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GAHC040013532026
2026:GAU-AP:1150
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/389/2026
Dr Mai Kuru Camder
Son of Late Mai Tar, permanent resident of Village Mai, Keyi Panyor
District, Arunachal Pradesh.
VERSUS
The NERIST and 2 Ors
represented by its Board of Management, Nrijuli, Arunachal Pradesh
791109
2:The Chairman
Age: 0
Occupation :
Board of Management
NERIST
Nirjuli
Arunachal Pradesh 791109
3:The Director
Age: 0
Occupation :
NERIST
Nirjuli
Arunachal Pradesh 79110
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Advocate for the Petitioner
: Bedanta Kaushik, Marge Doji,Pankaj Borah
Advocate for the Respondent : Ajin Apang, Sr. Advocate, S/C NERIST
Linked Case : WP(C)/339/2026
Dr Mai Kuru Camder
Age: 52
Occupation :
Address:Son of Late Mai Tar
permanent resident of Village Mai
PO and PS Yachuli
Keyi Panyor District
Arunachal Pradesh.
VERSUS
The NERIST and 3 Ors
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:represented by its Board of Management
Nirjuli
Arunachal Pradesh 791109
2:The Chairman
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:Board of Management
North Eastern Regional Institute of Science and Technology
Nirjuli
Arunachal Pradesh 791109
3:The Director
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:North Eastern Regional Institute of Science and Technology
Nirjuli
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Arunachal Pradesh 791109
4:Prof Sarat Kumar Patra
Age: 0
Occupation :
Address:Director of NIT
Agartala
Barjala
Jirania Tripura 799046
-----------Advocate for : Bedanta Kaushik
Advocate for : Ajin Apang
Sr. Advocate appearing for The NERIST and 3 Ors: Advocate ,
-BEFOREHON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS
: Mr. B. Kaushik, Adv.
: Mr. K. N. Choudhury, Sr. Adv.
: Mr. A. Apang, Sr. Adv.
: Mr. J. Jini, Adv.
Advocate for the Petitioners
Advocate for the Respondents
Date on which judgment is reserved
:
09.09.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
:
13.11.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment ?
:
N/A
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
:
Yes
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. B. Kaushik, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard
Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. J. Jini, learned
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counsel; Mr. A. Apang, learned Senior counsel and Standing counsel,
NERIST, for the respondents.
2.
Both the writ petitions being WP(C)/339/2026 and WP(C)/389/2026,
are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3.
In WP(C)/339/2026, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to assail the Order dated
29.05.2026, passed by the Director, North Eastern Regional Institute of
Science & Technology (hereinafter NERIST), Nirjuli, Arunachal Pradesh,
whereby
the
petitioner
has
been
placed
under
suspension
in
contemplation of departmental proceedings in connection with inter alia
alleged irregularities and manipulation in the Recruitment Rules, 2022
relating to non-teaching staff of the Institute.
3.1. In WP(C)/389/2026, the petitioner invoking the writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution is assailing the resolution of the
Minutes of the 110th meeting of the Board of Management dated
29.07.2026, whereby inter alia, the suspension of the petitioner vide order
dated 29.05.2026 was ratified and approved. The petitioner is also seeking
a writ in the nature of mandamus to conduct an inquiry by the Two
Committee Member as proposed vide resolution No. 110.12(1) of the said
meeting dated 29.07.2026 and seeks an inquiry by such Two Committee
Member to examine the correctness of the report dated 15.04.2026
submitted by Professor Sarat Kumar Patra, Director NIT, Agartala
{respondent No. 4 in WP(C)/339/2026}.
Facts contended by the petitioner
4.
It is the case of the petitioner that the suspension order has been
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issued by an authority who is not competent, in view of the fact that the
appointing/disciplinary authority is the Board of Management, NERIST. It
is contended that under Rule 10 of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter the CCS Rules),
it is the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority that may place
an employee under suspension, contemplating disciplinary proceedings.
5.
Notice was issued upon the respondents, whereupon the respondent
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 filed an affidavit-in-opposition.
6.
The petitioner has also filed an additional affidavit bringing on record
certain facts and also annexed some documents regarding the matter.
7.
Notice of motion was issued on the matter on 24.07.2026 and in the
meantime, the Board of Management ratified the order dated 29.05.2026,
placing the petitioner under suspension. In this context, the contention of
the petitioner was that the aforesaid approval of the Board of
Management was made when the Court was already in seisin of the
matter.
8.
It is the case of the petitioner that the NERIST is an autonomous
institute which is a deemed university under Section 3 of the UGC Act,
1956 and managed by a Board of Management which is an authority
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and amenable
to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is stated
that the Board of Management has its own Memorandum of Association
and Rules framed for management and functioning of the institute.
However, there is no independent service rule and therefore, the service
rules applicable to Central Government employees are adopted. It is
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stated that the petitioner was appointed as Registrar of NERIST by the
Chairman on 20.09.2023 and the petitioner has been discharging his
duties sincerely. It is stated by the petitioner that the Board of
Management is the principal executive body of the institute and it is also
empowered to regulate and enforce discipline among the employees and
take appropriate disciplinary action wherever necessary.
9.
It is stated by the petitioner that in November 2025 there was a
strike called for by the students' organization in the campus of NERIST
raising certain demands. At that time, the petitioner is stated to have been
on leave and later an agreement was entered into with the students' body
under which certain actions were to be taken. It is further stated by the
petitioner that pursuant to strike and unrest situation occurring at NERIST,
the Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education, Government of
India passed an order for holding an enquiry by a one-man committee
into the issues of NERIST. In this connection, the respondent No. 4, who
was Director, NIT Agartala was appointed to head the one-man committee
and submit recommendations on certain terms of reference which are
enumerated in para 8 of the writ petition.
10. It is the case of the petitioner that upon the report of the one-man
committee and the instructions of the Central Government, the Director,
NERIST vide order dated 29.05.2026 placed the petitioner under
suspension for, inter alia, irregularities and manipulation purportedly in
Recruitment Rules, 2022 of non-teaching staff of the institute. It is stated
that the suspension order was issued by invoking the powers conferred by
Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules. In this context, it is stated by the
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petitioner that under the aforementioned rule of the CCS Rules, the
appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or
disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in this behalf by
the President may place a Government servant under suspension in
contemplation of or pending disciplinary proceedings.
11. It is further stated by the petitioner that the petitioner as Registrar
of NERIST was appointed by the Board of Management and therefore, the
Board of Management was the appointing authority regarding him and the
post held by him. It is stated that as the Board of Management was the
disciplinary and appointing authority of the petitioner, the suspension
order was issued by the Director on 29.05.2026 and shown to have been
made in the name of the Board of Management. It is stated that vide
email dated 29.05.2026, the Director requested clarification from the
Chairman, Board of Management regarding approval or authorization of
the same and in response thereof, the Chairman, Board of Management
informed that action be taken upon the order of the Ministry of Education
on the basis of the Enquiry Committee report.
12. The primary contention of the petitioner is that the Director, not
being the appointing authority or the disciplinary authority of the
petitioner, was not empowered to suspend the petitioner and therefore,
the said suspension order dated 29.05.2026 is vitiated in law. It is further
stated that the aforementioned Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules empowers
only the appointing authority and the disciplinary authority to place the
petitioner under suspension and that the Director is not one of those
authorities. It is further contended by the petitioner that before issuing
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the impugned suspension order dated 29.05.2026, the Director neither
obtained any approval from the Board of Management nor the Board of
Management authorized the Director for issuing the suspension order.
Accordingly, the petitioner sought interference with the suspension order
dated 29.05.2026 and also prayed for certain other reliefs enumerated in
the prayer portion of the writ petition.
13. In the additional affidavit, the petitioner has stated that on
24.07.2026 this Court, while issuing notice, raised a specific query
regarding the authorization/approval from the Board of Management for
the suspension order of the petitioner and the respondents took time for
instructions. However, in the meantime, a meeting of the Board of
Management was convened on 29.07.2026 and without the leave of the
Court, the suspension order dated 29.05.2026 was purportedly ratified
and approved in the meeting of the Board of Management on 29.07.2026.
It is therefore, contended by the petitioner that as the ratification and
approval was done while the Court was in seisin of the matter, it was done
to make the challenge redundant and therefore, such approval was
invalid.
14. It is also stated in the additional affidavit in para 3 thereof, that
apart from ratifying and approving the suspension of the petitioner, the
Board of Management also constituted a two-man committee comprising
of one member to be nominated by the Chairman and the other member
by the Director, NERIST for the purpose of examining the one-man
committee report which was the basis of the petitioner's suspension, and
that such examination would be for the purpose of deciding the future
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course of action. However, though the petitioner was in expectation that
he would get an opportunity to make his case before the two-man
committee, but the two-man committee, sitting in New Delhi, submitted a
report on 16.08.2026. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner then
submitted an appeal before the Joint Secretary, Department of Higher
Education, Government of India against the report dated 16.08.2026,
making a prayer for an independent and fair inquiry to determine the
purported culpability of the petitioner with regard to violation of
Recruitment Rules, 2022 and also for review of the suspension.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
15. Mr. Kaushik, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
submits that the Chairman of the Institute alone is not the Board of
Management and that only the Board of Management can take disciplinary
action. It is submitted that the rules cannot be read in isolation and that
the power, if any, has to be properly delegated by a resolution of the
Board. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the order of suspension
issued by the Director amounted to impersonating the Board of
Management, which was not permissible in law and that, there was no
approval of the Board of Management on the date of passing the
impugned order. It is submitted that the meeting was rescheduled in a
mala fide manner. It is also contended and submitted that it is
questionable as to whether such a Board meeting, the minutes thereof,
and the approval of the suspension can be done during the pendency of
the instant writ petition.
16. It is contended that there was malice against the petitioner and that
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the findings of the one-man Committee are perverse. The learned counsel
reiterates and questions as to whether ratification of the suspension could
be done in the manner in which it has been done in the instant case.
Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that the order of suspension was passed in a vindictive manner
and that the suspension was without authority and that the ratification by
the Board subsequently was illegal.
17. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner
cites the following decisions:(i)
Security and Finance (P) Ltd and Anr Vs. Dattatraya Raghav
Agge and Ors reported in 1968 Supreme (SC) 330;
(ii)
Mrs. S. Aruna and Anr Vs. Secretary to the Government of
Tamil Nadu, Department of Racing, Madras reported in 1994
Supreme (Mad) 207;
(iii)
Prasanta Dutta Vs. The State of Assam and 4 Ors reported in
2023 Supreme (Gau) 640;
(iv)
Akaddas Ali Vs. State of Assam and 6 Ors reported in 2014 0
Supreme (Gau) 239;
(v)
Parle International Limited Vs. Union of India and Ors in Writ
Petition No. 12904 of 2019;
(vi)
Tata Steel Limited (Growth Shop) Vs. Union of India reported
in 2023 Supreme (Jhk) 144;
(vii)
Padma Kalita Vs. State of Assam and Ors reported in 2019 0
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Supreme (Gau) 1087
Contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents
18. As mentioned at the outset, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 filed a
joint affidavit-in-opposition. In the said pleading of the respondents, it is
stated that the Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education
upon coming to know about the incidents in the institute, vide order dated
19.12.2025, constituted a one-member enquiry Committee to enquire into
the academic and administrative issues of NERIST, appointing the
respondent No. 4 to head the said Committee. The terms of reference
were also delineated. It is stated that during the enquiry, the respondent
No. 4 instructed all the officials, including the petitioner, to be present and
that as specifically recorded under Clause 4 of the report, the Committee
had a separate meeting with the petitioner on 29.01.2026 and thereafter,
the petitioner also participated in an exit meeting on 30.01.2026. In this
context, it is contended that adequate opportunity was afforded to the
petitioner to place his version before the Committee.
19. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 stated
that in Clause 8.2, the Committee recorded its findings regarding alleged
tampering of the approved Recruitment Rules, 2022 and unauthorized
modification of qualifications for certain posts. It is stated and contended
that based on the findings of the Committee regarding several anomalies
including the ones mentioned above, the Committee in Clause 10 of the
report recommended initiation of stringent disciplinary proceedings against
the petitioner and one Mr. Doge Kamduk, Assistant Registrar, for their
misconduct.
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20. It is stated that pursuant to submission of the report by the onemember Committee, the Ministry of Education, Government of India
examined the recommendations and was of the opinion that tampering
with or forging a government approved document amounts to grave
misconduct under the CCS Rules and therefore, the Ministry of Education
decided to place the petitioner under suspension. Accordingly, letter dated
27.05.2026 issued by the Under Secretary of the Ministry, informed the
respondents that the petitioner was to be placed under suspension and
also asked the respondents to submit an action taken report. It is stated
that upon receiving the said letter, the respondents on the same day
informed the Chairman of the Board of Management, NERIST.
21. In this context, the respondents vide letter dated 27.05.2026
requested the Chairman of the Board of Management to grant approval to
place the petitioner and the aforementioned Assistant Registrar under
suspension with immediate effect in compliance with the Ministry's
directive, and to initiate further proceedings as per the CCS Rules. It is
further stated that the letter also indicates that the matter regarding
placing the petitioner under suspension would be placed before the Board
of Management in due course for ratification of the above action. It is
further stated that in response to the said letter, the Chairman of Board of
Management vide email dated 27.05.2026 informed the respondents to
take a decision as per the rules, observing the directions issued by the
Ministry of Education of the Union Government.
22. Accordingly, the respondents in terms of the instruction of the
Ministry and the Chairman of Board of Management placed the petitioner
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under suspension vide the impugned order dated 29.05.2026. It is stated
that the order of suspension was issued in exercise of powers under Rule
10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules. The respondents in their affidavit further
contended that the meeting of the Board of Management was held on
29.07.2026 through physical and virtual mode at New Delhi, during which
the action taken report was placed before the Ministry and discussed. The
suspension of the petitioner vide order dated 29.05.2026 was also placed
for approval before the Board of Management, and the Board ratified and
approved the said suspension of the petitioner. The Board also resolved to
constitute a two-member expert Committee to conduct a detailed enquiry
into the issues of NERIST.
23. In this context, the respondents in their affidavit also stated that
there was a letter dated 26.04.2026 from the respondents requesting the
Ministry to suggest a convenient date for holding the Board meeting, and
the same was replied to vide email dated 27.07.2026, and due to
administrative reasons, the meeting was held on 29.07.2026 at 2:30 PM at
New Delhi as referred to earlier. The respondents in their affidavit stated
that the petitioner was appointed as Registrar of NERIST vide order dated
20.09.2023, which was approved by the Board of Management on
28.12.2023. The respondents further contended in the affidavit that
Clause 12 of the Memorandum of Association of NERIST provides that the
Central Government/UGC shall have the right to cause enquiry into any
matter of the Institute and may issue directions to the Institute which will
be binding and in case of failure of the Institute to comply with such
directions, even the deemed university status of the institute could be
withdrawn.
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24. It is contended that thus, Clause 12 of the Memorandum of
Association
of
the
Institute
expressly
empowers
the
Central
Government/UGC to cause an enquiry into the affairs of the Institute,
further providing that any direction pursuant to such enquiries shall be
binding upon the Institute. The respondents in their affidavit have also
contended that the petitioner has not challenged the decision of the
Ministry of the Union Government dated 27.05.2026 directing action
against the petitioner and that without challenging the same, he cannot
challenge the consequential order of suspension taken pursuant to that
direction. In para 6 of the affidavit filed by the respondents, it is admitted
that in the absence of independent service rules, the CCS Rules and other
applicable Central Government service rules are adopted and followed
regulating the service conditions and disciplinary proceedings of the
employees of NERIST. However, it is contended that the Memorandum of
Association of the institute constitutes a foundational document defining
the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Director, and in terms of
Clause 14(c)(iii) of the Memorandum of Association, the Director is the
Principal Executive Officer of the Institute and that Clause 14(c)(iv)
specifically empowers the Director to take immediate action on any
matter.
25. It is contended by the respondents in their affidavit that the
petitioner's contention that the respondents lack jurisdiction under Rule 10
of the CCS Rules is wholly misconceived as it is founded upon a selective
reading of the service rules, while ignoring the mandatory duties and
powers vested in the Director under the Memorandum of Association. The
respondents in their affidavit stated that the contention of the petitioner
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that the Director, while issuing the suspension order, impersonated the
Board of Management is completely baseless and further states that the
Director merely implemented the binding directions of the Union Ministry
of Education, in discharge of the obligations cast upon him under the
Memorandum of Association. It is reiterated by the respondents in their
affidavit that the decision of the Union Ministry was binding upon the
Institute and its authorities and therefore, no separate approval of the
Board of Management was required before implementation of the said
direction.
Reply of the petitioner
26. In response to the above affidavit-in-opposition filed by the
respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the petitioner filed an affidavit-in-reply,
reiterating his contentions and stating that the Director was not
empowered to issue the impugned suspension order dated 29.05.2026.
Another major contention of the petitioner in the affidavit-in-reply is that
the approval of the Board of Management was taken when this Court had
already issued notice upon the writ petition and had sought for
instructions from the respondents on the matter of approval of the
suspension order and that the hurried approval of the Board of
Management on 29.07.2026 was done to defeat the case of the petitioner,
which was already pending before this Court.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents
27. Mr. Choudhury, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the
respondents submits that the preliminary enquiry was conducted to gather
the facts and that the same revealed serious allegations which
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necessitated appropriate action from the authorities in the Ministry and
also in the Institute. It is submitted that the decision of this Court in
Akaddas Ali (supra) relied upon by the petitioner would be distinguishable
on facts and in this regard, the learned Senior counsel reiterates the
established principle that a judgment is an authority for what it actually
decides. The learned Senior counsel submits that the Director was
empowered to pass the order in compliance with what was directed by the
Union Ministry of Education, and that the order was duly ratified by the
Board of Management on 29.07.2026.
28. In support of his contentions, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondents cites the following decision:(i)
National Institute of Technology and Anr Vs. Pannalal
Choudhury and Anr reported in (2015) 11 SCC 669.
Discussion and conclusion
29. I have perused the pleadings of the writ petition, the annexed
documents, the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2
and 3 along with the annexed documents thereof. I have perused the
affidavit-in-reply and the additional affidavit filed by the petitioner along
with the annexed documents thereof. I have considered the submissions
of the learned counsels on both the sides and perused the decisions cited
at the Bar.
30. From the materials, contentions and submissions, the following
issues arise for consideration:
(i)
Whether the Director of NERIST was empowered in law to issue the
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impugned suspension order dated 29.05.2026 placing the petitioner under
suspension?
(ii)
Whether the action of Director NERIST in suspending the petitioner
is saved by the provisions of Clause 14(c)(iv) of the Memorandum of
Association of NERIST, which empowers the Director to take emergency
administrative action?
(iii)
Whether the subsequent ratification of the suspension order by the
Board of Management on 29.07.2026 during the pendency of the instant
writ petition would have the effect of correcting the illegality or
irregularity, if any, in the suspension order, if it was passed by the
Director, NERIST without authority?
31. Before proceeding further, certain rules and provisions governing the
matter may be looked at.
32. Under Rule 5(a)(viii) of the Memorandum of Association, the Board
of Management has been designated as the disciplinary authority. It may
be mentioned herein that vide order dated 20.09.2023 by which the
petitioner was appointed as the Registrar, his appointing authority was the
Chairman of the Board of Management. It is an admitted position that the
CCS Rules, 1965 have been adopted by the NERIST in the absence of its
own service rules. Needless to say that CCS Rules are rules framed under
Article 309 of the Constitution of India and therefore, having statutory
force. Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules stipulates that an employee could be
put under suspension pending or in contemplation of disciplinary
proceedings, and that such power of suspension can be exercised by the
appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is
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subordinate or by the disciplinary authority or by any authority specifically
empowered in this regard by the President, by general or special order.
33. Now, in the case of NERIST, from the Memorandum of Association
noticed above and the pertinent clauses, it is clear that the disciplinary
authority is the Board of Management, and the petitioner in question was
appointed by the Chairman of the Board of Management. Though the
suspension order has been mentioned as for or on behalf of the Board of
Management, the respondents could not show any document of the Board
specifically or explicitly authorizing the Director to issue the suspension
order in question, though he was directed to do the needful in terms of
the directions of the Union Education Ministry and as per the Rules.
34. Though Rule 7 of the Memorandum of Association empowers the
Board to delegate powers by a Board Resolution to the Chairman, Director
or any other officer of the Standing Committee or Adhoc Committee,
subject to subsequent reporting at Board meeting - no document
pertaining to any such delegation has been placed before the Court, as
part of the affidavit filed by the answering respondents.
35. Another question which emerges is that whether the Director, who is
neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority within the
meaning of Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules, can issue the suspension
order invoking his powers under Rule 14(c)(iv) of the Memorandum of
Association,
which
empowers
the
Director
to
take
emergency
administrative actions.
36. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Director cannot resort to
the emergency powers under Rule 14(c)(iv) of the Memorandum of
Page No.# 19/30
Association to nullify the statutory Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules, 1965,
which have been adopted by the Institute, in the absence of the Institute’s
own service rules.
36.1. In this context, some case laws can also be looked at. In the case
of Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, reported in
(1989) 3 SCC 132, it was argued on behalf of the University that the
express power of the Vice-Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of
officers of the University implies as well, the power to take disciplinary
action against the officers. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court disagreed
with the said contention and held that the power to regulate the work and
conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for
their removal and that, the University Act conferred that power to appoint
officers on the Executive Council and it also generally includes the power
to remove and hence, it was futile to contend that the Vice-Chancellor can
exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council. The
pertinent para 20 may be reproduced herein below:“20. Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the ViceChancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the University
implies as well, the power to take disciplinary action against officers. We are
unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the work
and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action
for their removal. Secondly, the Act confers power to appoint officers on the
Executive Council and it generally includes the power to remove. This power
is located under sec. 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend
that the Vice-Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the
Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act pre- scribes a
particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It
cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also
provide for such delegation. Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol.1, 4th Ed. para
32) summarises these principles as follows:
Page No.# 20/30
36.2.
32. Sub-delegation of powers. In accordance with the maxim delegatius
non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the
body or officer in whom it has been confided, unless sub-delegation of
the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication.
There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative,
judicial or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation;
and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the
designated body should address its own mind."
Similarly, in the case of V.C., Banaras Hindu University and Others
v. Shrikant, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 42, the Vice-Chancellor had invoked
executive authority to terminate the service of a Reader, but under the
University Statute only the Executive Council was competent to initiate
disciplinary action and impose major penalties. In para 38 of the
judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court noticed this stipulation and held that
the Vice-Chancellor had no say in the matter and he was merely a
member of the Executive Council and therefore, he could not have
initiated any proceeding and imposed any punishment on the respondent.
The pertinent para 38 of the judgment may be reproduced herein below:“38. The Statute and the Ordinance postulate that an order of termination
of services could be passed only by the Executive Council and that too in the
event two-third of the Members were present and voted in support thereof.
Therefore, the Vice Chancellor had no say in the matter. He was merely a
member of the Executive Council. He, thus, could not have initiated any
proceeding and imposed any punishment on the Respondent.”
36.3.
In the case of (Dr.) Sanjib Bhattacharjee v. Assam University and
Others, reported in (2020) 6 Gauhati Law Reports 694, it was noticed by a
Coordinate Bench of this Court that under Section 28(1) of the University
Act, with regard to employees who are neither teachers nor members of
the academic staff, it is the appointing authority and not the ViceChancellor which is the competent authority to place such an employee
under suspension. It was held in the facts of that case that as the post of
Page No.# 21/30
Registrar was not a teacher or member of the academic staff, therefore,
the Executive Council and not the Vice-Chancellor was the competent
authority to place the Registrar under suspension. The pertinent para 21
may be reproduced herein below:“21. Thus, on conjoint reading of Rule 10(1) of the CCS (CCA) Rules,
1965 and Section 15(1) of the Assam University Act along with Statute 13(2)(v),
Statute 28(1), it is abundantly clear that the Executive Council, being the
appointing authority of the Register, is the competent authority to place the
Registrar under suspension and not the Vice-Chancellor.
As mentioned above, it is not the case of the University that the
petitioner was suspended by an authority which is above the Executive Council.
The Vice-Chancellor is admittedly not above the Executive Council, in
which event, unless there are specific provisions under the Assam University Act
or the Statutes to enable the Vice-Chancellor to order suspension, the
impugned suspension order could not have been issued at the instance of the
Vice-Chancellor.
The only provision which is relied upon by the University authorities is
the power of the Vice-Chancellor as provided under Section 12(3) of the Assam
University Act to place the petitioner under suspension.
As quoted above, it is a wide power given to the ViceChancellor to act
when immediate action is necessary on any matter even though authority to
exercise such power is conferred on other authority. As a corollary, unless
immediate action is necessary, this power provided under Section 12 (3) could
not be exercised by the Vice-Chancellor. Under Section 12(3) of the Act, the
Vice-Chancellor can exercise such power which is otherwise conferred on other
authority of the University, if “immediate action is necessary”.”
36.4. In the same judgment, i.e., (Dr.) Sanjib Bhattacharjee (supra), the
Court also noticed that Section 12(3) of the University Act conferred
certain emergency powers on the Vice-Chancellor, to be exercised if
immediate action is necessary. The Court held that immediate action
would mean certain action which would be necessary to be taken without
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any delay or any action which brooks no delay. It was held that it would
not cover within its ambit any action which could be taken in a routine
manner. In terms of the University Statute of the Assam University, it was
noticed by the Court that such emergency power could be exercised by
the Vice-Chancellor to even exercise the power to suspend an employee.
However, the Court held that such power is by way of exception to the
general power of the appointing authority to place an employee under
suspension and therefore, the said emergency provision is required to be
strictly construed and the circumstances attending the exercise of such
exceptional power have to be fully satisfied. The Court held that
otherwise, there would not be any difference between the general power
of the appointing authority to place an employee of the University under
suspension under Section 28(1) and the exceptional power given to the
Vice-Chancellor to place an employee under suspension under Section
12(3) of the Act and that there would be a duplication of authorities for
the same purpose.
37. Coming back to the facts of the instant case, though the
Memorandum of Association of NERIST confers an emergency power on
the Director, but it does not explicitly state in any manner that it also
covers the power to take disciplinary action, including suspension of an
employee, which power is otherwise conferred on the Board of
Management. In any case, this Court is of the considered opinion, as
stated above, that as the applicable rule is a statutory rule of the CCS
Rules by way of Rule 10(1)(a), it would not be permissible for the Director
to invoke the emergency powers conferred upon him under Rule 14(c)(iv)
of the Memorandum of Association to override the statutory Rule 10(1)(a)
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of the CCS Rules, which are the governing service rules for the employees
of NERIST.
38. In the instant case, clearly the suspension order dated 29.05.2026
was passed by the Director, NERIST though he was not empowered to do
so in terms of Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules, as he was neither the
appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority. As already mentioned
above, respondents could not show any document of the Board explicitly
authorizing the Director to pass any such order of suspension, despite the
Rule 10(1)(a) of CCS Rules. As already mentioned, he was only authorized
to comply with Union Ministry’s direction, as per the Rules. In any case,
even if it were so, it is doubtful as to whether the Director can assume the
role of disciplinary authority and pass the order of suspension.
39. Now the next question is as to whether the subsequent ratification
by the Board of Management of NERIST of the suspension order on
29.07.2026 would validate the order of suspension passed by the Director,
NERIST in the first place.
40. By the time the ratification of the suspension order by the Board of
Management on 29.07.2026 was obtained, the writ petition by the
petitioner challenging the order of suspension dated 29.05.2026 was
already in place, as it was filed on 23.07.2026. The writ petition came up
for the first time before a coordinate bench on 24.07.2026, on which date
the Court held that interim prayer shall be considered on subsequent date.
The writ petition came up next on 31.07.2026, on which date some
instructions were placed before the Court and it became clear that vide
resolution dated 29.07.2026, the Board of Management had ratified and
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approved the suspension order of the petitioner dated 29.05.2026.
41. On this, the coordinate bench in para 6 of the order dated
31.07.2026, was pleased to hold that the conduct of the respondent prima
facie, indicates that the same appears to have been taken to stultify the
matter, which is in seisin of this Court, as notice was issued on
24.07.2026. The coordinate bench further stated that the Court would
have passed an interim order, but as the instructions were in loose sheets,
therefore, the respondents were directed to bring those on record.
42. However, from the order sheets I find that, on subsequent dates no
interim order has come to be passed so far and the matter was taken up
for final adjudication on 09.09.2026.
43. As set out in a preceding paragraph, now the question is as to
whether the subsequent ratification of the suspension order by the Board
of Management would cure the initial defect so as to restore its validity,
assuming that the initial order was passed by the Director, though he was
neither the appointing authority nor the disciplinary authority in terms of
Rule 10(1)(a) of the CCS Rules.
44. To address this question, some of the decisions cited by the
petitioner side have to be looked at.
45. In the case of Akadas Ali (supra), relied upon by the petitioner side,
a Division Bench of this Court held as follows in paragraph 15 of the
judgment:“15. When the Court is in seisin of a matter, an administrative authority cannot
start a parallel proceeding on the very same subject matter at its own ipse dixit
Page No.# 25/30
and record a finding on the issues. If such an action is taken, the same will
amount to directly interfering with the dispensation of justice by the Courts of
law. We have no hesitation to hold that the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative
Societies, Hojai clearly transgressed his authority in venturing into dabble in a
matter which is sub-judice before this Court. Clearly, this is an instance of an
authority trying to over-reach the orders of this Court. The order dated
28.11.2013 being patently illegal and without jurisdiction, findings recorded in
the said order are of no consequence.”
46. Thus, it is clear from the said Division Bench judgment of this Court
that when a court is seized of a particular litigation, the administrative
authority is not encouraged or rather discouraged to start any parallel
proceeding into the sub-judice matter.
47. In the case of Padma Kalita (supra), a coordinate bench of this Court
held that time and again, Supreme Court as well as this Court has held
that when a court is in seisin of a matter, an administrative authority
cannot start a parallel proceeding on the very same subject matter and
that it would amount to interfering with the dispensation of justice by
courts. While rendering the said opinion, the coordinate bench referred to
the aforementioned decision of Akadas Ali (supra). The relevant
paragraphs 11 and 11.1 of the decision of this Court in Padma Kalita
(supra) may be reproduced herein below:“11. Before delving into the matter a little deeper, it would be apposite to briefly
refer to the impugned speaking order dated 03.03.2018. Departmental
Commissioner and Secretary took the view that cases of persons killed by
unknown armed miscreants are not covered by the office memorandum dated
29.07.2013 and, therefore, the claim of the petitioner for enhanced ex-gratia
grant was rejected. This order was passed during the pendency of WP(C) No.
Page No.# 26/30
565 of 2018 filed by the petitioner seeking enhanced ex-gratia grant. Time and
again, Supreme Court as well as this Court has held that when a Court is in seisin
of a matter an administrative authority cannot start a parallel proceeding on the
very same subject matter. It would be amounting to interfering with the
dispensation of justice by Courts. (Please see Akkadas Ali –Vs- State of Assam)
(2014) 4 GLR 3 [Writ Appeal No. 51 of 2014, decided on 12.03.2014]. It was held
thus:
“15. When the Court is in seisin of a matter, an administrative authority
cannot start a parallel proceeding on the very same subject matter at its
own ipse dixit and record a finding on the issues. If such an action is taken,
the same will amount to directly interfering with the dispensation of justice
by the Courts of law. We have no hesitation to hold that the Assistant
Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Hojai clearly transgressed his authority
in venturing into dabble in a matter which is sub-judice before this Court.
Clearly, this is an instance of an authority trying to over-reach the orders of
this Court. The order dated 28.11.2013 being patently illegal and without
jurisdiction, findings recorded in the said order are of no consequence.”
11.1. By passing the impugned speaking order dated 03.03.2018, the
departmental Commissioner and Secretary had rendered the earlier writ petition
filed by the petitioner infructuous. Such a course of action should be avoided by
the administrative authority when a Court is examining and adjudicating the
same subject matter.”
48. Some of the other decisions cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner are rendered by other High Courts of the country and these
rulings also support the aforesaid position of law discussed by a Division
Bench of this Court and also reiterated by a Single Bench.
49. Thus, it follows from the position of law that when the writ petition
in the instant case was preferred challenging the correctness of the
Page No.# 27/30
impugned order of suspension dated 29.05.2026 and the Court was
already in seisin of the matter, the subsequent ratification by the Board of
Management of NERIST on 29.07.2026 would be contrary to the principles
laid down in the aforesaid decisions and would amount to interfering with
a sub-judice matter. Hence, such ratification would not be a valid exercise
of power and would not have the effect of curing the initial defect of the
suspension order dated 29.05.2026, which was challenged before this
Court on the very same infirmity.
50. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents has relied
upon the decision of Pannalal Choudhury (supra) to contend that in the
said case it was held that a subsequent ratification of the dismissal order
was held to have corrected the initial defect of the dismissal order having
been passed by an authority, which was not legally qualified to do so.
51. However, upon perusing the said decision, I find that the ruling is
distinguishable on facts, inasmuch as, in that case, ratification was prior to
the filing of the writ petition before the Court. And in that factual matrix, a
two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the ratification
was successful in curing the initial defect. Further, in that case, the Hon'ble
Apex Court also held that the materials indicated clear delegation of
powers to the Principal and Secretary to pass the impugned order. In the
said ruling, the factual matrix revealed that the dismissal order was passed
on 16.08.1996 and subsequently, there were several meetings of the
Board of Governors and the last resolution was dated 22.08.1996,
whereupon the dismissal order dated 16.08.1996 was approved and
ratified. From the para 12 and 13 of the said decision, it appears that only
Page No.# 28/30
thereafter, the writ petition came to be filed before the High Court.
Interestingly, the decision in Pannalal Choudhury (supra) was a judgment
emanating from this Court.
52. Thus, I come to the considered opinion that the ruling in Pannalal
Choudhury (supra) would not come to the assistance of the respondent
authorities of NERIST to save the impugned order of suspension dated
29.05.2026, which was subsequently ratified by the Board of Management
on 29.07.2026.
53. Consequently, upon considering the matter in its entirety, this Court
comes to the following conclusions:(i) The impugned suspension order dated 29.05.2026 passed by the
Director, NERIST was bad in law as he was neither the appointing
authority nor the disciplinary authority in terms of Rule 10(1)(a) of the
CCS Rules, 1965.
(ii) The power of the Director to resort to emergency administrative
action under Rule 14(c)(iv) of the Memorandum of Association of NERIST
cannot be used to usurp the power of appointing authority or disciplinary
authority to exercise the power of suspension, in terms of the statutory
Rule 10(1)(a) of CCS Rules.
(iii) In terms of the decisions discussed earlier, the subsequent
ratification of the suspension order by the Board of Management on
29.07.2026 would not have the effect of curing the initial defect, as by
that time the writ petition had been filed and the Court was already in
seisin of the matter.
Page No.# 29/30
54. Resultantly, the impugned suspension order dated 29.05.2026
passed by the Director, NERIST placing the petitioner under suspension is
hereby set aside and quashed.
55. Further, the resolution of the Board of Management dated
29.07.2026, to the extent it ratifies the suspension order dated 29.05.2026
of the petitioner, is also set aside to that extent.
56. As stated at the outset, another prayer of the petitioner in
WP(C)/389/2026 was a direction to conduct an inquiry by Two Committee
Member to examine the correctness of the report dated 15.04.2026
submitted by Professor Sarat Kumar Patra.
57. I find that with regard to Item No. 110.12(1), the resolution of the
Board of Management already ratified and approved by holding that a Two
Member Committee may be constituted by the Chairman, Board of
Management and Director, NERIST to conduct a detail inquiry for further
action and that the report to be submitted within 30 days. Therefore, in
my opinion, no direction with regard to the said matter needs to be given.
58. In WP(C)/339/2026, one of the prayers of the petitioner is to set
aside and quash the advertisement dated 24.06.2026 inviting applications
for appointment to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) and Assistant
Engineer (Civil) on deputation basis in NERIST.
59. Considering the nature of the adjudication conducted by this Court in
the preceding paragraphs on the subject of suspension of the petitioner,
with the conclusion and decision recorded above – this Court does not find
any justification to pass any orders interfering with the aforementioned
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advertisement dated 24.06.2026.
60. The authorities of NERIST are at liberty to place the petitioner in any
suitable post after he is reinstated, pursuant to the order passed by this
Court today.
61. Accordingly, both the writ petitions – WP(C)/339/2026 and WP(C)/
389/2026 - are allowed to the extent as indicated above.
62. Both the writ petitions stand disposed of.
JUDGE
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