Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil vs The Chief Minister & Ors.

OBC shall not be justice to them, which circumstances is not covered under the parameters indicated in Indra Sawhney’s case as extraordinary circumstance to breach 50% ceiling – No extraordinary circumstances made out in granting separate reservation of Maratha Community by exceeding the 50 per cent ceiling limit of reservation – Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018.

Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15 and 16 – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Representation of Marathas in State services – Whether the State Government on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in the judgment of Indra Sawhney – Held, No – The Constitution pre-condition for providing reservation as mandated by Article 16(4) is that the backward class is not adequately represented in the public services – The Commission labored under misconception that unless Maratha community is not represented equivalent to its proportion, it is not adequately represented – Indra Sawhney has categorically held that what is required by the State for providing reservation under Article 16(4) is not proportionate representation but adequate representation – The constitutional precondition as mandated by Article 16(4) being not fulfilled with regard to Maratha class, both the Gaikwad Commission’s report and consequential legislation are unsustainable – Sufficient and adequate representation of Maratha community in public services is indicator that they are not socially and educationally backward. Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15, 16 and Art.342A r/w Art.366(26C) – Constitution 102nd Amendment – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Whether the Constitution 102nd Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power and Whether, States power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342A read with Article 366(26C) of the Constitution – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J., with L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring) (majority opinion): The two points of reference are inter-related – By introduction of Articles 366(26C) and 342A through the 102nd Constitution Amendment, the President alone, to the exclusion of all other authorities, is empowered to identify SEBCs and include them in a list to be published under Article 342A (1), which shall be deemed to include SEBCs in relation to each State and Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution – The States can, through their existing mechanisms, or even statutory commissions, only make suggestions to the President or the Commission under Art.338B, for inclusion, exclusion or modification of castes or communities, in the list to be published under Art.342A(1) – The States’ power to make reservations, in favour of particular communities or castes, the quantum of reservations, the nature of benefits and the kind of reservations, and all other matters falling within the ambit of Arts.15 and 16 – except with respect to identification of SEBCs, remains undisturbed – Held (per L. Nageswara Rao, J. supplementing, with Hemant Gupta, J. concurring therwith): There is only one list that can be issued by the President specifying the socially and educationally backward classes and only those classes are treated as socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution – It is apparent from Article 342A(1) and (2) that there is no scope for any list of socially and educationally backward classes, other than the list to be notified by the President – Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)](minority opinion): Parliamentary intention discernible from Select Committee report and statement of Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment is that the intention of the Parliament for bringing Constitutional amendment was not to take away the power of the State to identify backward class in the State – The use of word ‘Central’ in Article 342A(2) was only with the intent to limit the list issued by the President to Central services.

Reservation – Constitution of India – Arts. 15(4) and 16(4) – Socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) – Reservation in favour of backward class citizens – Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act challenged, on ground that it violated the basic & ANR

structure, or essential features of the Constitution – Article 342A of the Constitution was brought by the Constitution 102nd Amendment – Whether, Article 342A abrogates States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” and thereby affects the federal policy / structure of the Constitution of India – Held [per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.)]: Article 342A was brought by Constitution 102nd Amendment to give constitutional status to National Backward Classes Commission and for publication of list by the President of socially and educationally backward classes which was to be Central List for governing employment under Government of India and the organisations under it – The Constitution 102nd Amendment Act does not violate any basic feature of the Constitution and is constitutionally valid – Held (per Ravindra Bhat, J., with L. Nageswara Rao, J. and Hemant Gupta, J. concurring): Alteration of the content of state legislative power in an oblique and peripheral manner would not constitute a violation of the concept of federalism – It is only if the amendment takes away the very essence of federalism or effectively divests the federal content of the constitution, and denudes the states of their effective power to legislate or frame executive policies (co-extensive with legislative power) that the amendment would take away an essential feature or violate the basic structure of the Constitution – Applying such a benchmark, the power of identification of SEBCs hitherto exercised by the States and now shifted to the domain of the President (and for its modification, to Parliament) by virtue of Article 342A does not in any manner violate the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution – The 102nd Amendment is also not contrary to or violative of proviso to Article 368 (2) of the Constitution – Article 342A of the Constitution by denuding States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” does not affect or damage the federal polity and does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution of India.

Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.2(j) – Held: s.2(j) of the Act, 2018 insofar as it declares Maratha community Educationally and Socially Backward Category is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down.

Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.4(1)(a) – Held: s.4(1)(a) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 insofar as it grants reservation under Art.15(4) to the extent of 12% of total seats in educational institutions including private institutions whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions, is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down – Constitution of India – Art.15(4).

Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 – s.4(1)(b) – Held: s.4(1)(b) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 granting reservation of 13% to the Maratha community of the total appointments in direct recruitment in public services and posts under the State, is ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. In the instant matters, questions of seminal importance relating to contours and extent of special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward class (SEBC) of citizens as contemplated under Article 15(4) of the Constitution and contours and extent of provisions of reservation in favour of the backward class citizens under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, arose for consideration.

The State of Maharashtra promulgated an Ordinance in the year 2014, which granted reservation to the Maratha community in public employment and in the field of education. Later, the Ordinance was given the shape of an Act, which was challenged before the High Court. The court stayed the operation of the enactment. The State Government then set up a backward class commission to ascertain the social and educational status of the community. By its report dated 13.11.2018 (the Gaikwad Commission Report), the Commission recommended that the Maratha class of citizens be declared as a Socially and Educationally Backward Class (“SEBC”). This soon led to the enactment of the Maharashtra State Reservation (of Seats for Admission in Educational Institutions in the State and for & ANR

appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018, giving effect to the recommendations of the Gaikwad Commission, resulting in reservation in favour of that community; consequent to which, the aggregate reservations exceeded 50%.

Subsequently, writ petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court, challenging the identification of Marathas as SEBCs, the conclusions of the Commission, which culminated in its adoption by the State of Maharashtra and enactment of the SEBC Act, the quantum of reservations, and the provisions of the Act itself, on diverse grounds. By the impugned judgment, the High Court turned down the challenge and upheld the identification of Marathas as SEBCs, and further upheld the reasons presented before it, that extraordinary circumstances existed, warranting the breach of the 50% mark, which was held to be the outer limit in the nine-judge decision of this court in Indra Sawhney case. Six separate judgments were delivered in the case including one judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy, which was for himself and three other judges. The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 also came to be challenged before this Court, on the ground that it violated the basic structure, or essential features of the Constitution. The Constitution (102nd Amendment) Act, 2018 was brought into force on 15.08.2018 adding Article 338B, 342A and 366(26C).

The following six questions accordingly arose for consideration before this Court:

1. Whether judgment in case of Indra Sawhney needs to be referred to larger bench or require re-look by the larger bench in the light of subsequent Constitutional Amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society etc.?

2. Whether Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case?

3. Whether the State Government on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad has made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in the judgment of Indra Sawhney?

4. Whether the Constitution One Hundred and Second Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power?

5. Whether, States power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342(A) read with Article 366(26C) of the Constitution of India?

6. Whether, Article 342A of the Constitution abrogates States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” and thereby affects the federal policy / structure of the Constitution of India?

Disposing of the matters, the Court

per Ashok Bhushan, J. (for himself and for S. Abdul Nazeer,

J.)

HELD:1.1. The greatest common measure of agreement in six separate judgments delivered in Indra Sawhney is: (i) Reservation under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50%. (ii)For exceeding reservation beyond 50%, extra-ordinary circumstances as indicated in paragraph 810 of Justice Jeevan Reddy should exist for which extreme caution is to be exercised. [Para 444][940C-D]

1.2. The 50% rule spoken in Balaji and affirmed in Indra Sawhney is to fulfill the objective of equality as engrafted in Article

14 of which Articles 15 and 16 are facets. 50% is reasonable and it is to attain the object of equality. To change the 50% limit is to have a society which is not founded on equality but based on caste rule.

1.3. The cap on percentage of reservation as has been laid down by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney is with the object of striking a balance between the rights under Article 15(1) and & ANR

15(4) as well as Articles 16(1) and 16(4). The cap on percentage is to achieve principle of equality and with the object to strike a balance which cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. [Para 444][940-D-F]

1.4. Providing reservation for advancement of any socially and educationally backward class in public services is not the only means and method for improving the welfare of backward class. The State ought to bring other measures including providing educational facilities to the members of backward class free of cost giving concession in fee, providing opportunities for skill development to enable the candidates from the backward class to be self-reliant. [Para 444][940-G]

1.5. There can be no quarrel that society changes, law changes, people changes but that does not mean that something which is good and proven to be beneficial in maintaining equality in the society should also be changed in the name of change alone. [Para 444][940-H; 941-A]

1.6. When the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney held that 50% is upper limit of reservation under Article 16(4), it is the law which is binding under Article 141 and to be implemented. [Para 444][941-A-B]

1.7. The Constitution Bench judgment in Indra Sawhney is also fully applicable in reference to Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India. [Para 444][941-B]

1.8. The setting aside of 50% ceiling by eleven Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case as was laid down by St. Stephen’s case i.e. 50% ceiling in admission in aided Minority Instructions has no bearing on the principle of 50% ceiling laid down by Indra Sawhney with respect to reservation. The judgment of T.M.A. Pai was in reference to rights of minority under Article

30 and is not relevant for Reservation under Articles 16(4) and 15(4) of the Constitution. [Para 444][941-C-D]

1.9. The Constitution (Eighty-first Amendment) Act, 2000 by which sub-clause (4B) was inserted in Article 16 makes it clear that ceiling of 50% “has now received constitutional recognition”. [Para 444][941-D]

1.10. The extraordinary situations indicated in paragraph

810 were only illustrative and cannot be said to be exhaustive. However, it cannot be said that paragraph 810 provided only a geographical test. The use of expression “on being out of the main stream of national life”, is a social test, which also needs to be fulfilled for a case to be covered by exception. [Para 444][941E-F]

1.11. There is no substance in any of the 10 grounds urged for revisiting and referring the judgment of Indra Sawhney to a larger Bench. [Para 444][941-F-G]

1.12. What was held by the Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney on the relevance and significance of the principle of stare decisis is clearly binding. The judgment of Indra Sawhney has stood the test of the time and has never been doubted by any judgment of this Court. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Indra Sawhney neither needs to be revisited nor referred to a larger Bench for consideration. [Para 444][941-G-H]

1.13. The Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj does not contain any ratio that ceiling of 50% reservation may be exceeded by showing quantifiable contemporary data relating to backwardness. The Commission has completely misread the ratio of the judgment, when the Commission took the view that on the quantifiable data ceiling of 50% can be breached. [Para 444][942A-B]

1.14. The Commission and the High Court found existence of the extra-ordinary situations with regard to exceeding 50% ceiling in respect to grant of separate reservation to Maratha because the population of backward class is 80% and reservation limit is only 50%, containing the Maratha in pre-existing reservation for OBC shall not be justice to them, which circumstances is not covered under the parameters indicated in Indra Sawhney’s case as extra-ordinary circumstance to breach 50% ceiling. [Para 444][942-C]

1.15. No extraordinary circumstances were made out in granting separate reservation of Maratha Community by exceeding the 50 per cent ceiling limit of reservation. The Act, 2018 violates the principle of equality as enshrined in Article 16. The exceeding of ceiling limit without there being any extra-& ANR

ordinary circumstances clearly violates Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution which makes the enactment ultra vires. [Para 444][942-D-E]

1.16. The proposition is well settled that Commissions’ reports are to be looked into with deference. However, one of the parameter of scrutiny of Commission’s report as approved by this Court is that on the basis of data and materials referred to in the report whether conclusions arrived by the Commission are justified. [Para 444][942-E-F]

1.17. The measures taken under Article 15(4) and 16(4) can be examined as to whether they violate any constitutional principle, and are in conformity with the rights under Article 14,

15 and 16 of the Constitution. The scrutiny of measures taken by the State, either executive or legislative, thus, has to pass test of the constitutional scrutiny. [Para 444][942-F-G]

1.18. The word ‘adequate’ is a relative term used in relation to representation of different caste and communities in public employment. The objective of Article 16(4) is that backward class should also be put in mainstream to enable to share power of the State by affirmative action. To be part of public service, as accepted by the Society of today, is to attain social status and play a role in governance. [Para 444][942-G-H; 943-A]

1.19. The representation of Marathas in public services in Grade A, B, C and D comes to 33.23%, 29.03%, 37.06% and 36.53% computed from out of the open category filled posts, is adequate and satisfactory representation of Maratha community. One community bagging such number of posts in public services is a matter of pride for the community and its representation in no manner can be said to not adequate in public services. [Para 444][943-B-C]

1.20. The Constitution pre-condition for providing reservation as mandated by Article 16(4) is that the backward class is not adequately represented in the public services. The Commission labored under misconception that unless Maratha community is not represented equivalent to its proportion, it is not adequately represented. Indra Sawhney has categorically held that what is required by the State for providing reservation under Article 16(4) is not proportionate representation but adequate representation. [Para 444][943-C-D]

1.21. The constitutional precondition as mandated by Article 16(4) being not fulfilled with regard to Maratha class, both the Gaikwad Commission’s report and consequential legislation are unsustainable. [Para 444][943-E]

1.22. Having disapproved the grant of reservation under Article 16(4) to Maratha community, the said decision becomes relevant and shall certainly have effect on the decision of the Commission holding Maratha to be socially and educationally backward. Sufficient and adequate representation of Maratha community in public services is indicator that they are not socially and educationally backward. From the facts and figures as noted by Gaikwad Commission in its report regarding representation of Marathas in public services, the percentage of Marathas in admission to Engineering, Medical Colleges and other disciplines, their representation in higher academic posts, it is seen that conclusion drawn by the Commission is not supportable from the data collected. The data collected and tabled by the Commission as noted in the report clearly proves that Marathas are not socially and educationally backward class. [Para 444][943F-H; 944-A]

1.23. The elementary principle of interpreting the Constitution or statute is to look into the words used in the statute, when the language is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The aid to interpretation is resorted to only when there is some ambiguity in words or expression used in the statute. The rule of harmonious construction, the rule of reading of the provisions together as also rule of giving effect to the purpose of the statute, and few other principles of interpretation are called in question when aids to construction are necessary in particular context. [Para 444][944-B-C]

1.24. The shift from literal rule to purposive and objective interpretation of a constitutional document is adopted since the Constitution is not to be interpreted in static and rigid manner, & ANR

the Constitution is an organic and living document which needs to be interpreted with cardinal principals and objectives of the Constitution. The shift from literal to purposive method of interpretation has been now more and more, being adopted for interpreting a constitutional document. [Para 444][944-D-E]

1.25. The law is well settled in this country that Parliamentary Committee reports including speech given by the Minister in the Parliament are relevant materials to ascertain the intention of Parliament while construing constitutional provisions. [Para 444][944-E-F]

1.26. The consultation by the State on all policy matters affecting the socially and educationally backward classes is now mandatory as per sub-clause (9) of Article 338B which mandatory requirement cannot be by-passed by any State while the State takes any major policy decision. Sub-clause (9) of Article 338B uses the expression ‘consultation’. It is true that the expression ‘consultation’ is not to be read as concurrence but the ‘consultation’ has to be effective and meaningful. The object of consultation is that ‘consultee’ shall place the relevant material before person from whom ‘consultation’ is asked for and advice and opinion given by consulting authority shall guide the authority who has asked for consultation. [Para 444][944-F-H]

1.27. It is, thus, clear as sun light that Parliamentary intention discernible from Select Committee report and statement of Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment is that the intention of the Parliament for bringing Constitutional amendment was not to take away the power of the State to identify backward class in the State. [Para 444][945-A-B]

1.28. When the Parliamentary intention is discernable and admissible as aid to statutory interpretation, there is no reason not to interpret Article 342A in manner as per the intention of the Parliament noticed above. [Para 444][945-B]

1.29. The word ‘Central’ in Article 342A (2) was used for purpose and object. The use of ‘Central’ was only with the intent to limit the list issued by the President to Central services. It is well settled rule of interpretation that no word in a statute or Constitution is used without any purpose. Word ‘Central’ has to be given meaning and purpose. [Para 444][945-C-D]

1.30. When Article 342A is interpreted to mean that Article 342A refers to ‘Central List’ which is prepared for services under the Government of India and organisations under the Government of India, the definition given under Article 366(26C) which specifically refer to Article 342A has to be read together and list of backward classes which is not Central List shall not be governed by the definition under Article 366(26C). Since, (26C) has been inserted in the context of Article 342A, if the context is list prepared by the State and it is State List, definition under (26C) shall not govern. [Para 444][945-D-F]

1.31. Article 342A was brought by Constitution 102nd Amendment to give constitutional status to National Backward Classes Commission and for publication of list by the President of socially and educationally backward classes which was to be Central List for governing employment under Government of India and the organisations under it. [Para 444][945-F-G]

1.32. The Constitution 102nd Amendment Act does not violate any basic feature of the Constitution. The constitutional validity of Constitution (One Hundred and second Amendment) Act is upheld. [Para 444][945-G-H]

2.1. Section 2(j) of the Act, 2018 insofar as it declares Maratha community Educationally and Socially Backward Category is held to be ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-C-D]

2.2. Section 4(1)(a) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 insofar as it grants reservation under Article 15(4) to the extent of 12% of total seats in educational institutions including private institutions whether aided or unaided by the State, other than minority educational institutions, is declared ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-D-E]

2.3. Section 4(1)(b) of Act, 2018 as amended by Act, 2019 granting reservation of 13% to the Maratha community of the total appointments in direct recruitment in public services and posts under the State, is held to be ultra vires to the Constitution and struck down. [Para 444][946-F]

& ANR

T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR

587 and S.V.Joshi v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC

41 – distinguished.

M. Nagraj and others v. Union of India & Ors. (2006)

8 SCC 212 and M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 439 – explained.

Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, AIR 1965 SC 1636 : [1965] SCR 908 – held applicable.

Ram Singh and others v. Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC

697 : [2015] 5 SCR 670 – affirmed.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Suppl. (3) SCC

217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454]; Jarnail Singh and others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others, 2018 (10) SCC 396 : [2018] 10 SCR 663; Barium Chemicals ltd. and another v. The Company Law Board and others, AIR 1967 SC 295 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; Dinesh B. v. Union of India and others, T. Devadasan v. Union of India and another, AIR (1964) SC 179 : [1964] SCR 680; State of Punjab v. Hiralal and others, (1970) 3 SCC 567 : [1971] 3 SCR 267; State of Kerala and others v. N.M. Thomas and others, (1976) 2 SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh, (Railway) v. Union of India and others, (1981)

1 SCC 246 : [1981] 2 SCR 185; K.C. Vasant Kumar and another v. State of Karnataka, (1985) Supp. (1) SCC 714; Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 50: [2010] 1 SCR 483; Vikas kishanrao Gawali v. The State of Maharashtra, (2021) SCC Online SC 170; St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121; Kalpana Mehta and others v. Union of India and others, (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee, Patna and another, AIR 1954 SC 569 : [1955] SCR 290; Re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, Ajmer-Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947 v. Part ‘C’ States(Laws) Act, 1950, AIR 1951 SC 332 : [1951] SCR 747; General Manager, Southern Railway, Personnel Officer (Reservation), Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36 :[1962] SCR 586; State of Kerala and another v. N.M. Thomas and others, 1976 (2) SCC 310 : [1976] 1 SCR 906; T. Devadasn v. Union of India and another, AIR 1964 SC

179 : [1964] SCR 680; Akhil Bharatiya Sochit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) Represented by its Assistant General Secretary on behalf of the Association v. Union of India and others, (1981) 1 SCC 246 : [1981]

2 SCR 185; K.C. Vasanth Kumar and another v. State of Karnataka, 1985 (Supp) SCC 714 : [1985] Suppl. SCR 352; State of Punjab and Hira Lal and others, 1970 (3) SCC 567 : [1971] 3 SCR 267; N.M. Thomas, Akhil Bharatiya Karamchari Sangh and State of Punjab S.V. Joshi and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2012) 7 SCC 41; Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh and others v. Faculty Association and others; Chebrolu Leela Prasad Rao & Ors. v. State of A.P. & Ors., 2020 (7) SCALE 162; Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1975) Suppl. SCC

1 : [1976] SCR 347; His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala and another, (1973)

4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others, 2017 (10) SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Supreme Court Advocateson-Record Association and others v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India and others, 2008 (6) SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; All India Reporter Karamchari Sangh and others v. All India Reporter Limited and others, 1988 Supp SCC 472 : [1988] SCR 774; Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, 1995 (6) SCC 614 : [1995]

4 Suppl. SCR 16; The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226 : [1951] SCR 525; B. Venkataramana v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, AIR 1951 SC 229; Minerva Mills limited and others v. Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : [1981]

1 SCR 206; St. Stephen’s College case, (1992) 1 SCC & ANR

558 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 121; Society for Un-aided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India and another, (2012) 6 SCC 1: [2012] 2 SCR 715; K. Krishna Murthy and others v. Union of India and another, (2010)

7 SCC 202 : [2010] 6 SCR 972; Jarnail Singh and others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and others, 2018 (10) SCC

396 : [2018] 10 SCR 663; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur, Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and others, (2005) 8 SCC

534 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582; Union of India and others v. Rakesh Kumar and others, (2010) 4 SCC 50 : [2010]

1 SCR 483; M.R. Balaji v. The State of Mysore and others, AIR (1963) SC 649 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 439; The State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. U.S.V. Balram, etc., (1972) 1 SCC 660 : [1972] 3 SCR 247; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC

295 : [1966] Suppl. SCR 311; B.K. Pavitra and others v. Union of India and others, (2019) 16 SCC 129 : [2019]

7 SCR 1086; Mukesh Kumar and another v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2020) 3 SCC 1; ITC Ltd. v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and others, (2002)

9 SCC 232 : [2002] 1 SCR 441; State of Travancore, Cochin and others v. Bombay Company Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 366 : [1952] SCR 1112 ; Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v. Arabinda Bose and another, AIR 1952 SC 369 : [1953] SCR 1; His Holiness Kesvananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 1984 (2) SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Minerva Mills Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, (1980) 3 SCC 625 : [1981] 1 SCR 206; Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. The Patna High Court and others, (1969) 3 SCC 56 : [1970] 2 SCR 666; Union of India v. Shankalchand Himatlal Sheth and another, (1977) 4 SCC 193 : [1978]

1 SCR 423; Indian Administrative Services (S.C.S.) Association, U.P. and Others, (1993) Suppl. 1 SCC 730: [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 389; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and others v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 : [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 659; State (NCT) of Delhi v. Union of India and another, 2018 (8) SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1 and Abhiram Singh v. C.C. Commachen (Dead) By Legal Representatives and others, (2017) 2 SCC 629 : [2017] 1 SCR 158 – referred to.

The Central Province and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxations Act, 1938, AIR 1939 Federal Court 1 – referred to.

Granville Austin in “The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation” and Justice G.P. Singh in 296 ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’, 14th Edition – referred to.

per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. [Concurring with Ashok Bhushan, J. on question Nos.1,2,3 and also supplementing in relation to question No.1]

1.1. Re Point No. 1: Indra Sawhney does not require to be referred to a larger bench nor does it require reconsideration in the light of subsequent constitutional amendments, judgments and changed social dynamics of the society, for the reasons set out by Ashok Bhushan, J. and my reasons, in addition. [Para 188][1064-F-G]

1.2. A careful reading of the judgments in Indra Sawhney, clarifies that seven out of nine judges concurred that there exists a quantitative limit on reservation – spelt out @ 50%. In the opinion of four judges, therefore, per the judgment of B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., this limit could be exceeded under extraordinary circumstances and in conditions for which separate justification has to be forthcoming by the State or the concerned agency. However, there is unanimity in the conclusion by all seven judges that an outer limit for reservation should be 50%. Undoubtedly, the other two judges, Ratnavel Pandian and P.B. Sawant, JJ. indicated that there is no general rule of 50% limit on reservation. In these circumstances, given the general common agreement about the existence of an outer limit, i.e. 50%, the petitioner’s argument about the incoherence or uncertainty about the existence of the rule or that there were contrary observations with respect to absence of any ceiling limit in other judgments (the dissenting judgments of K. Subbarao, in T. Devadasan v Union of India, the judgments of S.M. Fazal Ali and Krishna Iyer, & ANR

JJ. in State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas and the judgment of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka) is not an argument compelling a review or reconsideration of Indra Sawhney rule. [Para 10][951-F-H; 952-A-B]

1.3. The idea of a definitive and objective principle, in the form of a 50% ceiling on limitation, emerges on an overall reading of Indra Sawhney. The argument made by the respondents was that this court should not go by such a ceiling limit, but rather, while exercising its judicial review power, proceed on a case-bycase approach, and resting its conclusions on fact dependent exercises, using other criteria, such as reasonableness, proportionality, etc. for judging excessive reservations. However, what constitutes reasonableness and what is proportionate in a given case, would be unchartered and indeterminate areas. It is one thing to try persuading the court to discard a known principle, in the light of its loss of relevance, yet for that argument to prevail, not only should the harm caused by the existing principle be proved, but also a principle that is sought to be substituted, should have clarity, or else, the argument would be one asking the court to take a leap in the dark. It is not enough, therefore to resort to observations such as “the length of the leap to be provided depends upon the gap to be covered” or the proportionality doctrine (deployed to judge validity of an executive or legislative measure), because they reveal no discernible principle. Reasonableness is no doubt a familiar phrase in the constitutional lexicon; yet there is considerable subjectivity and relativity in its practise. [Para 31][962-G; 963-A-C]

1.4. The ceiling of 50% with the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, is the just balance- what is termed as the “Goldilocks solution” - i.e. the solution containing the right balance that allows the state sufficient latitude to ensure meaningful affirmative action, to those who deserve it, and at the same time ensures that the essential content of equality, and its injunction not to discriminate on the various proscribed grounds (caste, religion, sex, place of residence) is retained. This court in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India observed that “a numerical benchmark is the surest immunity against charges of discrimination.” To dilute the 50% benchmark further, would be to effectively destroy the guarantee of equality, especially the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of caste (under Articles 15 and 16). [Para 34][964-D-F]

2. Re Point No 2: The Maharashtra State Reservation (of seats for admission in educational institutions in the State and for appointments in the public services and posts under the State) for Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) Act, 2018 as amended in 2019 granting 12% and 13% reservation for Maratha community in addition to 50% social reservation is not covered by exceptional circumstances as contemplated by Constitution Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case. [Para 188][1064-GH; 1065-A-B]

3. Re Point No. 3: The State Government, on the strength of Maharashtra State Backward Commission Report chaired by M.C. Gaikwad has not made out a case of existence of extraordinary situation and exceptional circumstances in the State to fall within the exception carved out in Indra Sawhney. [Para 188][1065-B-C]

4. Re Point No 4: Whether the Constitution One Hundred and Second Amendment deprives the State Legislature of its power to enact a legislation determining the socially and economically backward classes and conferring the benefits on the said community under its enabling power?; and Re. Point No. 5 Whether, States’ power to legislate in relation to “any backward class” under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is anyway abridged by Article 342(A) read with Article 366(26c) of the Constitution of India.

On these two interrelated points of reference, conclusions are as follows:

(i) By introduction of Articles 366 (26C) and 342A through the 102nd Constitution of India, the President alone, to the exclusion of all other authorities, is empowered to identify SEBCs and include them in a list to be published under Article 342A (1), which shall be deemed to include SEBCs in relation to each state and union territory for the purposes of the Constitution. [Para 188]

& ANR

(ii) The states can, through their existing mechanisms, or even statutory commissions, only make suggestions to the President or the Commission under Article 338B, for inclusion, exclusion or modification of castes or communities, in the list to be published under Article 342A(1). [Para 188][1065-D-H]

(iii) The reference to the Central List in Article 342A(2) is the one notified by the President under Article 342A(1). It is to be the only list for all purposes of the Constitution, in relation to each state and in relation to every union territory. The use of the term “the Central List” is only to refer to the list prepared and published under Article 342A (1), and no other; it does not imply that the states have any manner of power to publish their list of SEBCs. Once published, under Article 342A (1), the list can only be amended through a law enacted by Parliament, by virtue of Article 342A (2). [Para 188][1066-A-C]

(iv) In the task of identification of SEBCs, the President shall be guided by the Commission set up under Article 338B; its advice shall also be sought by the state in regard to policies that might be framed by it. If the commission prepares a report concerning matters of identification, such a report has to be shared with the state government, which is bound to deal with it, in accordance with provisions of Article 338B. However, the final determination culminates in the exercise undertaken by the President (i.e. the Central Government, under Article 342A (1), by reason of Article 367 read with Section 3 (8) (b) General Clauses Act). [Para 188][1066-C-E]

(v) The states’ power to make reservations, in favour of particular communities or castes, the quantum of reservations, the nature of benefits and the kind of reservations, and all other matters falling within the ambit of Articles 15 and 16 – except with respect to identification of SEBCs, remains undisturbed. [Para 188][1066-E-F]

(vi) The Commission set up under Article 338B shall conclude its task expeditiously, and make its recommendations after considering which, the President shall expeditiously publish the notification containing the list of SEBCs in relation to states and union territories, for the purpose of the Constitution. [Para 188][1066-F-G]

(vii) Till the publication of the notification mentioned in direction (vi), the existing lists operating in all states and union territories, and for the purposes of the Central Government and central institutions, continue to operate. This direction is issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. [Para 188][1066G-H]

5. Re Point No. 6: The alteration of the content of state legislative power in an oblique and peripheral manner would not constitute a violation of the concept of federalism. It is only if the amendment takes away the very essence of federalism or effectively divests the federal content of the constitution, and denudes the states of their effective power to legislate or frame executive policies (co-extensive with legislative power) that the amendment would take away an essential feature or violate the basic structure of the Constitution. Applying such a benchmark, this court is of the opinion that the power of identification of SEBCs hitherto exercised by the states and now shifted to the domain of the President (and for its modification, to Parliament) by virtue of Article 342A does not in any manner violate the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution. The 102nd Amendment is also not contrary to or violative of proviso to Article 368 (2) of the Constitution of India. Article 342A of the Constitution by denuding States power to legislate or classify in respect of “any backward class of citizens” does not affect or damage the federal polity and does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution of India. [Paras 187, 188][1064-C-E; 1067-AB]

6. The appeals and writ petitions are therefore, disposed of in terms of the operative order of Bhushan, J. in para 444 of his Judgment. [Para 189][1067-B-C]

Indra Sawhney v Union of India (1992) 3 Supp SCC

217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; T. Devadasan v Union of India [1964] 4 SCR 680; State of Kerala v N.M. Thomas 1976 (2) SCC 310 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 352; M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore 1963 Suppl. 1 SCR 439; P. Rajendran v. State of T.N. [1968] & ANR

2 SCR 786; A Peeriakaruppan v. State of T.N. (1971) 1 SCC 38: [1971] 2 SCR 430; State of A.P. v. USV Balram (1972) 1 SCC 660: [1972] 3 SCR 247; State of U.P. v. Pradeep Tandon (1975) 1 SCC 267 : [1975] 2 SCR 761; Janki Prasad Parimoo v. State of J&K (1973) 1 SCC 420 : [1973] 3 SCR 236; Krishena Kumar and Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 207 : [1990]

3 SCR 352; Union of India v Raghubir Singh [1989] 3 SCR 316; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board [1966] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 311; Mukesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 3 SCC 1; In re Kerala Education Bill [1959] SCR 995; T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka 2002 (8) SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 587; R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India 1994 Supp

(1) SCC 324 : [1993] 1 SCR 891; State of Punjab v. Hiralal [1971] 3 SCR 267; M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212 : [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336; Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India 2014 (8) SCC 1 : [2014] 11 SCR 712; B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019) 16 SCC 129: [2019]

7 SCR 1086; State of Travancore-Cochin v. Bombay Company Ltd, [1952] SCR 1112; Aswini Kumar Ghose & Anr. v. Arabinda Ghose & Anr. AIR 1953 SC 75: [1953] SCR 215 P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2 SCR 870; Sanjeev Coke

Manufacturing v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Anr. [1983] 1 SCR 1000; Kalpana Mehta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018] 4 SCR 1; Soosai Etc v. Union of India [1985] Suppl 3 SCR 242; Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Singh [1965] 2 SCR 877; Basavalingappa v Munichinnappa [1965] 1 SCR 316; Kishori Lal Hans v. Raja Ram Singh 1972 (3) SCC 1 : [1972] 2 SCR 632; Bir Singh v. Delhi Jal Board (2018)

10 SCC 312 : [2018] 10 SCR 513; Champakam

Dorairajan v. State of Madras AIR 1951 SC 226 : [1951] SCR 525; State of Karnataka v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 1; GVK Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer (2011) 4 SCC 36 : [2011] 3 SCR 366; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006]

5 Suppl.

SCR 1;

G.

Narayanaswami v. G.

Panneerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 : [1973] 1 SCR 172; Pushpa Devi v. Milkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134: [1990]

1 SCR 278; Karnataka State Financial Corporation. v. N. Narasimahaiah (2008) 5 SCC 176 : [2008] 4 SCR 853; Laurel Energetics (P) Ltd. v. Securities Exchange Board of India (2017) 8 SCC 541 : [2017]

5 SCR 1005; Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) 2 Suppl. SCC 651 : [1992] 1 SCR 686; Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College (1990)

3 SCC 130 : [1990] 2 SCR 843; State of Maharashtra & Anr v. Union of India & Anr. (1994) 5 SCC 244 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 714; 20th Century Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 6 SCC 12: [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 120; Builders’ Association of India v. Union of India (1989) 2 SCC 645 : [1989]

2 SCR 320; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Willamson Financial Services (2008) 2 SCC 202 : [2007]

13 SCR 376; Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P. (2005) 1 SCC 308 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 1040; Bimolangshu Roy v. State of Assam (2018) 14 SCC 408 : [2017] 13 SCR 301; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1 : [2008] 4 SCR 1; New Delhi Municipal Council v. State of Punjab (1997) 7 SCC

339 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 472; Shivraj Singh Chauhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly 2020 SCC Online SC 363 141; DTC Mazdoor Congress v. Delhi Transport Corporation [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 142; Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen (2017) 2 SCC 629 : [2017]

1 SCR 158; Punjab Land Development and

Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111; P. Kasilingam v PSG College of Technology 1995 Supp

(2) SCC 348 : [1995] 2 SCR 1061; Black Diamond Beverages v Commercial Tax Officer 1998 (1) SCC 458 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 133; Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co v State of Maharashtra 2014 (3) SCC & ANR

430 : [2014] 2 SCR 203; K. Lakshminarayanan v. Union of India (2020) 14 SCC 664 : [2018]

14 SCR 689; Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v. Union of India 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 191 : [1993] 1 SCR 480; Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1260; State of Rajasthan v. Union of India 1978 1 SCR 1; Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1965] 1 SCR 933; and Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 166 : [1985]

1 Suppl. SCR 862 – referred to.

Harksen v. Lane 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC); BBC Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., 1990) 2 All ER 118; City Council of Pretoria v. Walker 1998 (3) BCLR

257 (CC); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Penal 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Canadian National Railway Co v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) [1987] 1 SCR 1114; Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Ontario (Ministry of Health) (1994) 21 CHRR (Ont CA) D/

259 and R. (Baiai) v. Home Secretary, [2006] EWHC

823 (Admin). – referred to.

Rabindranath Tagore’s Gitanjali, Verse 35; Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, p.132; Michael Kirby, Indian and Australian Constitutional Law: A Recent Study in Contrasts’, 60 JILI (2018) 1, p. 30 and Herbert Weschler, ‘Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’, (1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 – referred to.

per L. Nageswara Rao, J. [Concurring with Ashok Bhushan, J. on question Nos.1, 2 and 3, and concurring with S. Ravindra Bhat, J. on question Nos.4, 5 and 6]

1. It is difficult to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the Respondents that the use of words ‘central list’ would restrict the scope and amplitude of the notification to be issued under Article 342A(1). There is only one list that can be issued by the President specifying the socially and educationally backward classes and only those classes are treated as socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution. Taking cue from the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993, the Respondents argued that the words ‘Central list’ is with reference only to appointments to Central services and admission in Central educational institutions. Reading ‘Central list’ in that manner would be curtailing the width of Article 342A(1). If so read, the sweep of Sub-Clause (1) shall be minimized. Moreover, to achieve the said meaning, words which are not in Article 342A(1) have to be read into it. Contextually, the words Central list in Article 342A(2) can be only with reference to the list contained in the notification which may be issued under Article 342A(1). It is well settled law that the provisions of the Constitution have to be harmoniously construed and it is apparent from Article 342A(1) and (2) that there is no scope for any list of socially and educationally backward classes, other than the list to be notified by the President. As the other expressions ‘for the purposes of the Constitution’ and ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ have been dealt with by Justice Bhat, there is nothing more to add to the construction placed by him on the said expressions. [Para 25][1077-F-G; 1078-A-C]

2. Only those backward classes included in the public notification under Article 342A shall be socially and educationally backward classes for the purposes of the Constitution. [Para 26][1078-E]

Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 : [2006]

5 Suppl. SCR 1; G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam (1972) 3 SCC 717 : [1973] 1 SCR 172; South Asia Industries Private Ltd v. S. Sarup Singh and others [1965] 3 SCR 829; Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse (1997) 6 SCC 312 : [1997]

2 Suppl. SCR 267; J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 5 SCC 134 : [2003] 2 SCR 933; Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, [1958] 1SCR 360; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 : [2018] 7 SCR 1; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1984) 2 SCC 183 : [1984] 2 SCR 495; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (2002) 4 SCC 297 : [2002] 2 SCR 945; Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate & ANR

v Managenment of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, [1958] SCR 1156; M/s New India Sugar Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar [1963] 2 SCR Suppl. 459; C. I. T v. N. C. Budharaja and Co.(1994)1 SCC Suppl. 280: [1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 185; Kalpana Mehta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 1 : [2018]

4 SCR 1; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111; P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, (1995) 2 Suppl. SCC 348; Indra Sarma v. V. K. V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755 : [2013] 14 SCR 1019; Sudha Rani Garg v. Jagdish Kumar (2004) 8 SCC 329; Nyadar Singh v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 170 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 546 and Union of India v. Sankalchand Himmat Lal Seth [1977) 4 SCC 193 : [ 1978] 1 SCR 423 – referred to. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Adams Express Company v. Commonwealth of Kentucky 238 US 190 (1915); United States v. Goldenberg 168 US 95 (1897); Jones v D.P.P. [1962] AC. 635; R. v. Oakes [1959] 2 Q.B. 350; Aron Soloman v. Soloman & Co. 1897 AC 22; Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart 1993 AC 593; R v. DPP ex-parte Duckenfield [1999] 2 All ER 873; Black-Clawson International Ltd. 1975 AC 591; Assam Railways and Trading Co Ltd v. Inland Revenue, 1935 AC 445; Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665; Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288; East End Dwellings Co. Ltd v. Finsbury Borough Council [1952] AC 109 and Towne v. Eisner 245 U.S. 425 (1918) – referred to. Purposive Interpretation in Law by Aharon Barak; Benjamin Cardozo, the Nature of Judicial Process, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 13th Edn., 1946), 141; Craies on Legislation, 9th Edition and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition – referred to.