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Page No.# 1/60
GAHC010032462020
2026:GAU-AS:10922
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/938/2020
ANUPAM DAS AND 4 ORS.
S/O- TRIDIP RANJAN DAS, R/O- ARYA NAGAR, P.O. GOPINATH NAGAR,
DIST.- KAMRUP, ASSAM, PIN- 781016.
2: SAMARJIT DAS
S/O- SARAL KUMAR DAS
R/O- CHAPAR
P.O. CHAPAR
DIST- DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN- 783371.
3: ATOWAR UL ISLAM
S/O- ABDUL MOMIN SK.
R/O- EIDGAH PATH
HOUSE NO. 12
P.O. DISPUR
SARUMOTORIA
DIST.- KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN- 781006.
4: NABANITA DAS
D/O- LT. DIPAK KR. DAS
R/O- HOUSE NO. 16
SARVODAYA PATH
ABC
DIST.- KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN- 781005.
5: BISWAJIT DAS
S/O- DHIREN DAS
R/O- PASCHIM BORAGAON
Page No.# 2/60
BAMUNPARA
DIST.- KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN- 781035
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 8 ORS.
REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY., GOVT. OF ASSAM, HIGHER EDUCATION
DEPTT., DISPUR, GHY.- 06, ASSAM.
2:THE DY. SECY.
GOVT. OF ASSAM
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT.
DISPUR
GHY.- 06.
3:THE DIRECTOR
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT.
KAHILIPARA
GHY.-19.
4:THE VICE-CHANCELLOR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GHY.- 781001.
5:THE REGISTRAR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GHY.-01.
6:COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GHY.-01
REP. BY THE REGISTRAR.
7:HIMANISH SHEKHAR DAS
S/O NOT KNOWN
R/O- HOUSE NO. 14D
ROY NAGAR
DIST.- KARIMGANJ
ASSAM.
8:PRAKASH CHAUHAN
ASSTT. PROFESSOR
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND I.T. DEPTT.
COTTON UNIVERSITY
Page No.# 3/60
GHY.-01
DIST. KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM.
9:KANGKANA BORA
ASSTT. PROFESSOR
COMPUTER SCIENCE AND I.T. DEPTT.
COTTON UNIVERSITY
GHY.-01
DIST.- KAMRUP(M)
ASSAM
Linked Case : WP(C)/5195/2020
DR MANOJ KUMAR DAS AND ANR
S/O. MATHURA MOHAN DAS
R/O. VILL. JAYANAGAR
MALIGAON
GUWAHATI-781011
DIST. KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM.
2: NOVONITA BARUAH
W/O. DR. JHON KUMAR KALITA
R/O. HOUSE NO. 116
OPPOSITE K.B. SOUND LAKHIMINAGAR
HATIGAON
GUWAHATI-781036
DIST. KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS
REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT.
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
ASSAM.
2:THE DIRECTOR
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT.
KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI-781019.
3:THE VICE-CHANCELLOR
Page No.# 4/60
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001.
4:THE REGISTRAR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001.
5:COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001
REP. BY THE REGISTRAR.
-----------Linked Case : WP(C)/9474/2019
DR. ANUPAM DAS AND 4 ORS
S/O SRI TRIDIP RANJAN DAS
R/O ARYA NAGAR
P.O. GOPINATH NAGAR
DIST. KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN-781016
2: SAMARJIT DAS
S/O SARAL KUMAR DAS
R/O CHAPAR
P.O. CHAPAR
DIST. DHUBRI
ASSAM
PIN-783371
3: ATOWAR UL ISLAM
S/O ABDUL MOMIN SK.
R/O EIDGAH PATH
HOUSE NO. 12
P.O. DISPUR
SARUMOTORIA
DIST. KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN-781006
4: NABANITA DAS
Page No.# 5/60
D/O LT. DIPAK KR. DAS
R/O HOUSE NO. 16
SARVODAYA PATH
ABC
DIST. KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN-781005
5: BISWAJIT DAS
S/O DHIREN DAS
R/O PASCHIM BORAGAON
BAMUPPARA
DIST. KAMRUP
ASSAM
PIN-781035
VERSUS
THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY AND 5 ORS
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI-19
ASSAM
2:THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HIGHER EDUCATION
DEPTT. DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
3:THE DIRECTOR
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT. KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI-781019
4:THE VICE CHANCELLOR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001
5:THE REGISTRAR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001
6:COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001 REP. BY THE REGISTRAR
------------
Page No.# 6/60
Linked Case : WP(C)/285/2020
MANOJ KUMAR DAS AND ANR.
S/O MATHURA MOHAN DAS
R/O JAYANAGAR
MALIGAON
GUWAHATI-781011
DIST. KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM
2: NOVONITA BARUAH
W/O DR. JHON KUMAR KALITA
R/O HOUSE NO. 116
OPP. K.B. SOUND LAKHINAGAR
HATIGAON
GUWAHATI-781036
DIST. KAMRUP (M)
ASSAM
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 4 ORS.
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT. DISPUR
GUWAHATI-781006
ASSAM
2:THE DIRECTOR
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPTT. KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI-781019
3:THE VICE CHANCELLOR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001
4:THE REGISTRAR
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001
5:COTTON UNIVERSITY
COTTON UNIVERSITY
PANBAZAR
GUWAHATI-781001 REP. BY THE REGISTRAR
------------
Page No.# 7/60
–B E F O R E –
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KAUSHIK GOSWAMI
For the Petitioner(s)
: Mr. K. N. Choudhury, Sr. Advocate,
assisted by Mr. H. Das, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. D. Das, Senior Counsel assisted by
Mr. H. Rohman, Advocate appearing for
the respondent Nos. 4, 5 & 6 (Cotton
University) in WP(C) No. 938/2020 and
WP(C) No. 9474/2019,
Mr. P.D. Nair, Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr. H. Rohman, learned counsel,
appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 to 5
in WP(C) No. 285/2020 and WP(C) No.
5195/2020.
Mr. K. Gogoi, Standing Counsel, Higher
Education.
Mr. J. Roy, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Ms.
N. Kumari, Advocate for the private
respondents.
Date on which judgment
is reserved
: N/A
Date of pronouncement
of judgment
: 06.08.2026
Whether the pronouncement
is of the operative part
of the judgment ?
: No.
Whether the full judgment
has been pronounced
: Yes.
Page No.# 8/60
JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. H.
Das, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. D. Das,
learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. H. Rohman, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent Nos. 4, 5 & 6 (Cotton University) in WP(C) No. 938/2020 and
WP(C) No. 9474/2019, Mr. P.D. Nair, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. H.
Rohman, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in WP(C)
No. 285/2020 and WP(C) No. 5195/2020, Mr. K. Gogoi, learned Standing
Counsel, Higher Education, and Mr. J. Roy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Ms. N. Kumari, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents.
2]
These four writ petitions raise a common question touching upon the
entitlement of the petitioners to seek regularisation/absorption as Assistant
Professors in different Departments of Cotton University. The petitioners have
also assailed the consequential actions taken by the respondent authorities
pursuant to the recruitment process initiated for filling up regular teaching
posts. Since the issues arising for determination are substantially common and
the factual background overlaps to a considerable extent, all the writ petitions
were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
However, wherever the factual circumstances pertaining to the individual writ
petitions or the respective Departments materially differ, the same shall be
noticed separately.
3]
The petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 938/2020 and 9474/2019 were initially
engaged in the Department of Computer Science & Information Technology of
the erstwhile Cotton College between the years 2007 and 2009 under the
Page No.# 9/60
designation of Academic Counsellors. According to the petitioners, their
appointments were preceded by public advertisements and a process of
selection involving interviews conducted by the competent authority. It is their
specific case that, notwithstanding the nomenclature of Academic Counsellor,
they continuously discharged duties and responsibilities substantially identical to
those performed by regular Assistant Professors, including classroom teaching,
evaluation of answer scripts, preparation of question papers, curriculum
development,
examination-related
functions,
and
other
academic
and
administrative responsibilities ordinarily entrusted to members of the regular
teaching faculty.
4]
The petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 285/2020 and 5195/2020, on the other
hand, were engaged in the Department of Biotechnology, presently known as
the Department of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology, between the years
2008 and 2010. Their case likewise rests on the assertion that they were
appointed pursuant to public advertisements followed by a process of selection
and interview, and that throughout the period of their engagement they
discharged teaching, academic and research responsibilities comparable to
those discharged by regular Assistant Professors in the said Department.
5]
The common thread running through all the four writ petitions is that the
Departments in which the petitioners were engaged had been established with
the approval of the Government of Assam and were catering to substantial
teaching requirements generated by newly introduced academic programmes.
According to the petitioners, although they were initially appointed under
different designations, the respondent authorities continued to utilise their
services uninterruptedly for long periods and subsequently redesignated them
Page No.# 10/60
as Assistant Professors (Contractual), thereby recognising the true nature of the
functions performed by them. It is their further case that they rendered
continuous service for well over a decade and that the question of regularisation
of their services remained under consideration at different administrative levels
from time to time.
6]
The respondents, however, dispute the very foundation of the petitioners’
claim. According to the respondent University as well as the Higher Education
Department, the petitioners were never appointed against sanctioned teaching
posts in accordance with the statutory recruitment framework governing
appointments to teaching positions. It is contended that the petitioners were
engaged purely on contractual or ad hoc basis in connection with self-financing
courses and that such engagements were dehors the statutory recruitment
procedure governing appointments to regular teaching posts in Government
Colleges and, subsequently, in the University.
7]
It further appears that, during the pendency of the controversy relating to
the claim for regularisation, the respondent University initiated a regular
recruitment process for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor by
issuing advertisements inviting applications from eligible candidates. Some of
the petitioners participated in the said recruitment process but were ultimately
unsuccessful. Thereafter, the contractual engagements of the petitioners came
to be discontinued, giving rise to the present batch of writ petitions wherein
both the recruitment process and the consequential orders discontinuing their
services have been called into question.
8]
Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners,
submits that none of the petitioners can be described as backdoor entrants. It is
Page No.# 11/60
contended
that
their
initial
appointments
were
preceded
by
public
advertisements inviting applications from eligible candidates and were followed
by a process of interview conducted by the competent authorities. According to
the learned Senior Counsel, the constitutional requirement of transparency and
fairness underlying Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution stood substantially
satisfied at the very inception of their engagement and, therefore, their
appointments cannot be equated with clandestine or arbitrary appointments
made dehors the constitutional scheme governing public employment.
9]
Learned Senior Counsel further submits that throughout the tenure of
their engagement, the petitioners discharged duties which were in no manner
distinguishable from those performed by regular Assistant Professors. It is
contended
that
the
designation
of
Academic
Counsellor
was
merely
nomenclatural and did not truly reflect either the nature of the work assigned to
the petitioners or the responsibilities continuously discharged by them. Reliance
is placed upon the subsequent redesignation of the petitioners as Assistant
Professors (Contractual), as well as various official communications issued by
the respondent authorities, to contend that the employer itself recognised the
true character of the services rendered by the petitioners.
10] Elaborating the aforesaid submission, learned Senior Counsel contends
that the Departments in question had a continuing and perennial requirement of
teaching personnel and that the respondent authorities consciously retained the
petitioners in service for more than a decade to meet such institutional
requirements. According to the petitioners, after having continuously extracted
work identical to that of regular Assistant Professors and thereafter
redesignated them as Assistant Professors (Contractual), it is no longer open to
Page No.# 12/60
the respondents to deny them the consequential benefits merely by relying
upon the original nomenclature of the post under which they entered service.
The submission is that constitutional adjudication must look to the substance of
the engagement rather than the label attached to it.
11] Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners further submits that the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Secretary,
State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1, cannot
be applied in a mechanical or isolated manner divorced from the subsequent
evolution of service jurisprudence. It is argued that the later decisions of the
Supreme
Court
have
consistently
emphasised
the
distinction
between
appointments which are “illegal” and those which are merely “irregular”, and
have cautioned against employing the decision in Umadevi (3) (supra) as an
instrument to perpetuate arbitrary or exploitative contractual engagements. In
support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the
following decisions:
(i) Jaggo v. Union of India, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826
(Paras 8, 9, 10, 19, 20, 26, 27 and 28);
(ii) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam Ghaziabad, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 221 (Para 14);
(iii) State of Jharkhand v. Kamal Prasad, reported in (2014) 7 SCC
223 (Paras 30 and 44);
(iv) Dharam Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1735 (Para 17);
Page No.# 13/60
(v) Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, reported in 2024 INSC 332 (Para 5);
(vi) Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, reported in
(2014) 4 SCC 583 (Paras 43, 44 and 45);
(vii) Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, reported in
(2018) 8 SCC 238 (Paras 7 and 8);
(viii) Hiren Chandra Das v. State of Assam, reported in 2024 SCC
OnLine Gau 1880 (Para 34); and
(ix) Rofiqul Islam v. State of Assam, in WP(C) No. 5304/2021 (Paras 4
and 6).
12] Relying upon the aforesaid authorities, learned Senior Counsel submits
that while adjudicating claims for regularisation or absorption, the Court is not
confined to the nomenclature of the post under which an employee initially
entered service. Rather, the Court is required to examine the entire factual
matrix, including the manner of entry into service, whether the initial
engagement followed a transparent selection process, the qualifications
possessed by the employee, the nature of duties continuously discharged, the
length and continuity of service, and the conduct of the employer over the
years. It is submitted that the cumulative effect of these circumstances must be
assessed in order to determine whether the engagement was merely irregular or
fundamentally illegal.
13] Per contra, Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. P.D. Nair, learned
Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. H. Rohman, learned Counsel appearing for the
respondent Cotton University, submits that the petitioners were never appointed
Page No.# 14/60
against sanctioned teaching posts and that their engagements were contractual
from the very inception. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there never
existed any sanctioned cadre post known as Academic Counsellor under the
statutory framework governing the erstwhile Cotton College and, at the relevant
point of time, the entry-level teaching post in Government Degree Colleges was
that of Lecturer, now redesignated as Assistant Professor. It is further submitted
that no material has been produced to demonstrate that the petitioners were
appointed through the recruitment process prescribed for appointment to
regular teaching posts under the applicable statutory provisions.
14] It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent University that the
advertisements relied upon by the petitioners themselves demonstrate that the
recruitment was never undertaken for regular teaching posts. According to the
respondents, the advertisements neither prescribed the qualifications mandated
under the applicable UGC Regulations for appointment as Assistant Professor
nor specified the number of sanctioned vacancies sought to be filled. It is,
therefore, contended that the petitioners cannot equate their initial contractual
engagement as Academic Counsellors with appointment to regular teaching
posts governed by the statutory recruitment framework.
15] Learned Senior Counsels appearing for the respondent Cotton University
further submits that the petitioners were engaged only in connection with selffinancing courses introduced by the erstwhile Cotton College to cater to
emerging academic requirements and that their remuneration was paid out of
the revenue generated from such courses and not from Government funds
earmarked for sanctioned teaching posts. It is submitted that the contractual
terms governing their engagement clearly contemplated that their services
Page No.# 15/60
would continue only so long as the courses remained operational or the
workload so required. According to the University, the very nature of the
engagement negates any claim that the petitioners were appointed against
regular cadre posts.
16] It is further contended that the petitioners cannot claim any special or
preferential right merely because they continued in service for a considerable
period. Learned Senior Counsel submits that several other contractual teachers
similarly engaged in the Department of Computer Science & Information
Technology and in other self-financing courses also ceased to continue upon
regular recruitment being undertaken by the University. According to the
respondents, the continuation of the petitioners was purely on account of
administrative exigencies and cannot confer any enforceable right to
regularisation or absorption.
17] Learned Senior Counsels further submits that many of the petitioners did
not possess the qualifications prescribed under the applicable UGC Regulations
for appointment as Assistant Professors at the time of their initial engagement
and that some of them continued to remain ineligible even when the present
writ petitions were instituted. It is contended that the educational qualifications
prescribed for contractual engagement under the advertisements cannot be
equated with the minimum qualifications prescribed under the UGC Regulations
governing appointments to regular teaching posts. Consequently, according to
the respondents, the petitioners cannot claim parity with regularly appointed
Assistant Professors.
18] Referring to the Resolution of the Executive Council dated 17.11.2018,
learned Senior Counsel submits that the University never resolved to regularise
Page No.# 16/60
the services of contractual teachers. According to him, the only decision taken
by the Executive Council was that contractual teachers would be at liberty to
participate in the recruitment process initiated for filling up regular posts and
that, while making such recruitment, due weightage to their experience might
be
considered
in
accordance
with
law.
It
is
submitted
that
this
decision/resolution of the Executive Council has not been challenged by the
petitioners. It is, therefore, submitted that the petitioners have misconstrued
the said Resolution as a decision to regularise their services, whereas no such
policy decision was ever taken by the competent authority.
19] Learned Senior Counsels also submits that some of the petitioners, having
consciously participated in the recruitment process initiated pursuant to the
advertisement dated 19.06.2019 without any protest, cannot now be permitted
to assail the very same selection process merely because they were
unsuccessful. Invoking the well-settled principle that a candidate who
participates in a selection process with full knowledge of its terms cannot
subsequently challenge the process after being declared unsuccessful, it is
contended that the writ petitions questioning the recruitment process are liable
to be rejected on this ground alone.
20] It is lastly contended on behalf of the respondent University that
appointment to the post of Assistant Professor in a University is governed
entirely by the UGC Regulations prescribing the minimum qualifications and the
procedure for direct recruitment. Since neither the UGC Regulations nor the
statutory framework governing the University recognizes regularisation as a
mode of appointment to teaching posts, it is submitted that no writ can be
issued directing regularisation in derogation of the statutory scheme. In support
Page No.# 17/60
of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the following
decisions.
(i) R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah, reported in (1972) 1 SCC 409;
(ii) State of Orissa v. Sukanti Mohapatra, reported in (1993) 2 SCC
486;
(iii) K.C. Joshi v. Union of India, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272;
(iv) Dr. M.A. Haque v. Union of India, reported in (1993) 2 SCC 213;
(v) Dr. Arundhati A. Pargaonkar v. Union of India, reported in 1994
Supp (3) SCC 380;
(vi) State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247;
(vii) State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Singamuthu, reported in (2017) 4 SCC
113; and
(viii) Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 1063.
21] Mr. K. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Higher Education
Department, while adopting the submissions advanced on behalf of the
respondent University, additionally submits that, at the relevant point of time,
the erstwhile Cotton College was a Government Degree College and
appointments to teaching posts therein were governed exclusively by the
provisions of the Assam Education Service Rules, 1982, framed under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India.
Page No.# 18/60
22] Elaborating the aforesaid submission, learned Standing Counsel contends
that Rule 5 of the Assam Education Service Rules, 1982 provided that
recruitment to the post of Lecturer in Government Degree Colleges could only
be made by direct recruitment, while Rule 6 mandated that such recruitment
should be made only on the recommendation of the Assam Public Service
Commission. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the Rules neither
recognised any cadre post known as Academic Counsellor nor authorised
appointment of contractual or ad hoc teaching personnel against regular
teaching posts. Consequently, it is submitted that the initial engagement of the
petitioners did not conform to the statutory recruitment mechanism prescribed
under the said Rules.
23] Learned Standing Counsel further submits that where a statute prescribes
a particular mode of appointment, the authorities are bound to adhere strictly to
the procedure so prescribed and no alternative method of recruitment can be
evolved by executive or administrative action. Since the petitioners admittedly
did not enter service through the procedure contemplated under the Assam
Education Service Rules, 1982, no legal right can accrue in their favour merely
because they continued in service for a considerable length of time. It is,
therefore, submitted that the equitable considerations pressed into service by
the petitioners cannot override statutory provisions framed under Article 309 of
the Constitution.
24] Learned Standing Counsel has also contended that some of the petitioners
voluntarily participated in the recruitment process initiated pursuant to the
advertisement dated 19.06.2019 for appointment to regular posts of Assistant
Professor but were unsuccessful. It is submitted that, having participated in the
Page No.# 19/60
selection process without raising any objection, the petitioners are estopped
from questioning either the advertisement or the selection process after their
failure to secure appointment. The well-settled principle that a candidate cannot
approbate and reprobate in the same breath is pressed into service in support
of the aforesaid contention.
25] Distinguishing the authorities relied upon by the petitioners, learned
Standing Counsel submits that the said decisions arose in entirely different
factual and statutory settings and cannot dilute the binding principles laid down
by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) (supra), which, according to the
respondents, continues to govern the field. It is argued that where statutory
recruitment Rules framed under Article 309 are in force, no Court can direct
regularisation or permanent absorption in violation thereof. In support of the
aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon:
(i) Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), reported in (2006) 4
SCC 1;
(ii) State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247;
(iii) Ganesh Digambar Jambhrunkar v. State of Maharashtra,
reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1417;
(iv) Union of India v. Ilmo Devi, reported in (2021) 20 SCC 290;
(v) Vibhuti Shankar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in
(2023) 3 SCC 69;
(vi) State of Gujarat v. R.J. Pathan, reported in (2022) 5 SCC 394;
Page No.# 20/60
(vii) Union of India v. Mahendra Singh, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 909;
(viii) Tajvir Singh Sodhi v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, reported in
(2023) 17 SCC 147;
(ix) Official Liquidator v. Dayanand, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1;
(x) B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, reported in (1979) 4 SCC
507;
(xi) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, reported in (2017)
16 SCC 680;
(xii) Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. Government of NCT of Delhi,
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247; and
(xiii) Dr. Kishore Kumar Deka v. State of Assam, passed in WP(C)
No.7982/2015.
26] Mr. J. Roy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondents,
submits that although the candidates selected pursuant to the fresh recruitment
process have been impleaded as private respondents, no substantive relief has
been claimed against them.
27] I have given my prudent consideration to the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have also considered
the materials available on record. I have also duly considered the case laws
cited at the Bar.
Page No.# 21/60
28] The rival submissions fall for consideration in the backdrop of the
constitutional principles governing public employment, the statutory framework
applicable to appointments in Government Colleges and Universities, and the
evolution of the law relating to regularisation of long-serving contractual and ad
hoc employees.
29] Accordingly, the following questions arise for determination in the present
batch of writ petitions:
(i) Whether the initial engagement of the petitioners was illegal or merely
irregular, having regard to the manner of their appointment, the nature of
the recruitment process undertaken, the qualifications possessed by them,
and the statutory framework governing appointments to teaching posts in
the erstwhile Cotton College and the respondent University?
(ii) Whether the subsequent redesignation of the petitioners as Assistant
Professors (Contractual) amounted to a fresh appointment to a distinct
post or merely recognised and formalised the nature of the duties and
responsibilities which the petitioners had been continuously discharging
since their initial engagement?
(iii) Whether, notwithstanding the principles enunciated by the Constitution
Bench in Umadevi (3) (supra), the petitioners have established a case for
regularisation, absorption or any other equitable relief having regard to
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the doctrine of legitimate
expectation, and the subsequent development of service jurisprudence by
the Supreme Court?
Page No.# 22/60
30] Before adverting to the rival factual contentions, it would be apposite to
notice the legal principles governing the field. It is trite that an ad hoc or
contractual appointment does not, by itself, ripen into a regular appointment
merely by efflux of time. Such appointments are ordinarily conceived as stopgap arrangements intended to meet temporary administrative exigencies until
regular recruitment is undertaken in accordance with the applicable statutory
Rules. Equally well settled, however, is the principle that where such stop-gap
arrangements continue for prolonged periods, the Court is required to examine
whether the initial engagement was fundamentally illegal or merely suffered
from procedural irregularities. It is this distinction between an illegal
appointment and an irregular appointment which constitutes the bedrock of the
jurisprudence relating to regularisation.
31] The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) (supra), while
reiterating that appointments made dehors the constitutional scheme governing
public employment cannot ordinarily be regularised, nevertheless recognised a
distinction between appointments which are illegal and those which are merely
irregular. The Apex Court observed that where duly qualified persons had been
appointed against duly sanctioned vacant posts, though with certain procedural
irregularities, and had continued in service for a considerable period without the
protection of interim orders passed by Courts or Tribunals, their cases could be
considered for regularisation as a one-time measure. Paragraph 53 of the
judgment, which has since formed the foundation of the subsequent
jurisprudence on the subject, is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular
appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V.
Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagarajan
Page No.# 23/60
(supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons
in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the
employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the
intervention of orders of Courts or of tribunals. The question of
regularization of the services of such employees may have to be
considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in
the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that
context, the Union of India, the State Governments, and their
instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time
measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have
worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not
under cover of orders of the Courts or of tribunals and should
further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill
those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases
where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now
employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this
date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not
subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there
should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and
regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme. (Emphasis supplied)”
32] The above observations unmistakably demonstrate that while reaffirming
the constitutional mandate requiring appointments to public posts to be made
through a fair and transparent process, the Constitution Bench simultaneously
carved out a limited exception in respect of certain irregular appointments. At
the same time, the Apex Court cautioned that such exception could not
thereafter become a means of bypassing the constitutional requirement of
regular recruitment or of perpetuating appointments made dehors the statutory
framework.
33] The scope and ambit of paragraph 53 of Umadevi (3) (supra) came to be
explained in greater detail by the Apex Court in M.L. Kesari (supra). The Apex
Court clarified that the expression “one-time measure” employed in paragraph
53 of Umadevi (3) was not intended to deprive otherwise eligible employees
Page No.# 24/60
merely because the employer failed to undertake the exercise within the period
contemplated therein. It was held that every Department or instrumentality of
the State was under an obligation to undertake a one-time exercise to identify
employees who had completed ten years or more of continuous service, without
the protection of interim orders, against vacant posts and possessing the
requisite qualifications, and to consider their cases for regularisation. The Court
further clarified that omission on the part of the employer to undertake such an
exercise, or to include otherwise eligible employees therein, would not
extinguish their entitlement to be considered in terms of paragraph 53 of
Umadevi (3) (supra). The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“9. The term ‘one-time measure’ has to be understood in its proper
perspective. This would normally mean that after the decision in
Umadevi, each department or each instrumentality should
undertake a one-time exercise and prepare a list of all casual,
daily- wage or ad hoc employees who have been working for more
than ten years without the intervention of Courts and tribunals
and subject them to a process verification as to whether they are
working against vacant posts and possess the requisite
qualification for the post and if so, regularize their services.
10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi, cases
of several daily-wage/ad-hoc/casual employees were still pending before
Courts. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not
commence the one- time regularization process. On the other hand,
some Government departments or instrumentalities undertook the
one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration
either on the ground that their cases were pending in Courts or
due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who
were entitled to be considered in terms of Para 53 of the decision
in Umadevi, will not lose their right to be considered for
regularization, merely because the one-time exercise was
completed without considering their cases, or because the six
month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi has expired. The
one-time exercise should consider all daily- wage/adhoc/those
employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on
Page No.# 25/60
10.4.2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of
Courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the one-time
exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi, but did not consider the
cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para
53 of Umadevi, the employer concerned should consider their
cases also, as a continuation of the one-time exercise. The one
time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who
are entitled to be considered in terms of Para 53 of Umadevi, are
so considered.
11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of
continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of Courts
or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi was rendered, are
considered for regularization in view of their long service. Second is to
ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the
practice of employing persons on daily- wage/ad-hoc/casual for long
periods and then periodically regularize them on the ground that they
have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional
or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true
effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for
more than ten years as on 10.4.2006 (the date of decision in
Umadevi) without the protection of any interim order of any Court
or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite
qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularization. The
fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of
regularization within six months of the decision in Umadevi or
that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited
few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered
for regularization in terms of the above directions in Umadevi as
a one-time measure. (Emphasis supplied)”
34] The decision in M.L. Kesari (supra), thus, does not dilute the ratio laid
down in Umadevi (3) (supra). On the contrary, it explains the manner in which
the limited exception recognised in paragraph 53 is required to be implemented.
The emphasis of the decision is that the benefit contemplated under Umadevi
(3) (supra) cannot be defeated merely because the employer failed to undertake
the one-time exercise within the period indicated therein or omitted to consider
Page No.# 26/60
all employees who were otherwise entitled to such consideration. The judgment,
therefore, reinforces the principle that while regularisation cannot become an
alternate mode of recruitment, employees falling within the limited exception
recognised in Umadevi (3) (supra) cannot be denied consideration solely on
account of administrative inaction or omission on the part of the employer.
35] Likewise, in Jaggo (supra), after surveying the earlier precedents, the
Apex Court emphasised that Umadevi (3) (supra) was intended to prevent
backdoor entries and illegal appointments, and not to perpetuate exploitative
contractual engagements extending over decades. The Apex Court observed
that where employees had undergone a transparent process of selection,
continuously discharged duties of a perennial nature, and performed functions
integral to the administration, procedural irregularities at the inception ought
not to be employed indefinitely to deny substantive rights. The relevant
paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are extracted hereinbelow for ready
reference:
“12. Despite being labelled as “part-time workers,” the appellants
performed these essential tasks on a daily and continuous basis over
extensive periods, ranging from over a decade to nearly two decades.
Their engagement was not sporadic or temporary in nature;
instead, it was recurrent, regular, and akin to the responsibilities
typically associated with sanctioned posts. Moreover, the
respondents did not engage any other personnel for these tasks
during the appellants' tenure, underscoring the indispensable
nature of their work.
13. The claim by the respondents that these were not regular posts lacks
merit, as the nature of the work performed by the appellants was
perennial and fundamental to the functioning of the offices. The
recurring nature of these duties necessitates their classification
as regular posts, irrespective of how their initial engagements
were labelled. It is also noteworthy that subsequent outsourcing of these
same tasks to private agencies after the appellants' termination
Page No.# 27/60
demonstrates the inherent need for these services. This act of
outsourcing, which effectively replaced one set of workers with another,
further underscores that the work in question was neither temporary nor
occasional.
19. It is evident from the foregoing that the appellants' roles were
not only essential but also indistinguishable from those of regular
employees. Their sustained contributions over extended periods,
coupled with absence of any adverse record, warrant equitable
treatment and regularization of their services. Denial of this benefit,
followed by their arbitrary termination, amounts to manifest injustice and
must be rectified.
20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra) does
not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long years of
service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the State or
its instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to prevent
backdoor entries and illegal appointments that circumvent
constitutional requirements. However, where appointments were
not illegal but possibly “irregular,” and where employees had
served continuously against the backdrop of sanctioned functions
for a considerable period, the need for a fair and humane
resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged, continuous, and
unblemished service performing tasks inherently required on a
regular basis can, over the time, transform what was initially adhoc
or
temporary
into
a
scenario
demanding
fair
regularization. In a recent judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar v.
Union of India, it was held that held that procedural formalities cannot
be used to deny regularization of service to an employee whose
appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed the same duties
as performed by the regular employee over a considerable period in the
capacity of the regular employee.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as
exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers' rights and job security. In the private
sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious
employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job
security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for
exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government
institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and
justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative
employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse
Page No.# 28/60
of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends
observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent
that can erode public trust in governmental operations.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly in
government institutions, often face multifaceted forms of exploitation.
While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to
address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a
mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These
practices manifest in several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work that is
essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are
often labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles
mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives
workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are
entitled to, despite performing identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This
practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers
to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of
their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find
themselves excluded from opportunities for skill development, promotions,
or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a
systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite
their contributions being equally significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly resort to
outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively
replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only
perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to
bypass the obligation to offer regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often
denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health
insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This
lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship,
especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the
practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are
Page No.# 29/60
often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of
long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish
between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically
held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged
in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more
than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a onetime measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is
being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases
where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack
adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments
often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no
vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees,
overlooking the judgment's explicit acknowledgment of cases
where regularization is appropriate. This selective application
distorts the judgment's spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing
it against employees who have rendered indispensable services
over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative for
government departments to lead by example in providing fair and stable
employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended
periods, especially when their roles are integral to the
organization's functioning, not only contravenes international
labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal
challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair
employment practices, government institutions can reduce the
burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and
uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant
to embody. This approach aligns with international standards
and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow,
thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices
in the country. (Emphasis supplied)”
36] The aforesaid decision of the Apex Court reiterates that the constitutional
obligation of the State is not confined merely to ensuring transparency at the
stage of initial recruitment. Equally important is its obligation to function as a
model employer by refraining from retaining employees for years together under
temporary or contractual designations while continuously extracting work of a
Page No.# 30/60
regular and perennial nature. The judgment cautions that Umadevi (3) (supra)
cannot be construed as a charter permitting the indefinite continuation of such
arrangements, nor can procedural irregularities at the inception be invoked
perpetually to defeat otherwise legitimate claims founded upon long,
uninterrupted service rendered against continuing institutional requirements.
37] Further, in Shripal (supra), the Apex Court reiterated that where
employees have been appointed through a transparent process, have
continuously discharged duties of a perennial nature over a long period of time,
and their appointments are at best irregular and not illegal, the employer cannot
defeat their legitimate claim merely by relying upon the contractual or
temporary description of their engagement. The Apex Court emphasised that
the distinction between illegal appointments and irregular appointments,
recognised in Umadevi (3) (supra) and explained in M.L. Kesari (supra), remains
the governing principle while examining claims for regularisation.
38] Likewise, in Vinod Kumar (supra), the Apex Court once again underscored
that constitutional courts are required to examine the substance of the
engagement rather than its mere nomenclature. It was observed that prolonged
utilisation of employees against continuing institutional requirements, coupled
with a transparent mode of initial selection, constitutes a relevant circumstance
while considering claims founded upon the principles recognised in Umadevi (3)
(supra). The Apex Court reiterated that the State cannot indefinitely continue
contractual engagements where the requirement itself is regular and perennial.
The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “5. Having heard the arguments of both the sides, this Court believes that the
essence of employment and the rights thereof cannot be merely determined by
the initial terms of appointment when the actual course of employment has
Page No.# 31/60
evolved significantly over time. The continuous service of the appellants in the
capacities of regular employees, performing duties indistinguishable from those
in permanent posts, and their selection through a process that mirrors that of
regular recruitment, constitute a substantive departure from the temporary and
scheme-specific nature of their initial engagement. Moreover, the appellants'
promotion process was conducted and overseen by a Departmental Promotional
Committee and their sustained service for more than 25 years without any
indication of the temporary nature of their roles being reaffirmed or the duration
of such temporary engagement being specified, merits a reconsideration of their
employment status.”
39] Similarly, in Dharam Singh (supra), the Apex Court emphasised that the
State, being a model employer, cannot indefinitely postpone regular recruitment
and simultaneously continue to utilise the services of employees on contractual
or temporary arrangements for years together. The Apex Court observed that
where the employer itself has permitted such arrangements to continue despite
the existence of a recurring and perennial requirement, it cannot subsequently
rely upon its own omission to deny the employees the protection available under
law. The judgment further reiterates that Umadevi (3) (supra) was never
intended to legitimise exploitative employment practices or to permit the State
to derive advantage from its own inaction.
40] The aforesaid decisions, when read together with Umadevi (3) (supra) and
M.L. Kesari (supra), demonstrate a consistent evolution of the law. While
preserving the constitutional mandate of recruitment through a fair and
transparent process, the Apex Court has repeatedly cautioned that constitutional
courts must also examine the nature of the initial engagement, the transparency
of the selection process, the continuity of service, the existence of a perennial
institutional requirement, and the conduct of the employer over the years.
These decisions consistently emphasise that while Umadevi (3) (supra) continues
to govern appointments to public service, its ratio cannot be applied
Page No.# 32/60
mechanically so as to perpetuate unfair labour practices or enable the State to
take advantage of its own failure to undertake timely regular recruitment.
41] It is against this backdrop that the decision in Sukhendu Bhattacharjee v.
The State of Assam, in Civil Appeal No(s). 4514/2025 , assumes significance
wherein the Apex Court, after considering the earlier regularization judgments,
categorically rejected the State’s contention that regularization must fail merely
because the initial engagement was not against a sanctioned post, particularly
when the workers were engaged for decades and despite the state regularizing
thirty thousand similarly situated workers, the state cannot adopt a rigid
interpretation of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) (supra) to deny
the remaining workers. In the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court in the context
of the reliance placed by the High Court in the judgment under appeal on
Umadevi (3) (supra) and ML Kesari (supra) held that the ratio of the aforesaid
decisions were misplaced in the facts of the case. Relevant paragraphs in this
regard are extracted herein below for ready reference :“59. In our considered view, the reliance placed by the Division Bench
on Umadevi (supra) and M.L. Kesari (supra) was misplaced in the facts
of the present case. Paragraph 53 of Umadevi (supra) carved out a
limited exception for those employees who had worked for more than ten
years in duly sanctioned posts without the protection of Court orders.
However, the appellants were not seeking regularization on the basis of
that one-time exception. Their claim is rooted in the Cabinet decision
dated 22nd July, 2005, by which the State consciously decided to
regularize the services of Work Charged and Muster Roll workers
engaged prior to 1st April, 1993, and pursuant to which nearly
30,000 similarly situated employees were in fact regularized by creation
of posts. The appellants claimed parity with that very class and sought
equal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution. The issue, therefore,
is not one of invoking the limited exception carved out
in Umadevi (supra), but of ensuring that employees who stand on the
same footing are treated alike.
60. It is a settled principle that equals must be treated equally, and if
persons similarly placed are treated differently without a rational basis, it
Page No.# 33/60
would amount to a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. If two sets of
employees stand on the same footing in terms of date of engagement,
nature of duties, length of service and eligibility under a declared policy,
the State cannot extend a benefit to one large group and deny it to the
smaller group without demonstrating a valid distinction. Equality does
not allow selective or partial implementation of a policy. Once a policy
decision is taken to benefit a defined class, it must be applied uniformly
to all who satisfy the prescribed conditions.
73. As regards the contention of Shri Gupta that after the decision
in Umadevi (supra) no regularization can be effected in respect of
employees who were not appointed against duly sanctioned posts, we
are unable to accept such a sweeping proposition in the facts of the
present
case. The
submission
proceeds
on
the
premise
that Umadevi (supra) lays down an absolute and inflexible embargo
against all forms of regularization irrespective of the surrounding
circumstances. Such an interpretation, in our considered view, does not
reflect the true scope and ratio of the decision.
75. Recently, this Court in Bhola Nath (supra) while relying on the
judgment of Jaggo (supra), Shripal (supra), and Dharam Singh (supra)
observed as follows:“13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice adopted by
States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of “part-time”,
“contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby exploiting them by not
regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of India, this Court underscored
that government departments must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable
employment, and evolved the test of examining whether the duties performed
by such temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the
organization.
13.7 In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, this
Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to
deny regularization to temporary employees in the absence of statutory rules. It
was held that Umadevi (supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise
exploitative engagements continued for years without undertaking regular
recruitment. The Court further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction
between appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”,
the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the prescribed
conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly deprecated the
culture of “ad-hocism” adopted by States in their capacity as employers. The
Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or informalizing recruitment as a
means to evade regular employment obligations, observing that such measures
perpetuate precarious working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful
engagement practices.
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such as the
appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which the machinery
Page No.# 34/60
of the State continues to function. They are not merely ancillary to the system,
but form essential components thereof. The equality mandate of our
Constitution, therefore, requires that their service be reciprocated in a manner
free from arbitrariness, ensuring that decisions of the State affecting the
careers and livelihood of such part-time and contractual employees are guided
by fairness and reason.” (Emphasis supplied)
76. What emerges from the principles enunciated in the aforesaid
decisions is that the State cannot rely upon the mere form of engagement
to deny fair and equitable treatment to employees who have served it for
long years. The consistent thread running through these judgments is
that Umadevi (supra) cannot be invoked as a blanket barrier to justify
prolonged and continued engagements of a temporary or ad hoc nature,
especially where the employees have been discharging essential and
recurring functions of the State. The Court has repeatedly emphasised
that the distinction between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments must
be kept in view, that long and continuous service is a relevant
consideration, and that the State, as a model employer, is under a
constitutional obligation to act with fairness, consistency and
reasonableness. The practice of retaining employees for decades under
deceptively titled designations, while simultaneously extracting regular
work integral to the administration, has been disapproved consistently.
77. Applying these principles to the present case, it is evident that
engaging workers on muster rolls was a consistently employed policy of
the State which continued for prolonged period of time. The appellants
were not engaged for sporadic or seasonal purposes but were taken on
muster rolls and have rendered continuous service for decades in
departments performing regular governmental functions. The State itself
acknowledged the magnitude of the issue and framed a Cabinet policy to
regularize similarly situated workers, acting upon it in respect of nearly
30,000 employees. In such circumstances, to deny consideration to the
fraction of remaining eligible workers including the appellants, by taking
shelter under a rigid reading of Umadevi (supra) would defeat the very
principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness that this Court has
consistently upheld.
78. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to accept the contention of
the State that the appellants cannot be granted regularization on the
ground that they were not initially appointed against duly sanctioned
posts. The State, having engaged the appellants prior to 1st April, 1993,
utilised their services continuously for decades, and having itself framed
and implemented a Cabinet policy regularizing nearly 30,000 similarly
situated workers, cannot now exclude the appellants by taking shelter
Page No.# 35/60
behind a rigid or technical reading of Umadevi (supra). In absence of any
cogent distinction or reasoned decision justifying such exclusion, the
action of the State is manifestly arbitrary. It is inconsistent with its
obligation to function as a model employer and does not withstand
scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution. Conclusion
79. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the impugned judgment
dated 8th June, 2017 passed by the Division Bench cannot be sustained
and is set aside and the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 20th
December, 2013 is affirmed.
Consequently, we pass the following directions:I. The appellants shall be treated as regularised in service in terms of the
Cabinet decision dated 22nd July, 2005 and from the date on which
similarly placed 30,000 employees were given benefit of the said Cabinet
decision. II. The State of Assam shall identify and verify the eligible
appellants and, where necessary, create supernumerary posts to
facilitate their regularization.
III. Upon regularization, the appellants shall be entitled to all
consequential benefits, including fixation of pay in the regular scale,
continuity of service, and all applicable pensionary and post- retiral
benefits in the same terms, as were extended to similarly situated 30,000
employees.
IV. In case of retired appellants, they shall be granted notional
regularization with consequential monetary benefits and arrears from the
relevant date until their superannuation for the purpose of recalculating
pension, gratuity, and terminal dues. V. In case of deceased appellants,
arrears and other benefits shall be released to their legal heirs in
accordance with law.
VI. The entire exercise, including the calculation and payment of all
financial arrears, shall be completed within a period of one year from the
date of this judgment.
VII. We make it clear that the benefit of the above directions shall only be
applicable to the appellants who were working in the departments of the
State before the cut-off date prescribed in Cabinet decision dated 22nd
July, 2005 i.e. before 1st April, 1993.”
42] At this stage, Mr. K. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the
Higher Education Department, has placed reliance upon the recent judgment of
Page No.# 36/60
the Apex Court in Najima Khatun & Others v. State of West Bengal &
Others, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1313, in support of the contention
that the petitioners are not entitled to regularization on the basis of the
decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Jaggo (supra) and Sukhendu
Bhattacharjee (supra) as the Apex Court had clearly held that the aforesaid
two cases are rendered to its own facts rather than laying down law which is
binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
43] This Court has carefully considered the said judgment. The factual
foundation upon which the Apex Court proceeded in Najima Khatun (supra) is
materially different from the case at hand. The controversy before the Apex
Court arose out of appointments which, upon a detailed factual examination,
were found to be illegal and backdoor appointments, dehors the prescribed
recruitment procedure and unsupported by any transparent process of selection.
The Court was, therefore, dealing with appointments which were illegal in their
inception. Such appointments, in the considered opinion of this Court, are
plainly incapable of being regularised. There can scarcely be any dispute with
that proposition. The constitutional mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16
admits of no compromise in cases where entry into public service itself is illegal.
44] The present case, however, stands on an entirely different footing. Here,
the petitioners entered service pursuant to public advertisements issued by the
respondent institution. They participated in a process of selection and were
engaged because the respondent itself required qualified teaching personnel for
newly introduced academic programmes. It is nobody’s case that the petitioners
rendered service only by way of guest or part-time faculty. The necessity for
their engagement, therefore, is not in dispute. The materials on record further
Page No.# 37/60
demonstrate that they continuously discharged teaching and academic functions
against recurring institutional requirements for well over a decade. Apposite that
during the course of such engagement, they were successively redesignated as
Assistant Professors (Contractual) without any fresh process of recruitment,
while continuing to perform substantially the same duties and responsibilities
which they had been discharging from the very inception. The redesignation
thus recognised the true nature of the engagement rather than creating a new
one.
45] The prolonged continuation of ad hoc or contractual arrangements in the
present case is itself a matter of concern. Ad hoc appointments are intended to
meet temporary exigencies. They are not meant to become a permanent
substitute for regular recruitment. If an employer continues to extract work of a
regular and perennial nature from employees engaged on ad hoc or contractual
basis for years together, despite the existence of a continuing institutional
requirement, the vice lies not in the conduct of the employees but in the failure
of the employer to undertake regular recruitment within a reasonable period. It
is precisely such continuance of ad hocism that constitutional jurisprudence
seeks to discourage.
46] Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the subsequent decisions in
Jaggo (supra) and Sukhendu Bhattacharjee (supra) are left out of
consideration in view of the observations made in Najima Khatun (supra), the
conclusion in the present case would remain unaltered. The entitlement of the
petitioners can be determined on the basis of the principles laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) (supra), as explained in M.L. Kesari
(supra). Those decisions continue to recognise the distinction between illegal
Page No.# 38/60
appointments and irregular appointments. Where the initial appointment is
illegal, being dehors the constitutional scheme or without any transparent
process of selection, the question of regularisation does not arise. However,
where the initial appointment is not illegal but, at the highest, suffers from an
irregularity, and the employer itself continues such engagement for years
together against a recurring and perennial institutional requirement, the
constitutional infirmity lies not in the employee continuing in service but in the
employer perpetuating an arrangement which ought to have been regularised
by undertaking timely recruitment in accordance with law.
47] The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution exists to remedy illegality wherever it is found. It cannot remain a
silent spectator where the employer itself has continued an arrangement which
the constitutional scheme never contemplated as permanent. To deny relief in
such circumstances solely by invoking the contractual description attached to
the initial engagement would not advance the constitutional object underlying
Umadevi (3) (supra); rather, it would permit the continuation of the very
mischief which the Constitution Bench intended to eradicate.
48] What thus emerges from the aforesaid line of authorities is a consistent
and harmonious development of service jurisprudence. Umadevi (3) (supra)
continues to govern the constitutional requirement that appointments to public
posts must ordinarily conform to the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution and the applicable statutory recruitment framework. At the same
time, the subsequent decisions neither dilute nor depart from the ratio of
Umadevi (3) (supra); rather, they explain the limited exception recognised
therein and caution against its mechanical application in situations where the
Page No.# 39/60
State itself has continued to utilise the services of duly qualified employees for
prolonged periods against recurring institutional requirements. The enquiry,
therefore, cannot remain confined to the nomenclature of the engagement but
must extend to the substance of the appointment, the manner of entry into
service, the nature of duties actually discharged, the continuity of service, and
the conduct of the employer over the years.
49] The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions may, therefore, be
summarised thus. Umadevi (3) (supra) continues to hold the field and
reiterates the constitutional mandate that appointments to public posts must
ordinarily conform to the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
and the applicable statutory recruitment rules. Equally, however, the subsequent
decisions of the Apex Court have consistently explained that Umadevi (3)
(supra) was never intended either to legitimise exploitative contractual
engagements or to deny consideration in every case where long years of service
have been rendered pursuant to a transparent process of engagement. The
distinction between an illegal appointment and an irregular appointment
remains central to the enquiry. Likewise, while the nomenclature assigned to a
post may furnish one relevant circumstance, it cannot be regarded as
conclusive. The Court is required to examine the substance of the engagement,
the manner of entry into service, the qualifications possessed by the employee,
the nature of the duties actually discharged, the continuity of service, the
existence of a perennial institutional requirement, and the conduct of the
employer over the years. It is in the light of these settled principles that the
factual materials placed before this Court are now required to be examined. The
cumulative effect of these decisions leaves little room for doubt that the
jurisprudence relating to regularisation has evolved substantially after Umadevi
Page No.# 40/60
(3) (supra) without departing from its constitutional foundation. The enquiry
today is not confined to the label attached to the engagement but extends to
the legality of the initial process, the nature of the duties discharged, the
continuity of service, the existence of a perennial requirement, and the conduct
of the employer. These are the parameters on which the present case must be
examined.
50] At this stage, it is also apposite to refer to the recent decision of the
Division Bench of this Court in Narayan Prasad Rabha and Ors v. State of
Assam and Ors, inWA No. 428/2023. While dealing with appointments made
pursuant to a public recruitment process, the Division Bench, after considering
Umadevi (3) (supra), M.L. Kesari (supra), Jaggo (supra), Vinod Kumar
(supra) and the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court, held that where
appointments are made pursuant to public advertisement and a process of
selection initiated by the State, and the appointees have rendered long and
uninterrupted service without any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation, such
appointments cannot be characterised as void ab initio merely because of
procedural lapses attributable to the employer. The Division Bench further held
that the State cannot, after extracting prolonged service, take advantage of its
own administrative lapses to the prejudice of such employees. The relevant
observations are extracted hereinbelow:
“65. In the present cases, the appellants did not enter into service
through a concealed or surreptitious route.
66. Their entry resulted from a recruitment process initiated by the State
itself. Advertisements were issued in the public domain, applications
were invited, selections were held, appointment orders were issued, and
the appellants were inducted into service. From that point onwards, the
State treated the appellants as members of its workforce, assigned them
duties essential to the functioning of public health institutions, and paid
Page No.# 41/60
them salaries from the government fund. This conduct of the State
continued uninterruptedly for nearly 14 years. In public law, such
sustained conduct is not devoid of normative significance. It generates a
legitimate expectation that the engagement is lawful and stable, and it
simultaneously imposes a corresponding obligation on the State to act
fairly, reasonably, consistently and non-arbitrarily.
67. Viewed thus, the appointments of the appellants cannot be
characterised as void ab initio. At the highest, they suffer from procedural
irregularities attributable solely to the employer. Such irregularity does
not erase the reality of long and continuous service rendered, nor does it
neutralise the equities that have crystallised over time.
68. Public law does not sanction a course that the State may approve for
years and then reprobate when it finds administrative convenience in
doing so. The principle that the State cannot take advantage of its own
wrong is not a mere equitable slogan. It is a constitutional limitation on
arbitrary state action.”
51] The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench was carried in appeal by the
State of Assam before the Apex Court in The State of Assam and Ors. v.
Narayan Prasad Rabha and Ors, in SLP (C) Diary No. 30413 of 2026.
Upon condoning the delay and hearing the parties, the Apex Court declined to
interfere with the judgment and order dated 30.01.2026 passed by the Division
Bench of this Court. The judgment has, therefore, attained finality.
52] Having delineated the legal principles governing the field, this Court now
proceeds to examine the factual materials placed on record. Since the
petitioners belong to two distinct departments, namely, the Department of
Computer Science & Information Technology and the Department of Molecular
Biology and Biotechnology, and although the legal issues involved are common,
certain material facts are peculiar to each department, it would be appropriate
to appreciate the evidence department-wise before considering its cumulative
effect.
Page No.# 42/60
A. Petitioners belonging to the Department of Computer Science &
Information Technology [WP(C) Nos. 938/2020 and 9474/2019]
53] The records reveal that by Office Order dated 20.05.2003, the Higher
Education Department, Government of Assam, delegated authority to the
erstwhile Cotton College to introduce new academic courses. Pursuant thereto,
the Government of Assam issued the requisite No Objection Certificates
enabling the College to commence, inter alia, the Department of Computer
Science & Information Technology. The materials placed before this Court
further disclose that with the introduction of the said academic programmes and
the consequential increase in teaching workload, the College initiated
recruitment of teaching personnel through a process of public advertisement.
Accordingly, an advertisement dated 19.02.2008, published in The Assam
Tribune, invited applications for engagement as Academic Counsellor (Ad hoc) in
the Department of Computer Science & Information Technology. The said
advertisement, forming part of the records in WP(C) No. 938/2020, is extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference:
“GOVT. OF ASSAM
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL:COTTON COLLEGE
GUWAHATI-1
Website: http://www.cottoncollege.org
Applications along with all necessary documents are invited from the
interested candidates for the post of Academic Counsellor (Ad hoc) in the
department of Computer Science & IT, Cotton College on or before 25 th
February, 2008.
Eligibility: M.Sc./M.Tech/MCA in Computer Science.
Salary: Rs. 8,000/- + 12 % HRA (consolidated).”
Page No.# 43/60
54] Pursuant to the aforesaid advertisement, a process of selection, including
interview, was admittedly undertaken. Thereafter, the petitioners in WP(C) Nos.
938/2020 and 9474/2019 came to be appointed as Academic Counsellors in
different phases between the years 2007 and 2009. However, petitioner No. 1
Anupam Das was engaged as an Academic Counsellor on 06.08.2007, prior to
the advertisement relied on by the petitioners. Their respective appointment
letters are available at Page Nos. 31 to 35 of WP(C) No. 9474/2019. The
contemporaneous records further disclose that their contractual engagements
were periodically renewed and extended by successive orders (Annexure-6,
Page Nos. 35 to 39 of WP(C) No. 938/2020), with the result that each of the
petitioners continued in service uninterruptedly for a period extending well
beyond a decade.
55] One of the principal objections advanced on behalf of the respondent
University is that the advertisement pursuant to which the petitioners entered
service did not prescribe NET/SLET as an essential qualification, which,
according to the respondents, constituted the minimum eligibility requirement
for appointment as Assistant Professor under the applicable UGC Regulations.
The petitioners, on the other hand, have placed reliance upon Clause 3.3.3 of
the UGC Regulations, 2009 (as amended), annexed as Annexure-1 at Page No.
28 of the affidavit-in-reply filed in WP(C) No. 938/2020, to contend that
exemption from NET/SLET was permissible in disciplines where such
examinations were either not conducted or where sufficient qualified candidates
were unavailable. Whether the petitioners ultimately satisfy the statutory
requirements governing appointment to the post of Assistant Professor is a
matter which shall be examined at the appropriate stage. At present, it is
sufficient to observe that it is not in dispute that the petitioners possessed the
Page No.# 44/60
qualifications prescribed in the advertisement pursuant to which they were
initially engaged (Annexure-4, WP(C) No. 938/2020).
56] The materials on record further reveal that the engagement of the
petitioners was neither casual nor confined to a short-lived contractual
arrangement. On the contrary, the contemporaneous documents indicate that
they continued to discharge teaching responsibilities in the Department over
several academic sessions. During the course of their engagement, the issue
relating to regularisation also appears to have engaged the attention of both the
University authorities and the Government of Assam. The President of the
Cotton University Teachers’ Association requested the Chancellor of Cotton
College State University to consider the regularisation of the services of the
petitioners. Thereafter, by communication dated 18.12.2012 (Annexure-8, Page
No. 51 of WP(C) No. 938/2020), the Joint Secretary to the Government of
Assam addressed the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Assam,
Higher Education Department, regarding the said issue. This was followed by a
series of official communications dated 16.09.2015 (Annexure-10, Page No. 54),
19.08.2016,
24.10.2018,
15.02.2019,
and
22.02.2019
(Annexure-11
to
Annexure-14, Page Nos. 55 to 60 of WP(C) No. 938/2020), whereby the
Government repeatedly sought formal proposals from the authorities of Cotton
College/Cotton University concerning the regularisation of the petitioners serving
in the Department of Computer Science & Information Technology. Though
these communications do not, by themselves, create any enforceable legal right
in favour of the petitioners, they unmistakably demonstrate that the issue of
regularisation remained under active administrative consideration over a
considerable period of time.
Page No.# 45/60
57] It further appears that, in response to the aforesaid communications, the
respondent University represented that due weightage would be accorded to the
experience gained by the contractual teachers while undertaking recruitment to
regular teaching posts. Acting upon such representation, the petitioners
submitted their applications pursuant to the advertisement dated 19.06.2019
(Annexure-15, Page No. 63 of WP(C) No. 938/2020) issued for recruitment to
the regular posts of Assistant Professor. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding their long years of teaching experience and the qualifications
possessed by them, no meaningful weightage was ultimately accorded to their
experience during the recruitment process. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners
instituted WP(C) No. 9474/2019, questioning the recruitment process and
simultaneously seeking regularisation of their services. During the pendency of
the said proceedings, the respondent University issued separate orders dated
06.02.2020 (Annexure-21 to Annexure-25, Page Nos. 84 to 88 of WP(C) No.
938/2020), whereby the contractual engagements of the petitioners came to be
discontinued, giving rise to WP(C) No. 938/2020, wherein the said termination
orders have also been assailed.
58] Another circumstance emerging from the materials on record relates to
the availability of qualified candidates in the discipline during the relevant
period. It appears that Ms. Sangita Baruah, who was appointed as the only
regular Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science &
Information Technology in the year 2007, admittedly did not possess NET/SLET,
M.Phil. or Ph.D. qualification on the date of her appointment and acquired her
Ph.D. qualification only in the year 2025. Though the legality or validity of her
appointment is not the subject matter of adjudication in the present
proceedings, the aforesaid circumstance assumes relevance only to the limited
Page No.# 46/60
extent of appreciating the petitioners’ contention that sufficient NET/SLETqualified candidates in the discipline were not available during the relevant
period. At the same time, it is equally evident from the records that the
petitioners themselves were not appointed against sanctioned cadre posts of
Assistant Professor but were initially engaged as Academic Counsellors. The real
issue, therefore, is not whether the petitioners bore the designation of Academic
Counsellor, but whether, viewed in the light of the contemporaneous records,
the substance of their engagement was materially different from the
nomenclature assigned to it.
59] A careful scrutiny of the materials available on record further reveals that,
throughout the tenure of their engagement, the petitioners were entrusted with
responsibilities extending far beyond classroom teaching. The contemporaneous
documents relied upon by the petitioners indicate that they were assigned
teaching responsibilities in both undergraduate and postgraduate programmes;
entrusted with the setting and moderation of question papers; invigilation of
examinations; evaluation of answer scripts; preparation and revision of syllabi,
including the CBCS curriculum under Gauhati University, Cotton College State
University and Cotton University; participation in departmental administration;
preparation and presentation of departmental profiles before the NAAC Peer
Team during the accreditation exercises held in the years 2010 and 2015; and
discharge of several confidential examination-related assignments, including
duties as Supervisory Officers in examinations conducted by Gauhati University
and Krishna Kanta Handiqui State Open University. The records further disclose
that some of the petitioners were also entrusted with election duties as
Presiding Officers during General Elections conducted in the State of Assam.
Whether the discharge of these responsibilities, by itself, confers any
Page No.# 47/60
enforceable legal right upon the petitioners is a matter which shall be
considered subsequently. Nevertheless, the nature, extent and continuity of the
responsibilities entrusted to them constitute relevant circumstances while
examining the true character of their engagement.
60] The materials placed on record further disclose that all the petitioners
serving in the Department of Computer Science & Information Technology were
members of the Cotton University Teachers’ Association (CUTA), an association
comprising members of the teaching faculty of the University. Though
membership of such an association cannot, by itself, determine the legal status
of an employee or confer any right of regularisation, it nevertheless constitutes
another contemporaneous circumstance which may legitimately be taken into
consideration while appreciating the overall factual matrix and the manner in
which the respondent institution itself perceived the role discharged by the
petitioners.
61] Significantly, the records further reveal that, having regard to the nature
of the duties continuously discharged by the petitioners, the Principal of the
erstwhile Cotton College, by orders issued in July, 2012, redesignated their posts
from Academic Counsellor to Assistant Professor (Contractual) in the
Department of Computer Science & Information Technology and simultaneously
revised their remuneration. The contemporaneous records further disclose that
the No Objection Certificates issued by the Registrar of Cotton University in the
year 2020 in favour of three of the petitioners specifically recorded that they
had been serving the institution as Assistant Professors (Contractual) from the
dates of their initial appointments. These documents undoubtedly constitute
relevant pieces of evidence while examining whether the subsequent
Page No.# 48/60
redesignation merely altered the nomenclature assigned to the post or, instead,
recognised the true nature of the duties and responsibilities which the
petitioners had, in fact, been discharging throughout their engagement.
62] The materials available on record also disclose that the Principal of the
erstwhile Cotton College, while forwarding the proposal sought by the
Government of Assam, indicated the existence of five vacant posts of Assistant
Professor in the Department of Computer Science & Information Technology. It
further appears from the Resolution of the Executive Council that the sanctioned
strength of the Department comprised one post of Professor, two posts of
Associate Professor and nine posts of Assistant Professor, out of which three
posts of Assistant Professor came to be filled pursuant to the advertisement
dated 19.06.2019. According to the petitioners, six sanctioned posts of Assistant
Professor continued to remain vacant, as reflected in the Resolution of the
Executive Council as well as the records of the Internal Quality Assurance Cell
(Annexure-26, Page No. 89 of WP(C) No. 938/2020). Whether such vacancies in
fact existed and, if so, the legal consequences flowing therefrom in the context
of the relief sought, are matters which shall be examined at the appropriate
stage. At present, it is sufficient to note that these documents form part of the
contemporaneous evidentiary materials placed before this Court.
63] The records further reveal that, during the relevant period, the
Department of Computer Science & Information Technology catered to a
substantial student strength across different academic programmes, namely,
BCA (approximately 150 students), MCA (approximately 120 students), B.Sc.
Major in Computer Science (approximately 75 students), B.Sc. Pass Course
(approximately
students),
and
Higher
Secondary
Science
classes
Page No.# 49/60
(approximately 40 students), aggregating to nearly 445 students. The materials
placed before this Court further indicate that, till the year 2015, the Department
had only one regular faculty member apart from the five petitioners. It was only
in the year 2015 that two additional Assistant Professors came to be appointed
by Cotton College State University. Consequently, during the intervening period,
the petitioners appear to have shouldered a substantial part of the teaching,
examination, curriculum development and other academic responsibilities
necessary for the uninterrupted functioning of the Department. Though the
volume of work discharged by the petitioners cannot, by itself, create a legal
right to regularisation, it nevertheless constitutes a relevant circumstance while
appreciating the nature of the institutional requirement against which their
services continued to be utilised over a prolonged period.
B. Petitioners belonging to the Department of Molecular Biology and
Biotechnology [WP(C) Nos. 285/2020 and 5195/2020]
64] Turning now to the petitioners belonging to the Department of Molecular
Biology and Biotechnology, the materials placed on record disclose that the
erstwhile Department of Biotechnology, presently known as the Department of
Molecular Biology and Biotechnology (MBBT), was also established pursuant to
the approval granted by the Government of Assam. Consequent upon the
introduction of the academic programme and the corresponding increase in
teaching
requirements,
the
erstwhile
Cotton
College
issued
public
advertisements dated 27.06.2008 and 05.06.2010 inviting applications for
engagement of teaching personnel. Pursuant to a process of public
advertisement and interview held on 12.03.2008 (Annexure-2, Page No. 32 of
the affidavit-in-reply filed in WP(C) No. 938/2020), the petitioners came to be
Page No.# 50/60
appointed by orders dated 23.07.2008 (Annexure-3, Page No. 30 of WP(C) No.
285/2020) and 28.07.2010 (Annexure-4, Page No. 31 of WP(C) No. 285/2020),
respectively.
65] The contemporaneous records further disclose that, although the
petitioners were initially appointed on an ad hoc basis under the designation of
Academic Counsellor, they continued to be re-engaged from time to time and
were thereafter described as Academic Counsellors (Contractual) till January,
2012. With effect from February, 2012, they were redesignated as Associate
Faculty (Annexure-5, Page No. 31 of WP(C) No. 5195/2020), and subsequently,
with effect from January, 2018, they came to be redesignated as Assistant
Professors (Contractual) (Annexure-5, Page Nos. 32 to 36 of WP(C) No.
285/2020). Their contractual engagements continued through successive
extensions till December, 2020 (Annexure-10 and Annexure-11, Page Nos. 48
and 49 of WP(C) No. 285/2020). Thus, the continuity of their engagement over
a prolonged period is not in dispute, although the legal consequences flowing
therefrom remain the principal issue between the parties.
66] The records further reveal that the Executive Council of Cotton University,
by Resolution No. 2018/5/(vi) dated 22.11.2018 (Annexure-7, Page No. 38 of
WP(C) No. 285/2020), took note of the staffing position in the Department of
Molecular Biology and Biotechnology. According to the petitioners, six vacancies
of Assistant Professor existed in the Department as on the relevant date.
Notwithstanding the continuance of the petitioners in service for a considerable
period, the respondent University issued the advertisement dated 19.06.2019
(Annexure-8, Page Nos. 38 to 44 of WP(C) No. 5195/2020), inviting applications
for three regular posts of Assistant Professor, of which only one post was
Page No.# 51/60
earmarked for the unreserved category. Relying upon the Resolution of the
Executive Council, the petitioners participated in the recruitment process on the
understanding that due weightage would be accorded to their long years of
teaching experience.
67] It appears from the materials on record that both the petitioners
possessed the educational qualifications prescribed under the UGC Regulations,
2018 (Annexure-10, Page No. 47 of WP(C) No. 5195/2020), and accordingly
submitted their candidature pursuant to the advertisement dated 19.06.2019.
They were, however, not shortlisted for the viva voce. According to the
petitioners, they subsequently learnt that one of the reasons for their nonconsideration was the question of upper age limit. It is their specific case that
such age restriction is applicable only to appointments in Government or
provincialised colleges and not to appointments in Universities governed by the
UGC Regulations. The petitioners accordingly submitted representations dated
06.03.2020 (Annexure-11, Page Nos. 60 to 61 of WP(C) No. 5195/2020),
requesting relaxation of the upper age limit, which, according to them,
remained
unconsidered.
Aggrieved
thereby,
they instituted
WP(C)
No.
5195/2020, questioning the shortlist dated 26.11.2020 (Annexure-9, Page Nos.
45 to 46 of WP(C) No. 5195/2020) and seeking, inter alia, consideration of their
candidature as well as regularisation of their services. It is further their case
that the lone unreserved post for which they had applied continues to remain
vacant.
68] The materials placed before this Court further indicate that, throughout
their engagement, the petitioners belonging to the Department of Molecular
Biology and Biotechnology were entrusted with responsibilities ordinarily
Page No.# 52/60
discharged by members of the regular teaching faculty. Apart from taking theory
and practical classes, they were entrusted with confidential examination work,
including the setting of question papers, invigilation duties, evaluation of answer
scripts, and discharge of duties as External Examiners in provincialised colleges
under Gauhati University, Cotton College State University and Cotton University
between the years 2009 and 2019. The records further indicate that one of the
petitioners discharged election duties as Presiding Officer during the Panchayat
Elections held in the State of Assam in the year 2011; coordinated the
preparation and presentation of the Departmental Profile before the NAAC Peer
Team during the accreditation exercises held in the years 2010 and 2015;
participated in the design and preparation of CBCS syllabi under Cotton College
State University and Cotton University during the years 2013 and 2018; secured
external research funding from the UGC and the Department of Science and
Technology, Government of Assam; successfully completed research projects;
was recognised as a Ph.D. Supervisor under Cotton College State University with
effect from November, 2016; served as a member of the Departmental Research
Committee with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor; and supervised advanced
laboratory visits both within and outside the State of Assam. These
contemporaneous documents have been relied upon by the petitioners to
demonstrate the nature, extent and continuity of the academic responsibilities
entrusted to them.
69] The materials on record further disclose that the remuneration of the
petitioners was revised from time to time corresponding with the responsibilities
assigned to them. It further appears that, notwithstanding their long and
uninterrupted engagement extending over more than twelve years, the
respondent authorities continued to retain them on contractual arrangements.
Page No.# 53/60
According to the petitioners, although they discharged academic responsibilities
substantially similar to those performed by regular Assistant Professors, they
continued
to
receive
considerably
lesser
remuneration.
While
these
circumstances do not, by themselves, conclude the legal controversy involved,
they nevertheless constitute relevant factors while determining the true nature
of the engagement and evaluating the conduct of the employer over the years.
70] A cumulative consideration of the materials placed on record relating to
both Departments discloses certain significant common features. First, the
petitioners entered service pursuant to public advertisements followed by a
process of selection and interview. Secondly, each of them admittedly possessed
the qualifications prescribed in the respective advertisements under which they
were initially engaged. Thirdly, their engagements were not confined to isolated
or sporadic assignments but were successively extended over prolonged
periods. Fourthly, throughout the tenure of their engagement, they discharged
teaching
and
academic
responsibilities
which,
according
to
the
contemporaneous records, substantially overlapped with those ordinarily
discharged by regular Assistant Professors. Finally, in both Departments, the
respondent authorities themselves successively redesignated the petitioners
from Academic Counsellors to Associate Faculty and ultimately to Assistant
Professors (Contractual). Whether these circumstances satisfy the legal
requirements for regularisation now falls for consideration.
71] At this stage, this Court considers it necessary to examine the substance
of the engagement rather than the nomenclature assigned to it. Constitutional
adjudication does not ordinarily proceed upon the labels employed by the
employer but upon the true nature of the relationship emerging from the
Page No.# 54/60
contemporaneous records. The materials placed before this Court disclose that,
notwithstanding their initial designation as Academic Counsellors, the petitioners
continuously discharged teaching and academic functions in their respective
Departments over prolonged periods, worked within the same academic
hierarchy, catered to continuing institutional requirements, and were ultimately
redesignated as Assistant Professors (Contractual). The records further indicate
that the redesignation was not accompanied by any fundamental alteration in
the nature of their duties or responsibilities but merely recognised the very
functions which they had all along been discharging.
72] Having considered the contemporaneous records in their entirety, this
Court is of the considered view that the subsequent redesignation of the
petitioners as Assistant Professors (Contractual) cannot be examined in isolation
from the history of their engagement. The redesignation was neither preceded
by a fresh process of recruitment nor accompanied by the entrustment of any
substantially different duties or responsibilities. On the contrary, the materials
placed before this Court unmistakably indicate continuity in the nature of the
work performed, continuity in the institutional requirement sought to be fulfilled,
and continuity in the services rendered by the petitioners. The redesignation,
therefore, merely recognised and formalised the true character of the services
which the petitioners had, in substance, been rendering from the inception of
their engagement.
73] The objection advanced on behalf of the respondent University regarding
the absence of NET/SLET qualification also requires consideration. It is not in
dispute that the petitioners possessed the qualifications prescribed under the
advertisements pursuant to which they initially entered service and were
Page No.# 55/60
selected through a transparent process. The controversy raised by the
respondents
pertains
to
the
educational
qualifications
and
statutory
requirements applicable to regular appointment as Assistant Professor under the
relevant UGC Regulations. Whether each petitioner presently satisfies such
educational qualifications and other statutory requirements is a matter which
necessarily falls for consideration by the competent authority while undertaking
the exercise of regularisation. Consequently, the objection relating to NET/SLET
cannot, by itself, render the petitioners’ appointments illegal so as to deny them
consideration for regularisation at the threshold.
74] Equally significant is the nature of the duties continuously discharged by
the petitioners. The contemporaneous records unmistakably establish that they
were entrusted not merely with classroom teaching but with the entire spectrum
of academic responsibilities ordinarily discharged by regular faculty members,
including curriculum development, setting and moderation of question papers,
evaluation
of
administration,
answer
scripts,
accreditation
conduct
exercises,
of
examinations,
research
supervision
departmental
and
other
institutional responsibilities. These materials lend considerable support to the
conclusion that, notwithstanding the nomenclature initially assigned to their
posts, the petitioners were, in substance, discharging the functions of Assistant
Professors to meet the regular and perennial academic requirements of the
institution. Though discharge of such duties does not by itself confer a legal
right to regularisation, it constitutes an important circumstance in determining
the true nature of their engagement.
75] The contemporaneous records further indicate that sanctioned teaching
posts existed in the respective Departments and that the respondent institution
Page No.# 56/60
itself recognised the continuing requirement of qualified teaching personnel. The
resolutions of the Executive Council, the proposals forwarded by the University
to the Government and the other materials placed on record sufficiently
demonstrate that vacancies in the cadre of Assistant Professor existed during
the relevant period. Whether the exact number of such vacancies was five or six
is not of determinative significance. What is material is that the petitioners were
retained over several years to discharge the functions attached to sanctioned
academic posts and not to meet any casual or temporary exigency. This
circumstance reinforces the conclusion that their appointments, if irregular in
certain procedural respects, cannot be characterised as illegal or as backdoor
entries.
76] The petitioners entered service pursuant to a transparent process of
selection through public advertisement and interview. They possessed the
qualifications prescribed under the advertisements pursuant to which they were
initially engaged, and their appointments were made to meet the teaching
requirements arising out of newly introduced academic programmes. Although
they were initially designated as Academic Counsellors, the contemporaneous
records unmistakably establish that from the inception of their engagement they
continuously discharged duties and responsibilities substantially identical to
those
ordinarily
performed
by
Assistant
Professors.
The
subsequent
redesignation of the petitioners as Assistant Professors (Contractual) was not
preceded by any fresh recruitment process nor accompanied by any material
alteration in the nature of the duties entrusted to them. Rather, it merely
recognised and formalised the factual position which had existed throughout
their engagement. The existence of sanctioned teaching posts, the continuing
institutional requirement, the transparent mode of selection and the absence of
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any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation or backdoor entry collectively
demonstrate that the petitioners’ appointments, even if procedurally irregular,
cannot be characterised as illegal within the meaning explained in Umadevi (3)
(supra) and the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. Consequently,
Issue Nos. (i) and (ii) are answered in favour of the petitioners.
77] Having continuously availed the services of the petitioners for well over a
decade to meet recurring academic requirements, it would be manifestly
inequitable to permit the respondent authorities to dispense with their services
solely on the basis of the contractual label attached to their initial engagement.
The materials on record further demonstrate that the issue of regularisation
remained under active consideration at different administrative levels and that
the respondent authorities themselves repeatedly acknowledged the continuing
necessity of the petitioners’ services. It is nobody’s case that the petitioners
secured their appointments by fraud, misrepresentation, concealment of
material facts or any other unfair means. Any procedural irregularity, if at all, is
attributable to the employer and not to the petitioners.
78] The respondent University has also contended that some of the
petitioners, having voluntarily participated in the recruitment process initiated
pursuant to the advertisement dated 19.06.2019, are estopped from questioning
the recruitment process or from seeking regularisation. This submission cannot
be accepted. The challenge raised in the present proceedings is not confined to
the recruitment process undertaken in the year 2019 but is founded upon an
independent claim arising from the petitioners’ long and uninterrupted
engagement in the service of the respondent institution and their entitlement to
consideration for regularisation in accordance with law. Participation in the
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recruitment process, undertaken in an attempt to secure continuation of service,
cannot amount to a waiver of that independent claim, nor can it operate as an
estoppel against asserting a legal right otherwise available. The principle that a
candidate who participates in a selection process cannot subsequently challenge
the same has no application where the relief sought is founded upon a distinct
and independent cause of action.
79] Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent University as well as
the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Higher Education Department
have relied upon several decisions including R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), B.N.
Nagarajan (supra), Sukanti Mohapatra (supra), K.C. Joshi (supra), Dr.
M.A. Haque (supra), Dr. Arundhati A. Pargaonkar (supra), A. Singamuthu
(supra), Mohd. Mustafa (supra), Ganesh Digambar Jambhrunkar (supra),
Ilmo Devi (supra), Vibhuti Shankar Pandey (supra), R.J. Pathan (supra),
Mahendra Singh (supra), Official Liquidator v. Dayanand (supra),
Trimurthi Fragrances (supra), Tajvir Singh Sodhi (supra) and Dr. Kishore
Kumar Deka (supra). There can be no quarrel with the principles enunciated
therein. Those decisions reiterate that appointments made dehors the
constitutional scheme or in violation of the applicable statutory recruitment rules
cannot ordinarily be regularised and that regularisation cannot become an
alternative mode of recruitment.
80] The difficulty, however, lies in applying those decisions mechanically to the
facts of the present case. Unlike the cases relied upon by the respondents, the
petitioners before this Court entered service pursuant to public advertisements,
participated in a transparent process of selection, possessed the prescribed
qualifications for their initial engagement, continuously discharged perennial
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teaching functions for prolonged periods and were successively redesignated by
the respondent authorities themselves without any fresh recruitment. The
controversy here is therefore not whether illegal or backdoor appointments
deserve regularisation. The real issue is whether appointments which are, at the
highest, irregular, made pursuant to a transparent selection process to meet
sanctioned and continuing institutional requirements, fall within the principles
recognised in Umadevi (3) (supra) and subsequently explained in M.L. Kesari
(supra), Shripal (supra), Vinod Kumar (supra), Dharam Singh (supra) and
Narayan Prasad Rabha (supra). In the considered opinion of this Court, they
do.
81] In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is satisfied that the
petitioners have established a case warranting equitable relief in terms of the
principles emerging from Umadevi (3) (supra), M.L. Kesari (supra), Shripal
(supra), Vinod Kumar (supra), Dharam Singh (supra) and Narayan Prasad
Rabha (supra). Having regard to the peculiar facts of the present case, the
petitioners are entitled to consideration for regularisation as Assistant Professors
in their respective Departments, subject to their satisfying the requisite
educational qualifications and other statutory requirements applicable to the
posts. Issue No. (iii) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioners.
82] Consequently, the respondent authorities are directed to undertake the
exercise of considering the cases of the petitioners for regularisation as
Assistant Professors in their respective Departments, in accordance with law and
in the light of the observations made hereinabove. While undertaking such
exercise, the respondents shall examine the eligibility of each petitioner with
reference to the educational qualifications and other statutory requirements
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applicable to the post of Assistant Professor and shall pass a reasoned decision
in respect of each petitioner.
83] Until the aforesaid exercise is completed and a final decision is taken by
the competent authority, the impugned orders terminating the services of the
petitioners, if any, shall remain in abeyance. Any decision regarding continuation
or otherwise of the petitioners’ services shall abide by and be governed by the
outcome of the exercise directed herein.
84] The entire exercise shall be completed by the respondent authorities
within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
judgment.
85] The writ petitions stand allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
signed
Pranab Digitally
by Pranab
Das
Chand Chandra
Date:
2026.08.07
ra Das 18:34:12 +05'30'
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