Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs Mr. Deepak Aggarwal & Ors.

1.2 The legislative intention behind bringing up the 2013 Act was to have a unified enactment facilitating land acquisition for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in a timely and transparent manner and at the same time, providing for just and fair compensation, to make adequate provision for rehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for affected persons and their families. The word ‘initiated’ has to be construed with a view to implement the aforesaid twin purposes of providing fair and just compensation and facilitating acquisition of land for industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects. The impact of ‘initiation’ of land acquisition proceedings and its culmination in an award under Section 11 of the L.A Act and also non-culmination in such an award has already been referred to. For a proper and purposive construction of the word ‘initiated’, in the contextual situation it will not be inappropriate to look into the legislative history of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as well, as explained in the written submission filed on behalf of HSIIDC/STATE/COMMITTEE dated 11.04.2022. However, it is not deemed necessary to refer to or to deal with it, in detail. In short, it is stated therein that the events happened prior to the drafting of Section 24, as it exists on the statute book today, is a safe guide to cull out the legislative intent in formulating Section 24 in the 2013 Act, by the legislature. Furthermore, it is stated therein that the legislature was fully aware of the fact that lands acquired under the L.A. Act were already being used for several public purposes and more particularly for infrastructural projects and large number of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, relating large number of public projects for various public purposes, are in progress at various stages. Hence, lapsing of everything would be seriously detrimental to public interest and at the same time, the interest of land holders is also taken into account. The consideration of all such relevant aspects and the pros and cons made the legislature to come up with a balancing provision under Section 24(1)(a) and clauses therein, in the 2013 Act. This was incorporated as a balancing provision for controlling the extent of retrospectivity and for curtailing the erosion of rights of land holders. [Paras 22-24][1098-D-E; 1099-A-C] Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 213 : [1987] 1 SCR 562 – relied on.

1.3 Right to property had ceased to be a fundamental right. True that it is a human right as also constitutional right. Hence, compulsory acquisition by scrupulous adherence to the procedures authorised by law would not violate Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 21 mandates that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, except according to procedures established by law. Bearing in mind the twin purposes mentioned hereinbefore, this Court is of the view that they can only be achieved if the word ‘initiated’ is taken as the point of time when section 4 (1) notification is issued and published under the L.A. Act, in the Official Gazette. Such a construction would embrace more number of affected persons within the fold of affected persons entitled to higher amount of compensation by application of the 2013 Act in the matter of determination of compensation. As a necessary sequel more extent of land in respect of which acquisition proceedings have been initiated, for public purposes, under the L.A. Act for the various ongoing and proposed projects, would remain protected from lapsing. In this context, it is to be noted that all the parties in all the appeals in unison would admit the fact that determination of compensation based on the 2013 Act would be beneficial to the persons affected by acquisition and entitled to be compensated. The words ‘initiate’ or ‘initiated’ are not defined under the L.A. Act and also under the 2013 Act. Hence, to ascribe its meaning the dictionary meaning of the word has to be looked into. In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the legislative intention this Court has no hesitation to hold that the point of initiation of land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification in the official gazette of the appropriate Government. [Paras 26, 27][1100-B, F-H; 1101-A-D]

State of M.P. Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – relied on.

1.4 A perusal of Section 4 of the L.A. Act would reveal that a preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) is issued whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. The said formal expression of the decision takes concrete shape and forms only on its Publication in the Official Gazette. It is only upon issuance and publication of a Notification under Section 4(1) that any officer, either generally or specially authorised by the appropriate Government and his servants and workmen could lawfully enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality in terms of sub-Section (2) thereof. Section 4(2) would reveal that besides entering upon and surveying and taking levels of any land in the locality concerned, the officer authorised by the Government through the Notification is also empowered to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for all purposes; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches and such other activities mentioned under sub-Section (2) thereof. In such circumstances, the fact is that it is the issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification that will empower the authorised officer and workmen to enter into and do such permissible acts and activities. [Paras 28, 29][1101-E-G; 1102E-F] Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay & Ors. AIR 1960 SC 1203 : [1961] SCR 128 – referred to.

1.5 Now, this Court will consider the other common questions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after 01.01.2014. While considering those questions, the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Act will have to be borne in mind and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the manner in which it now exists. One crucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act was initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section

11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation should apply to such acquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of nonpassing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would apply to such acquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in such circumstances the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all the provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures to be followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. The question is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear with necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation alone would be applicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken and the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain. They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensation alone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is only a restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to such proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what is applicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the period up to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribed under the L.A. Act. Without such a construction, the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. Any construction of the said provision without taking into the legislative intention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention as also the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in public interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities to follow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will. A uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in a fair and transparent manner with a view to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have definite idea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party ‘B’ would not be justified in describing such situations of necessity and the consequential application of provisions which are actually saved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party ‘B’ that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all such procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determination of compensation by applying all the provisions for determination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. A contraconstruction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during its continuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act unworkable.[Paras 31, 32][1103-D-H; 1104-A-H; 1105-A-C]

Shiv Kumar and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2019)

10 SCC 229 – referred to.

1.6 For the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be treated as initiated on publication of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. When Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable, the proceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for the determination of compensation amount, the provisions of the 2013 Act shall be applied. [Para 34][1105-E]

Laxman Lal (Dead) Through LRs. & Anr. V. State of Rajasthan Civil Appeal No.6392 of 2003; Offshore Holdings Private Limited V. Bangalore Development Authority (2011) 3 SCC 139; Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn. Vs. Mahesh &Ors. (2022) 2 SCC 772, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalatha S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447 : [1986] SCR 866; Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan (1975) 4 SCC 296: [1975] 2 SCR 68; V.K.M. Kattha Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana (2013) 9 SCC 338 : [2013] 10 SCR 33; M/s. Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. Vs. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto & Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 152 : [1985] 2 SCR 937– referred to.