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Sr. No. 140
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
ATJAMMU
Case:-MA No. 14/2026
Gurudwara Prabhandak
Committee& Ors.
.....Appellants
Through :- Ms. Vasudha Sharma, Advocate
v/s
Nagesh Padha
.....Respondent
Through :- Mr. Mohinder Sharma, Advocate
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
05.08.2026
1.
The petitioners, who are defendants in the suit titled
“Nagesh Padha v. Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee &
Ors.”, pending before the Court of Principal District Judge,
Samba (hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”), have
called in question the order dated 10.04.2026, whereby the
parties have been directed to maintain status quo with
respect to the suit property comprising land measuring 2
kanals and 6 marlas falling under Khasra Nos. 40 and 40
min, Khata Nos. 33 and 34, Khewat No. 15, situated at
Village Chak Shiba Khurd, Tehsil Vijaypur, District Samba.
2.
The
trial Court, while
passing the
impugned order,
proceeded on the premise that the plaintiff could not be
deprived of his rights in respect of land measuring 4 kanals
and 10 marlas. It noticed that, out of the aforesaid land, 1
kanal and 14 marlas had been kept as a pathway to provide
access to the land sold by the predecessor-in-interest of the
plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff could not, at that stage,
be presumed to have lost his rights over the remaining land
measuring 2 kanals and 6 marlas.
3.
The principal ground urged by the petitioners in assailing
the impugned order is that the plaintiff was never in
possession of the suit land and that the same has
throughout remained in their possession. It is contended
that a boundary wall has also been raised around the suit
land by the petitioners and their possession thereon stands
corroborated by the report of the Commissioner.
4.
It is further urged that neither the plaintiff nor his brother
figures in the revenue record as being in possession of the
suit land. The petitioners also seek to question the
plaintiff’s claim on the ground that his predecessor-ininterest had alienated land measuring 7 kanals and 10
marlas, which had vested in him under Sections 4 and 8 of
the Agrarian Reforms Act, allegedly in contravention of the
provisions of the said Act. Yet another ground of challenge
is that the suit itself is barred under the provisions of the
Tenancy Act. According to the petitioners, the father of the
plaintiff had remained out of possession for more than six
decades and, as such, whatever tenancy rights he may have
possessed could not have survived thereafter.
MA No. 14/2026
5.
It is also contended that the mere existence of an entry in
the revenue record in the name of “Comrade Brick Kiln”
would not establish the plaintiff’s possession over the suit
land. According to the petitioners, the very nature of the
reliefs claimed in the suit, namely, recovery of possession,
damages and mesne profits for alleged unauthorized use
and occupation of the suit land, belies the plaintiff’s
assertion of possession. It is further submitted that the
Gurudwara structure already stands raised and pillars have
also been erected over the suit land. The order of status
quo,
however,
has
stalled
further
construction
of a
community hall, which, according to the petitioners, is
intended for the use and benefit of the general public.
6.
It is further argued that the presumption, if any, attaching
to the entries in the Khasra Girdawari stands rebutted by
the material relied upon by the plaintiff himself. Reference
in this regard is made to the demarcation report, which
records that no brick kiln exists on the spot. The report
further indicates that, out of the land measuring 4 kanals,
an area of 1 kanal and 14 marlas is recorded as Gair Mum
kin Pathway, whereas the remaining 2 kanals and 6 marlas
is in possession of the Gurudwara.
7.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that,
once their possession over the suit land is not in dispute,
MA No. 14/2026
the direction to maintain status quo operates to their
prejudice.
It
is
submitted
that
the
petitioners
had
undertaken construction of a community hall over the suit
land for the use and benefit of the local public and the
Sangat, who are stated to have contributed towards the
construction of the Gurudwara building as well. The
impugned order, according to the petitioners, has brought
the construction to a standstill and has effectively deprived
them of the beneficial use of the property despite their
admitted possession thereof.
8.
It is contended that when the plaintiff himself proceeds on
the premise that the defendants are in possession of the
suit property and has sought recovery of possession from
them, the petitioners cannot, merely by virtue of an interim
order, be prevented from using and occupying the property
during
the
pendency
of
the
suit.
According
to
the
petitioners, such a restraint cannot be justified unless and
until the plaintiff establishes, in accordance with law, his
right to recover possession of the suit property.
9.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, during the course of
arguments, submitted that the petitioners are willing to
furnish an undertaking before the trial Court that any
construction raised by them over the suit land during the
pendency of the proceedings shall be entirely at their own
MA No. 14/2026
risk and responsibility. It is further submitted that, in the
event the plaintiff ultimately succeeds in establishing his
right to recover possession of the suit property, the
petitioners shall remove/demolish, at their own cost, any
structure raised by them thereon and shall not claim any
equity on the basis of such construction.
10.
Per
contra,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent/plaintiff sought to support the order impugned
by contending that defendant No. 1 is a complete stranger
to the suit property and that its occupation thereof is wholly
unauthorized, being neither traceable to any allotment or
conveyance nor to any other lawful source. It is submitted
that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a prima facie
title over the suit property before the trial Court. It is
further pointed out that the plaintiff has also sought a
decree of mandatory injunction for demolition/removal of
the pillars allegedly raised by the defendants over the suit
property. In these circumstances, according to learned
counsel, the trial Court was justified in directing the parties
to maintain status quo during the pendency of the suit.
11.
Learned counsel for the respondent, placing reliance upon
the judgment reported as 2010 (Punjab & Haryana) 1475,
further contends that entries in the revenue record carrying
a presumption of correctness cannot be lightly brushed
MA No. 14/2026
aside merely on the basis of a report obtained from the
Patwari Halqa. It is, thus, urged that the revenue entries
reflecting possession over the suit land have to be given due
weight unless rebutted by cogent and legally admissible
material.
12.
Reliance is also placed upon the judgment reported as 2011
AIR SCW 3769 to contend that a demarcation report, by
itself, cannot override or supersede duly maintained
revenue entries. It is accordingly submitted that the
petitioners cannot rely upon the demarcation report to
dislodge the prima facie evidentiary value attaching to the
revenue record and, therefore, no interference with the
order of status quo is called for.
13.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and
perused the material on record, what emerges is that the
respondent/plaintiff traces his claim over the suit property
to his predecessor-in-interest, who is stated to have
purchased land measuring 11 kanals and 10 marlas in the
name of “Comrade Brick Kiln” and to have remained in
possession thereof. Out of the aforesaid land, an area
measuring 7 kanals and 10 marlas is stated to have
subsequently been sold by the predecessor-in-interest of the
plaintiff to one Anu Gupta.
MA No. 14/2026
14.
The revenue record further reveals that, by virtue of
Mutation No. 101 attested under Section 8 of the Agrarian
Reforms Act, land measuring 7 kanals and 10 marlas under
Khasra No. 40 min came to be recorded in favour of the
predecessor-in-interest
remaining
land
of
the
plaintiff,
continued
to
stand
whereas
recorded
the
in
the
ownership of one Dhana Ram. A portion of the remaining
land
has
since
been
utilized
for
construction
of
a
pathway/road, while the land measuring 7 kanals and 10
marlas, which had vested under the Agrarian Reforms Act,
is stated to have subsequently been alienated. The spot
inspection/demarcation report further records that land
measuring 2 kanals and 6 marlas falls within the boundary
wall of the Gurudwara, whereas an area measuring 1 kanal
and 14 marlas is under a pathway.
15.
There is, however, a serious dispute between the parties as
regards
the
possession
nature
and
duration
of
over
the
suit
land.
the
petitioners’
While
the
respondent/plaintiff maintains that the Gurudwara came
into possession only in the year 2022, the petitioners assert
that their possession is of long standing. The record does
indicate that the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest
were tenants in respect of land measuring 7 kanals and 10
marlas, which subsequently vested in them by operation of
MA No. 14/2026
Sections 4 and 8 of the Agrarian Reforms Act. This
circumstance lends prima facie support to the position that
their initial possession over at least the aforesaid extent of
land was in the capacity of tenants. Once proprietary rights
in respect of 7 kanals and 10 marlas came to be conferred
upon them under the Agrarian Reforms Act, the question
whether any tenancy rights subsisted in their favour in
respect of the remaining land is a matter which would
necessarily have to be determined on the basis of the
pleadings, revenue record and other evidence led before the
trial Court.
16.
It has also been urged that, in respect of the portion of land
which has come under the pathway, there is nothing in the
pleadings or the material placed on record to indicate that
any acquisition proceedings were ever undertaken or that
compensation was paid to the respondent/plaintiff or his
predecessor-in-interest for such land.
17.
The petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the
remaining land, including the portion utilized for the
pathway, was State land and had been permitted to be used
by petitioner No. 1 for raising the Gurudwara. Significantly,
however, it is fairly conceded on behalf of the petitioners
that, except for their asserted possession, they do not
possess any allotment order, conveyance or other document
MA No. 14/2026
evidencing any right, title or interest in respect of the suit
land. The respondent/plaintiff, in contrast, relies upon the
revenue record to demonstrate that his predecessor-ininterest was recorded in cultivating possession of the land.
The competing claims of the parties, therefore, essentially
rest upon the evidentiary value of the revenue entries, the
nature and duration of the petitioners’ possession and the
legal effect of the material relied upon by them, all of which
would fall for determination by the trial Court on the basis
of evidence.
18.
In Rame Gowda (dead) by Lrs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu
(dead) by Lrs. and another, (2004) 1 SCC 769, discussing
the Indian law on the subject the Apex Court observed as
under:
“8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is
concerned the person in peaceful possession is
entitled to retain his possession and in order to
protect such possession, he may even use
reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A
rightful owner who has been wrongfully
dispossessed of land may retake possession if he
can do so peacefully and without the use of
unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled
possession of the property belonging to the rightful
owner, the rightful owner shall have to take
recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own
hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with
his possession. The law will come to the aid of a
person in peaceful and settled possession by
injuncting even a rightful owner from using force
MA No. 14/2026
or taking law in his own hands, and also by
restoring him in possession even from the rightful
owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if
the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by
use of force. In the absence of proof of better title,
possession or prior peaceful settled possession is
itself evidence of title. Law presumes the
possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The
owner of any property may prevent even by using
reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted
trespass, when it is in the process of being
committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring,
intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just
been committed, while the rightful owner did not
have enough time to have recourse to law. In the
last of the cases, the possession of the trespasser,
just entered into would not be called as one
acquiesced to by the true owner.”
19.
In AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 813 it was held
as under:“The crux of the matter is that a person who
asserts possessory title over a particular property
will have to show that he is under settled or
established possession of the said property. But
merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not
give such a right against the true owner. Settled
possession means such possession over the
property which has existed for a sufficiently long
period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the
true owner. A casual act of possession does not
have the effect of interrupting the possession of the
rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a
possession which has not matured into settled
possession, can be obstructed or removed by the
true owner even by using necessary force. Settled
possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed,
and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without
any attempt at concealment by the trespasser.
MA No. 14/2026
There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine
settled possession. Occupation of a property by a
person as an agent or a servant acting at the
instance of the owner will not amount to actual
legal possession. The possession should contain an
element of animus possidendi. The nature of
possession of the trespasser is to be decided based
on the facts and circumstances of each case.”
20.
At the interlocutory stage, this Court is neither required nor
expected to finally pronounce upon the title of either party
or the legal effect of the revenue entries, mutations,
demarcation report or the provisions of the Agrarian
Reforms Act and the Tenancy Act relied upon by the parties.
Any conclusive finding on these questions would have the
effect of prejudging issues which properly fall within the
domain of the trial Court after the parties have had an
opportunity to lead evidence.
21.
What is, however, relevant for the present purpose is the
admitted factual position obtaining on the spot. The plaintiff
himself seeks, inter alia, recovery of possession of the suit
property from the defendants, besides damages/mesne
profits for its alleged unauthorized use and occupation. The
demarcation/spot inspection report also records that the
land measuring 2 kanals and 6 marlas is presently within
the boundary wall of the Gurudwara. Thus, for the limited
purpose of deciding the application for interim relief, the
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physical possession of the petitioners over the suit land
cannot be ignored.
22.
At the same time, mere possession cannot, by itself, confer
upon the petitioners an unrestricted right to materially alter
the nature and character of the suit property during the
pendency of the litigation. This assumes significance
because the petitioners admittedly do not possess any
allotment, conveyance or other document evidencing title or
an independent right to raise construction over the suit
land, whereas the plaintiff has placed reliance upon revenue
entries in support of his claim. Whether those entries
ultimately establish the right asserted by the plaintiff is a
matter for trial, but the claim cannot, at the present stage,
be regarded as wholly illusory so as to permit irreversible
alteration of the suit property. Reliance on the precedents
cited by respondent is totally misplaced.
23.
The object of an interim injunction is to preserve the subject
matter of the suit and to ensure that the final adjudication
is not rendered ineffective by acts undertaken during the
pendency of the proceedings. At the same time, an interim
arrangement ought not to travel beyond what is reasonably
necessary for protection of the competing rights of the
parties. The Court is required to strike a balance so that
neither party is permitted to create an irreversible situation
MA No. 14/2026
to the prejudice of the other before their substantive rights
are adjudicated.
24.
In the present case, a blanket order directing maintenance
of status quo has the effect of restraining the petitioners
even from dealing with property which is admittedly in their
physical
possession.
On
the
other
hand,
permitting
construction without adequate safeguards may materially
change the nature of the suit property and may give rise to
further equities and complications in the event the plaintiff
ultimately
succeeds.
The
interests
of
justice
would,
therefore, be better served by suitably modifying the interim
arrangement rather than either maintaining an absolute
restraint or permitting unrestricted construction.
25.
The statement made on behalf of the petitioners that they
are prepared to undertake that any construction raised
during the pendency of the suit shall be entirely at their
own risk and cost and that no equity shall be claimed on
the basis thereof assumes significance in this regard. Such
an undertaking, if made binding upon the petitioners and
coupled with appropriate safeguards against alienation or
creation of third-party rights, would substantially protect
the plaintiff against the possibility of the construction being
relied upon to defeat or dilute the relief that may ultimately
be granted in his favour.
MA No. 14/2026
26.
Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits
of the respective claims of the parties, this petition is
disposed of by modifying the order dated 10.04.2026 passed
by the trial Court to the following extent:
(i) The petitioners/defendants shall be permitted to
proceed with construction over the suit land to the
extent of laying of a single floor only, to be used for
convening of Sangat only, after filing before the trial
Court an unconditional undertaking, duly supported
by an affidavit, that the construction so raised by
them during the pendency of the suit shall be entirely
at their own risk, cost and responsibility;
(ii) the petitioners shall specifically undertake that, in
the event the respondent/plaintiff ultimately succeeds
in obtaining a decree entitling him to possession of the
suit property, they shall, without claiming any equity,
compensation or other right on account of the
construction so raised, remove/demolish the same at
their own cost to the extent required for
implementation of the decree;
(iii) no construction raised during the pendency of the
suit shall create or be treated as creating any equity in
favour of the petitioners, the Sangat, contributors,
donors or any other person;
(iv) the petitioners shall not alienate, transfer,
encumber, lease out or otherwise create any thirdparty interest in the suit property, or in any
construction raised thereon, during the pendency of
the suit;
(v) the construction, if undertaken, shall remain
subject to the final outcome of the suit and shall not
be relied upon by the petitioners to seek any
advantage on the ground of change in the nature or
character of the property or on the basis of
expenditure incurred thereon; and
(vi) save to the extent modified hereinabove, the
parties shall continue to remain bound by the
impugned order.
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26. It is made clear that the observations made in this order are
confined to the adjudication of the present petition and the
interim arrangement between the parties. Nothing stated
herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the
title, possession, tenancy rights or any other substantive
issue arising in the suit. The trial Court shall decide all such
issues independently, on the basis of the pleadings and
evidence before it, uninfluenced by any observation made
herein.
27. Having regard to the nature of the controversy and the fact
that the dispute concerns immovable property over which
construction is proposed, the trial Court shall endeavour to
proceed with the suit expeditiously and avoid unnecessary
adjournments to either side.
28. The petition, along with all connected application(s), stands
disposed of in the above terms.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
(Sanjay Parihar)
ge
JAMMU
05.08.2026
Sneha
Whether the order is speaking: Yes/No
Whether the order is reportable: Yes/No
MA No. 14/2026
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