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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C) 156/2023
Dr. Subhajit Dhar,
son of Sri Sankar Dhar, resident of Gandhighat Quarter Complex, BlockA, Type-3, Quarter No. 3, P.S. West Agartala, Agartala, West Tripura
…..Petitioner
-VERSUS1.
Society for Tripura Medical College & Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
Memorial Teaching Hospital, Chairman of the Society, Hapania, P.S.
Amtali, West Agartala, Tripura
2.
The Chief Executive Officer, Society for Tripura Medical College
& Dr. B.R.A.M. Teaching Hospital, Hapania, P.S. Amtali, West Agartala,
Tripura
3.
The Medical Superintendent, TMC & Dr. BRAM Teaching
Hospital, Hapania, P.S. Amtali, West Agartala, Tripura.
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
….Respondents.
Mr. BN Majumder, Sr. Advocate
Mr. DJ Saha, Advocate
Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, GA
Mr. S. Saha, Advocate
Date of hearing & delivery:
of judgment & order
10.07.2023
Whether fit for reporting :
Yes
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
Judgment & Order (ORAL)
10/07/2023
Heard Mr. BN Majumder, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.
DJ Saha, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. D.
Bhattacharjee, learned GA assisted by Mr. S. Saha, learned counsel for
the respondents.
2.
It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed on contract
basis for a period of one year with the following terms and conditions:
“(i)
He will be paid contractual remuneration of Rs. 46,120/- per month
subject to normal standard deductions, if any;
(ii)
The appointment may be terminated at any time by either side by
giving one month’s notice without assigning any reason. The Appointing
Authority, however, reserves the right to terminate the service of the
appointee forthwith or before the expiry of the stipulated period of notice by
making payments of a sum equivalent to the emoluments for the period of
notice. Appointee may also pay one month’s salary in lieu of one month’s
notice. This amount is not permissible to be adjusted against any leave or
fund;
(iii)
****
(iv)
****
(v)
****
(vi)
****
(vii)
The appointment may be extended for further period on mutual
consent depending on performance.”
3.
This is the second round of litigation. In the first round of
litigation, the petitioner had challenged his termination order stating that
said order was a stigmatic one. This court while disposing of that writ
petition, had set-aside and quashed the termination order holding that the
order was stigmatic. Thereafter, the petitioner was reinstated in the same
terms and conditions. In the instant writ petition, the petitioner has stated
that after expiry of 1 year 29 days, the respondents did not allow him to
continue his service. The respondents even have not issued any order of
discontinuation.
4.
Mr. BN Majumder, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has the right to know the
reason as to why his service was discontinued. The service contract of
other contractual doctors has been renewed by the respondents. Mr.
Nandi Majumder, learned senior counsel has further submitted that the
salary of 11 days has not been paid to the petitioner by the respondents.
5.
On the other hand, Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned GA appearing for
the respondents has submitted that the performance of the petitioner was
not found satisfactory by the respondents, as such, his service was
discontinued. While the services of other similarly situated doctors were
found to be satisfactory to the respondents, as such their services had
been continued.
6.
I have perused the pleadings of both the parties, and considered the
submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties.
7.
It is apparent from the appointment order of the petitioner dated
19th July, 2021 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) that the appointment is
purely on contract basis for a period of one year. It is also clear that after
expiry of one year, the contractual service of the petitioner has come to an
end. In the counter affidavit, the respondents have stated that the
performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory to the respondents
(para 14 to the counter affidavit).
8.
Before I advert to the merits of the writ petition, I may gainfully
refer to a judgment passed in the case of Cyriac Joseph & T.S. Thakur
Gridco Limited and another vs. Sri Sadananda Doloi and others,
reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court almost
in a similar situation had observed thus:
“16. This question has to be answered in two distinct parts. The first part relates to
the aspect whether the order passed by the appellant-Corporation is amenable to
judicial review and if so what is the scope of such review. The second part of the
question is whether on the standards of judicial review applicable to it, the order of
termination is seen to be suffering from any legal infirmity. Before we refer to certain
decisions of this Court that have dealt with similar issues in the past we may at the
outset say that there was no challenge either before the High Court or before us as to
the competence of the authority that passed the termination order. There was indeed
a feeble argument that the order was mala fide in character but having regard to the
settled legal position regarding the proof of mala fides and the need for providing
particulars to substantiate any such plea, we are of the view that the charge of mala
fide does not stand scrutiny. Neither before the learned Single Judge nor before the
Division Bench was the ground based on mala fides seriously argued by the
respondent. What was contended on behalf of the respondent was that the
appellant-Corporation did not act fairly and objectively in taking the decision to
terminate the arrangement. It was contended that the decision to terminate the
contractual employment was not a fair and reasonable decision having regard to the
fact that the respondent had performed well during his tenure and the requirement of
the Corporation to have a Chief General Manager (HR) continued to subsist. In
substance, the contention urged on behalf of the respondent was that this Court
should reappraise and review the material touching the question of performance of
the respondent as Chief General Manager (HR) as also the question whether the
Corporation's need for a General Manager (HR) had continued to subsist. We regret
our inability to do so. It is true that judicial review of matters that fall in the realm of
contracts is also available before the superior courts, but the scope of any such review
is not all pervasive. It does not extend to the Court substituting its own view for that
taken by the decision-making authority. Judicial review and resultant interference is
permissible where the action of the authority is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational,
disproportionate or unreasonable but impermissible if the petitioner's challenge is
based only on the ground that the view taken by the authority may be less reasonable
than what is a possible alternative. The legal position is settled that judicial review is
not so much concerned with the correctness of the ultimate decision as it is with the
decision-making process unless of course the decision itself is so perverse or irrational
or in such outrageous defiance of logic that the person taking the decision can be said
to have taken leave of his senses.
17. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 212, the State
Government had by a circular terminated the engagement of all the government
counsels engaged throughout the State and sought to defend the same on the ground
that such appointments being contractual in nature were terminable at the will of the
government. The question of reviewability of administrative action in the realm of
contract was in that backdrop examined by this Court. The Court also examined
whether the personality of the State Government undergoes a change after the initial
appointment of government counsels so as to render its action immune from judicial
scrutiny. The answer was in the negative. The Court held that even after the initial
appointment had been made and even when the matter is in the realm of contract,
the State could not cast off its personality and exercise a power unfettered by the
requirements of Article 14 or claim to be governed only by private law principles
applicable to private individuals. The Court observed:
"... we are also clearly of the view that this power is available even without that
element on the premise that after the initial appointment, the matter is purely
contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being
settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a
contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said
that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled power
unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters
and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to
private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without
anything more? We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State,
requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14,
does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely
because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if
the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts,
which cannot co-exist."
18. Recognizing the difference between public and private law activities of the State,
this Court reasoned that unlike private individuals, the State while exercising its
powers and discharging its functions, acts for public good and in public interest.
Consequently every State action has an impact on the public interest which would in
turn bring in the minimal requirements of public law obligations in the discharge of
such functions. The Court declared that to the extent, the challenge to State action is
made on the ground of being arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable hence offensive to
Article 14 of the Constitution, judicial review is permissible. The fact that the dispute
fell within the domain of contractual obligations did not, declared this Court, relieve
the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Article 14. The
court said :
"This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of
public law obligations and impress with this character the contracts made by the
State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review
in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be
more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of
their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual
disputes. However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground of violation of
Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable,
the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations
would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements
of Article 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in
every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition
thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the
guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of
its actions."
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors. v. Issac Peter & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 104, the
dispute related to supply of additional quantities of arrack demanded by the licenseholder. Supply of arrack was, however, controlled by the Government and the entire
transaction relating to the supply and sale of arrack was based on licenses granted
under the relevant rules to persons who emerged successful in a public auction. The
Government claimed that the only obligation cast upon it under the Rules was to
provide the monthly quota of arrack to each license-holder, supply of additional
quantity being discretionary with the authorities. The license-holders, on the other
hand, argued that supply of additional quantity was implicit in the conditions of the
license. In support they relied upon the past practice and argued that if the supply is
limited to the monthly quota only it would not be possible for the license holder to
pay even the license fee. The license-holders questioned the refusal of the State
Government to issue additional quantities of arrack as unfair and unreasonable. This
court, however, rejected that contention and held :
"Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine
developed in the administrative law field to ensure the Rule of Law and to prevent
failure of justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of
natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi-judicial, the
doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is
administrative. But it can certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the
express terms of the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is
governed by statutory provisions, i.e., where it is a statutory contract - or rather
more so."
(emphasis supplied)
20. Taking note of the decision of this Court in Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra), this
court held that there was no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and
reasonableness against one party to the contract, for the purpose of altering or
adding to the terms and conditions of the contract merely because it happens to be
the State.
The Court said :
"It was a case of termination from a post involving public element. It was a case of
non-government servant holding a public office, on account of which it was held to
be a matter within the public law field. This decision too does not affirm the
principle now canvassed by the learned Counsel (that being of incorporating the
doctrine of fairness in contracts where State is a party). We are, therefore, of the
opinion that in case of contracts freely entered into with the State, like the present
ones, there is no room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and reasonableness
against one party to the contract (State), for the purpose of altering or adding to
the terms and conditions of the contract, merely because it happens to be the
State. In such cases, the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by
the terms of the contracts (which may be statutory in some cases) and the laws
relating to contracts. It must be remembered that these contracts are entered into
pursuant to public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. There is no
compulsion on anyone to enter into these contracts. It is voluntary on both sides."
(emphasis supplied)
21. In conclusion, the Court made it clear that the opinion expressed by it was only in
the context of contracts entered into between the State and its citizens pursuant to
public auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. The court considered it
unnecessary to express any opinion about the legal position applicable to contracts
entered into otherwise than by public auction, floating of tenders or negotiation.
22. In State of Orissa v. Chandra Sekhar Mishra (2002) 10 SCC 583, the respondent had
been appointed as a Homeopathic Medical Officer whose services were subsequently
terminated by issue of a notice. While rejecting the challenge to the termination
order, the Court observed "when the respondent was only a contractual employee,
there could be no question of his being granted the relief of being directed to be
appointed as a regular employee."
23. We may also refer to the decision of this court in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of
India (AIR 1953 SC 250), where the petitioner, an employee of the Directorate General
of Resettlement and Employment, was removed from contractual employment after
being served a notice of termination. The contract of service in that case was initially
for a period of five years which was later extended. A five-Judge Bench hearing the
matter, dismissed the petition, challenging the termination primarily on the ground
that the petitioner could not prove a breach of a fundamental right since no right
accrued to him as the whole matter rested in contract and termination of the contract
did not amount to dismissal, or removal from service nor was it a reduction in rank.
The Court found it to be an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice
under one of its clauses. The Court observed :
"10. There was no compulsion on the Petitioner to enter into the contract he did.
He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or reject the offer
which was made to him. Having accepted, he still had open to him all the rights
and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights
under his contract, which has been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to
pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land, such remedies for a breach as are open
to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not
been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws
which others similarly situated could claim...
11. ... .........
The Petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of
appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of
temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance when
analysed, not one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary
employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment. But of
course the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose
special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the
Constitution, and those who chose to accept those terms and enter into the
contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound."
(emphasis supplied).”
9.
Applying the aforesaid ratio, decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court,
in the facts of the present case, I may unhesitantly hold that the
termination of the service of the petitioner after expiry of one year is
purely within the ambit of the terms and conditions of the appointment
order dated 19th July, 2021. The extension or renewal of the contract
entirely depends upon the employer. The court will not exercise its power
of judicial review to interfere with the order of discontinuation unless and
until the records show otherwise or the court finds any illegality or
arbitrariness or malafide intention for discontinuing the service of a
contractual employee.
10.
In the instant case, it is the grievance of the petitioner that no order
of discontinuation has been passed by the respondents. In my opinion,
non-renewal of the contract on expiry of the stipulated period of contract
manifestly implies that the respondents discontinued the contractual
service period of the petitioner after expiry of 1 (one) year in terms of the
appointment letter.
11.
In the present case, there is nothing on record to show that the
discontinuation of the contractual service of the petitioner was actuated
with malafide intention or by any act of arbitrariness. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Cyriac Joseph & T.S. Thakur (supra), has
clearly held that renewal or extension were subject to terms and
conditions as mentioned in the appointment letter. It is further held that
termination of a contractual employment in terms of contract is
permissible.
12.
After perusal of the appointment order dated 19 th July, 2021, I do
not find any infirmity or illegality. Non-renewal of the contract is rooted
in the appointment letter itself. I said earlier that renewal or extension of
the contract period would be governed / regulated by the terms and
conditions embodied in the appointment letter itself. Non-renewal of the
contract of appointment by the respondent-employer itself amounts to
discontinuation. For this, no formal order is mandatory. The petitioner
cannot raise his objection against such discontinuation because he knows
the implications of the terms and conditions regulating his service
conditions. He is well aware of the nature of his appointment. In the
appointment order, one of the terms and conditions is that the
appointment may be extended for further period on mutual consent
depending on performance. In my opinion, in the instant case,
discontinuation is simpliciter and within the realm of the contract that the
service of the petitioner may not be extended after a period of one year.
13.
The submission of learned senior counsel that the services of other
similarly situated contractual doctors had been extended and that the nonrenewal of the contractual service of the petitioner is an act of
arbitrariness on the part of the respondent-Medical College, in the
opinion of this court, is not acceptable on the ground that the appointment
of the petitioner was only for one year, and the extension and renewal
would be decided on mutual consent on the basis of performance, which
decision is entirely within the domain of the respondents. In such a case,
in my opinion, equality clause as enshrined under Article 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India will not come into play because such appointment
will be governed by the terms and conditions of the contract entered into
between the employee and the employer being agreed upon mutually.
14.
The petitioner has not produced any such record wherefrom it can
be revealed that the contract service of the petitioner was discontinued on
some extraneous consideration or actuated with malice. The facts and law
surveyed in the preceding paragraphs lead this court to hold that the
petitioner has no right to go beyond the terms and conditions laid down in
the appointment letter.
15.
Further, it is no more res integra that principle of natural justice is
not a straight jacket formula. In the facts of the present case, the doctrine
of natural justice would not come in the way of discontinuation of the
contract service of the petitioner.
16.
The petitioner also could not furnish any such records that he
worked for 11 (eleven) days after expiry of the contract period of 1 (one)
year. However, I direct the respondents to pay remuneration for 11 days,
if it is found from the records of the respondents that the petitioner had
worked for 11 days after expiry of the contractual period.
17.
For the reasons stated and discussed here-in-above, I do not find
any merit in the present writ petition, and accordingly, the same stands
dismissed.
JUDGE
SAIKA
T KAR
Digitally signed
by SAIKAT KAR
Date:
2023.07.18
17:18:12 +05'30'
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