clearly without substance. The said case
relates to use of the expression “undesirable” in an order
affecting the continuance in service by way of discharge. The
decision has therefore no application to the facts of the present
case. The manner, nature and extent of exercise to be undertaken
by courts/tribunals in a case to adjudge whether it casts a stigma
or constitutes one by way of punishment would also very much
depend upon the consequences flowing from the order and as to
whether it adversely affected any service conditions — status,
service prospects financially — and the same yardstick, norms
or standards cannot be applied to all categories of cases.
Transfers unless they involve any such adverse impact or visit
the persons concerned with any penal consequences, are not
required to be subjected to same type of scrutiny, approach and
assessment as in the case of dismissal, discharge, reversion or
termination and utmost latitude should be left with the
department concerned to enforce discipline, decency and
decorum in public service which are indisputably essential to
maintain quality of public service and meet untoward
administrative exigencies to ensure smooth functioning of the
administration.”
“14. The allegations made against the respondents are of serious
nature, and the conduct attributed is certainly unbecoming.
Whether there was any misbehaviour is a question which can be
gone into in a departmental proceeding. For the purposes of
effecting a transfer, the question of holding an enquiry to find out
whether there was misbehaviour or conduct unbecoming of an
employee is unnecessary and what is needed is the prima facie
satisfaction of the authority concerned on the contemporary
reports about the occurrence complained of and if the
requirement, as submitted by learned counsel for the
respondents, of holding an elaborate enquiry is to be insisted
upon the very purpose of transferring an employee in public
interest or exigencies of administration to enforce decorum and
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[13]
ensure probity would get frustrated. The question whether the
respondents could be transferred to a different division is a
matter for the employer to consider depending upon the
administrative necessities and the extent of solution for the
problems faced by the administration. It is not for this Court to
direct one way or the other. The judgment of the High Court is
clearly indefensible and is set aside. The writ petitions filed
before the High Court deserve to be dismissed which we direct.
The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs.”
(c) “Paresh Choudhury Vs. State of Assam & ors.” reported in
2004 (3) GLT 295 wherein it has been held at para. 15 as under
–
“15. The ground of attack that the progress of the work pertaining to
various scheme would be hampered automatically falls
through. The petitioner may feel his service indispensable at a
particular place of posting. But it is the Government which is to
decide as to who should be posted where. The kind of
dissatisfaction expressed in the functioning of the petitioner
coupled with the stand of the respondents in their affidavit that
the petitioner did not show any interest towards
implementation of the scheme in the division perfectly justified
the action of the respondents in transferring the petitioner.”
(d)
“S.C. Saxena Vs. Union of India & ors.” reported in (2006)
9 SCC 583 wherein it has been held at para. 6 as under –
“6. We have perused the record with the help of the learned counsel
and heard the learned counsel very patiently. We find that no
case for our interference whatsoever has been made out. In the
first place, a government servant cannot disobey a transfer order
by not reporting at the place of posting and then go to a court to
ventilate his grievances. It is his duty to first report for work
where he is transferred and make a representation as to what
may be his personal problems. This tendency of not reporting at
the place of posting and indulging in litigation needs to be
curbed. Apart therefrom, if the appellant really had some genuine
difficulty in reporting for work at Tezpur, he could have reported
for duty at Amritsar where he was so posted. We too decline to
believe the story of his remaining sick. Assuming there was
some sickness, we are not satisfied that it prevented him from
joining duty either at Tezpur or at Amritsar. The medical
certificate issued by Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital proves this
point. In the circumstances, we too are of the opinion that the
appellant was guilty of the misconduct of unauthorisedly
remaining absent from duty.”
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[14]
(e) “Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras”
reported in (2011) 12 SCC 137 wherein it has been held at
paras. 22 to 24 as under –
“22. In the context of transfer of a government servant we may
refer to the dicta of this Court in N.K. Singh v. Union of
India where this Court observed in AIR para 22 as follows:
(SCC p. 108, para 23)
“23. … Transfer of a government servant in a transferable
service is a necessary incident of the service career.
Assessment of the quality of men is to be made by
the superiors taking into account several factors
including suitability of the person for a particular
post and exigencies of administration. Several
imponderables requiring formation of a subjective
opinion in that sphere may be involved, at times. The only
realistic approach is to leave it to the wisdom of the
hierarchical superiors to make the decision. Unless the
decision is vitiated by mala fides or infraction of any
professed norm of principle governing the transfer, which
alone can be scrutinised judicially, there are no judicially
manageable standards for scrutinising all transfers and
the
courts lack the necessary expertise for personnel
management of all government departments. This must
be left, in public interest, to the departmental heads
subject to the limited judicial scrutiny indicated.”
“23. In State of M.P. v. S.S. Kourav the Administrative Tribunal
had interfered with the transfer order of the respondent and
directed him to be posted at a particular place. It is relevant
to note that while setting aside the order of the Tribunal this
Court observed in para 4 of its judgment as follows: (SCC p.
272)
“4. … The courts or tribunals are not appellate forums to
decide on transfers of officers on administrative
grounds. The wheels of administration should be
allowed to run smoothly and the courts or tribunals are
not expected to interdict the working of the
administrative system by transferring the officers to
proper places. It is for the administration to take
appropriate decision and such decisions shall stand
unless they are vitiated either by mala fides or by
extraneous
consideration
without
any
factual
background or foundation. In this case we have seen that
on the administrative grounds the transfer orders came
to be issued. Therefore, we cannot go into the
expediency of posting an officer at a particular place.”
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[15]
“24. We may mention that this Court has reiterated the legal
position recently in Airports Authority of India v. Rajeev
Ratan Pandey that: (SCC p. 339, para 10)
“10. … In a matter of transfer of a government employee,
[the] scope of judicial review is limited and the High
Court would not interfere with an order of transfer
lightly, be it at interim stage or final hearing. This is so
because the courts do not substitute their own decision
in the matter of transfer.”
[10]
Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel appearing for the
private respondent No. 3 submitted that as the father of the respondent
No. 3 is about 73 years old and suffering from serious ailment with his
health condition deteriorating day by day, the respondent No. 3 is
taking care of his ailing father and that as the writ petition is handling
ten projects under the SSD-II, out of which five projects are to be
commissioned within three to four months, the respondent No. 3
submitted an application dated 03-04-2025 to the Commissioner
(Power), Government of Manipur, stating, inter alia, that the respondent
No. 3 do not want to get involved in the present writ petition as it gives
him extra and huge mental stress and also requesting to arrange his new
place of posting as DGM, Transmission Division No. 1 (TD-1) instead of
DGM, SSD-II and that the said application is still pending for
consideration by the authorities.
[11]
I have heard at length the submissions advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the parties and also carefully perused
the materials available on record. I have also perused the judgments
cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[16]
With regard to the allegations of mala fide raised on behalf
of the petitioner, it is to be noted that all such allegations
have been specifically and elaborately refuted by the authorities in
their counter affidavit and as such, this court cannot accept such
allegations and contentions raised by the petitioner as the absolute
truth, since it involves disputed question of facts. Even if the
allegations and contentions raised by the petitioner in support of the
ground of mala fide are taken to be true, such allegations and the
contentions cannot be construed to establish the allegations of
mala fide on the part of the authorities in effecting the impugned
transfer order of the petitioner specifically when such actions of the
authorities does not result in any civil consequences upon the
petitioner in any manner or affect any of his rights established by law.
Looking from this point, this court cannot come to the conclusion that
the petitioner has been victimized by the authorities by effecting the
transfer and posting order of the petitioner. Accordingly, this court is
not inclined to interfere with the impugned transfer order on ground
of mala fide.
[12]
It has been specifically stated by the authorities that the
petitioner was posted at his present place of posting by an order
dated 20-07-2022 and he continued to serve in the said post till the
issuance of the impugned transfer order dated 27-03-2025 and as
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[17]
such, the petitioner had already completed more than two and
half years at his present place of posting. It has been clearly stated
by the authorities that the respondent No. 3 was promoted from
Manager (Elect.) to Deputy General Manager (Elect.) by an order
dated 30-10-2024 and that after such promotion, the impugned
transfer and posting order is the first transfer order in respect of the
respondent No. 3. Accordingly, this court is of the considered view
that the allegations raised by the petitioner that the impugned
transfer order had been issued in violation of the transfer policy of
the State Government is without any substance and devoid of merit.
The authorities have also specifically stated that the
petitioner has not been given any DDO power in his earlier place of
posting and that the nature of his work is not at all related with any
financial transaction relating to the end of the financial year and such
transfer does not cause any disruption of the work relating to the
end of the financial year. It has also been specifically stated by the
authorities that the handing over and taking over of the petitioner and
the private respondent No. 3 can be done after the authorities issued
any order in this regard and as such, the petitioner cannot find any
merit in the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner that the
impugned transfer order has been effected in violation of the transfer
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[18]
policy of the State Government. Accordingly, this court declined to
interfere with the impugned transfer order on this ground also.
[13]
It is well settled principle of law that a Government servant
holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at
the place of his choice and he is liable to be transferred from one
place to the other in public interest or for an administrative reason.
Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate
authority to decide and court should not interfere with the transfer
order unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any
mandatory statutory rules or on the ground of mala fide.
In the present case, as discussed above, this court did not
find any ground or reason for interfering with the impugned transfer
order on the basis of the grounds raised on behalf of the petitioner
and as such, I do not find any merit in the present writ petition.
[14]
I have also perused the case laws cited on behalf of the
petitioner and this court is of the considered view that the ratio laid
down therein is of no help to the petitioner, rather the same are all
against the petitioner.
So far as the contentions made on behalf of the respondent
No. 3 is concerned, this court is of the considered view that it is
for the authorities to decide on the grievances raised by the
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
[19]
respondent No. 3, especially as the respondent No. 3 has already
approached the authorities by filing a representation.
In the result, the writ petition is hereby dismissed is being
devoid of merit, however, without any order as to cost. Interim order
passed earlier stands vacated.
JUDGE
FR / NFR
Devananda
WP(C) No. 285 of 2025
Contd…/-
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