Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd. vs The State of Telangana & Ors.

Hyderabad Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Applicability of – Held: The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for the reason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the religious institutions in terms of s.1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter in terms of first proviso to s.4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act – Thus, any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposes of negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights – It has been categorically held by the Joint Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt – Telangana Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 – Andhra Pradesh (Amendment) Act, 1994.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 What is the effect of the order dated 25.8.2007 passed by the Joint Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act?

The Inams Abolition Act abolished all inams (grants) by the Nizam. The Act contemplates adjudication of matters in relation to grant of occupancy rights and certificates in respect of inam lands covered by the Act and vested with the Government, inquiry into the nature and history of such lands, determination of compensation payable to the Inamdar and apportionment thereto. Sections 4 to 8 of the Inams Abolition Act came into force on 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of grant of occupancy rights under the Inams Act. It appears that the Mutt entered into an agreement with one Kalyani Narsing Rao. He filed an application for grant of occupancy rights. Such application was allowed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner on 27.11.2004. The Revenue Divisional Officer was considering an application for issuance of occupancy rights certificate to the general power of attorney holder of the Mutt. The application was allowed. In an appeal under Section

24 of the Inams Abolition Act, a finding was returned that the land in question was converted into for nonagricultural use before 1973. The issue no. 2 therein was to the effect whether the land in question was under agriculture as on the crucial date. The finding on the said issue is that it was being used for nonagricultural purposes. The Inams Abolition Act was enacted to abolish the inams and to confer occupancy rights to the tiller. Since the land was an inam land given to the charitable and religious institutions, it was found to be exempt from the operation of the Inams Abolition Act. The Joint Collector held that the land is an inam land and in terms of proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act, the inam was held by or for the benefit of charitable and religious institutions, therefore, no person shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant and the institution alone shall be entitled to be registered as the occupant. It is the said order of the Revenue Divisional Officer which was set aside by the Joint Collector. [Paras 45 and 46][402-D-F; 403-B-D]

1.2 The scope of inquiry under the said Act was restricted to grant of occupancy rights which was negated for multiple reasons including the fact that the land was not under agriculture on the crucial date. Since the Inams Abolition Act is a special Act in respect of abolition of inams and conferment of occupancy rights, it is an order not by a Tribunal having a plenary jurisdiction. The Tribunal under the Inams Abolition Act had limited jurisdiction to decide the questions arising under the Inams Abolition Act. Therefore, the findings recorded in such proceedings neither act as estoppel, nor res judicata for any other proceedings. The proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act were initiated by a Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights on the basis of an agreement to sell. The Mutt was represented by a Power of Attorney holder who was claiming independent rights, therefore, the previous proceedings were not between the same parties as the Mutt was not a party in its own rights but through an attorney who was claiming independent right in himself. Therefore, the findings recorded therein are not relevant or binding in respect of proceedings under another statute, enacted for different objective to protect the inam land given to the charitable and religious institutions. The Inams Abolition Act is not applicable to the Mutt for the reason that the Act itself is not applicable to charitable and the religious institutions in terms of Section 1(2)(i) up to 26.12.1985 and thereafter in terms of first proviso to Section 4(1) of the Inams Abolition Act. Thus, any finding recorded by the Joint Collector is only for the purposes of negating the claim of Power of Attorney holder claiming occupancy rights. It has been categorically held by the Joint Collector that the Act is not applicable to the Mutt. [Paras 47, 49 and 50][404-H; 405-A-B]

2.1 Whether the land in question is agricultural land to which the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 is applicable and the lease in favor of the lessee stands cancelled in terms of Section 82(1) of the Act? The primary argument of the learned counsel for the lessees is that there was no pleading that the land in question was agricultural land, therefore, the lessees were not made aware of the fact that the lease stands statutorily cancelled. The said argument is not tenable for the reason that the Inspector in his report dated 29.1.2008 and 16.12.2008 reported that the lands in question are agricultural lands and that lease of such lands stands cancelled. The lessee had earlier filed Writ Petition No. 24440 of 2010 challenging the continuation of proceedings before the Endowments Tribunal. In the counter affidavit dated 7.12.2010 filed on behalf of the Mutt, it was stated that the leases have become null and void under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The writ petition was dismissed on 20.1.2011. The High Court also noticed the argument of the Mutt that in terms of Section 82, the leases stood cancelled. The High Court had called for the record of the fourth respondent i.e., the Assistant Commissioner (Endowment). The argument that the land is agricultural land was raised by the Mutt and also recorded in the report of the Inspector. Thus, it is noted that lessees were well aware of the nature of the land as agricultural land. Such order of the High Court has attained finality. The Mutt has based its arguments on the premise that the land in question is agricultural land. [Paras 51-56][406-B-D, F-G, H; 407-F-G]

2.2 A perusal of the written arguments shows that the lessees have submitted that the land is being used for non-agricultural purposes. The entire argument is based upon use of the land for non-agricultural purposes. The nature of land is distinct from the use of the land. Since the land is agricultural land, its use for nonagricultural purposes would not alter the nature of the land as an agricultural land. Section 82 of the 1987 Act mentions “any lease of agricultural land….”, therefore, the lease has to be of agricultural land irrespective of the use to which the lessee may put such agricultural land to. The language of the statute refers to nature of the land and not the use thereof. Therefore, even in terms of the written arguments raised by the lessee before the Tribunal, the use of land for non-agricultural purposes would be irrelevant for statutory cancellation of the lease of agricultural lands under Section 82 of the 1987 Act. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land sought to be drawn from the reading of Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Assessments Act, 1963 repealed by the A.P Agricultural Land (Conversion for Non-Agricultural Purposes) Act, 2006, is not tenable. The distinction between the categories of land leads to consequence of higher assessment in the case of non-agricultural land. The lessee has not led any evidence that they are paying levy as per the rates fixed under this statute as that of nonagricultural land. In respect of the 1987 Act, the Division Bench of the High Court in Siddhartha Academy held that use of land for non-agricultural purpose is immaterial for the purpose of statutory cancellation of lease deed, as provided under Section 82(1) of the said Act. The SLP (Civil) Nos. 25617-25619 of 2013 stood withdrawn on 35 27.2.2017. Thus, the order passed by the Division Bench had attained finality. [Paras 57, 58, 60, 61][408G-H; 409-A-C; 410-B, F] Siddartha Academy of General and Technical

Education v. Deputy Commissioner of Endowments 2010 SCC Online AP 461 – referred to.

3.1 Whether the parties went to trial with the knowledge that the land in question was agricultural land in the proceedings between the parties before the Endowments Tribunal? The 1987 Act is a Code in itself providing for constitution of the Endowments Tribunal, appeal, revision and review. The strict rule of procedure contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of pleadings and evidence cannot be extended to the Tribunal constituted for specific purpose. Since the lessees were aware of the fact that the Mutt claims the land to be agricultural land and statutory cancellation of the lease was being averred for the reason that the leased land was agricultural, therefore, the lessees cannot complain of any violation of principles of natural justice or strict rules of pleading as is required under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the parties were aware of the controversy about the nature of the land. Thus, the lessee cannot be permitted to turn around to dispute the nature of land leased to them. [Paras 63, 66][411-B-D; 412-A] Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal & Anr. (2008) 17 SCC

491 : [2008] 14 SCR 621; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 555 : [1987] 2 SCR 805; Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. (2012) 8 SCC 148 : [2012] 8 SCR 35; Biraji alias Brijraji & Anr. v. Surya Pratap & Ors. (2020) 10 SCC 729 – held inapplicable.

Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao AIR 1963 SC 884 : [1963] SCR 208; Swamy Atmananda & Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors. (2005) 10 SCC 51 : [2005] 3 SCR 556; Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 1 : [2019] 10 SCR 88 – relied on .

3.2 There is merit in the argument raised by the lessees that the lease executed prior to the commencement of 1987 Act would not be annulled for the reason that there was no prior approval. The leases were granted prior to the commencement of the 1987 Act but even under the 1966 Act, Section 70 prohibited lease of the inam land if its term exceeded six years. The lease of land measuring 143 acres vide lease deed dated 23.7.1964; 257 acres 19 guntas vide lease deed dated 14.9.1966 and 2 acres 32 guntas vide lease deed dated 21.3.1969 were not preceded with any prior approval of the competent authority. Reliance is placed upon the note dated 24.2.1964 but such note is part of the decision-making process as no approval was communicated to either the lessee or the lessor or to any person. In fact, the said communication is a note of Second Secretary to Government Home (Endowments-III) Department that lease for a term of 99 years cannot be construed as a transfer of ownership of the endowed lands by outright sale and is prohibited under Rule 331 of Hyderabad State Endowment Rules and Regulations. It is not a communication addressed either to the lessee or to the lessor or to any other person or institution. The regulation

331 prohibits the possession over and transfer of the nuzli lands (tax bearing lands) from generation to generation in future. The note dated 24.02.1964 relied upon to argue that it leads to approval of lease is not a decision which can be said to be effective and binding in view of the judgements of this Court. The only approval of land measuring 173 acres and 19 guntas is dated 10.5.1976. Though there is a reference to the communication of the Commissioner Endowment dated 29.4.1975 in respect of three previous lease deeds, but there is no communication to the Mutt either of the letter dated 10.5.1976 or of 29.4.1975. Section 82 does not make any exception of the lease granted with approval. The approval is mentioned only in Section 75 of the 1987 Act. Even if such approval is treated to have been granted in respect of the entire land, the lease granted with approval is relevant only for the purposes of Section 75 of the 1987 Act and not for the purposes of Section 82 of the said Act. [Paras 6769][412-B-G; 414-A-C]

3.3 Similarly, the argument that the land now falls within the urban agglomeration in view of the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is again not tenable. Firstly, the said Act stands repealed on 22.3.1999. Still further, the mere fact that the land has come within the municipal limits would not make the land as non-agricultural land. It only means that the land within the municipal limits can be utilized or the buildings be constructed in terms of the provisions of the Municipal Laws applicable thereto. Similarly, the argument that the land in question falls with the Zonal Development Plan for Kukatpally as per the communication of the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority is again not tenable. The Zonal Development Plan is future planning of the development of the area. Thus, in future, the land can be used only according to Zonal Development Plan but that does not mean that the agricultural nature of the land has ceased to exist. Therefore, the said communication is also not tenable. [Paras 70, 71][414-C-F]

3.4 In Civil Appeal No. 7761 of 2014, there is a direction to consider the request of the lessee. However, Rule 15 of the Telangana Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Immovable Properties and other Rights (Other than Agricultural Land) Leases and Licenses Rules, 2003 will have no application to the agricultural land in view of the fact that Section 82(3) and (4) is applicable only to the land and property which is not agricultural. Since the land has been found to be agricultural, therefore, 2003 Rules would not be applicable to the land in question. Thus, the direction to consider the request of the lessee to consider the grant of lease under Rule 15 is untenable and is set aside. [Paras 72, 73][414-F-H] Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and Anr. (1999) 5 SCC 590 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 514; Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Officer in Charge (Court of Wards) (1976) 3 SCC 864 : [1977] 1 SCR 146; Sarifabibi Mohmed Ibrahim (SMT) v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujrat (1993) 4 Supp SCC 707 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 264; ITC Limited v. Blue Coast Hotels Limited (2018) 15 SCC 99 : [2018] 5 SCR 516; Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 141 : [2009] 3 SCR 1122; State of A.P. v. Nallamilli Rami Reddy & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 708 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 287; Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors. AIR 1956 SC 593 : [1956] SCR 451; A.P. Punjabi Sabha, Hyderabad v. Joint Collector, Hyderabad 2004 SCC OnLine AP 689 – referred to.