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Serial No.10
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CM(M) No. 195/2023
CM No. 6190/2023
Date of pronouncement:- 03.11.2026
Uploaded on :- 12.11.2026
01.
Girdhari Lal S/o Late Dharam Chand
R/o Village Supwal, Tehsil Vijaypur
District Samba.
02.
Tirath Ram S/o Late Dharma Chand
R/o Village Supwal, Tehsil Vijaypur
District Samba.
…..Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. D.K. Khajuria, Advocate.
Vs
Brij Lal S/o Late Govind Ram
R/o Supwal, Tehsil Vijaypur, District Samba
.…. Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Dhiraj Chowdhary, Advocate.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
03.11.2026
01.
The petitioners, by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court,
have called in question the legality and propriety of the order dated
16.06.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge, Samba (hereinafter
referred to as the Appellate Court) in an appeal titled “Brij Lal v.
Girdhari Lal and Another”, whereby the Appellate Court, while setting
aside the order dated 02.03.2023 passed by the Trial Court, modified the
interim protection granted in favour of the petitioners and directed the
parties to maintain status quo with respect to the suit land.
CM(M) No. 195/2023
02.
The principal grievance projected by the petitioners is that the Appellate
Court has failed to appreciate the material available on record, particularly
the revenue entries reflecting the possession of the petitioners and their
predecessor-in-interest over the land measuring 07 Kanals and 06 Marlas,
falling under Khasra No. 419, situated at Village Supwal, Tehsil Vijaypur,
District Samba. It is contended that the land is recorded as Shamlat Deh
and that the revenue records disclose the cultivating possession of Dharam
Chand, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, over a portion thereof.
According to the petitioners, the Appellate Court, without properly
appreciating the distinction between the rival claims and the material
bearing upon possession, has erroneously substituted the order of
injunction passed by the Trial Court with a direction to maintain status
quo. It is further alleged that the respondent, taking undue advantage of
the impugned order, forcibly interfered with and assumed possession of
the suit land. The petitioners, therefore, seek interference by this Court for
correction of the alleged jurisdictional and legal errors committed by the
Appellate Court.
03.
The facts necessary for adjudication of the controversy, briefly stated, are
that the plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction
before the Trial Court in respect of land measuring 07 Kanals and 06
Marlas, comprising Khasra No. 419, situated at Village Supwal, Tehsil
Vijaypur, District Samba. The plaintiff asserted that he and the proforma
defendant were in exclusive physical possession of the suit land, having
cultivated fodder crops over a portion thereof, while the remaining portion
was lying vacant. It was pleaded that their father, Dharam Chand, had
CM(M) No. 195/2023
been holding the land in ownership and cultivating possession and that,
upon his demise, the plaintiff and the proforma defendant succeeded to his
rights and continued in possession thereof.
04.
The plaintiff further pleaded that the contesting defendant had no right,
title or interest in the suit land and was attempting to interfere with the
peaceful possession of the plaintiff and the proforma defendant without
any lawful justification. Apprehending forcible interference and
dispossession, the plaintiff sought a decree of permanent prohibitory
injunction, besides interim protection under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
05.
The contesting defendant resisted the suit by filing a written statement,
wherein the claim of exclusive possession set up by the plaintiff was
specifically denied. It was asserted that the defendant was a co-sharer in
the suit land and, therefore, no injunction could be granted against him in
the manner prayed for. The defendant also raised objections regarding the
maintainability of the suit, non-joinder of necessary parties and
jurisdiction of the Civil Court, having regard to the agricultural nature of
the land. Reference was additionally made to another suit titled “Brij Lal
v. Vinay Sharma”, concerning land falling under the same Khasra
number, stated to be pending before another Court at Samba, wherein an
ex parte interim order had allegedly been passed.
06.
It also emerges from the record that another suit titled “Madan Lal v.
Vinay Sharma” had been instituted, wherein Brij Lal, Khem Raj, Sham
Krishan and Sunil Sharma were arrayed as proforma defendants. The
existence of these proceedings was relied upon by the contesting
CM(M) No. 195/2023
defendant to question the maintainability of the suit and the entitlement of
the plaintiff to interim relief.
07.
Upon consideration of the pleadings, revenue records and other material
placed before it, the Trial Court, by order dated 02.03.2023, allowed the
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and restrained the
contesting defendant, Brij Lal, from interfering with the possession of the
plaintiff over the suit land, forcibly occupying the same or dispossessing
the plaintiff therefrom, except in accordance with law.
08.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the contesting defendant preferred an
appeal before the Additional District Judge, Samba. The Appellate Court,
by the impugned order dated 16.06.2023, proceeded to examine the
revenue entries, including Mutation Nos. 249 and 480. It noticed that
Mutation No. 249, relating to the estate of Ganju Ram, had been attested
in favour of Girdhari Lal, Des Raj, Mulakh Raj and Chuni Lal, sons of
Ganju Ram, whereas Mutation No. 480, relating to the estate of Govind
Ram, had been attested in favour of Sham Lal, Brij Lal, Sunil Sharma,
Tripta Devi and Sarika Sharma. On the basis of its appreciation of the
revenue record and the rival claims of co-sharer ship, the Appellate Court
concluded that the restraint imposed by the Trial Court would occasion
greater prejudice and irreparable injury to the contesting defendant. It
accordingly modified the order of the Trial Court and directed the parties
to maintain status quo with respect to the suit land.
09.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has assailed the impugned
order primarily on the ground that the Appellate Court has proceeded
upon an erroneous appreciation of the identity of the persons reflected in
CM(M) No. 195/2023
the revenue records. It is submitted that the Appellate Court failed to
distinguish between two individuals bearing the name Girdhari Lal, one
being the son of Ganju Ram and the other being the son of Dharam
Chand. The plaintiff, Girdhari Lal, is the son of Dharam Chand, whereas
Girdhari Lal, son of Ganju Ram, belonged to a different branch of the
family and is stated to have since died. According to learned counsel, the
failure to appreciate this material distinction has substantially vitiated the
reasoning adopted by the Appellate Court.
10.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners are the sons of
Dharam Chand, a fact which, according to him, is also borne out from the
stand taken by the contesting defendant before the Trial Court. It is urged
that the revenue entries, when read in their proper perspective and in
conjunction with the genealogy of the parties, prima facie support the
possession asserted by the petitioners. The Appellate Court, it is
contended, has failed to identify any perversity, illegality or material
irregularity in the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court warranting
appellate interference. The impugned order is, therefore, sought to be set
aside.
11.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the order
passed by the Appellate Court. It is contended that the dispute essentially
relates to the respective shares and possession of the parties in Shamlat
Deh land and that the parties claim through co-sharers having interests
therein. It is argued that an injunction in favour of one co-sharer,
operating to the exclusion of another, could not have been granted without
proper adjudication of their respective rights. Learned counsel has further
CM(M) No. 195/2023
submitted that the Civil Court's jurisdiction itself was under challenge in
view of the agricultural character of the land and the applicable statutory
provisions. According to him, the Appellate Court was justified in
modifying the injunction and directing maintenance of status quo so as to
preserve the subject matter of the litigation.
12.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available
on record.
13.
The controversy requiring consideration is whether, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court was justified in interfering
with the discretionary order of temporary injunction passed by the Trial
Court and substituting the same with a direction to maintain status quo.
The determination of this question necessarily requires examination of the
prima facie material concerning possession, the competing claims of cosharer ship and the principles governing appellate interference with orders
passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
14.
At the outset, it deserves to be noticed that the plaintiff, Girdhari Lal,
claims through his father, Dharam Chand, and is stated to be
approximately 86 years of age, while his brother, Tirath Ram, is stated to
be approximately 76 years of age. The contesting defendant, Brij Lal, on
the other hand, claims through his father, late Govind Ram. The material
placed on record indicates that the parties trace their respective claims
through different branches of a common family. The distinction assumes
significance in view of the fact that the revenue records also refer to
another person bearing the name Girdhari Lal, who was the son of Ganju
Ram.
CM(M) No. 195/2023
15.
A perusal of the revenue extracts reveals that Khasra No. 419 comprises
land measuring 07 Kanals and 06 Marlas, reflected in two portions
measuring 05 Kanals and 06 Marlas and 02 Kanals, respectively. The
revenue entries record the cultivating possession of a person named
Girdhari Lal over the former portion and that of Dharam Chand,
shareholder, over the latter portion. The identity of the person named
Girdhari Lal in the revenue record, particularly in the light of the
existence of two persons bearing the same name, was thus a material
circumstance requiring careful consideration. The Appellate Court was
obliged to examine the entries in conjunction with the genealogy and the
other material available on record, rather than treating the similarity of
names as sufficient to determine the competing claims.
16.
The Trial Court, while considering the application for temporary
injunction, had noticed the nature of the land as Shamlat Deh and the rival
claims of the parties concerning their respective shares and possession. It
also took note of the fact that Dharam Chand, Govind Ram and
Vishwanath, son of Sant Ram alias Santu, were stated to have held
proprietary interests in Village Supwal and, consequently, claimed
corresponding interests in the Shamlat Deh land. The plaintiff's case was
that the respective predecessors-in-interest had been enjoying distinct
portions of the land and that their successors continued to assert
possession through them.
17.
The plaintiff had further asserted that the arrangement relating to the
respective shares of the predecessors-in-interest had resulted in separate
enjoyment of portions of the suit land. According to the plaintiff, Dharam
CM(M) No. 195/2023
Chand had been allotted or was otherwise enjoying one-half share, while
the remaining share was associated with the branches represented by
Govind Ram and Vishwanath. Upon the demise of the respective
predecessors, their successors stepped into their shoes. These assertions,
however, constitute matters requiring adjudication upon evidence and
cannot, at the interlocutory stage, be treated as conclusively establishing
title or the precise extent of the respective shares.
18.
What assumes significance at the present stage is that the Trial Court,
upon consideration of the revenue record and the material placed before it,
recorded a prima facie satisfaction regarding the possession asserted by
the plaintiff and the proforma defendant. It was on that basis that the Trial
Court found a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and considered it
appropriate to protect the existing possession against forcible interference
or dispossession pending adjudication of the suit.
19.
It is well settled that the grant or refusal of temporary injunction is an
exercise of judicial discretion governed by the existence of a prima facie
case, the balance of convenience and the likelihood of irreparable injury.
Equally settled is the principle that an Appellate Court, while examining
an order granting or refusing temporary injunction, does not exercise its
jurisdiction merely to substitute its own discretion for that of the Trial
Court. Interference is warranted where the discretion exercised by the
Trial Court is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse or contrary to
settled principles of law, or where material circumstances have been
ignored. Where the view adopted by the Trial Court is reasonably possible
CM(M) No. 195/2023
on the material before it, the mere existence of another possible view
would not, by itself, justify appellate interference.
20.
Tested on the aforesaid principles, the impugned order does not appear to
be sustainable. The Appellate Court, though referring to the revenue
extracts and mutation entries, failed to adequately appreciate the material
distinction between the two individuals named Girdhari Lal and the
separate lines of succession through which the rival parties asserted their
claims. The plaintiff, Girdhari Lal, claims through Dharam Chand,
whereas the other Girdhari Lal, referred to in the revenue and succession
record, was the son of Ganju Ram. The contesting defendant, Brij Lal,
claims through Govind Ram. These distinctions were relevant to the
determination of the prima facie rights and possession of the parties and
could not have been overlooked while considering whether the Trial Court
had exercised its discretion on a legally sustainable basis.
21.
The record further indicates that Ganju Ram, Vishwanath and Dharam
Chand belonged to the same ancestral family, with the contesting
defendant claiming through the branch of Ganju Ram and the plaintiff
claiming through Dharam Chand. The mere fact that the parties trace their
lineage to a common ancestor does not, without more, establish that every
parcel of land claimed by one branch continues to be jointly possessed by
all the branches. Whether the suit land is jointly owned, whether there has
been any lawful partition or arrangement, and whether the parties are
entitled to possession of particular portions are questions which
necessarily require determination on the basis of pleadings, revenue
records and evidence. At the interlocutory stage, however, the Court is
CM(M) No. 195/2023
required to assess the existing state of possession and to ensure that the
subject matter of the litigation is not disturbed by unilateral acts of either
party.
22.
In the present case, the contesting defendant asserted co-sharer ship in the
suit land but failed, at the stage of consideration of the application for
temporary injunction, to place such cogent prima facie material before the
Trial Court as would displace the possession found in favour of the
plaintiff. A mere assertion of co-ownership, without sufficient supporting
material demonstrating an existing right to interfere with the possession
claimed by the plaintiff, could not by itself furnish a ground for denying
interim protection. Even where parties claim to be co-sharers, the question
whether one of them is in settled and separate possession of an
identifiable portion of the joint property remains a relevant consideration
for the grant of an injunction against forcible dispossession or
interference.
23.
The Appellate Court appears to have proceeded on the premise that the
restraint imposed by the Trial Court would cause greater prejudice to the
contesting defendant by reason of his asserted status as a co-sharer. Such
an approach, without first examining whether the claim of co-sharership
was prima facie supported by the relevant record and whether the
defendant was shown to be in possession of the portion sought to be
protected, cannot be sustained. The balance of convenience and
irreparable injury were required to be assessed in the context of the
possession disclosed by the material on record and the consequences
CM(M) No. 195/2023
likely to follow from disturbing such possession during the pendency of
the suit.
24.
The direction to maintain status quo, though ordinarily intended to
preserve the subject matter of litigation, cannot be regarded as an
adequate substitute for a specific order of injunction in every case. Where
the Trial Court has, on a prima facie appreciation of the record, identified
the possession requiring protection, a general direction to maintain status
quo, without clearly determining the factual position sought to be
preserved, may itself give rise to uncertainty and further disputes. In the
facts of the present case, the Appellate Court was required to identify a
legally sustainable ground for disturbing the specific protection granted by
the Trial Court. No such ground is discernible from the reasoning
recorded in the impugned order.
25.
The objection regarding non-joinder of necessary parties and the plea
concerning the maintainability of the suit were also matters requiring
consideration by the Trial Court in accordance with law. The existence of
such objections did not, in the circumstances of the case, automatically
disentitle the plaintiff to interim protection, particularly when the Trial
Court had prima facie found possession in his favour. Questions relating
to jurisdiction, maintainability and the rights of the respective parties are
undoubtedly important, but their determination must proceed in the
manner contemplated by law. Unless the Court is demonstrably precluded
from exercising jurisdiction or granting the relief sought, the mere raising
of such objections cannot, by itself, justify disturbance of possession
pending adjudication.
CM(M) No. 195/2023
26.
Insofar as the pendency of other suits concerning land comprised in
Khasra No. 419 is concerned, the same does not, by itself, constitute
sufficient justification for interfering with the order passed by the Trial
Court. The parties to those proceedings are not shown to be identical in all
respects, although the subject matter may overlap. Whether the suits
involve substantially common questions of fact and law, whether they
ought to be tried together, or whether any procedural arrangement is
necessary to avoid conflicting decisions are matters to be examined by the
competent Court upon an appropriate application. The parties shall be at
liberty to seek consolidation or analogous hearing of the proceedings, if
otherwise permissible under law.
27.
The learned Trial Court, while dealing with the application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, was principally concerned with preserving
the subject matter of the suit and protecting the possession prima facie
established before it, until the rights of the parties could be finally
determined. The Trial Court had considered the material placed on record
and exercised its discretion in favour of granting protection against
forcible interference and dispossession. The Appellate Court, without
demonstrating that the discretion so exercised suffered from perversity,
arbitrariness or disregard of settled legal principles, proceeded to modify
the order merely on a different appreciation of the rival claims. Such
substitution of discretion was not warranted in the facts and circumstances
of the case.
28.
Having considered the matter in its entirety, this Court is of the view that
the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the material circumstances
CM(M) No. 195/2023
bearing upon the prima facie possession of the plaintiff and the distinct
branches of succession through which the parties claimed their respective
rights. The Trial Court had exercised its discretion upon consideration of
the relevant material, and no sufficient legal basis existed for the
Appellate Court to substitute the order of injunction with a general
direction to maintain status quo. The impugned order, therefore, suffers
from a material error in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and warrants
interference by this Court.
29.
Accordingly, the present petition is allowed. The order dated 16.06.2023
passed by the Additional District Judge, Samba, in the appeal titled “Brij
Lal v. Girdhari Lal and Another” is set aside. Consequently, the order
dated 02.03.2023 passed by the Trial Court on the application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC is restored.
30.
However, in order to safeguard the subject matter of the litigation and to
ensure that the rights of the parties are not prejudiced during the pendency
of the suit, it is directed that the plaintiff shall not create any third-party
interest in the suit land until disposal of the suit or until further orders of
the competent Court.
31.
It is further clarified that the question regarding the maintainability of the
suit, including the objection that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is
barred by the provisions of the Agrarian Reforms Act, is expressly left
open for consideration by the Trial Court. The Trial Court shall be at
liberty to frame and decide a preliminary issue in this regard, if
permissible under law, or to determine the objection at the appropriate
stage in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and settled
CM(M) No. 195/2023
principles of law. The Trial Court shall proceed with the adjudication of
the suit uninfluenced by any observations made herein on the merits of the
rival claims, which are confined to the determination of the interlocutory
controversy. The rights and contentions of both parties on all substantive
issues shall remain open.
32.
The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
Jammu
03.11.2026
Renu
Whether the order is speaking: Yes.
Whether the order is reportable: Yes.
CM(M) No. 195/2023
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