LegalFirms.in
LegalFirms.in Judgments · legalfirms.in/judgments/dr-sohail-malik-vs-union-of-india-anr-20251210/ · Printed 07 Nov 2026
Civil · Reportable judgment

Dr. Sohail Malik vs Union of India & Anr.

Court
Supreme Court of India
Date
10 December 2025
Case No.
Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2024
Result
Dismissed
Bench
J.K. Maheshwari
Citation
[2025] 12 S.C.R. 505 : 2025 INSC 1415
Acts & Sections
Constitution IPC Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace… Central Civil Services (Classification… Information Technology Act, 2000
Supreme Court Reports [2025] 12 S.C.R. 505 : 2025 INSC 1415
Issue for consideration
Issue arose whether the Internal Complaints Committee-ICC constituted in one department of the Central Government has the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint of sexual harassment under the POSH Act against an employee of a different department of the Central Government; whether the use of the words ‘where the respondent is an employee’ as contained in s.11 of the POSH Act would mandate that ICC proceedings must be instituted and carried out at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint was made; and if not, under the scheme of s.13, how is action supposed to be taken by the department of the ‘respondent’ in pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s department; and whether the proceedings of the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman, have caused any prejudice to the appellant, warranting interference by this Court.
Headnote

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – ss.2(o), 2(o)(v), 9,

11 – Complaint of sexual harassment – Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee-ICC – ICC constituted in one Government Department, if can entertain a complaint under the Act against the appellant working at a different Government Department at the relevant time – IAS officer alleged that the appellant IRS officer, sexually harassed her at her workplaceKrishi Bhawan, New Delhi – FIR by the aggrieved woman against the appellant – Subsequently, complaint under the POSH Act presented before the ICC constituted u/s.9 at the aggrieved woman’s department/workplace-Department of Food and Public Distribution – Pursuant thereto ICC issued meeting notice/order to the appellant – Appellant filed application before the tribunal challenging jurisdiction of ICC, however the same was dismissed – High Court upheld the said order – Correctness:

Read the full headnote (10 more paragraphs)

Held: Aggrieved woman can approach ICC of her own department against harassment by an employee of another workplace – Phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ in s.11, cannot be interpreted to mean that ICC proceedings against ‘respondent’ may only be instituted before the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ – Such restrictive interpretation of the POSH Act contrary to the scheme and object of the Act and its intent as a social welfare legislation, specifically in light of the wide definition of the term ‘workplace’ in s.2(o)(v) which include any place visited by the employee ‘arising out of or during the course of employment’ – U/s.13, recommendations and report of the ICC are to be sent to the ‘employer’ which shall then take a decision with respect to initiation of disciplinary action – In light of the OM dt 6.07.2025, ICC has a dual-role-to conduct the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry under POSH Act and to act as the inquiry authority in the formal disciplinary proceedings under the CCS CCA Rules, 1965, since nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the Department of the aggrieved woman from conducting the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry and upon receiving the report of the ICC, if the employer initiates disciplinary proceedings, the ICC constituted at the Department of the ‘respondent’ shall act as the inquiry authority in the disciplinary proceedings – In case the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace is conducting a fact-finding inquiry under the POSH Act, the employer of the ‘respondent’, even if it is a different department, must abide its duties u/s.19(f) to swiftly cooperate and make available information upon a request by the ICC of the aggrieved woman’s workplace, which has duly been complied with – ‘Respondent’ not shown that any prejudice has been caused to him due to the proceedings being carried out by the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman. [Para 72]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.11 – Inquiry into the complaint – Textual interpretation of s.11 – Meaning of the word ‘where’ as used therein:

Held: s.11(1) envisages three distinct situations or contingencies, followed by how inquiry into a complaint is to be carried out by the ICC or Local Committee – Use of the word ‘where’ as it occurs in the contingency (i) and (ii), refers to two different conditions precedent/situations, where contingency (i) relates to a situation in case the ‘respondent’ is ‘employee’ under the meaning as prescribed under the POSH Act, inquiry must be made by the ICC in accordance with the service rules applicable to him, and contingency (ii) relates to a situation in case no such rules exist, it shall be inquired into by ICC in such manner as prescribed – Contingency (iii) is a different situation altogether-in case the ‘respondent’ is a domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, on taking a prima facie view about the existence of a case against ‘respondent’, forward the complaint to the police – Contingency (i) and (iii) operate in the form of ‘either-or’ – Grammatical function of the word ‘where’ as appearing in s.11 is that of a ‘conditional conjunction’– When the section is read as a whole, it has been constructed in the form of ‘where and where or, detailing three different contingencies and the procedure to be followed in each contingency – Merely the phrase ‘where the respondent is an employee’ cannot be read in isolation, all parts of the section must be read together to find out a workable conclusion – In case the ‘respondent’ is an ‘employee’, the ICC is obligated to apply the service rules applicable to him, but it does not mean that the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman cannot exercise jurisdiction – As such, the construction of s.11 is in the nature of a procedural section rather than one that lays down jurisdictional restraints. [Paras 42, 43, 45, 46]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.11 – Inquiry into the complaint – Respondent, if to be employee of the same workplace as aggrieved woman:

Held: Definitions of the word ‘employee’ and ‘workplace’ are completely neutral, as they do not suggest that the ‘respondent’ must necessarily be an employee of the workplace where the aggrieved woman works – Expansive definitions of the words “respondent, employee and workplace” enable the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace to exercise jurisdiction over an employee of a different workplace – None of these definitions provide that the ‘respondent’ must necessarily be an employee of the same workplace where the aggrieved woman works – It cannot be said that in view of s.19(h), the only remedy available to the aggrieved woman when the perpetrator of sexual harassment is an outsider (employee of a different workplace) is to register a complaint under the IPC through the employer, since s.19(h) makes it a duty of the employer to facilitate the initiation of action under the IPC if the aggrieved woman so desires, it is not in derogation or exclusion of the power to initiate proceedings under the POSH Act – Even where the ‘respondent’ is not an employee anywhere, criminal proceedings may be initiated. [Paras 47, 49, 50] Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Contextual Interpretation of provisions of the POSH Act – Intent, purpose and context of the Act:

Held: POSH Act was enacted by the legislature, recognizing the legislative void – Its intent is to uphold women’s right to equality u/Arts.14 and 15 and right to a dignified life u/Art.21 – POSH Act does not merely punish acts of sexual harassment, but actively imposes a legal duty on employers to prohibit and prevent harassment – Narrow interpretation of provisions of the POSH Act, in order to hold that only the ICC of the workplace of the ‘respondent’ has jurisdiction to inquire into complaints against him, irrespective of where the workplace of the aggrieved woman is or where the alleged act of sexual harassment took place, would undermine the POSH Act’s remedial social welfare intent since it would create significant practical hurdles for the aggrieved woman – POSH Act, by introducing s. 2(o)(v) which enlarged the scope of ‘workplace’ to include any place visited by the employee during the course of employment, including during transportation, has expanded the scope of ‘workplace’ manifold – In such a case, the intent of the legislature was clearly to prohibit acts of sexual harassment at any place incidental to work and employment, at any place visited by the employees during the course of employment – Taboo around sexual harassment at the workplace and the fear of stigma which may be attached to the aggrieved woman as a consequence of a complaint regarding sexual harassment already poses a massive psychological barrier for the aggrieved women which actively dissuades them from pursuing their remedy in law – In view thereof, the intent of the legislature behind giving such a wide meaning to the word ‘workplace’ to go beyond the bounds of the traditional meaning implying location of the office, cannot be brushed aside by narrow construction of other provisions of the POSH Act – It cannot be said that only the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ has the jurisdiction to entertain complaints and not the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace. [Paras 53, 54, 56, 57]

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – s.13 – Inquiry report – Construction and the scheme of s.13 – Role of ICC in conducting inquiry – Action to be taken by the department of the ‘respondent’ in pursuance of the findings of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s department: Held: Under the scheme of the POSH Act and particularly u/s.13, nothing prevents the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman from carrying out the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry at the first stage – After completion of the fact-finding inquiry, the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman can send its recommendation and report to the employer of the ‘respondent’ – Upon receiving the findings and recommendations of the ICC constituted at the aggrieved woman’s workplace, the employer of the ‘respondent’ and the Disciplinary Authority, upon making a decision that disciplinary proceedings are warranted, can then issue a charge-sheet to the ‘respondent’ and initiate disciplinary proceedings against him – In this inquiry, the ICC constituted at the workplace of the ‘respondent’ may conduct the second stage formal inquiry, acting as the inquiring authority for the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings – As such, the OM dated 16.07.2015, in respect of employees of the Government of India treats inquiry into complaints of sexual harassment as a two-stage process where there is a preliminary/fact-finding inquiry at first and then a disciplinary proceedings based on the findings of the preliminary/fact-finding inquiry – Fact that ultimately disciplinary action against the ‘respondent’ has to be taken by his employer and his department cannot be an impediment for the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman to take up the fact-finding inquiry u/s.11 when read with the OM – s.13(3)

(i) lays down that the ICC, upon reaching the conclusion that the allegations against the ‘respondent’ are proved, shall recommend to the employer to take disciplinary action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules of the ‘respondent’. [Paras 66, 67]

Interpretation of statutes – Principles of Statutory Interpretation – Relevance of text and context of a statute:

Held: Language employed in a statute is the best aid for statutory interpretation – Primary rule of construction is the intention of the legislature and the same must be found in the words used by the legislature itself – However, where there is doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of the words used, interpretation must be made keeping in mind the object and purpose of the statute – Thus, both text and context of a statute have their own relevance while interpreting provisions of a statute – Part of a section cannot be read in isolation, the construction of the entire section must be made as a sum of its parts and no word or phrase thereof can be picked out in isolation to give a certain meaning to the section as a whole. [Paras 32, 35]

Keywords: Internal Complaints Committee-ICC · Jurisdiction of ICC · Complaint of sexual harassment · Where the respondent is an employee · ICC proceedings · Workplace of the ‘respondent’ instead of the workplace of the aggrieved woman where incident occurred and complaint was made · Complaint of sexual harassment · Appellant and aggrieved woman working at different Government Department · IAS officer · IRS officer · Role of ICC in conducting inquiry · Principles of Statutory Interpretation

As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.

Full Judgment Text

Judgment J.K. Maheshwari J. 1. Assailing the final judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “High Court”) in WP (C) 8624/2023 confirming the judgment dated 23.06.2023 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “CAT”) in OA No. 1838/2023, the instant appeal has been preferred. 2. The jurisdictional challenge by the Appellant in the present case, inter alia relates to whether the Internal Complaints Committee (hereinafter referred to as “ICC”) constituted at a certain Department of
Full text available to subscribers
Subscribe to access complete judgment text, daily digests, and AI-powered legal research tools. For informational and research purposes only.
View Subscription Plans →
Annual plans from ₹1,599 + GST.

This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.

All SC judgments →