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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
Reserved on:- 01.10.2026
Pronounced on:- 16.11.2026
Uploaded on:- 16.11.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced:- FULL
1. Dr. Gulzar Ahmad
Aged about 64 years
S/o Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Bhat
R/o Hill View Colony, Wanabal
Rangreth, Srinagar;
2. Dr. Abdul Lateef Salik
Aged about 62 years
S/o Abdul Khaliq Salik
R/o Thong Mohalla Khanyar, Srinagar
At present Umerabad Zainakote,
Srinagar
...Applicant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through:- Mr. Salih Pirzada, Advocate with
Ms. Syed Ainain Qadri, Advocate
V/s
Crime Branch Kashmir, Through
Investigating Officer FIR No. 64/2021,
Police Station, Crime Branch Kashmir
…Respondent(s)
Through:- Mr. Mohsin Qadri, Sr. AAG with
Ms. Maha Majeed, Assisting Counsel
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
1. The principal question that arises for consideration in this petition is
whether the Crime Branch, Kashmir, possesses the jurisdiction and
authority to investigate offences punishable under the Jammu and
Kashmir Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006 (hereinafter referred to
as “the Prevention of Corruption Act”), particularly where allegations
concerning the abuse of official position by public servants and the
conferment of undue benefits upon private individuals emerge during the
investigation of offences registered under the Ranbir Penal Code (RPC).
The petitioners contend that the jurisdiction to investigate offences under
the Prevention of Corruption Act vests exclusively in the Vigilance
Organization, now known as the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), and that
the Crime Branch cannot assume such jurisdiction by invoking SRO 202
dated 03.06.1999.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the scheme of the
Prevention of Corruption Act expressly confers jurisdiction upon the
Vigilance Organization to register and investigate offences punishable
thereunder. It was contended that Section 3 of the Act, read with its
provisos, imposes statutory restrictions upon the investigation of
corruption offences by police officers who do not possess the requisite
rank or authorization. Reference was also made to Section 8-A of the Act,
which, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure,
confers
upon
designated
officers
of
the
Vigilance
Organization, not below the prescribed rank, the powers exercisable by an
Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station. Similarly, Section 8-B(2) empowers
the competent officers of the Vigilance Organization to exercise powers
relating to attachment and seizure of property in accordance with law.
3. Elaborating the submission, learned counsel argued that the aforesaid
provisions, particularly when examined in the light of the legislative
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framework introduced by the Jammu and Kashmir State Vigilance
Commission Act, 2011, demonstrate the legislative intention to entrust the
investigation of corruption offences to a specialized agency. It was urged
that the registration and investigation of such offences, including the
consequential steps for obtaining sanction for prosecution, fall within the
statutory domain of the Vigilance Organization. Consequently, an
investigation undertaken by the Crime Branch into offences under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, without compliance with the statutory
requirements, would be without jurisdiction.
4. Learned counsel further submitted that SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999, upon
which reliance has been placed by the investigating agency, cannot be
construed as conferring an independent or unrestricted power upon the
Crime Branch to investigate offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act. According to learned counsel, the notification merely delineates the
categories of offences and matters that may be investigated by the Crime
Branch, including those relating to the conduct of public servants, and
cannot override the express provisions of a special enactment. Reliance
was also placed upon Circular Order No. 12261-64/GB dated 03.09.1999,
wherein it was indicated that, in view of the existence of a specialized
agency, namely the Vigilance Organization, matters involving offences
under the Prevention of Corruption Act were not to be investigated by the
Crime Branch. It was, therefore, urged that the impugned investigations,
insofar as they relate to offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
are legally unsustainable.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
5. Per contra, Ld. Senior Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the
Crime Branch, controverted the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioners. He submitted that the FIRs in question were initially
registered for offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120-B RPC and
also under Sections 467, 468 and 471 RPC. It was only during the course
of investigation into the aforesaid offences that material allegedly
disclosing the commission of an offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act came to light. According to ld. Sr. AAG the mere
disclosure of an offence under the special enactment during an otherwise
lawful investigation would not, by itself, render the entire investigation
without jurisdiction.
6. Learned Senior Additional Advocate General further submitted that SRO
202 dated 03.06.1999 empowers the Crime Branch to investigate the
categories of offences and matters enumerated in the Schedule annexed
thereto, including matters concerning the conduct of public servants. It
was contended that the allegations against the petitioners involve not
merely the commission of offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act but also substantive offences of cheating, forgery, use of forged
documents and criminal conspiracy punishable under the RPC. The Crime
Branch, having lawfully commenced investigation into those offences,
was competent to collect evidence concerning the entire transaction,
including the role allegedly played by the public servants. It was further
submitted that the investigation has substantially concluded and the matter
has been referred to the competent authority for consideration of sanction
for prosecution.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
7. The factual background giving rise to the controversy, as emerging from
the record of investigation, may be noticed briefly. The prosecution case
is that the principal accused, Ghulam Hassan Bhat, allegedly procured and
utilized a false age certificate for securing regularization and permanent
employment in the Public Health Engineering Department. During the
preliminary inquiry, it was revealed that the said accused, allegedly in
conspiracy with the members of the then Medical Board, Srinagar,
comprising the petitioners, Dr. Gulzar Ahmad Bhat and Dr. Abdul Lateef
Salik, and Dr. Abdul Samad Sheikh, the then Chief Medical Officer,
Srinagar, who is stated to have expired in the year 2012, obtained an age
certificate dated 16.12.1999.
8. The Medical Board assessed the age of Ghulam Hassan Bhat as 32 years
as on 16.12.1999, which would place his approximate date of birth in the
year 1967. However, verification of the service record and school record
of his son, Mohammad Shafi Bhat, who was stated to be serving as a
Forest Guard, revealed his date of birth to be 25.02.1966. The
prosecution, therefore, alleges that the age assessed by the Medical Board
was demonstrably inconsistent with the verified age of the son, inasmuch
as the father would, on the basis of such assessment, be younger than his
own biological son. This circumstance, according to the investigating
agency, raises a serious question regarding the genuineness of the age
certificate issued by the Medical Board.
9. It is further alleged that the members of the Medical Board, by abusing
their official position and acting in concert with the principal accused,
facilitated the issuance of the aforesaid certificate, thereby enabling him
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
to obtain regularization and consequential service benefits to which he
was otherwise not entitled. The prosecution maintains that the certificate
was subjected to forensic examination and that the material collected
during investigation discloses manipulation of the age particulars. It is
alleged that, on the strength of the certificate, the principal accused
continued to draw salary and other service benefits from the State
exchequer, thereby causing wrongful loss to the Government and
corresponding wrongful gain to himself, besides adversely affecting the
claims of otherwise eligible candidates. On the basis of the material so
collected, offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B RPC, read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are
alleged to have been made out. The matter is stated to be awaiting
consideration of sanction for prosecution in respect of the petitioners, who
are stated to be in service.
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival
submissions, the controversy essentially turns upon the interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act vis-à-vis the
powers conferred upon the Crime Branch under SRO 202 dated
03.06.1999. There can be no dispute with the proposition that the
Prevention of Corruption Act is a special enactment intended to deal with
offences involving corruption and abuse of official position by public
servants. The Act contains specific provisions regulating investigation
into such offences and confers statutory powers upon the Vigilance
Organization. The existence of such a specialized investigative
mechanism, however, must be examined in the context of the precise
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
nature of the offences initially registered, the authority under which the
investigation commenced, and the stage at which material relating to an
offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act surfaced.
11. It is not in dispute that, on the dates when the FIRs in question were
registered, SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999 was in operation. The said
notification empowered the Crime Branch to investigate the categories of
offences and matters specified therein, including matters relating to the
conduct of public servants. In the present cases, the allegations are not
confined to an isolated act of misconduct by a public servant. They
involve a transaction in which the petitioners, while functioning as
members of a Medical Board, are alleged to have participated in the
preparation and issuance of a false certificate, which was subsequently
utilized by the beneficiary for obtaining employment-related advantages.
The allegations thus disclose an apparent nexus between the conduct of
the public servants and the offences punishable under the RPC.
12. The contention that the Vigilance Organization alone is competent to
investigate every allegation concerning the conduct of a public servant
cannot be accepted in such absolute terms. A distinction is required to be
maintained between an offence specifically punishable under the
Prevention of Corruption Act and an offence under the general penal law
in which a public servant may be involved. The mere fact that an accused
happens to be a public servant, or that the alleged transaction involves
misuse of official position, does not necessarily divest an otherwise
competent investigating agency of its authority to investigate offences
falling within its lawful jurisdiction under the RPC.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
13. At the same time, the powers conferred upon the Crime Branch by SRO
202 cannot be interpreted in isolation from the statutory restrictions
governing investigation of offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act. A notification issued in exercise of powers under the Code of
Criminal Procedure cannot override the substantive requirements of a
special statute. Accordingly, while the Crime Branch may be competent to
investigate offences under the RPC and collect evidence relating to the
conduct of public servants in connection therewith, the investigation of an
offence specifically punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act
must conform to the requirements prescribed by that enactment.
14. A plain reading of Section 3 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that
offences punishable thereunder are cognizable in nature and, therefore,
may be investigated without prior permission of the Magistrate having
jurisdiction, subject, however, to the restrictions expressly prescribed
under the said provision. Section 3 draws a clear distinction between the
investigative powers of officers belonging to the regular Police, including
the Crime Branch, and those belonging to the Vigilance Organization.
Under the principal provision, a police officer not below the rank of
Deputy Superintendent of Police (Dy.SP) is competent to investigate
offences punishable under the Act without obtaining prior permission
from the Magistrate.
15. The first proviso specifically stipulates that no police officer below the
rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate any such
offence without an order of a Magistrate of the First Class or effect an
arrest without a warrant. Consequently, an officer of the regular Police or
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
Crime Branch holding the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or
above is legally competent to investigate offences under the Act, whereas
an officer below the said rank may undertake such investigation only
upon obtaining the requisite order from the competent Magistrate. The
second proviso, however, carves out a specific exception in favour of
officers of the Vigilance Organization. It permits an officer of the
Vigilance Organization above the rank of Sub-Inspector, though below
the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, to investigate offences under
the Act, provided such officer has been specifically authorized in writing
by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police.
Such authorization is confined to the offence specified therein and does
not, by itself, confer the power of arrest. The power to effect arrest
remains subject to separate authorization by the Deputy Superintendent of
Police in accordance with Section 56 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
16. Thus, the statutory scheme makes a clear distinction between the power
to investigate and the power to arrest, while prescribing different
conditions for officers of the Vigilance Organization and those belonging
to other wings of the Police.
17. Significantly, Section 3 does not confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Vigilance Organization to investigate offences under the Act, nor does it
impose an absolute prohibition upon the regular Police or Crime Branch
from investigating such offences. On the contrary, the provision expressly
recognizes the competence of police officers of the prescribed rank to
undertake such investigations, irrespective of the wing of the Police to
which they belong, subject to compliance with the statutory requirements.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
Crime Branch holding the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or
above is the inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that an officer of the
regular Police or competent to investigate offences punishable under the
Act without obtaining prior permission from a Magistrate. An officer
below that rank may also investigate such offences upon obtaining an
order from a Magistrate of the First Class, whereas eligible officers of the
Vigilance Organization may exercise such powers pursuant to the special
authorization contemplated under the second proviso.
18. Any interpretation suggesting that the Vigilance Organization alone
possesses exclusive authority to investigate offences under the Act would
amount to reading into Section 3 a restriction that the Legislature has not
expressly imposed. Such an interpretation would not only disregard the
plain language of the provision but would also render the distinction
consciously drawn between the principal enactment and its two provisos
largely redundant. This is the only interpretation that harmoniously gives
effect to the language, structure and legislative intent of Section 3 of the
Act.
19. The interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the petitioners, if
accepted without qualification, would substantially denude SRO 202
dated 03.06.1999 of its operation in matters involving the conduct of
public servants. Such a construction would not be warranted unless the
governing statute expressly or by necessary implication excludes the
jurisdiction otherwise conferred upon the Crime Branch. The notification
must, therefore, be given effect within its legitimate field of operation,
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
subject always to the overriding requirements of the Prevention of
Corruption Act in respect of offences specifically punishable thereunder.
20. The Circular Order No. 12261-64/GB dated 03.09.1999, relied upon by
the petitioners, also does not advance their case to the extent suggested.
An administrative circular regulating the distribution of investigative
work between different agencies may govern their internal functioning;
however, it cannot, by itself, enlarge or curtail jurisdiction conferred by
statute or by a notification validly issued under statutory authority. The
effect of the circular must consequently be understood in the context of
the governing statutory framework. Similarly, any internal instruction
requiring prior approval of the Inspector General of Police before an
investigation is undertaken by the Crime Branch would have to be
examined with reference to its source, scope and legal effect. The alleged
breach of an administrative instruction cannot, without more, be equated
with the absence of statutory jurisdiction.
21. A careful examination of Section 8-A of the Jammu and Kashmir
Prevention of Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, reveals that the provision
confers upon officers of the Vigilance Organization, above the rank of
Sub-Inspector, the powers exercisable by an Officer-in-Charge of a Police
Station, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Such powers may be exercised throughout the territorial limits
of the State, now the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and an
officer exercising those powers is deemed to be the Officer-in-Charge of a
Police Station within the territorial limits in which such powers are
exercised.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
22. Ordinarily, under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station is empowered to investigate
cognizable offences within the territorial jurisdiction of that police station.
Section 8-A, however, confers a wider territorial authority upon
designated officers of the Vigilance Organization, enabling them to
exercise the powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station
throughout the territory to which the enactment applies. The object of the
provision is thus to facilitate the effective functioning of the Vigilance
Organization by removing the ordinary territorial limitations applicable to
police stations. It cannot, merely on that account, be construed as
excluding the jurisdiction of every other investigating agency in respect of
offences otherwise falling within its lawful competence.
23. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 8-A,
read with Section 3 of the Act, completely excludes the jurisdiction of the
Crime Branch is, therefore, not sustainable in the broad manner in which
it has been advanced. Equally untenable is the reliance placed upon
Circular Order No. 12261-64/GB dated 03.09.1999. An administrative
circular regulating the distribution of investigative functions cannot
override the authority conferred by SRO 202 dated 03.06.1999, nor can it
displace the requirements of the governing statute. The circular must
necessarily be construed in harmony with the statutory framework.
24. In the present case, the FIRs were initially registered for offences under
the Ranbir Penal Code. During investigation, material surfaced indicating
that the petitioners, while functioning as members of the Medical Board,
had allegedly abused their official position to confer an undue pecuniary
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
advantage upon the beneficiary, Ghulam Hassan Bhat. The Medical Board
assessed his age as 32 years on 16.12.1999, which would place his
approximate date of birth in December 1967, whereas the verified date of
birth of his son, Mohammad Shafi Bhat, was 25.02.1966. The resulting
inconsistency constituted the foundation of the allegations concerning
manipulation of age and abuse of official position.
25. It was in the course of investigation into these allegations that the offence
punishable under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was
invoked. The subsequent disclosure of an offence under the special
enactment does not, by itself, invalidate an investigation lawfully
commenced in respect of offences under the RPC. The competence of the
investigating officer to investigate the offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act must, however, remain subject to the requirements
prescribed by Section 3 of that Act. Subject to such statutory compliance,
the objection that the Crime Branch lacked jurisdiction merely because
the investigation also disclosed an offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act cannot be accepted. Consequently, the preliminary
objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Crime Branch to investigate the
allegations concerning the conduct of the petitioners is overruled. The
Court shall now proceed to examine whether the allegations and the
material collected during investigation disclose the essential ingredients of
the offences attributed to the petitioners.
26. The material on record indicates that the petitioners, Dr. Abdul Lateef
Salik and Dr. Gulzar Ahmad Bhat, were members of the Medical Board
constituted for assessment of the age of Ghulam Hassan Bhat. The Board
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
was headed by Dr. Abdul Samad Sheikh, the then Chief Medical Officer,
Srinagar, who has since expired. The certificate dated 16.12.1999 was
issued by the Board in the discharge of its official functions, and the
participation of the petitioners in its issuance is not seriously disputed.
27. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the
certificate in question, even if its contents are alleged to be incorrect,
cannot be regarded as a forged document within the meaning of Section
464 RPC. It is not the prosecution case that the signatures appearing on
the certificate were forged, that the seal affixed thereon was fabricated, or
that the document was issued by persons impersonating the members of
the Medical Board. The certificate was admittedly issued by the officials
who were authorized to undertake the age assessment. It was, therefore,
argued that the essential ingredient of making a false document, which
forms the foundation of the offences of forgery, is absent.
28. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim and Others v.
State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751, wherein the distinction
between a document containing an allegedly false assertion and a false
document within the meaning of Section 464 of the Penal Code was
examined. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that merely executing a
document containing an incorrect claim does not necessarily amount to
making a false document. For an offence of forgery to be constituted, the
act complained of must satisfy the statutory requirements relating to the
making of a false document.
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
29. The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that the falsity of a
statement contained in a document is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute
forgery. The prosecution must establish that the document was made or
executed in one of the modes contemplated by Section 464 of the Penal
Code. The distinction assumes significance because the offences
punishable under Sections 467 and 468 necessarily presuppose the
commission of forgery, while Section 471 contemplates the fraudulent or
dishonest use of a forged document as genuine. Reference was also made
to Mir Nagvi Askari v. Central Bureau of Investigation, AIR 2010 SC
528, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined allegations
concerning the preparation and use of documents by bank officials in the
course of their official duties. The decision emphasizes the necessity of
establishing the ingredients of making a false document before criminal
liability for forgery can be fastened upon an accused. The mere
circumstance that an official document contains an incorrect entry or was
prepared in connection with an allegedly irregular transaction does not
dispense with the requirement of satisfying the statutory definition of
forgery.
30. Section 464 of the Penal Code contemplates three broad categories in
which a person may be said to have made a false document. The first
relates to the dishonest or fraudulent making, signing, sealing or execution
of a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was
made or executed by another person, or by the authority of a person who
had not authorized its execution. The second concerns the dishonest or
fraudulent alteration of a document in a material part without lawful
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
authority after its execution. The third relates to dishonestly or
fraudulently causing a person to sign, execute or alter a document when
such person, by reason of unsoundness of mind, intoxication or deception,
is incapable of understanding its contents or the nature of the act. Tested
on the touchstone of the aforesaid statutory requirements, the certificate
dated 16.12.1999 does not appear to fall within any of the three
categories. It is not alleged that the petitioners lacked the authority to
issue an age assessment certificate in their capacity as members of the
Medical Board. Nor is it alleged that they impersonated any other person,
forged the signatures or seals of the competent authorities, materially
altered an existing certificate without lawful authority, or procured its
execution by resorting to any of the circumstances contemplated by the
third category of Section 464 RPC.
31. The gravamen of the prosecution case is that the petitioners, while
exercising their lawful authority to assess the age of the beneficiary,
deliberately recorded an incorrect assessment to confer an undue
advantage upon him. Such an allegation, if established, may attract
criminal liability under other provisions of the penal law, including those
relating to cheating, conspiracy and criminal misconduct by public
servants. It does not, however, automatically satisfy the statutory
definition of making a false document. A distinction must be maintained
between the authenticity of the execution of a document and the
truthfulness of its contents.
32. In the circumstances, the mere allegation that the age assessment
contained in the certificate was false or deliberately manipulated cannot,
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
without the additional ingredients contemplated by Section 464 RPC,
constitute the offence of forgery. Since the foundational requirement of
making a false document is not disclosed by the allegations as presently
framed, the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 RPC are
not prima facie attracted against the petitioners.
33. The conclusion reached in respect of the offences of forgery does not,
however, resolve the question whether the allegations disclose the
ingredients of cheating, criminal conspiracy and criminal misconduct.
These offences are distinct in their constituent elements and must be
examined independently.
34. Section 24 RPC defines the expression “dishonestly” with reference to an
intention to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to
another. For an offence of cheating, the material consideration is whether
deception was practised and whether, as a consequence thereof, the person
deceived was dishonestly or fraudulently induced to deliver property or to
act or omit to act in a manner contemplated by the relevant penal
provision.
35. In the present case, the prosecution alleges that the petitioners, while
acting as members of the Medical Board, assessed the age of Ghulam
Hassan Bhat as 32 years on 16.12.1999 (year of birth 1967)
notwithstanding the fact that his biological son was born on 25.02.1966.
The age assessment, if accepted, would place the father's birth
approximately one year after that of his son. Such an assessment is
manifestly inconsistent with the established biological relationship and
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
constitutes a circumstance of considerable significance in examining the
allegation of deliberate misrepresentation.
36. It is further alleged that the certificate was issued with the object of
enabling the beneficiary to secure regularization and permanent
employment in the Public Health Engineering Department. The
Department, acting upon the age assessment certified by the Medical
Board, is stated to have extended service benefits to the beneficiary,
including salary and other pecuniary advantages payable from the State
exchequer. The prosecution thus attributes to the petitioners an act of
deliberate deception intended to induce the Department to treat an
incorrect age assessment as genuine and to confer benefits upon a person
allegedly not entitled thereto.
37. The allegation, therefore, is not confined to a mere error of judgment in
the assessment of age. The prosecution case is that the petitioners
knowingly furnished a false assessment in the exercise of their official
functions and thereby facilitated the conferment of an unlawful pecuniary
advantage upon the beneficiary. Whether the assessment was deliberately
manipulated, whether the petitioners acted in concert with the beneficiary,
and whether the requisite dishonest intention existed are matters requiring
appreciation of evidence. At the present stage, however, the allegations
and the material collected during investigation furnish a prima facie basis
for examining the petitioners' liability under Sections 420 and 120-B
RPC.
38. The allegations also disclose the essential foundation of an offence of
criminal misconduct under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
Act, read with the relevant provision defining such misconduct. The
petitioners were public servants at the relevant time and are alleged to
have abused their official position to secure a pecuniary advantage for
another person. The benefit allegedly obtained by the beneficiary was not
merely incidental to the issuance of the certificate but is stated to have
been the intended consequence of the manipulation of his age. These
circumstances, if established at trial, may attract the penal consequences
prescribed by the Prevention of Corruption Act.
39. The power vested in this Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is undoubtedly wide, but its exercise is circumscribed
by well-settled principles. Such power is intended to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is not to
be employed as a substitute for trial, nor does it authorize the Court to
undertake a meticulous appreciation of disputed evidence at the stage of
considering the validity of criminal proceedings. In R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme Court recognized that criminal
proceedings may be quashed where the allegations, even if accepted at
their face value, do not constitute the offence alleged, or where the
proceedings suffer from a fundamental legal infirmity. The inherent
jurisdiction is thus available to prevent a prosecution from continuing
where the essential ingredients of the offence are demonstrably absent. In
V. Ravi Kumar v. State, (2019) 14 SCC 568, the Supreme Court
reiterated the limited scope of interference in criminal proceedings at the
threshold. Similarly, in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State
of Maharashtra and Others, decided on 13.04.2021, the Supreme Court
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
emphasized that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be
exercised sparingly and with circumspection, and that the Court ordinarily
ought not to interfere with a lawful investigation where the allegations
disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
40. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court finds that the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety, do not
disclose the making of a false document within the meaning of Section
464 RPC. The continuation of proceedings against the petitioners for
offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 RPC would,
therefore, not be justified in the absence of the foundational ingredients of
forgery. The position is, however, materially different in respect of the
offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120-B RPC, read with
Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The allegations
concerning deliberate manipulation of the age assessment, the alleged
concert between the petitioners and the beneficiary, and the consequent
conferment of pecuniary benefits from the State exchequer disclose
sufficient prima facie material warranting further proceedings in
accordance with law. Interference with the investigation or prosecution in
respect of these offences would require the Court to enter into disputed
questions of fact and assess the probative value of the material collected,
an exercise impermissible within the limited scope of the present
proceedings.
41. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioners have
made out a case for interference only to the extent of the offences
punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 RPC. No ground is made out
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
for quashing the proceedings insofar as they relate to offences punishable
under Sections 420 and 120-B RPC, read with Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, subject to compliance with the statutory
requirements governing investigation and prosecution. For the foregoing
reasons, this petition is partly allowed in the following terms:
i. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Crime Branch
to register and investigate the offences under the
RPC, on the ground that the allegations also involve
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, is
rejected.
ii. The impugned FIR and consequential proceedings,
insofar as they relate to offences punishable under
Sections 467, 468 and 471 RPC against the
petitioners, are quashed.
iii. The proceedings in respect of offences punishable
under Sections 420 and 120-B RPC, read with Section
5(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Prevention of
Corruption Act, Svt. 2006, shall continue in
accordance with law.
iv. The investigating agency shall be at liberty to take
such further steps as are permissible in law, including
completion of any remaining investigation and
presentation of the final report before the competent
court, subject to compliance with the statutory
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
requirements relating to investigation and sanction for
prosecution, wherever applicable.
(Sanjay Parihar)
Judge
JAMMU
16.11.2026
Akhil Dev
Whether the order is speaking? : Yes
Whether the order is reportable? : Yes
CRM(M) No. 78/2023
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