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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
HCP No.37/2026
Reserved on: 15.09.2026
Pronounced on: 25.09.2026
Uploaded on: ______________
Operative part or full judgment: Full
Firdous Ahmad Shah
S/O Bashir Ahmad Shah
R/O Shart-Muqam, Lolab,
District Kupwara.
…Petitioner(s)
Through: Adv. B.A.Tak.
Vs.
1. Union Territory of J&K
through Principal Secretary to Govt.
Home Department,
Civil Sectt. Srinagar.
2. District Magistrate,
Kupwara.
3. Sr. Superintendent of Police,
Kupwara.
…Respondent(s)
Through: GA Faheem Nisar Shah.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE M. A. CHOWDHARY, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. Through the medium of the instant petition, the petitionerdetenue, has called in question the detention Order No.
17-DMK/PSA of 2025 dated 01.05.2025 passed by
respondent No.2-District Magistrate, Kupwara, whereby
the petitioner has been placed under preventive detention
in exercise of powers conferred by Section 8(1)(a)(i) read
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with Clause (ii) of Sub Section (2) of Section-8 of the
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short,
"the Act"), with a view to prevent him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the ‘security of the UT of Jammu
and Kashmir’.
2. The challenge to the impugned detention order has been
made, inter alia, on the grounds that the material relied
upon by the detaining authority is stale; that there is no
live and proximate link between the alleged activities and
the necessity of preventive detention; that the grounds of
detention are vague; that the petitioner had earlier been
detained under the provisions of the Public Safety Act and
the earlier detention orders had either been quashed or
revoked; that the petitioner had been admitted to bail in
the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority;
that the ordinary criminal law was sufficient to deal with
the allegations; that the alleged activities pertaining to the
years 2018 and 2019 have become hopelessly stale and
cannot furnish the requisite live link for an order of
preventive detention at this stage; that the petitioner had
been enlarged on bail in the criminal cases and in relation
to FIR No. 67/2023 under Sections 7/25 Arms Act,
Sections 13, 18, 23, 39 UA(P) Act of Police Station Lalpora,
the investigation/prosecution had undergone a material
change, inasmuch as the petitioner was discharged from
certain UA(P) Act offences and was proceeded against
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under the Arms Act; that such circumstances completely
dilute the basis of the detention.
3. Respondents have filed their counter affidavit wherein it
has been submitted that the present detention order is not
founded merely on the old FIRs or on the grounds which
had formed the basis of the earlier detention order; that
the material concerning the earlier cases constitutes, at
best, the antecedent background, whereas the present
subjective satisfaction has been arrived at on the basis of
subsequent and independent material including FIR No.
67/2023 and the developments emanating therefrom; that
the fact that the petitioner was granted bail or that some of
the offences initially invoked during investigation did not
ultimately survive, does not by itself render the preventive
detention illegal; that the preventive detention proceeds on
a different consideration i.e., whether on the basis of the
material placed before the detaining authority there exists
a reasonable basis to apprehend that the person, if allowed
to remain at large, may indulge in activities prejudicial to
the security of the State/Union Territory; that the
detention order, impugned in the present petition, be
upheld.
4. Heard learned counsel for both the sides, perused the
detention record and considered the matter.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the
impugned order, argued that the petitioner has been
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repeatedly
subjected
to
preventive
detentions,
on
substantially the same set of allegations. Reference has
been made to the earlier criminal cases, including FIR No.
91/2018 and the proceedings emanating therefrom, as
also the earlier detention orders which came to be
revoked/quashed; that the earlier detention order having
ceased to exist, the same material could not have been
resurrected for recording fresh subjective satisfaction; that
the grounds supplied to the petitioner are vague and do
not disclose with sufficient clarity the material which
weighed with the detaining authority; that the record
contains inconsistencies regarding the chronology of
events and that certain documents appear to have been
prepared or introduced subsequently only to sustain the
detention order.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand,
would argue that the challenge proceeds on an erroneous
premise that preventive detention is a substitute for
criminal prosecution; that the two jurisdictions operate in
different fields; that the purpose of the present detention is
not to punish the petitioner for any past offence but to
prevent his future activities prejudicial to the ‘security of
the Union Territory’; that the grounds of detention were
duly
communicated
to
the
detenue
in
a
language
understood by him and that the requisite material was
supplied to him enabling him to make an effective
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representation; that the allegation that the grounds are
vague or that the documents were manufactured is stated
to be without any substance.
7. Before examining the individual grounds of challenge, it
would be apposite to notice the settled parameters
governing judicial review of an order of preventive
detention. Section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978 empowers the competent authority to
order detention where it is satisfied that such detention is
necessary with a view to prevent a person from acting in
any manner prejudicial to the ‘security of the Union
Territory’ or maintenance of ‘public order’. Section 13 of
the Public Safety Act read with Article 22(5) of the
Constitution
of
India,
obligates
the
authority
to
communicate the grounds of detention in a language
understandable to the detenue and afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation.
8. Preventive detention is, undoubtedly, an exceptional
measure and the procedural safeguards surrounding it
have to be strictly observed. At the same time, the Court,
while exercising jurisdiction in a Habeas Corpus Petition,
does not sit as an appellate authority over the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. The Court examines
whether the satisfaction has been arrived at on the basis of
relevant material, whether there has been application of
mind, whether the constitutional and statutory safeguards
Page |6
have been complied with and whether the grounds have
the requisite nexus with the object of detention. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the
adequacy or sufficiency of material is ordinarily not to be
re-appreciated by the Court as if it were deciding a
criminal trial.
9. The main submission on behalf of the petitioner is that
earlier detention orders have either been quashed/revoked
and, therefore, the respondents could not have relied upon
the same grounds again to invoke detenue fresh detention
vide impugned order. It is borne from the record that the
detenue was detained firstly under PSA on 18.09.2018,
after his involvement in case FIR No. 91/2018 registered at
Police Station Lalpora, which was quashed by this Court
on 31.12.2018; secondly detained on 28.01.2019 which
was quashed on 11.07.2019 and thirdly on 02.08.2019
which was revoked by the Government of J&K itself on
12.04.2020. Therefore, this in his fourth detention under
PSA.
10.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that
where an earlier detention order has been quashed by a
Court, the grounds which stood nullified cannot be treated
as the foundation of a subsequent detention order. The
subsequent order must have its foundation in fresh and
independent
material.
This
principle
has
also
been
recognized in the context of the J&K Public Safety Act.
Page |7
However, the said principle does not mean that the
subsequent conduct of a detenue becomes immune from
consideration
merely
because
he
had
earlier
been
subjected to preventive detention. The real question is
whether the impugned order is substantially founded upon
the very grounds which had earlier been nullified or
whether there is fresh material which independently
furnishes the basis for the present subjective satisfaction.
11.
On examination of the material placed before this
Court, the present case falls in the latter category. The
impugned detention order cannot, on the material placed
before the Court, be characterised as a mere reproduction
or revival of the earlier detention order(s). The subsequent
involvement of the petitioner in FIR No. 67/2023 coupled
with the material and developments arising therefrom,
constitutes an independent subsequent circumstance. The
earlier cases, insofar as they have been referred to, have to
be understood as antecedental background and not as the
sole foundation of the present detention. This distinction
assumes significance. Had the present order been based
exclusively on the same very grounds which had earlier
been quashed, the challenge would have had considerable
force. But where subsequent material has intervened and
the detaining authority has considered that material along
with the antecedents of the petitioner, the mere existence
of an earlier detention orders which were quashed/revoked
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cannot, by itself, invalidate the subsequent order. The
argument that the incidents of 2018 and 2019 are stale
also cannot be examined in isolation from the subsequent
conduct attributed to the petitioner.
12.
The doctrine of "live link" undoubtedly constitutes an
important safeguard in preventive detention jurisprudence.
A detention order cannot ordinarily be founded upon
remote
incidents
having
no
rational
or
proximate
connection with the necessity of detention. At the same
time, the question of proximity has to be examined in the
context of the entire chain of circumstances and the
nature of the alleged activities.
13.
In the present case, the material does not stop with
the incidents of the years 2018-2019. The record refers to
subsequent criminal activity resulting into registration of
FIR
No.67/2023
and
the
subsequent
investigation/prosecution. Thus, the Court is unable to
accept the submission that the impugned detention order
rests solely upon stale incidents or the same incidents
which were basis of earlier detentions. The Supreme Court
has
consistently
held
that
preventive
detention
is
concerned with a reasonable prognosis of future conduct
drawn from past conduct and surrounding circumstances;
the relevant question is whether the material relied upon
retains a rational nexus with the apprehension sought to
be prevented.
Page |9
14.
The present case, therefore, cannot be equated with a
case where an isolated incident several years old is
suddenly resurrected without any intervening conduct.
The subsequent FIR and the material arising from it
constitute the intervening circumstances which, according
to the detaining authority, demonstrate the continuing
propensity of the petitioner. Whether such material is
ultimately sufficient to secure a conviction is not the
question before this Court. The Court is concerned with
the legality of the subjective satisfaction recorded for
preventive detention.
15.
The argument that the petitioner has been enlarged
on bail or that certain charges did not survive in the
criminal proceedings also does not, by itself, demolish the
detention order. The Constitution Bench in Haradhan
Saha v. State of West Bengal reported as (1975) 3 SCC
198, made a distinction between punitive detention
following a finding of guilt and preventive detention, the
latter
being
directed
towards
preventing
anticipated
prejudicial conduct. The pendency of, or even proceedings
under, the ordinary criminal law does not, by itself, bar
recourse
to
preventive
detention.
Likewise,
in
Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, reported as (1991) 1
SCC 128, the Supreme Court recognised that a detention
order may validly be passed even in respect of a person
who is in custody, provided the detaining authority is
P a g e | 10
aware of the custody, there is reliable material indicating a
real possibility of release and there is a reasonable basis to
apprehend prejudicial activity upon release. This principle
becomes even more apposite where the detenue has
already been released on bail and the detaining authority,
on the basis of subsequent material, records satisfaction
that his remaining at large poses a continuing threat
sought to be prevented by the preventive detention law.
16.
The fact that the petitioner was discharged from
particular offences, or that the prosecution ultimately
proceeded under a different statutory provision, cannot
automatically be equated with a judicial declaration that
the factual material underlying the incident was false or
non-existent. Preventive detention is not dependent upon
the eventual result of a criminal trial. The Court, however,
has carefully examined whether the detaining authority
was aware of the developments in the criminal case. On
the material placed before it, this Court finds no sufficient
basis to hold that the impugned satisfaction was arrived at
by suppressing or ignoring such material.
17.
The next contention is that the grounds of detention
are vague. The constitutional requirement is not that the
grounds should satisfy the standard of a charge-sheet or a
judgment of a criminal court. The requirement is that the
detenue must be placed in a position to understand the
substance of the allegations and the material which has
P a g e | 11
led
the
detaining
satisfaction
so
authority
that
he
to
form
the
requisite
can
make
an
effective
representation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated
communication of clear and intelligible grounds as a vital
safeguard under Article 22(5). In the present case, the
grounds
refer
to
the
relevant
criminal
case,
the
antecedents of the petitioner, the material considered by
the detaining authority and the apprehension regarding
his
future
conduct.
supplied/explained
to
The
the
grounds
detenue
in
were
the
also
language
understandable to him.
18.
The fact that the grounds contain considerable
factual narration cannot make them vague. Vagueness
arises
when
the
detenue
is
left
without
sufficient
particulars to understand what conduct is attributed to
him and what has weighed with the detaining authority.
That situation is not demonstrated in the present case.
19.
The record further indicates that the material relied
upon by the detaining authority was furnished to the
detenue and the requisite opportunity of representation
was made available to him. Section 13 of the Act
specifically requires communication of the grounds in a
language
understandable
to
the
detenue
and
an
opportunity to make a representation. The Supreme Court
has clarified that the crucial consideration in a challenge
based upon non-supply of documents is whether the
P a g e | 12
alleged
omission
actually
impaired
the
detenue's
constitutional right to make an effective representation.
20.
In the present case, no specific relied-upon document
has been identified before this Court, the non-supply of
which has demonstrably prejudiced the petitioner's ability
to make an effective representation. The allegation, in
general terms, that the record was incomplete or that
documents were subsequently introduced cannot justify
interference with the detention order.
21.
It bears repetition that the Court is not required to
determine
whether
the
petitioner
will
ultimately
be
convicted in FIR No. 67/2023 or whether the prosecution
will succeed. Those are matters for the competent criminal
court. The Court is equally conscious that the power of
preventive
detention
cannot
be
exercised
casually.
Personal liberty is a cherished constitutional value and
preventive detention must remain within the confines of
the statute and the Constitution. However, where the
competent authority has considered relevant material,
recorded
the
requisite
subjective
satisfaction,
communicated the grounds in an intelligible manner and
afforded the detenue an opportunity of representation, the
Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the
detaining authority merely because another view may also
be possible.
P a g e | 13
22.
On an overall consideration of the detention record,
this Court is satisfied that:
(i)
the impugned detention order is founded upon
relevant material;
(ii)
the present detention cannot be said to be merely
a revival of the earlier detention orders;
(iii)
the subsequent FIR No. 67/2023 and the material
arising therefrom provide a subsequent factual
basis for the present subjective satisfaction;
(iv)
the earlier cases, insofar as referred to, do not
constitute the sole foundation of the impugned
order;
(v)
the plea of staleness and absence of live link,
when examined in the backdrop of the subsequent
material, is not made out;
(vi)
the grounds of detention are sufficiently clear and
intelligible and cannot be characterized as vague;
(vii) the fact of bail/discharge or alteration of the
offences in the criminal proceedings does not, by
itself, invalidate the preventive detention; and
(viii) no violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution or
the mandatory procedural safeguards contained in
the Act has been demonstrated.
23.
The contention that the respondents have resorted to
preventive detention merely because the ordinary criminal
law has failed, or that the detention is punitive in
P a g e | 14
character, is also not borne out from the record. The object
of the impugned order is preventive only in order to
prevent
the
petitioner
from
indulging
in
activities
considered prejudicial to the security of the Union
Territory. The distinction between punitive and preventive
detention has been repeatedly recognised by the Supreme
Court.
24.
It is, therefore, not possible for this Court to hold that
the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining
authority is vitiated by non-application of mind, irrelevant
material, vagueness, staleness or absence of proximity.
25.
For the foregoing reasons, the impugned detention
Order No. 17-DMK/PSA of 2025 dated 01.05.2025
passed by respondent No.2-District Magistrate, Kupwara
under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public
Safety Act, 1978, is upheld. The instant petition fails and
is, accordingly, dismissed.
26.
Scanned detention record, as produced by learned
counsel for the respondents, is directed to be sent back
through him.
(M. A. CHOWDHARY)
JUDGE
Srinagar
25.09.2026
Muzammil. Q
Whether the order is reportable:
Yes / No
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