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Serial No. 01
Supplementary
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HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.Petn. No. 15 of 2022
Date of Decision: 16.12.2022
Shri. Fourness Dhar
Vs.
Smti. Corsica Shabong & Anr.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. L. Shongwan, Adv.
Mr. S.M. Suna, Adv.
Mr. S. Sen, Adv. for R 1.
Mr. A.G. Momin, Adv. for R 2.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This is a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, wherein the
petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer to set aside and quash
the Complaint Case No. 114 (S) of 2021 under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act), 1881 and which case is pending
before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at Shillong.
2.
Heard Mr. L. Shongwan, learned counsel for the petitioner who
has submitted that the case of the petitioner is that on 15.10.2019, the
petitioner and the respondent No. 1 on one side and the proforma
respondent on the other side, have jointly entered into an Agreement for
Sale of a plot of land situated at Bishop Cotton Road, Shillong measuring
about 18,262.69 sq.ft, which land belongs to the proforma respondent, with
the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 being the proposed buyers. The
agreed consideration for the said plot of land is ₹ 2,60,00,000/- (Rupees
two crores sixty lakhs).
3.
Prior to the date fixed for execution of the final Sale Deed, in the
month of May, 2019, the respondent No. 1 apparently backed out of the
deal citing inability to fulfil her part of the monetary commitment. The
petitioner then agreed to carry on with the proposed sale transaction by
going single and pursuant to this, a Settlement Agreement dated
13.08.2020 was drawn up between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1.
4.
According to the terms of the said Settlement Agreement, the
petitioner has agreed to refund a sum of ₹ 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees one crore
fifty lakhs) to the respondent No. 1 which sum of money was said to have
been paid to the proforma respondent by the respondent No. 1 as advance
payment in respect of the property. The said amount was to be disbursed
in the following manner:
i.
₹ 35,00,000/- (Rupees thirty-five lakhs) as the first
instalment to be paid in the last week of September,
2020;
ii.
₹ 37,50,000/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakhs and fifty
thousand) as the second instalment to be paid in the
month of March, 2021;
iii.
₹ 37,50,000/- (Rupees thirty-seven lakhs and fifty
thousand) as the third instalment to be paid in the month
of September, 2021 and;
iv.
₹ 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) only as the fourth
and last instalment to be paid in the month of March,
2022.
5.
The petitioner then paid the first of the instalments by remitting
the amount of ₹ 5,00,000/-(Rupees five lakhs) by cash and ₹ 30,00,000/(Rupees thirty lakhs) by cheque, about five of them for varying amounts.
Apart from this, the petitioner has also handed over five blank cheques to
the respondent No. 1.
6.
The learned counsel has also submitted that sometime in the
month of March, 2021, the petitioner received reliable information which
created doubt about the claim of the respondent No. 1 as regard the
payment of advance amount of ₹ 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore) to the
proforma respondent and accordingly, to allay this doubt, the petitioner
called for a joint meeting of the three of them on 16.03.2021, the said
meeting being held at the office of the petitioner at Lummawrie,
Laitumkhrah, Shillong.
7.
It was at this meeting that the proforma respondent clarified that
she was not paid the ₹ 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore) by the respondent
No. 1. To this effect, the proforma respondent has re-confirmed her claim
that she has not received the said sum of one crore from the respondent No.
1, by way of a letter dated 06.04.2021 issued upon the petitioner herein and
which letter was also attested by her two children as witnesses.
8.
The petitioner then instructed his Bank to stop payment of the
2nd, 3rd and 4th instalments to the respondent No. 1 and not to process any
cheque if presented for payment in this connection. The respondent No. 1,
apprehending that the petitioner might stop payment, went ahead and on
26.04.2021 went to the HDFC Bank Rynjah Branch, Shillong to en-cash a
cheque bearing No. 000095 for a sum of ₹ 30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty
lakhs). However, the cheque was returned unpaid on 28.04.2021 with the
endorsement “Payment stopped by drawer”
9.
The respondent No. 1 then caused issue of a legal Notice dated
05.05.2021, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
through her counsel with a demand that the petitioner pay the sum of ₹
30,00,000/- (Rupees thirty lakhs) which was responded by the petitioner
vide reply dated 02.07.2021 denying the claim.
10.
That the respondent No. 1 by filing the complaint before the
Court and the registration of the same as C.R. Case No. 114 (S) of 2021
under Section 138, NI Act, is nothing, but an abuse of the process of the
court with no substance in the said complaint and as such, this petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been preferred to put a stop to the process
which is malicious and cannot be sustained in law, submits the learned
counsel for the petitioner.
11.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that one of
the essential ingredients for a case to be prosecuted under Section 138 of
the NI Act, is that cheque in question should have been issued for the
discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability which is legally
enforceable if on the date of the issue of the cheque, no such debt or liability
exists, then the provision of this section cannot be attracted.
12.
The petitioner has further clarified his stand by submitting that
the fact that the respondent No. 1 has concealed material facts at the time
when the said Agreement dated 13.08.2020 was executed between the
parties concerned, inasmuch as, the fact that she has not made any payment
to the proforma respondent pursuant to the conditions as could be found in
the said Sale Agreement dated 15.10.2019 has not been disclosed to the
petitioner when he was made to commit to refund ₹ 1,50,00,000/-( Rupees
one crore fifty lakhs) to the respondent No. 1 when actually, the proforma
respondent who is the beneficiary of the same has not receive the said sum.
13.
The said Agreement dated 12.08.2020 is therefore rendered
voidable as per Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, as far as the
petitioner is concerned, submits the learned counsel. This is based on the
fact that the respondent No. 1 inspite of being confronted with this question
in the show cause issued by the petitioner against the legal notice issued by
the respondent No. 1 as to the fact that the proforma respondent has not
received the sum of ₹ 1,00,00,000/-(Rupees one crore) from her, the
respondent No. 1 has not given any reply or a satisfactory explanation for
the same.
14.
In support of his contention and submission, the learned counsel
for the petitioner has referred to the following judgments:
i.
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable
Energy Development Limited: (2016) 10 SCC 458,
para 10 & 22;
ii.
Rishi Mohan Srivastava v. State of U.P. and Anr:
2021 SCC Online All 532, para 21;
iii.
Som Mittal v. Governemnt of Karnataka: (2008) 3
SCC 753, para 9;
iv.
G. Sagar Suri & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors: 2000 AIR
SC 754, Para 8 & 9.
15.
Per contra, Mr. S. Sen, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1
has contradicted the contention and the submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioner on facts by referring to the Sale Deed dated 15.10.2019,
annexed to this petition as Annexure 1, wherein the contents of paragraphs
3, 4, 6 and 7 have been pointed out to show that it is an admitted fact
between the parties that the consideration for the total plot of land is ₹
2,60,00,000/- ( Rupees two crores sixty lakhs) out of which the respondent
No. 1 has already paid ₹60,00,000/- ( Rupees sixty lakhs) in the year 2012
duly acknowledged receipt by the proforma respondent. Therefore, having
already paid rupees sixty crores, the remaining amount to be paid by the
respondent No. 1 is ₹ 55,88,423/- (Rupees fifty-five lakhs eighty-eight
thousand four hundred and twenty-three). The proforma respondent
however at para 7 of the said Sale Deed has acknowledged receipt of
another sum of ₹ 2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crores) only, which in effect
is the total consideration paid, including the share of ₹ 1,15,88,423/(Rupees one crore fifteen lakhs eighty-eight thousand four hundred and
twenty-three) paid by the respondent No. 1.
16.
To this extent, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has
submitted that in this petition, the petitioner has stated that the said Sale
Deed is void and voidable as a consequent of subsequent developments,
but the fact remains that he cannot deny the authenticity of this document.
17.
Coming to the Settlement Agreement dated 13.08.2020, the
learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that one of the
terms of the same is that the petitioner as First Party has agreed to pay a
sum of ₹ 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees one crore fifty lakhs) only to the Second
Party, who is the respondent No. 1 herein, which is understood to include
the original sum of ₹ 1,15,88,423/- (Rupees one crore fifteen lakhs eighty
eight thousand four hundred and twenty-three) which is the share of the
respondent No. 1 towards the consideration of the said plot of land of the
proforma respondent and which also includes the consideration for the
services rendered by the respondent No. 1 as regard the said land deal and
again, for compensation for withdrawal from the agreement for sale with
Kristina Suchiang (proforma respondent).
18.
As to the letter dated 06.04.2021 said to have been issued by the
proforma respondent No. 1 to the petitioner which is a confirmation that
the proforma respondent has not received any money from the respondent
No. 1 amounting to ₹ 1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one crore) being the sale
amount of consideration for her land situated at Bishop Cotton Road,
Shillong, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that
the contents thereof are not consistent with the fact situation, inasmuch as,
the total consideration for the land is ₹ 2,60,00,000/- (Rupees two crores
sixty lakhs), the share of the respondent No. 1 is ₹ 1,15,88,423/- (Rupees
one crore fifteen lakhs eighty eight thousand four hundred and twentythree) out of which she has already paid ₹ 60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakhs),
therefore, the inconsistency here is apparent and for which the petitioner
cannot argue that the debt or liability cannot be legally enforceable.
19.
Referring to the said confirmation letter of 06.04.2021, wherein
the proforma respondent has purportedly informed the petitioner that she
did not receive any money from the respondent No. 1 as part of the
consideration for the sale of her land indicated in the Sale Deed of
15.10.2019, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has submitted that
reference may be made to the legal notice issued upon the petitioner by the
respondent No. 1 which is dated 05.05.2021 and the reply of the petitioner
to the same vide letter dated 02.07.2021 which did not mention the said
confirmation letter dated 06.04.2021 even though, she was allegedly in
possession of the same at the time when the reply dated 02.07.2021 was
issued. This, therefore has cast a doubt about the authenticity of the said
letter and it could be assumed that the same was never issued by the
proforma respondent and that it is a manufactured document.
20.
On the basis of the document (confirmation letter dated
06.04.2021) which the petitioner has termed as unimpeachable, this case
was set up to scuttle the due procedure of law, whereby the said document
has to pass the test of evidence which can only be realised at the trial and
hence, this petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits, submits
the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1.
21.
In response to the case laws cited by the petitioner, the learned
counsel for the respondent No. 1 has referred to the same authorities to
refute the contention of the petitioner and has submitted that in the case of
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao (supra), at para 15, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has referred to the case of Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd v. Rajvir
Industries Ltd & Ors: (2008) 13 SCC 678 wherein at para 22 of the same,
when the Hon’ble Supreme Court speaks of documents of unimpeachable
character, the said Confirmation Letter issued by the proforma respondent
to the petitioner cannot be termed as unimpeachable in the light of the
inconsistency evident thereto.
22.
The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 then went on to cite
the other paragraphs found in the said Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao case,
viz; para 16, 17, 18 and 20 to say that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that in dealing with a quashing petition, the court has ordinarily to proceed
on the basis of averments in the complaint. The defence of the accused
cannot be considered at this stage. The court considering the prayer for
quashing does not adjudicate upon a disputed question of facts. Yet again,
while referring to the case of Rangappa v. Sri Mohan: (2010) 11 SCC 441,
it was held that once issuance of a cheque and signature thereon are
admitted, presumption of a legally enforceable debt in favour of the holder
of the cheque arises. A similar situation is present in the case of the
petitioner herein, inasmuch as, he has not denied that the cheque was issued
by him, nor did he denied his signature on it or to the quantum mentioned
therein.
23.
Relying on the case of G. Sagar Suri (supra), the learned counsel
for the respondent No. 1 has referred to para 8 and 9 of the same (which
was also relied upon by the petitioner) in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code is to prevent abuse
of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice and in the
exercise of the wholesome power under Section 482, the High Court is
entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing it
to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court. But that is not
the case here as far as the complaint of the respondent No. 1 is concerned
as the respondent No. 1 has been able to make out good grounds for
sustenance of the said complaint.
24.
Again, in support of his case, the learned counsel for the
respondent No. 1 has cited the case of Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Another: 2022 SCC Online SC 513
para 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 & 18 and has submitted that this case
is very relevant to the case in hand as the facts are almost similar.
25.
Mr. A.G. Momin submitting on behalf of the proforma
respondent has referred to the said Sale Deed dated 15.10.2019 to say that
the same has been carefully worded only to safeguard the interest of the
respondent No. 1, inasmuch as, reference was made that a sum of sixty
lakhs was paid to the proforma respondent by the respondent No. 1 in the
year 2012, but the same was not actually paid. Even if one assumes that the
said sixty lakhs was paid, as to the remaining share required to be paid by
the respondent No, 1, that is, the sum of ₹ 55,88,423/- (Rupees fifty-five
lakhs eighty-eight thousand four hundred and twenty-three), the same has
also not been paid by the respondent No 1 till date. The confirmation letter
dated 06.04.2021 has been issued in the light of the fact situation, further
submits the learned counsel.
26.
This Court has given due consideration to the argument of the
parties and to the authorities cited. Facts and circumstances have been duly
noted on the basis of the submission of the parties and as such, need not be
reiterated except if so required. However, the moot issue to be decided here
is whether the petitioner is liable to make payment to the respondent No. 1
from the bank account maintained by him in HDFC Bank, Rynjah Branch,
Shillong for discharge of any debt or liability. The answer to this question
will determine the outcome of this lis.
27.
It would not be out of place to reproduce the provision of Section
138 NI Act, 1881 before proceeding further, which provision reads as
follows:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
in the account. —Where any cheque drawn by a person on an
account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount
of money to another person from out of that account for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is
returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the
cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be
deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice
to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment
for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which
may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is
drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever
is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,
as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment
of the said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty
days] of the receipt of information by him from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;
and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment
of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the
case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque,
within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice”.
28.
In the case of Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao (supra) at para 10, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that “discharge of debt or liability”
depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque
liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the
Section is attracted and not otherwise”.
29.
The petitioner has maintained that since the respondent No. 1 has
failed to keep her end of the agreement, that is, to make the necessary
payment of ₹ 60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakhs) and even the subsequent ₹
55,88,423/- (Rupees fifty-five lakhs eighty-eight thousand four hundred
and twenty-three) to the proforma respondent in terms of the Sale Deed
(Sale Agreement) dated 15.10.2019, therefore, the subsequent Agreement
between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 dated 13.08.2020 whereby
the petitioner was supposed to pay the respondent No. 1 a sum of ₹
1,50,00,000/- (Rupees one crore fifty lakhs), the sum of ₹ 30,00,000/(Rupees thirty lakhs) being part thereof which cheque was attempted to be
en-cashed by the respondent No. 1 and which forms the core dispute in the
complaint under Section 138 NI Act, filed by her, cannot be sustained to
consider it a debt or a legally enforceable liability. To solidify this
contention, the petitioner has specifically referred to the said Confirmation
Letter dated 06.04.2021 issued by the proforma respondent to inform him
that she has not received any money from the respondent No. 1 as
consideration towards the sale agreement in respect of her property.
30.
In the case of Som Mittal (supra) para 9 and also the case of G.
Sagar Suri (supra) at para 8 and 9, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has indeed
laid down the parameters and contours and has cautioned the exercise of
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C if applied routinely to a case, except where
abuse of the process of the court and miscarriage of justice is apparent.
31.
The case of Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan (supra) cited by the
respondent No. 1 also speaks about how an application for quashing of a
proceeding under Section 138 NI Act can be dealt with in an application
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
32.
This Court being made aware of the implication as indicated in
the authority cited above, would however observe that in the case in hand,
the petitioner has instructed his Bank to stop only after being convinced
that the respondent No. 1 has failed to make the necessary payment to the
proforma respondent which is intimately linked to his obligation to refund
the money to the respondent No. 1. Therefore, one cannot say that the
failure to en-cash the said cheque is because the petitioner has failed to
keep his part of the bargain or obligation. Even if the dispute is to be
agitated before the Court which has taken up the complaint case of the
respondent No. 1, the role and presence of the proforma respondent now
becomes necessary, if only to prove or disprove the said Confirmation
Letter dated 06.04.2021. In the proceedings before the Trial Court taking
up the complaint case of the respondent No. 1, the proforma respondent
has not been made a party and therefore, the said Confirmation Letter dated
06.04.2021 cannot be introduced or proved by the maker of the same,
particularly in a proceeding under section 138.
33.
As noticed above, in the light of the existence (or non- existence)
of the said Confirmation Letter, there has arisen the issue as to whether the
attempt at encashment of the cheque in question by the respondent No. 1
is towards a legally enforceable debt and liability or not. As observed
above, it is only in the presence of the proforma respondent that this
question can be answered and this, not being possible in a proceeding under
Section 138 NI Act, the alternative left to the parties is to approach a
competent civil court for adjudication of this dispute.
34.
By doing so, it is not that the respondent No. 1 is totally shut out
of her legitimate claim, but the burden will now shift to her to prove that
she has indeed satisfied her part of the consideration towards the proforma
respondent in terms of the said Sale Deed (Sale Agreement) dated
15.10.2019, following which, the petitioner would then be obligated to
refund or satisfy the terms of agreement as stipulated in the Settlement
Agreement dated 13.08.2020.
35.
In the light of the above observations, this Court is of the
considered view that the prayer of the petitioner is justified and that the
dispute between the parties cannot be confined only to the proceedings
under Section 138 NI Act, but has to be adjudicated before the proper
forum. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case of the parties, the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 138 NI Act is ousted as the inability
of the respondent No. 1 to en-cash the said cheque for a sum of ₹ 30,
00,000/- (Rupees thirty lakhs) does not pertains to the discharge, in whole,
or in part, of any debt or other liability and hence Section 138 NI Act is not
attracted in such case.
36.
Accordingly, this petition succeeds and the same is allowed.
Consequently, the proceedings in C.R. Case No. 114 (S) of 2021 pending
in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong is
hereby quashed.
37.
Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Meghalaya
16.12.2022
“D. Nary, PS”
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