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2025:KER:28390
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
THURSDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF APRIL 2025 / 13TH CHAITHRA, 1947
RFA NO. 97 OF 2016 (J)
AGAINST THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT DATED 31.07.2015 IN O.S. NO.211 OF 1992
OF SUB COURT, KOTTARAKKARA
APPELLANT/DEFENDANT:
G.VISWANATHAN
AGED 75 YEARS
SABITHA HOUSE, LION'S COLONY, MUNDAKKAL, KOLLAM, PIN-691010,
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT SHAJI BHAVANAM, KILLINOOR PO,
KOLLAM, PIN- 691004
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.V.GOPINATHAN NAIR
P.VISWANATHAN (SR.)(K/000283/1986)
RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFFS:
ABRAHAM SALAMMA
AGED 55 YEARS
W/O.T.V ABRAHAM, SALEM MANDIRAM, KOTTAPPURAM, KIZHAKKEKARA,
KOTTARAKARA VILLAGE, PIN-691532
NOW RESIDING AT BOTHUTHATSWANA, MAMABATHO 8681 P.B. 6238,
AFRICA
T.V.ABRAHAM
AGED 63 YEARS
SALEM MANDIRAM, KOTTAPPURAM, KIZHAKKEKARA, KOTTARAKARA
VILLAGE, PIN-691532
NOW RESIDING AT BOTHUTHATSWANA, MAMABATHO 8681 P.B. 6238,
AFRICA
ABRAHAM LOVELY
AGED 52 YEARS
W/O.CK.ALEXANDER, SALEM MANDIRAM, KOTTAPPURAM, KIZHAKKEKARA,
KOTTARAKARA VILLAGE, PIN-691532
RESPONDENTS ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR POWER OF ATTORNEY
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
HOLDER, C.K. ALEXANDER, AGED 36 YEARS, SALEM MANDIRAM,
KOTTAPPURAM, KIZHAKKEKARA, KOTTARAKARA VILLAGE, PIN-691532
BY ADVS.
SRI.B.ASHOK SHENOY
SRI.K.V.GEORGE
SRI.P.S.GIREESH
SRI.P.N.RAJAGOPALAN NAIR
SRI.RIYAL DEVASSY
THIS
REGULAR
FIRST
APPEAL
HAVING
BEEN
FINALLY
24.03.2025, THE COURT ON 03.04.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
HEARD
ON
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
“C.R”
JUDGMENT
Dated this the 3rd day of April, 2025
This regular first appeal has been filed under
Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred as ‘CPC’ for short],
challenging the decree and judgment dated 31.07.2015 in
O.S.
No.211/1992
on
the
files
of
the
Sub
Court,
Kottarakkara. The appellant herein is the defendant and the
respondents herein are the plaintiffs in the above suit.
2.
Heard the learned senior counsel for appellant and
the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in detail.
Perused the verdict under challenge, the records of the trial
court and the decisions placed by both sides.
3.
Parties in this appeal shall be referred with
reference to their status before the trial court, hereafter.
4.
The plaintiffs instituted this suit for recovery of
possession of plaint A schedule property with vacant
possession of plaint B schedule temporary cinema theater
and for realization of Rs.48,200/- towards compensation for
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
use and occupation of plaint B schedule item till the date of
the suit and Rs.1,500/- per mensum from the date of suit till
recovery of possession. The plaintiffs also sought the relief
of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove
the machinery and furniture from plaint B schedule theater.
The main contentions raised by the plaintiffs could be
gathered from paragraph Nos.3 and 4 of the plaint. The
same read as under:
3. By a tharavadaka agreement dated
23-5-1966 Geevarghese Abraham permitted one
K.M.Cherian to construct a temporary theatre in
the suit A schedule property for exhibition of
films in that theatre. Accordingly K.M.Cherian
put up a temporary theatre in the suit A
schedule property in 1966 itself and he began
exhibition of films in that theatre. That theatre
was named by him as Jawahar theatre. The term
of the tharavadaka agreement was fixed as ten
years. K.M.Cherian was given an option to
extend the term for a further period of 5 years if
he was interested to do so. After the expiry of
the period of 10 years K.M. Cherian exercised
the option and the period of the agreement was
further extended for 5 years. In the agreement
executed
by
K.M.Cherian
and
Geevarghese
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
Abraham
dated
23-5-1966,
Κ.Μ.
Cherian
covenanted to surrender the temporary theatre
to Geevarghese Abraham on the termination of
the
tharavadaka
agreement.
By
that
tharavadaka
agreement
K.M.Cherian
was
licensee
the
schedule
property.
of
Permission
granted
suit
to
K.M.Cherian
a
was
restricted to the construction of temporary
theatre and exhibition of films in that theatre.
K.M.Cherian was not permitted to do any other
act in the suit schedule property. K.M Cherian
has not done any other thing in the suit
schedule property. He paid theravadaka to
Geevarghese Abraham as consideration for the
licence.
4. At the fag-end of the term of the
tharavadaka agreement K.M. Cherian had put
the defendant in charge of the exhibition of films
in the theatre. He conducted exhibition of films
in the theatre as an employee of K.M Cherian.
5.
The specific case of the plaintiffs before the trial
court was that, a fresh tharavadaka agreement was
executed
between
Mr.Geevarghese
Abraham
and
the
defendant on 18.02.1982, for a period of two years and
thereafter the same was extended till 1989. According to the
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
plaintiffs, the status of the defendant is that of a licensee
and therefore the reliefs sought in the plaint are liable to be
granted.
6.
The defendant resisted the suit by filing written
statement
and
additional
written
statement.
The
contentions raised by the defendant could be gathered
from paragraph Nos.3, 5, 9 and 11 of the written
statement. The same read as under:
3. Plaint A schedule property is 23 cents
of dry land. That 23 cents consist of 19 cents in
Sy.No.17/8
and
cents
in
Sy.No.17/9.
Sy.No.17/9 is situated on the southern side of
Sy.No.17/8. The total extent of Sy.No.17/9 is 16
cents. The four cents included in schedule A
constitute the middle portion of that 16 cents.
Kollam- shencottah road is situated on the
southern side of Sy.No.17/9.
5. By a lease deed dated 23-5-1966
Geevarghese Abraham demised A schedule
land on lease to one K .M. Cherian. By that
lease deed Geevarghese Abraham authorised
K.M. Cherian to construct a theatre in B
schedule land and to conduct the business of
exhibiting cinematograph films in that theatre.
K.M.Cherian covenanted to pay rent at the rate
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
of Rs.100/- (Rupees One hundred only) per
mensem. The term of the lease was fixed as
ten
years
from
23-5-1966.
Geevarghese
Abraham also gave K.M. Cherian the option to
extend the term of lease for a further period of
five year.
9. After the expiry of the term of the
renewed
lease
Geevarghese
Abraham
attempted to obstruct the exhibition of films in
B
schedule
theatre
by
the
defendant.
Thereupon the defendant as the Attorney of
K.M.Cherian filed a suit in the court of the
Munsiff of Kottarakara as O.S.No.139 of 1981.
The defendant filed that suit for an injunction
restraining
Geevarghese
Abraham
from
trespassing into the plaint properties or from
obstructing the defendant's possession and
enjoyment thereof.
11.
The
Geevarghese
defendant,
Abraham
K.M.Cherian
and
compromised
the
disputes between them. As per the compromise
K.M.Cherian assigned his tenancy rights in A
schedule land to the defendant. Accordingly the
defendant and Geevarghese Abraham executed
an
agreement
on
23-2-1982.
By
that
agreement Geevarghese Abraham allowed the
defendant to continue in possession of A
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
schedule property as a lessee. The defendant
covenanted to pay rent at the rate of Rs.350/per mensem, for a period of two years from
18-2-1982.
Geevarghese
Abraham
also
acknowledged that defendant was the owner of
B schedule theatre. Pursuant to that agreement
the defendant continued to be in possession of
A
schedule
property
as
the
lessee.
He
continued to be in possession of B schedule
theatre as its owner.
7.
The defendant has a contention further that, later
the lease deed executed in between Mr.Geevarghese
Abraham and the defendant was renewed on 01.08.1984,
01.11.1986 and 01.01.1989. Accordingly, the defendant
claimed protection under Section 106 of the Kerala Land
Reforms Act, 1963 [hereinafter referred as ‘KLR Act’ for
short].
8.
Initially, when the suit was pending before the
trial court, in order to decide the question of protection
under Section 106 of the KLR Act, I.A. No.120/1997 was
filed to refer the matter to the Land Tribunal, Kollam. On
reference, the Land Tribunal, Kollam passed an ex-parte
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order dated 15.07.1998 in R.C. No.3/1997 and protection
under Section 106 of the KLR Act found in favour of the
defendant. On the basis of the said finding, the suit was
dismissed as per the judgment dated 14.07.2009.
9.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed appeal vide R.F.A.
No.769/2009 before this Court. As per the judgment dated
30.01.2015 in R.F.A. No.769/2009, this Court set aside the
decree and judgment of the trial court and the suit was
remanded back to the trial court for fresh consideration. In
paragraph No.5 of the judgment dated 30.01.2015 in R.F.A.
No.769/2009, this Court observed as under:
5. The materials on record indicate that
the plaintiffs have not appeared before the Land
Tribunal pursuant to the reference made by the
trial court. The decision of the Land Tribunal, in
the circumstance, was ex parte. Though the
learned counsel for the appellants submitted
the reasons for their absence before the Land
Tribunal, I am not referring to those reasons, as
I am convinced that the impugned order is
liable to be set aside on a point of jurisdiction. It
is settled that there is no ouster of jurisdiction
for the civil court to decide a claim for
protection under Section 106 of the Act and that
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
the said claim, if raised shall be decided by the
civil court itself. It is so held by this Court in
Govinda Panicker v. Sreedhara Warrier
(2000 (2) KLT 43). The decision of the Land
Tribunal,
based
on
which
the
impugned
judgment was rendered by the trial court is,
therefore, without jurisdiction. The impugned
judgment, in the circumstances, is liable to be
set aside.
10. After remand, the trial court, on appreciation of
rival pleadings, raised necessary issues and tried the
matter. PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A18
were marked on the side of the plaintiff. DW1 was
examined and Exts.B1 to B12 were marked on the side of
the defendants. Exts.C1 to C6 were also marked as court
exhibits.
11. Finally, the trial court found that the defendant is
a licensee and he could not get protection under Section
106 of the KLR Act. Accordingly, recovery of possession as
well
as
mandatory
injunction
to
surrender
vacant
possession of plaint A and B items were granted by the trial
court. Further, the relief sought for by the plaintiffs with
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regard
to
compensation
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and
damages
for
use
and
occupation of plaint A schedule property was also granted
by the trial court.
12. While challenging the verdict of the trial court,
the learned senior counsel for the defendant argued that,
since the status of the defendant is that of a tenant before
20.05.1967, he was protected under Section 106 of the KLR
Act and thus Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
suit. The learned senior counsel for the defendant pointed
out that, Ext.A12 is the initial document executed on
23.05.1966 in between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.
K.M. Cherian. Ext.A12 would recite the same as a lease
agreement and it was agreed to hand over the possession
of plaint A schedule property for the purpose of running
cinema theater, after constructing the same. According to
the learned senior counsel for the defendant, the tenancy
arrangement as per Ext.A12 agreement was periodically
renewed thereafter by executing Exts.A6 to A9. Thus, it is
emphatically clear that the arrangement in between Mr.
Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian is not a license
and the same is a lease. Therefore, the defendant, who is
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
continuing
the
tenancy,
started
originally
before
20.05.1967, would get protection under Section 106 of the
KLR Act. It is argued by the learned senior counsel for the
defendant further that, the suit was not properly valued
and the suit valued and court fee paid under Section 31 of
the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1959, on the
premise that the suit is based on license arrangement also
is incorrect.
13. Decisions of this Court in Ratheesh v. V.S.
Mary reported in [2023 (6) KHC 306 : 2023 KHC
OnLine 610 : 2023 (5) KLT 588] and Karunagappally
Coir Vyavasaya Cooperative Society Ltd. v. Sankaran
Namboothiri Ramachandran Namboodiri reported in
[2024 KHC 7338 : 2024 KHC OnLine 7338 : 2024 KLT
OnLine 3030] have been placed by the learned senior
counsel for the defendant to contend that the status of the
defendant is that of a lessee and if he is found to be not
entitled to get protection under Section 106 pf the KLR Act,
then also the suit must fail for want of notice terminating
tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 [hereinafter referred as ‘TP Act’ for short].
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
14. In paragraph Nos.22, 23 and 24 of Ratheesh’s
case (supra) this Court held as under:
22. As regards to the third question, the
learned counsel for the respondent placed
decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Jacob
Philip v. State Bank of Travancore & Others,
reported in 1972 KLT 914 (F.B.) and submitted
that when there is a contract to the contrary,
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (`TP
Act' for short hereafter) has no application and
in such cases, notice under Section 106 of the
TP Act is not mandatory. He also placed another
decision
of
the
Apex
Court
in
NOPANY
Investments (P) Ltd. Vs. Santokh Singh (HUF),
reported in (2008) 2 SCC 728 and submitted
that in paragraph 22 of the above judgment, it
was held by the Apex Court that it is well
settled that filing of an eviction suit under the
general law itself is a notice to quit on the
tenant. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold
that no notice to quit was necessary under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act in
order to enable the respondent to get a decree
of eviction against the appellant. This view has
also been expressed in the decision of this
Court in V.Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal.
23. In this connection, it is necessary to
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
refer another decision of the Apex Court in
Vijayalaxmi M. v. G.Goverdhan Reddy, reported
in 1997 KHC 3882 SC : 1997 KHC 3882 :
(1997) 11 SCC 358. In the said case, the Apex
Court considered a lease agreement providing
11 months period, wherein sufficiency of
notice was challenged on the ground that the
termination
of
tenancy
with
effect
from
28.02.1985, in a case where the tenancy
started on 02.04.1984 for a period of 11
months, is invalid. The Apex Court held in
paragraph No.4 as under:
“4.
The
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent has urged that the suit filed by the
appellant
was
based
on
the
alleged
termination of the tenancy by notice dated 281- 1985 and since the said notice was invalid
the suit must fail. We are unable to agree. The
suit was for recovery of possession of the
premises after termination of the tenancy.
Merely because the appellant had given a
notice terminating the tenancy by notice dated
28-1- 1984 (sic 1985) would not mean that the
appellant
was
not
entitled
to
seek
the
possession of the property after tenancy had
come to an end by efflux of time under
S.111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act.
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Therefore, even if it is held that the notice
dated 28-1-1985 was not a valid notice under
S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act it could
be regarded as a notice indicating that the
tenancy would not be continued after the term
of the tenancy comes to an end. In these
circumstances it cannot be said that the suit
filed by the appellant was not maintainable
and decree for eviction could not be passed in
favour of the appellant.”
24. To be on necessity of notice under
Section 106 of TP Act. Section 106 provides as
under:
“106:
Duration
of
certain
leases
in
absence of written contract or local usage:-(1) In the absence of a contract or local law or
usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable
property for agricultural or manufacturing
purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from
year to year, terminable, on the part of either
lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice; and a
lease of immovable property for any other
purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from
month to month, terminable, on the part of
either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained
in any other law for the time being in force,
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the period mentioned in sub-section (1) shall
commence from the date of receipt of notice.
(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall
not be deemed to be invalid merely because
the period mentioned therein falls short of the
period specified under that subsection, where
a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of
the period mentioned in that sub-section.
(4) Every notice under sub-section (1)
must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of
the person giving it, and either be sent by post
to the party who is intended to be bound by it
or be tendered or delivered personally to such
party, or to one of his family or servants at his
residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not
practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of
the property.”
On reading the provision, it is clear that
in the absence of a contract or local law for
usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable
property from year to year shall be terminable
by issuance of 6 months' notice and month to
month shall be terminable by 15 days' notice.
Therefore, in a case, where there is a contract
and determination of lease by efflux of time is
provided in the contract as per Section 111(a)
of the TP Act, the lease shall come to an end.
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
In this matter, as borne out from the records,
the lease arrangement started with effect from
01.08.2009 for 3 years and as on 31.07.2012,
the term of lease came to an end and,
therefore, the present suit is one filed after
termination of tenancy by efflux of time and in
such a case, notice mandated under Section
106 of the TP Act is not necessary and,
therefore, this challenge is found against the
defendant.
15. Similarly, in Karunagappally Coir Vyavasaya
Cooperative Society Ltd.’s case (supra), another Single
Bench of this Court, after referring the decision of the Apex
Court in [1984 KHC 580 : 1984 (1) SCC 369 : AIR 1984
SC
143]
Satish
Chand
Makhan
and
Others
v.
Govardhan Das Byas and Others, held in paragraph
No.22 as under:
22. In the case of a lease, a suit could not
be brought without serving a Termination Notice
as required under Section 106(1) of the Transfer
of Property Act. Ext.A5 is not a Notice of
Termination as required under Section 106 of
the Transfer of Property Act. The learned
Counsel for the appellant invited my attention to
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the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Satish Chand Makhan and others v. Govardhan
Das Byas and others[1984 (1) SCC 369] in which
it is held that a suit for recovery of possession of
the leased premises is not maintainable without
determination of the lease by service of notice
under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am
of the view that without proper termination of
lease as per Section 106(1) of the Transfer of
Property Act also, the relief of recovery of
possession could not be moulded and granted in
a suit for mandatory injunction. The learned
Counsel for the contesting respondents cited the
decision of this Court in Kochu Krishna Pillai V.
Ammalu Ammal [1972 KLT 223] to substantiate
the point that sufficiency of notice under Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act could not be
raised for the first time in appeal. The said
decision is clearly distinguishable from the facts
of the present case. In the present case, the
pleadings of the plaintiffs are to the effect that
the arrangement is license, and hence, there
was no occasion for the defendants to contend
that the lease is not terminated in accordance
with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
by issuing Termination Notice.
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16. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs refuted the
contention made by the learned senior counsel for the
defendant and submitted that the arrangement between
the parties is only license. It is submitted further that, if at
all the arrangement is found as a lease, then also the
defendant, who in fact, got occupation of the premises on
the strength of Ext.A6, executed during 1982, would not get
any protection under Section 106 of the KLR Act.
17. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed
decision of this Court in Abraham Varghese v. Kerala
State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. reported in [2023
(7) KHC 680 : 2023 KHC OnLine 831 : 2024 (1) KLT
561], with reference to paragraph Nos. 14 to 16, to
contend that, going by the ratio of the decision referring
the decisions of the Apex Court therein, on expiration of the
term of the lease, if a tenant remains in possession after
the determination of the lease, the common law rule is that
he is a tenant on sufferance. Therefore, it is argued that,
the question of sending notice under Section 106 of the TP
Act does not arise.
18. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed
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decision of this Court in Sulaikha Beevi v. Mathew
reported in [2001 KHC 109 : 2001 (1) KLT 360 : 2001
(1) KLJ 221], Parameswara Panicker v. Bharathan
reported in [1987 KHC 355 : 1987 (2) KLT 12 : 1987 KLJ
742], Thomas Varkey v. Arundhathi Ammal reported in
[1981 KHC 282 : 1981 KLT SN 170 : 1982 KLJ 44] and
Eldho v. Manual and Others reported in [2014 (3) KHC
611 : 2014 (3) KLT 787 : 2014 (3) KLJ 858] in support of
his contention.
19. In view of the rival contentions advanced by both
sides, points arise for consideration are:
1. Whether the finding of the trial court
that the suit is maintainable is erroneous?
2. Whether the trial court went wrong in
finding the defendant as a licensee?
3. What is the arrangement in between the
predecessor of the plaintiffs and the defendant?
4. Whether the protection claimed by the
defendant under Section 106 of the KLR Act is
sustainable?
5. Deeming the arrangement as lease,
whether the suit would fail for want of notice
under Section 106 of the TP Act?
6. Whether the decree and judgment of
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the trial court would require interference?
7. Reliefs and costs.
20. Point No.1:- In this matter, the trial court found
that the suit is maintainable within the ambit of Section 9 of
CPC. But, the learned senior counsel for the defendant
submitted that, since the status of the defendant is that of
a tenant, protected under Section 106 of the KLR Act, Civil
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In fact, this
contention is no more available to the defendant, since at
the time when the R.F.A. No.769/2009 was filed by the
plaintiffs challenging the judgment dated 14.07.2009 of the
trial court, this question was not raised before this Court.
Even otherwise, when there is a dispute with regard to the
nature of arrangement in between parties as lease or
license, the question can well be decided by the trial court.
That apart, in view of the finding in paragraph No.5 of the
judgment dated 30.01.2015 in R.F.A. No.769/2009, for
which there is no challenge raised by both sides, the said
judgment has become final and the parties are bound by
the findings thereof, conceding the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court in the matter of deciding the nature of arrangement
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
between them as well as the protection under Section 106
of the KLR Act. Therefore, the finding of the trial court that
the suit is maintainable is only to be justified.
21. Point Nos. 2 to 7:- The first point to be decided
herein is whether the arrangement in between the plaintiffs
and defendant is lease or license. In this connection, as
pointed
out
by
the
learned
senior
counsel
for
the
defendant, it is relevant to refer Ext.A12, the initial
document
executed
on
23.05.1960
in
between
Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and Mr. K.M. Cherian. Ext.A12
would recite the same as a lease agreement and it was
agreed to hand over the possession of plaint A schedule
property for the purpose of running cinema theater, after
constructing the same. Ext.A12 by nomenclature is a lease
deed referring the premium as ‘tharavadaka’.
22. The case of the plaintiffs is that, Ext.A12 got
terminated as per the compromise reached in between
Mr.Geevarghese
Abraham
and
Mr.K.M.Cherian
and
thereafter it was agreed to execute another agreement in
favour of the defendant to conduct exhibition of films in the
said theater and accordingly, Ext.A6 agreement dated
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
18.02.1982 has been entered into between the defendant
and Mr.Geevarghese Abraham. The recitals therein would
show that the property in possession of Mr.Geevarghese
Abraham, after parting the right of Mr.K.M.Cherian, the right
of running the cinema theater was entrusted to the
defendant. Thereafter, Ext.A6 agreement was renewed as
per Exts.A7 to A9, on the same conditions.
23. According to the learned senior counsel for the
defendant, renewal of Ext.A12 agreement by way of
Exts.A6 to A9, it is emphatically clear that the arrangement
in between Mr. Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian
is not a license, but the same is a lease, which started
before 20.05.1967. Therefore, the defendant, who is
continuing the said tenancy would get protection under
Section 106 of the KLR Act.
24. But, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs refuted
this
contention
and
submitted
that,
if
at
all
the
arrangement is found as a lease, then also the defendant,
who in fact, got occupation of the premises on the strength
of Ext.A6, executed during 1982, would not get any
protection under Section 106 of the KLR Act.
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25. Section 106(1) of the KLR Act provides as under:
106. Special provisions relating to
leases
for
purposes.-(1)
commercial
or
industrial
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in this Act, or in any other law, or in
any contract, or in any order or decree of Court,
where, on any land leased for commercial or
industrial purpose, the lessee has constructed
buildings for such commercial or industrial
purpose before the 20th May, 1967, he shall
not be liable to be evicted from such land, but
shall be liable to pay rent under the contract of
tenancy, and such rent shall be liable to be
varied every twelve years.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this
section, (a)
"lessee"
includes
a
legal
representative or an assignee of the lessee;
and
(b) "building" means a permanent or a
temporary building and includes a shed.
26. It is true that, any land leased for commercial or
industrial purpose before 20.05.1967, the lessee has
constructed buildings for such commercial or industrial
purpose, he shall not be liable to be evicted from such land.
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27. In the instant case, as per Ext.A12, the original
contract was in between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and
Mr.K.M.Cherian. Thereafter, on the strength of Ext.B3 power
of attorney, the defendant was authorized to run the
theater and to conduct cases on behalf of Mr.K.M.Cherian.
However, Ext.B3 in no way would suggest that, apart from
doing things for and on behalf of Mr.K.M.Cherian, nothing
attorned in favour of the defendant.
28. Ext.B10 is a document which was given much
emphasis by both sides. According to the learned senior
counsel for the defendant, there was sale of the theater
and
its
accessories
as
per
Ext.B10.
Therefore,
the
defendant is to be held as an assignee or a transferee of
the lease by interpreting Section 106 of the KLR Act, a
beneficial legislation in favour of the defendant.
29. But,
the
learned
counsel
for
the
plaintiffs
asserted that, as per Ext.B10, there was an agreement to
sell the theater and the movables therein and the same is
not a deed of assignment or transfer of lease within the
meaning of Section 106 of the KLR Act.
30. On perusal of Ext.B10, the projector, furniture,
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the theater shed and accessories thereof were agreed to be
sold for a total consideration of Rs.90,000/-, out of which
only Rs.10,001/- was given as advance by the defendant. In
fact, whether the sale was complete or not could not be
gathered from Ext.B10.
31. On reading Exts.A12 and A6, it could be gathered
that, even though the defendant, being the power of
attorney holder of Mr.K.M.Cherian, held the plaint B
schedule property for running the theater, he is not the
legal representative of Mr.K.M.Cherian or an assignee of the
lessee. In this case, originally Ext.A12 was executed in
between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian as
early on 23.05.1966 and the specific case of the plaintiffs is
that thereafter, the license arrangement in between
Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian was closed.
Later, as part of compromise, the right to run theater was
entrusted to the defendant on the strength of Ext.A6,
executed in the year 1982. Therefore, the arrangement in
between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian as
per Ext.A12 was closed and a new agreement entered into
between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and the defendant in
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the year 1982. Therefore, if at all the defendant is to be
held as a tenant, he would not get protection under Section
106 of the KLR Act. On scrutiny of Section 106(1) of the KLR
Act, any land leased for commercial or industrial purpose,
where the lessee has constructed buildings for such
commercial or industrial purpose before the 20.05.1967 is
protected from eviction. As per explanation (a) of Section
106(1), "lessee" includes a legal representative or an
assignee of the lessee. In the instant case, even though
Ext.B10
has
been
given
much
emphasis
to
show
assignment of the lease hold right, Ext.B10 would show
that the same is only an agreement to sell the articles in
the theater on getting advance payment.
32. On reading Exts.A12 and A6 in segregation, it is
discernible that, before the execution of Ext.A6, as part of
compromise, the arrangement between Mr.Geevarghese
Abraham and Mr.K.M.Cherian came to an end and there is
no assignment or transfer of lease as contended by the
defendant. In fact, as per Ext.A6, the defendant obtained
right to run the theater alone. Therefore, there is no reason
to apply the protection under Section 106 of the KLR Act in
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favour of the defendant, who got occupation of the theater
alone, as per Ext.A6 in the year 1982. Therefore, the
defendant could not succeed finding shelter under Section
106 of the KLR Act.
33. Coming to the question as to whether there is a
lease agreement in between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and
the defendant as per Ext.A6, it is apposite to refer the
earlier judgment rendered in between the same parties.
34. The trial court relied on Ext.A11 judgment in O.S.
No.9/1991 dated 15.11.1993 on the files of the Munsiff
Court, Kottarakkara, filed by the defendant against the
plaintiffs herein and others. Even though, the trial court did
not address the question regarding the arrangement
between the parties as license or lease, granted interim
injunction to keep possession of the theater by the
defendant. In the said judgment, the learned Munsiff made
clear that the decree granted so, would not mean that the
defendant therein (plaintiffs herein) could be obstructed
from entering into their own land and to take the usufruct
from the trees.
35. Ext.A11 judgment has become final, since no
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challenge raised against the same by both parties. As per
Ext.A11 judgment, the right to possess the theater by the
defendant alone is protected by an interim injunction, while
allowing the plaintiffs herein to enter into their own land
and to take the usufruct from the trees.
36. The difference between lease and license has
been considered by this Court as well as the Apex Court in
certain judgments. In paragraph No.20 of the decision of
this Court in Varghese C.D. v. Joseph Mani reported in
[2023 (7) KHC 123], it has been held as under:
20. In view of the above discussions, the
cardinal features, which would distinguish
`lease’ from `licence’ are as under:
`Lease’ is a transfer of a right coupled
with exclusive possession with transfer of
interest to enjoy an immovable property for
certain
period
expressly,
impliedly
or
in
perpetuity. On the other hand, `licence’ is a
right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the
immovable property of the grantor, given in
occupation of the licencee, something which
would, in the absence of such right, be
unlawful, and such right does not amount to
an easement or an interest in the property. To
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R.F.A. No. 97 of 2016
put
it
otherwise,
building/premises,
the
who
lessee
got
of
a
exclusive
possession coupled with transfer of interest
therein, has the right to possess and enjoy the
building/premises; whereas a licensee of a
building, who got only a mere right of
occupation of the premises/building without
transfer of any interest therein, does not have
such a right of absolute possession and
enjoyment of the building/premises and his
right is to do or continue to do the specific
business or trade only in the building/premises
for which permission has been granted by the
licensor
as
the
occupant
of
the
building/premises.
37. Thus, going by Exts.A11 judgment of the trial
court, what is obtained by the defendant is the permission
to run theater in plaint A schedule property and the same is
not an arrangement of lease. But, the available evidence
would show that the arrangement between the predecessor
of the plaintiffs and defendant could be held as only a
license.
38. On scrutinizing the decisions, what is held by this
Court in paragraph Nos. 22 to 24 of Ratheesh’s case
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(supra) is the legal position, insofar as notice under Section
106 of the TP Act is concerned. If so, there is no reason to
hold that, if the arrangement between the predecessor of
the plaintiffs and defendant is held as lease, then also for
want of notice the suit is liable to fail.
39. In this matter, it is pointed out by the learned
senior counsel for the defendant further that, the suit was
not properly valued and the suit valued and court fee paid
under Section 31 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit
Valuation Act, 1959, on the premise that the suit is based
on license arrangement. Therefore, this question also to be
considered by this Court.
40. Refuting this contention, the learned counsel for
the plaintiffs argued that, Section 54 of the Kerala Court
Fees and Suit Valuation, Act deals with the procedure where
objection is taken on appeal or revision that a suit or appeal
was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes and the
procedure provided in Section 54(a) and (b) of the Act shall
be followed. Section 54 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit
Valuation, Act reads as under:
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54.Procedure
where
objection
is
taken on appeal or revision that a suit or
appeal
was
not
properly
valued
for
jurisdictional purposes.- (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in section 99 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908),
an objection that by reason of the overvaluation or under- valuation of a suit or
appeal, a Court of first instance or lower
appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with
respect
to
the
suit
or
appeal
exercised
jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be
entertained by an appellate Court, unless—
(a) the objection was taken in the Court of
first instance at or before the hearing at which
issues were first framed and recorded, or in the
lower appellate Court in the memorandum of
appeal to that Court, or
(b) the appellate Court is satisfied, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the
suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued
and that the over-valuation or under-valuation
thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal
of the suit or appeal on its merits.
41. In this matter, the question of valuation of the
suit and non payment of sufficient court fee not raised
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before the trial court and the same is raised before this
Court for the first time. No doubt, this Court has the power
to consider the same, in view of Section 54(b) of the Kerala
Court Fees and Suit Valuation, Act.
42. The
finding
of
the
trial
court
is
that
the
arrangement in between Mr.Geevarghese Abraham and the
defendant is a license and on re-appreciation of evidence,
the said finding is upheld by this Court also. Therefore,
payment of court fee after valuing the suit under Section 31
of the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation, Act, is only to
be confirmed. Therefore, the said challenge is also set at
naught.
43. Summarizing the discussion, it is held that the
decree and judgment under challenge are only to be
confirmed. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with
the verdict of the trial court. Holding so, the trial court
verdict does not require any interference.
44. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed and
the verdict under challenge stands confirmed. Having
considered the facts of the case, there shall be no order as
to cost.
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All interlocutory applications pending in this regular
first appeal stand dismissed.
Sd/-
A. BADHARUDEEN
SK
JUDGE
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