Release Deed – Effect of – Spes Successionis – Estoppel – Warding off, of estoppel by heirs of the person whose conduct created the estoppel – Impropriety of – Dispute regarding selfacquired property of ‘S’ – ‘S’ had married twice – From the first marriage, a son ‘C’ was born, whose two children were the appellants – When one child of ‘C’ was minor and other was not born, he executed a release deed for relinquishing his share in the property for valuable consideration in the year 1975 – It was also specified in the release deed that ‘C’ will not have any relation apart from blood relation with ‘S’ – ‘C’ predeceased his father in the year 1978 – Two children from the second marriage of ‘S’ filed suit for partition for self-acquired property of ‘S’ and contended to exclude the children from the first marriage of ‘S’ on the basis of the release deed – Trial court found the release deed to be null and void since it was executed by ‘C’, when his father was alive – Thus, the property was divided between the children from both the marriages equally – On appeal, the High Court found the release deed to be a valid document and excluded the appellants – High Court held that the release deed coupled with the consideration received by ‘C’ acted as an estoppel against the appellants – Appellants assailed the High Court judgment on two grounds – Firstly, ‘C’, the father of appellants, at the time of the execution of release deed merely had a right as spes successionis, and, thus, the release deed had no effect – Secondly, the father being a natural guardian did not have the power to bind the minor by a personal covenant – Held: On facts, the property in dispute was the self-acquired property of ‘S’ – Thus, at the time of execution of the release deed, ‘C’, the father of the appellants, did not possess any right in the property apart from being a spes successionis – Further, ‘S’, the father of ‘C’, paid valuable consideration in order to secure the interest of the son from the second marriage, who used to be ill – Release deed by a spes successionis would be incapable to convey or relinquish any interest in the property – However, on facts, execution of the release deed relinquished every other right apart from being a blood relative – Additionally, the conduct accompanied by receipt of valuable consideration estopped ‘C’, the father of appellants, from claiming any right in the property – On the personal covenant, the limitation in s.8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,1956 can only be applicable when the minor possessed any independent right in the property – On facts, it was not even the case of the appellants that they had any such independent right – Thus, the release deed cannot be interdicted as being a personal covenant by the natural guardian which cannot bind a minor – Further contention that when the succession opened in 1988 on the death of their grandfather ‘S’, appellants being sons of ‘C’, the predeceased son of ‘S’, formed part of class-I heir category under the Hindu Succession Act, not acceptable – Appellants were claiming through their father ‘C’ and cannot ward off the estoppel created by the conduct of ‘C’ under whom they were claiming right in the property – Judgment of High Court accordingly affirmed –Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – s.8 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.6(a) – s.8.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.6(a) – Spes successonis – Chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or other mere possibility of a like nature – Held: Cannot be transferred – A living man has no heir – Equally, a person who may become the heir and entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up – Unlike a co-parcener who acquires right to joint family AND ORS. & ETC.
property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of the Hindu, no such right exists – Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis is ineffective to convey any right.
Estoppel – Effect of – Held: The effect of estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct generated the estoppel – The impact of estoppel applies irrespective of the personal law applicable to the party concerned – On facts, ‘C’, having received valuable consideration and allowed his father ‘S’ to proceed on the basis that the latter was free to deal with his self-acquired property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by ‘C’, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by ‘C’ – Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by ‘C’ or his children, viz., the appellants.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 declares that a chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman or other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred. A living man has no heir. Equally, a person who may become the heir and entitled to succeed under the law upon the death of his relative would not have any right until succession to the estate is opened up. When ‘S’, the father of ‘C’ was alive, ‘C’ had at best a spes successonis. Unlike a co-parcener who acquires right to joint family property by his mere birth, in regard to the separate property of the Hindu, no such right exists. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Release Deed may not by itself have the effect of a transfer of the rights of ‘C’ in favour of either his father or the minor son of his father from the second marriage. [Para 10][271-D-F]
2. The property in question was not the ancestral property of ‘C’. ‘C’ would have acquired rights over the same only if his father had died intestate. He was, thus, only a heir apparent. Transfer by an heir apparent being mere spes successonis is ineffective to convey any right. By the mere execution of Release Deed, in other words, in the facts of this case, no transfer took place. This is for the simple reason that the transferor, namely, the father of the appellants did not have any right at all which he could transfer or relinquish. [Para 14][273-G-H]
3. ‘S’, the father of ‘C’ married twice. The first union produced ‘C’, the father of the appellants. Thereafter, ‘S’ married again. It is after the second marriage and the birth of the children from the said wedlock that Release Deed came to be executed on 12th November, 1975. It would appear that from the second marriage, a son was born who incidentally was ill and in whose favour ‘C’, the father of the appellants executed the Release Deed. The intention of ‘S’ would appear to have been to secure the interest of the son from the second marriage. He wished to secure his interest created under the second marriage and for which the father of the appellants who was his son from the first marriage was given some valuable consideration, which persuaded ‘C’ to release all his rights in respect of property in question. The words in the ‘Release Deed’ that hereafter he did not have any other connection except blood relation appears to signify that the intention of ‘S’ was to deny any claim to ‘C’ in regard to the property. [Para 15][274-C-E]
4. Conjecturing that ‘C’ has survived his father and his succession had opened intestate in regard to the estate of his father, the conduct of executing the Release Deed though by itself may not have resulted in a lawful transfer, his conduct being accompanied by the receipt of consideration would have estopped ‘C’. The very fact that C’s father did not execute any document by way of Will only shows that he proceeded on the basis that the branch represented by ‘C’ was being cut off from inheritance from the property in question. [Para 16][274-F-G]
AND ORS. & ETC.
5.1. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, inter alia, declares that the father and, after him, the mother, shall, in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl, be the natural guardians of the minor’s person as well as in respect of the minor’s property. However, the minor’s property would not include the undivided interest the minor has in the joint family property. It is, thereafter, that Section 8 appears and it purports to delineate the powers of a natural guardian. The powers of a natural guardian, in other words, relate either to the person or to the minor’s property or both. Section 8 purports to, inter alia, provide that the natural guardian would have the power to do all acts, which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or realisation, protection or benefit of the minor’s estate. It is, thereafter, that the Law-Giver has interdicted the guardian from binding the minor by a personal covenant. [Para 20] [275-G-H; 276-A-C]
5.2. In the facts of this case, it is the case of the appellants, that ‘C’, their father, himself did not have any right in the plaint schedule property. This is for the reason that being the separate property of ‘S’, ‘C’ did not have any right by birth. He himself had only, what is described a spec successionis within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not even the case of the appellants that they had any independent right in the plaint schedule property either at the time of their birth or at the time when their father died or even when their grandfather ‘S’ died in 1988. The right, which they claim, at the earliest point, can arise only by treating the property as the separate property of ‘S’ on his death within the meaning of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, one is unable to discard the deed of release executed by ‘C’ in the year 1975 as a covenant within the meaning of Section 8 of the ‘1956 Act.’ [Para 21][276-D-F]
6. The appellants would not be in a position to claim immunity from the operation of the Principle of Estoppel on the basis of Section 8(a) of the Hindu Succession Act. If the principle in Gulam Abbas case applies, then, despite the fact that what was purported to be released by ‘C’, was a mere spec successonis or expectation his conduct in transferring/releasing his rights for valuable consideration, would give rise to an estoppel. The effect of the estoppel cannot be warded off by persons claiming through the person whose conduct has generated the estoppel. Also there is no merit at all in the attempt at drawing a distinction based on religion. The principle of estoppel applies without such distinction. [Para 23][277-G-H; 278-A-B]
7. Having received valuable consideration and allowed his father ‘S’ to proceed on the basis that he was free to deal with the property without the prospect of being haunted by any claim whatsoever as regards the property by ‘C’, a clear estoppel sprang into existence following the receipt of consideration by ‘C’. Estoppel would shut out in equity any claim otherwise either by ‘C’ or his children, viz., the appellants. [Para 24][278-C-D] Gullam Abbas v. Haji Kayam Ali and Others, AIR 1973 SC 554 : [1973] 2 SCR 300 – held applicable.
Estoppel by Representation by Spencer Bower and Turner – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.