Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 – ss. 37(1), 126- Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 - ss. 61(m), 63, 90(1) & (3), 91, 291, 296- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss. 4, 5A, 6, 11-Land Acquisition – Conflict between two statutes – Harmonious Construction – Public Interest – Colourable exercise of powerAppellants opposed the construction of road on their land by Respondent No. 2 (Municipal Corporation of Mumbai) proposed in Development Plan (DP) - Respondent No. 1 issued a directive under S. 37(1) of Act, 1966 acknowledging the need for a connecting road but stating that it was “not feasible” to pursue construction of an 18.30 metre road through the Appellants’ land – Respondent No. 2 renewed the proposal to have the link road constructed through Appellants’ land under Sec. 126 of the MRTP Act and ss. 90(1) & (3) of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act (MMC) – To acquire appellants’ land, Office of the Chief Engineer (Development Plan) forwarded an application to Respondent No. 1 seeking to initiate proceedings under Land Acquisition Act,1894 Appellants filed a Notice of Motion in the already pending Writ, seeking to restrain Respondent No. 2 - Notice dismissed by the High Court - Acquisition exercise under the LAA was put in motion Respondent No. 10 and 11 issued notifications under ss. 4 and 6 of the LAAct directing that Appellants’ land be acquired in public interest - Appellants’ interim prayer for status quo vis-à-vis the property was rejected by the High Court – High Court through the final judgment affirmed the need to acquire Appellants’ land for construction of the link road in public interest- High Court held that MMC Act conferred Respondent No. 2 with the power to acquire land and build a new road which required neither prior permission from the State Govt., nor for the road itself to be reflected in the DP- MMC Act and MRTP Act are distinct, and the powers granted to Respondent No. 2 under the former would not be impliedly repealed by the latter merely because it was a subsequent statute- Whether there is conflict between MMC and MRTP Act - Held: Merely because both statutes are concerned with land acquisition, may not necessarily result in conflict between them- Court’s endeavour shall always be to harmoniously construct such provisions so that the legislative intent underlying both statutes can be fulfilled - There is no direct or indirect bar on the exercise of powers under ss. 91, 291(a), and 296 of the MMC Act. - Not only does the State Govt. first evaluate the application under S. 91, but S. 5A of LAA also permits the landowners themselves to air their grievances -The two statutes exist side-by-side with some degree of overlap- Procedural rules must not be allowed to defeat the basic purpose of a statute In several situations, the needs of the many must outweigh that of the few- Notion of public interest will necessarily reflect the specificities of the situation at hand-the present case to be an appropriate instance where public interest must have paramountcy over private interest-The procedure contemplated under Section 91 of the MMC Act to commence proceedings under the LAA for procuring land was substantially complied with- Respondent No. 2 validly exercised its powers under the MMC Act to direct the acquisition of the Appellants’ land.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Under the MMC Act, the power to make a new public street is derived from S. 291. For the purpose of making a new street, S. 296 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to acquire land, subject to fulfilment of the conditions stipulated in Ss. 90-92. There is certain degree of overlap between these provisions, and S. 37 of the MRTP Act as they deal with procurement of land. The latter is relevant in the context of a DP whereas the MMC Act regulates the manner in which the Mumbai Municipal Corporation operates. Merely because both statutes are concerned with land acquisition, may not necessarily result in conflict between them. [Paras 23-24][1064-C-D, E-F]
1.2 Provisions of one statute should not be construed or interpreted in a manner that they render redundant the provisions in another statute. The Court’s endeavour shall always be to harmoniously construct such provisions so that the legislative intent underlying both statutes can be fulfilled. When the legislature knowingly allows two statutes to operate in the same space, it is a reasonable presumption that the legislative design would have been for both to remain operative without any overriding effect. The Court shall steer two statutes away from a direct collision with each other, even if their areas of operation are broadly similar. [Paras 26 & 29][1065-A; 1067-C]
1.3 External statutes or alternate schemes/plans under the MRTP Act or otherwise, should not be allowed to frustrate the DP or the overall objective of planned development under the MRTP Act. As the DP is the primary means of achieving the purpose of the MRTP Act, any violence done to the former would necessarily affect the latter. Conversely, if the former is left essentially undisturbed then it cannot be said that the spirit and scheme of the MRTP Act has not been honoured. The construction of the link road in the present case does not, in any way, frustrate the DP or defeat the overall objective of the statute. Only in instances where a requirement of the DP is being abrogated that a conflict arises and the observations in Girnar Traders 2011 and Manohar Joshi become relevant. [Paras 36 and 37][1069-F-G; 1070-A-C]
1.4 The court rejects the contention of the Appellants that the only means by which the link road through their property could have been constructed was through an amendment to the DP under S. 37 of the MRTP Act. Respondent No. 2 had the option to either follow the procedure under the MRTP Act, or to invoke the parallel process provided under Ss. 91, 291(a) and 296 of the MMC Act. [Para 43][1071-E]
2.1 The court also does not find merit in the argument that Respondent No. 2’s resort to the MMC Act constitutes a colourable exercise of power. Once we have ascertained that the two legislations in question, the MRTP Act and the MMC Act, exist in separate spheres with only incidental overlap, the possibility of a colourable exercise of power by Respondent No.
2 falls away. There is no direct or indirect bar on the exercise of powers under S.s 91, 291(a), and 296 of the MMC Act. Merely because a right to object to a modification of a DP exists under S.
37 of the MRTP Act does not automatically give it an ascendant position in the hierarchy that Appellants seek to create between the MRTP Act and the MMC Act. It is up to the legislature to determine the amount of discretion that is accorded to the relevant authorities under each statute. [Paras 44, 45 & 47][1071-F; 1072A-B. E]
2.2 Closer reading of the MMC Act and the LAA shows that there are adequate safeguards available and, in the facts of the case, Appellants were given ample opportunity to object to the proposed expropriation of their land. Mechanism for hearing objections is provided under S.5A of the LAA. Not only does the State Govt. first evaluate the application under S. 91, but S.5A of LAA also permits the landowners themselves to air their grievances. Decision by the appellants to stick to their position in terms of the notification and award being non-est due to the pendency of their WP at the High Court cannot entitle them to now argue that they were treated unfairly in the proceedings under the LAA. [Paras 48, 50, 51 & 57][1072-F-G; 1073-B, H; 1077-B]
3.1 Procedural rules must not be allowed to defeat the basic purpose of a statute or hamper the pursuit of justice unless violation of the procedure would itself amount to grave injustice. Rigid adherence to the notion that the Commissioner can be the only official to actually send an application under S. 91 may not be warranted in all scenarios. [Paras 64 and 70][1078-F; 1081-A-B]
3.2 Consequence in both scenarios, whether the Commissioner or some other official acts under the provision, would be that land acquisition proceedings are commenced under the LAA. None of the appellants’ rights are abrogated by the Chief Engineer making the application under S. 91. Legislative intent of ss. 126 and 127 which was to balance the power of the State of ‘eminent domain’. [Paras 71 & 73][1081-C-D; 1083-F]
3.3 S.91 imposes a statutory responsibility on Respondent No. 3, the Commissioner, to initiate the land acquisition process. Commissioner must apply his/her mind and take a conscious decision in favour of the acquisition proceedings being initiated under the LAA. Once the Commissioner is party to the Ministerial Committee and a determination is made by the Committee that a new public street must be laid and land must be acquired for this purpose under S. 91 of the MMC Act read with the LAA, it is no longer consequential which authority conveys this decision. The conclusion that the land is required for the construction of the road cannot be invalidated on this ground. [Para 78][1085-F-G]
3.4The court is inclined to hold and affirm that there has been substantial compliance with S.91 to the extent that it achieves the objective behind the provision. Undoubtedly, Respondent No.3 would have been a participant in the deliberations on whether to initiate the process under S. 91 for procurement of land. The final application was made only after gaining approval from him and the rest of the Committee. Purpose behind the provision of ensuring that the highest-ranking officer in the municipal corporation is privy and amenable to the acquisition proceedings is achieved by his participation and sign off on the action, regardless of whether he personally sends the application. The court, therefore, holds that once the proposal has been approved by the Commissioner, the lack of a formal signature from him on the eventual application is not a serious defect and cannot annul the entire process that followed. The court is satisfied that S.91 of the MMC Act has been substantially complied with in this case. [Paras 80, 81, 84 & 85][1086-F-G; 1087-A; 1088-E-F]
3.5 There is no indication in S. 91 of the MMC Act that the order of the State Govt. to carry out the land acquisition is supposed to be in a specific form. The court has no hesitation in taking a pragmatic and practical approach to this requirement. The fact that all the steps under the LAA were carried out is sufficient evidence that there has been adherence to the spirit and scheme of S.91 regarding Respondent No. 1 being involved and sanctioning the actions of Respondent Nos. 10 & 11. There has been substantial compliance with the provision and the objective underlying it has been honoured. [Paras 87, 88 & 89][1089-B-C, E-F]
4.1 In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, the rights of an individual carry immense importance and are the foundational blocks on which our legal, social, and political milieu thrives. Under no circumstances should the rights of individual citizens be trodden upon arbitrarily and any curtailment of them must be scrutinized with utmost care. In several situations, the needs of the many must outweigh that of the few. Notion of public interest will necessarily reflect the specificities of the situation at hand. In the present case, the public interest which has been emphasized upon by Respondents is the urgent need for the creation of a connecting road through the Appellants’ property. The need stems from the traffic congestion caused on the route from the Mahakali Caves to the Central MIDC. [Paras 90, 91 & 95][1089-H; 1090-A-B; 1091-E]
4.2 The court finds that Respondent No. 2 validly exercised its powers under the MMC Act to direct the acquisition of the Appellants’ land. In court opinion, the two statutes exist side-byside with some degree of overlap. The powers under the MMC Act remain intact even in cases where they cover a subject that is also provided for in the MRTP Act. Procedure contemplated under Section 91 of the MMC Act to commence proceedings under the LAA for procuring land was substantially complied with. Part of the provision relied upon by the Appellants is directory in nature and requires substantial compliance rather than strict compliance. This Court dismisses the present appeal as being devoid of merit. [Paras 100, 101 & 103][1093-B-D, F]
Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra [2007] 7 SCC
555 : [2007] 9 SCR 383 – distinguished.
Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2011]
3 SCC 1 : [2011] 3 SCR 1; Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2012] 3 SCC 619; The Chief Inspector of Mines & Ors. v. Lala Karam Chand Thapar & Ors [1962] 1 SCR 9; Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shafi [2001] 8 SCC 540; Sonapur Tea Co. Ltd. v. Must. Mazirunnessa [1962] 1 SCR 724; Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. [1985] 3 SCC
545 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 51; C.B. Gautam v. Union of India & Ors. [1993] 1 SCC 78 : 1992 [ 3] Suppl. SCR 12; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah & Anr [1955] 2 SCR 1; Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India [1984] 3 SCC 46 : [1984] 3 SCR 229; Sugandhi v. P. Rajkumar [2020] 10 SCC 706; State of U.P. & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya [1961] 2 SCR 679; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. & Anr [1987] 1 SCC 424 : [1987]
2 SCR 1; S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P [1996] 4 SCC
596 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 439; Sharif-ud-din v. Abdul Gani Lone [1980] 1 SCC 403; Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors. v. The Collector & Ors 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1067; Manimegalai v. Special Tehsildar [2018] 13 SCC 491; B.P. Sharma v. Union of India & Ors [2003] 7 SCC 309; Bihar Public Service Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi & Anr [2012] 13 SCC 61; Ramilila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary, Union of India & Ors [2012] 5 SCC 1; K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka [2011] 9 SCC 1 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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