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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Appellate side
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
WPA 28677 of 2025
Eastern Coalfield Limited
Vs
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Anup Kanti Poddar,
Ms. Anjali Shaw.
For the U.O.I.
:
Mr. Pinaki Bhattacharyya,
Ms. Shaista Afreen.
Judgment reserved on
:
31.03.2026
Judgment delivered on
:
05.05.2026
SHAMPA DUTT (PAUL), J. :
1.
The writ application has been preferred challenging an award dated
20.05.2024, passed by the Learned Central Government Industrial
Tribunal, Asansol, in reference Case No.18 of 2019.
2.
Vide the impugned order the Learned Tribunal directed as follows:“that the Industrial Dispute is allowed on contest against
management of ECL. The order of dismissal dated 13.03.2015
issued by the Assistant Personnel Manager (IC) of Kajora
Area, ECL on approval of the General Manager of Kajora Area
is hereby set aside. The management of ECL is directed to
reinstate Sunil Majhi in the service of the company within one
(1) month from the date of communication of the Award. Let an
award be drawn up in the light of my above findings. Let
copies of the Award in duplicate be sent to the Ministry of
Labour, Government of India, New Delhi for information and
Notification.”
3.
Being aggrieved the writ application has been preferred challenging the
said award.
4.
The petitioner’s case in short is that the Petitioner Eastern Coalfields
Limited (ECL) employed Respondent No. 4, Shri Sunil Majhi, as a
General Mazdoor under Kajora Area. On 22.11.2014. While on duty at
Madhabpur Colliery during the night shift, Respondent No. 4 committed
serious misconduct by jumping into Pit Shaft No. 2 after crossing the
pit fencing, resulting in disruption of mine operations and posing
serious safety risks in an active mine area. He thereby violated
Regulation 38(1)(a), 38(1)(b) and 38(3)(a) of the Coal Mines Regulations,
1957 read with Clause 26.3, 26.15, 26.22 and 26.26 of the Certified
Standing Orders of ECL.
5.
A domestic enquiry was conducted in compliance with the principles of
natural justice, where Respondent No. 4 admitted his misconduct. The
charges were duly proved. Considering the gravity of the misconduct
and his past disciplinary record, the competent authority dismissed
him from service by order dated 13.03.2015. Respondent No. 4 did not
file any departmental appeal within the stipulated period.
6.
More than one year later, Respondent No. 4 submitted a mercy petition
merely seeking sympathetic relief without raising any grievance
regarding the enquiry. Subsequently, a union espoused the dispute and
the matter was referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunalcum-Labour Court, Asansol (CGIT) as Ref. Case No. 18 of 2019.
7.
By the impugned Award dated 20.05.2024 (notified on 24.06.2024), the
CGIT illegally set aside the dismissal and directed reinstatement
without back wages.
8.
It is stated that the Tribunal completely ignored the proved misconduct,
statutory safety violations, the admission made during enquiry, and his
past record, and interfered with the penalty, solely based on misplaced
sympathy. Such interference exceeds the jurisdiction vested in an
Industrial Adjudicator and is contrary to settled principles regarding
judicial review over disciplinary action.
9.
The petitioner by way of filing written notes has argued that by an order
dated 25.11.2014, the Petitioner issued chargesheet to the Respondent
No. 4 charging him for attempt to commit suicide by jumping into the
2nd no. Pit Shaft of Madhabpur Colliery by crossing the pit fencing by
which he endangered himself and other persons and for other
misconduct as mentioned in the said chargesheet.
10.
He has also been charged for violation of Coal Mines Regulation, 1957
under clause 38 (i) (a), neglect and refuse to obey the order and
direction issued under the Act and regulation;
38 (i) (a), neglect and refuse to obey the order and direction
issued under Act and regulation;
38 (i) (b), interfere with, impact or obstruct any person on the
discharge of his duty.
38 (iii) (a), remove or pass through any fence barrier or gate.
190 General safety
26.3 Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone
or in conjunction with another or others of any lawful or
reasonable order of a superior.
26.15 Any breach of the Mines Act, 1952 of any other act or
any Rules, Regulation or bye laws there under.
26.22 Sabotage or causing willful damage to work in
progress or to property of the Company.
26.26 Conduct within the mine's premises of its precincts
which endangers life of safety of any person.
11.
Ultimately, charges against the employee have been proved before the
disciplinary proceedings followed by domestic enquiry against the
Respondent No. 4. Finally by an order dated 13.03.2015, Respondent
No. 4 has been removed from service with effect from 13.03.2015.
12.
It is the petitioner’s argument that the impugned award passed by the
learned tribunal setting aside the order of dismissal and directing
reinstatement of the workman, is perverse and bad in law as the
Learned Tribunal has failed to consider that in a domestic enquiry for
proving charge against the delinquent employee objective satisfaction
for proving charge is not necessary but subjective satisfaction is
sufficient.
13.
The petitioner has relied upon the judgment reported in (2014 SCC
online SC 397) order dated: 25th April, 2014, Bhuvnesh Kumar
Dwivedi Vs. Hindalco Industries Limited (Para 21 and 22).
14.
It is further stated that the Learned Tribunal has ignored the point, that
during enquiry proceedings, the employee concerned admitted the
Charges in the presence of defense assistance Mr. D.B.Chakraborty and
the same has been recorded in the Enquiry report.
15.
It is further stated that Respondent No.4 admitted his misconduct
before the Enquiry Officer and expressed remorse, and therefore, the
Tribunal could not have discarded the findings of the enquiry without
any material basis and the Tribunal ignored the past service record of
Respondent No.4 involving repeated unauthorized absence and prior
punishments, which was rightly considered by the disciplinary
authority while determining the penalty.
16.
On hearing the Learned Counsels for the parties, on perusal of the
materials on record and the findings of the Learned Presiding Officer of
the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in the impugned award, it
appears that the Learned Tribunal passed the impugned award on the
following findings:“The
dismissed
workman
urged
that
the
punishment
awarded against him is disproportionate to the nature of
alleged misconduct and that the management instead of
issuing any 2nd Show Cause Notice, dismissed him from the
service without complying with the mandate of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India as well as the Circular issued by the
Director (P & IR), Coal India Limited, regarding issuance of
2nd Show Cause Notice to the charged employee, seeking his
representation on the findings of the Enquiry Officer.
The aggrieved workman contended that on the instruction of
the local management he was compelled to admit the charge
and undertook that in future he shall not commit any mistake
or repeat such misconduct. It is contended that the
management could not prove the charge on the basis of any
independent evidence. According to the
workman the
occurrence was an accident. The workman has not been paid
the
sustenance
allowance
during
the
period
of
his
suspension until his dismissal.”
17.
The management case before the Tribunal was that the respondent had
attempted to commit suicide by jumping into pit shaft No. 2 of
Madhabpur Colliery by crossing the pit fence from the southern side.
Such act of the workman is a misconduct under Clause 26.3, 26.15,
26.22, and 26.26 of the Certified Standing Order of the company. In
course of enquiry the charges were established against the workman.
The findings of the Enquiry Officer was communicated to the General
Manager, Kajora Area. Ample opportunity was given to the workman to
defend himself.
18.
The Tribunal considering the said facts and circumstances including
the evidence before it held:“From the four corners of the Enquiry Proceeding, I am unable
to find any material statement of any person that the
concerned workman had crossed the fence to jump into the
pit or that there was any occasion to disobey any statement
of any superior officer, or any senior officer was present at
the place of occurrence. No management representative
was examined by the Enquiry Officer in support of the
charge that the workman acted in insubordinate
manner. From the facts and circumstances of the case it is
crystal clear that Sunil Majhi fell into the mining pit and he
tried to save himself by holding the winding rope
fifteen feet below the surface, in the pit. Later on, he
managed to reach the bottom of the pit without sustaining
any injury or causing injury to other co-workers. No
management evidence has been adduced to establish
that adequate care and protection had been taken by
the management to encircle the pit either with fence or
by wall. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the pit of
the colliery is safeguarded with any fence. The question
of violating the Regulation 38 of Coal Mines Regulations,
1957 therefore does not arise. I also find that there is
dearth of evidence to establish the charges under Clause
26.3, 26.15, and 26.22 of Certified Standing Order applicable
to the employer and employee of the coal mines. Admittedly,
workman had fallen into the shaft but no injury of the
workman or his co-employees was reported that night”
Having considered the facts and materials in the Enquiry
Proceeding, except an admission on the part of the charged
employee there is no material to establish that there
had been any violation of safety rules under the Coal
Mines Regulations, 1957 or insubordination on the
part of the concerned workman. No independent
evidence nor any material has transpired in the
Enquiry Proceeding to establish any loss of life or property
of co-workers or management. On a holistic consideration of
the Enquiry Proceeding, I do not find it sustainable under the
law.”
19.
Finally the tribunal held that as follows:“In view of my aforesaid discussion, I hold that order of
dismissal dated 13.03.2015 issued against Sunil Majhi for
his removal from service from 13.03.2015 is unreasonable,
improper, arbitrary, passed in violation of natural justice
and is not tenable under the facts and circumstances. The
order of dismissal dated 13.03.2015 passed by the
Assistant Personnel Manager (IC) of Kajora Area is set
aside. Management is directed to reinstate the workman
within one (1) month from the date of communication of the
Award. Since the workman has not adduced any
evidence that he did not work for gain after his
dismissal and that he did not render service for the
company since March, 2015 he shall not be entitled to
any back wages. His only relief in this case is his
reinstatement
in
service
within
one
month
from
communication of the Award. He shall also be entitled to all
consequential benefits, treating the period of his absence as
dies non.”
CONCLUSION:20.
In The State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs Heem Singh, in Civil Appeal
No.
3340 of 2020 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 30763 of 2019),
decided on October 29, 2020, wherein the Supreme Court in Para 13,
33 held:“13. The standard of standard of proof in disciplinary
proceedings is different from that in a criminal trial. In
Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce4, a
two judge Bench of this Court differentiated between the
standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings and criminal
trials in the following terms:
“ …the yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case
is different from the disciplinary proceeding. While the
standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all
reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding
is preponderance of probabilities.”
This standard is reiterated by another two-Judge Bench of
this Court in Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. :
“Acquittal in the criminal case shall have no bearing or
relevance to the facts of the departmental proceedings as
the standard of proof in both the cases are totally different.
In a criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the criminal
case beyond all reasonable doubt whereas in a
departmental proceedings, the department has to prove
only preponderance of probabilities.”
33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters,
there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a
rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is
permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of
judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The
determination of whether a misconduct has been
committed lies primarily within the domain of the
disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the
mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge
wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact
by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea
that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient
conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to
abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not
governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial
proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict
standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a
preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of
preponderance, there are varying approaches based on
context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is
founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the
position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding
authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining
discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of
the spectrum is the principle that the court has the
jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are
based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity.
A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what
the law regards as a perverse determination of fact.
Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our
jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for
long years in allowing for the authority of the court to
interfere when the finding or the penalty are
disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or
misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail
between the banks of these two shores which have been
termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest
with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they
exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding
in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an
initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is
to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some
evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard
against perversity. But this does not allow the court to reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or
to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more
appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which
has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise
of robust common sense without which the judges’ craft is
in vain.”
21.
In the present case, the other end of the spectrum is applicable, as the
total enquiry was based on no evidence and thus clearly suffers from
perversity.
22.
The penalty of dismissal in this case is disproportionate to the weight of
the evidence, a case of no evidence herein and when no misconduct
could be proved.
23.
The tribunal in its award which is impugned herein, has clearly noted
that there is no evidence on record to support the charge of
misconduct.
24.
The question of re-appreciating evidentiary findings in the disciplinary
enquiry conducted in this case thus does not arise as there was no
evidence adduced.
25.
The learned tribunal has also not tried to substitute a view but has
clearly pointed out the laches in the enquiry proceedings in the present
case.
26.
On considering the said materials on record and the impugned award,
this Court is of the view that first and foremost, the punishment of
dismissal
from
service
of
the
respondent/workman
is
clearly
disproportionate to any Act as alleged to have been committed by him.
27.
Secondly, the observation of the learned Tribunal that on the basis of
the evidence, it was clear from the conduct of the workman that:(i) He had accidently has fallen into the pit,
(ii) There were no safety measures taken by the management around
the pit and the findings,
(iii) The enquiry proceedings also did not have any person from the
management adducing the evidence, is in accordance with law and
there is thus clear perversity in the enquiry/disciplinary proceedings
conducted against the workman, which is based on ‘no evidence’ as
rightly held by the tribunal and is thus against the principles of natural
justice and also an abuse of the process of law.
28.
Thus the impugned order dated 20.05.2024 passed by Learned Central
Government Industrial Tribunal, Asansol, in reference Case No. 18 of
2019 calls for no interference, the same being in accordance with law.
29.
WPA 28677 of 2025 is dismissed.
30.
Connected application, if any, stands disposed of.
31.
Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties expeditiously after due compliance.
[Shampa Dutt (Paul). J]
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