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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: February 17/18,2016
Decision on: May 3, 2016
+
W.P.(C) 441/2013
MANGALI IMPEX LTD
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
R3 and R4.
Mr Rahul Kaushik, Senior Standing Counsel
with Mr Bhavishya Sharma, Advocate for
Customs.
With
+
W.P.(C) 8196/2013 & CM 17295/2013
SONY INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr V. Lakshmi Kumaran, Advocate
with Mr Abhinav Jagnathan, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA
..... Respondent
Through: Mr Sanjev Kumar Dubey, Advocate
with Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate and Mr Aman Singh Paras, Advocate
for DRI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
R3.
With
+
W.P.(C) 211/2014 & CM 389/2014
K.S.TRADERS
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Akshay Makjhija, CGSC with
Mr Vikas Bhadauria, Advocate for UOI.
Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with Mr Udit Malik,
and Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Advocate for DRI.
Ms Sonia Sharma, Senior Standing Counsel
with Mr C.P. Pandey, Advocate for R3.
With
+
W.P.(C) 863/2014 & CM 1731/2014
SENNHEISER ELECTRONICS INDIA PVT LTD ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr V. Lakshmi Kumaran and
Mr Abhinav Jaganathan, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Akshay Makhija, CGSC and
Mr Vikas Bhadauria, Advocate for UOI.
Mr Sanjev Kumar Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate and Mr Aman Singh Paras, Advocate
for DRI.
With
+
W.P.(C) 3803/2014 & CM 7658/2014
COMET IMPEX
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr C. Hari Shankar, Senior Advocate
with Mr S. Sunil and Mr P.K. Singh,
Advocates.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Ripu Daman Bhardwaj, CGSC
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
with Mr T.P. Singh, Advocate for R1.
Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with Mr Udit
Malik and Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Advocate for
DRI.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Mr Udit Malik and Mr
Aman Singh Paras, Advocate for DRI.
With
+
W.P.(C) 5262/2014
RAJESH GUPTA
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Rajesh Mahana, Advocate.
versus
UNIO N OF INDIA AND ORS
..... Respondent
Through: Mr Akshay Makhija, CGSC and
Mr Vikas Bhadauria, Advocate for UOI.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate with Mr Vineet
Sharma, Advocate for DRI.
With
+
W.P.(C) 5877/2014 & CM 14409/2014
DAIKIN AIRCONDITIONING INDIA
PRIVATE .LTD.
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr V. Lakshmi Kumaran and
Mr Abhinav Jaganathan, Advocates.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondent
Through: Mr Akshay Makhija, CGSC with
Mr Vikas Bhadauria, Advocate for UOI.
Mr Sanjev Kumar Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate and Mr Aman Singh Paras, Advocate
for DRI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
With
+
W.P.(C) 4162/2015 & CM 10559/2015
GODREJ AND BOYCE MANUFACTURING
CO. LTD.
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Arshad Hidyatullah, Senior
Advocate with Mr Rupesh Kumar, Mr Pravesh
Bhauguna, Mr Jitin Singhal and Mr Pratik
Raoka, Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Ajitesh Kumar, Advocate for
Mr Gaurav Sarin, Advocate for R1.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate with Mr Vineet
Sharma, Advocate for DRI.
With
+
W.P.(C) 11285/2015
CORTEL INDIA
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate with
Mr Vineet Sharma, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Mr Udit Malik and
Mr Aman Singh Paras, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Umesh Sharma, Senior CGSC with Mr
Akshat Kumar, CGSC.
Mr Kamal Nijhawan, Senior Standing Counsel
for R-2.
With
+
W.P.(C) 11853/2015 & CM 31504/2015
EASTRON OVERSEAS INC
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Ripu Daman Bhardwaj, CGSC
with MrT.P. Singh, Advocate for R1.
Mr Kamal Nijhawan, Senior Standing
Counsel for R2.
Mr Sanjeev Kumar Dubey, Advocate for DRI.
With
+
W.P.(C) 11854/2015 & CM 31506/2015
DIVYA ELECTRONICS
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Mr Udit Malik and
Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Advocates for DRI.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate with Mr Vineet
Sharma, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Kamal Nijhawan, Senior Standing Counsel
for R2.
Mr Riput Daman Bhardwaj, CGSC with Mr
T.P. Singh, Advocate for R1.
+
And
W.P.(C) 563/2016 & CM 2353/2016
RAJESH TRIPATHI
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Naveen Malhotra, Advocate.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Ajay Digpaul, CGSC for R1.
Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate witgh Mr Udit
Malik and Mr Rajmangal Kumar, Advocates for
DRI.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate with Mr Vineet
Sharma, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Kamal Nijhawan, Senior Standing Counsel
for R-2.
Mr Raghvendra Singh and Mr Rahul
Chaudhary, Advocates.
+
W.P.(C) 1185/2013 & CM 2240/2013
M/S LAKSHMAN OVERSEAS AND ORS
..... Petitioners
Through: Mr Akshay Chandra & Mr Raktim
Gogoi, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocates.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing
Counsel for R2 and R4.
+
W.P.(C) 7383/2013 & CM 15847/2013
M/S PACE INTERNATIONAL & ANR.
..... Petitioners
Through: Mr Akshay Chandra & Mr Raktim
Gogoi, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr Arun Bhardwaj, CGSC/UOI.
Mr Rahul Kaushik, Senior Standing Counsel
CBEC with Mr Bhavishya Sharma, Advocate
for Customs.
+
W.P.(C) 225/2014 & CM 416/2014
BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LIMITED
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr R.K. Sanghi and Mr satyendra
Kumar and Mr Palash, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Advocate for DRI.
Mr Amit Mahajan, CGSC for UOI.
+
W.P.(C) 4841/2015 & CM 8739/2015
SATYAM MARKETING THROUGH:
ITS PROPRIETOR
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Prosenjit Mandal and Mr Umang
Srivastav, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate.
Mr Vivek Goyal, CGSC with
Mr Prabhakar Srivastav,Advocate for UOI/R1.
Mr Akshay Makhija, CGSC for UOI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
R3.
+
W.P.(C) 5191/2015 & CM 9414/2015, 9416/2015
MANOJ SABOO @ MANOJ MAHESHWARI
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Pawan Shree Agarwal, Advocate
with Mr Ayush Sharma, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate.
Ms Suparna Srivastava, Senior Standing
counsel for UOI with Mr Manu Dev Sharma,
Advocate.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate for
DRI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
R3.
+
W.P.(C) 9379/2015 & CM 21818/2015
HANSRAJ BHATIA & CO. THROUGH:
ITS PROPRIETOR SHRI SANJEEV BHATIA
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Piyush Kumar and Ms Reena
Rawat, Advocates.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate.
Mr Kamal Nijhawan, Advocate with
Mr Sumit Gaur, Advocate for R3.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate for DRI.
Mr Anurag Ahluwalia, CGSC with Mr Prashant
Ghai, Advocate for UOI.
+
W.P.(C) 11041/2015 & CM 28502/2015
M/S. J.R. INTERNATIONAL
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Prem Ranjan Kumar, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate for DRI.
Mr Satish Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel for
R3.
+
W.P.(C) 11806/2015 & CM 31354/2015
BHAGWATI COMPONENTS MFG.CO.
THROUGH: ITS DIRECTOR
MR. SURJIT SINGH
..... Petitioner
Through: Mr Rupender Sinhman, Advocate
with Ms Rubal Maini, Advocate.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr S.K. Dubey, Advocate with
Mr Rajmangal Kumar and Mr Udit Malik,
Advocate for DRI.
Ms Sonia Sharma, Senior Standing Counsel
with Mr C.P. Pandey, Advocate for R3.
Mr Satish Aggarwala, Advocate for DRI.
CORAM:
JUSTICE S.MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
%
JUDGMENT
03.05.2016
Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:
Introduction
1. The common question in this batch of matters pertains to the
constitutional validity of Section 28 (11) of the Customs Act, 1962
(„Act‟) which was inserted by the Customs (Amendment and Validation)
Act, 2011 („Validation Act, 2011‟) with effect from 16th September 2011.
In terms of Section 28 (11) of the Act, all persons appointed as Customs
Officers under Section 4 (1) of the Act prior to 6 th July 2011 “shall be
deemed to have and always had the power of assessment under Section
17 and shall be deemed to have been and always had been the proper
officers.....”
2. Section 28(11) of the Act states that the provision would take effect
“notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any court of law, tribunal or other authority.”
However, this amendment adversely impacts the Petitioners herein in that
it seeks to validate the show-cause notices („SCNs‟) issued prior to 6th
July 2011 by not only officers of the Customs but also officers of the
Commissionerates of Customs (Preventive), Directorate General of
Revenue Intelligence („DRI‟), Directorate General of Central Excise
Intelligence and similar placed officers.
3. The subsidiary issue that arises is the possibility that on the strength of
Section 28 (11) of the Act, SCNs will now be issued by any of the above
officers for the purpose of “opening of assessment” prior to 6 th July 2011.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
4. The principal submission on behalf of the Petitioners is that although
the insertion of Section 28 (11) is by the Validation Act, 2011 which was
meant to cure the defects pointed out in Section 28 of the Act by the
Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Sayed Ali (2011) 3 SCC
537, in fact, it does not do so. The further submission is that for the
period prior to 6th July 2011 the decision of the Supreme Court in Sayed
Ali (supra) would still apply and even in terms of Section 28 (11) of the
Act the offices of the Commissionerates of Customs (Preventive), DRI,
DGCEI would not have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in relation to
the SCNs already issued or issue fresh SCNs for the period prior to 6th
July 2011.
5. This is then the conspectus of the main issue in these batch of petitions.
Relevant provisions of the Act
6. In order to appreciate the above central issue that arises, it is necessary
to first examine the background of the provisions of the Act. Under the
Act as it stood prior to the Validation Act 2011, the relevant provisions
read as follows.
7. Under Section 2 (34) of the Act, the „proper officer‟ is defined as
under:
“2 (34) “proper officer”, in relation to any functions to be
performed under this Act, means the Officer of Customs who
is assigned those functions by the Board or the Commissioner
of Customs.”
8. Section 4 of the Act talks of appointment of officers of customs. It
states that the Central Board of Excise and Customs “may appoint such
persons as it thinks fit to be officers of customs”. The concept of „proper
officer‟ becomes relevant for the purpose of assessment of duty under
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Section 17, provisional assessment of duty under Section 18, the exercise
of the power to issue SCN under Section 28 where there has been nonlevy, short-levy or erroneous refund of customs duty or where any
interest payable has not been paid or part-paid or erroneously refunded. It
is only a proper officer who can exercise jurisdiction under the above
provisions and certain other provisions which explicitly state that the
powers therein are to be exercised only by a proper officer.
9. In order to determine which of the officers of the customs are „proper
officers‟ one has to necessarily examine, in terms of Section 2 (34) of the
Act, whether such „proper officer‟ has been assigned those functions by
the CBEC or the Commissioner of Customs. Section 28 of the Act as it
stood prior to the recasting of the entire Section 28 by the Validation Act,
2011, reads as under:
“28. Notice for payment of duties, interest, etc. (1) When any
duty has not been levied or has been short-levied or erroneously
refunded, or when any interest payable has not been paid, part paid
or erroneously refunded, the proper officer may,(a) in the case of any import made by any individual for his
personal use or by government or by any educational, research or
charitable institution or hospital, within one year;
(b) in any other case, within six months,
from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with
the duty or interest which has not been levied or charged or which
has been short-levied or part paid or to whom the refund has
erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he
should not pay the amount specified in the notice:
Provided that where any duty has been levied or has been shortlevied or the interest has not been charged or has been part paid or
the duty or interest has been erroneously refunded by reason of
collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts by the
importer or the exporter or the agent or employee of the importer
or exporter, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect as if
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
for the words "one year" and "six months", the words "five years"
were substituted.
Provided further that where the amount of duty which has not been
levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded or the
interest payable has not been paid, part paid or erroneously
refunded is one crore rupees or less, a notice under this sub-section
shall be served by the Commissioner of Customs or with his prior
approval by any officer sub-ordinate to him:
Provided also that where the amount of duty has not been levied or
has been short-levied or erroneously refunded or the interest
payable thereon has not been paid, part paid or erroneously
refunded is more than one crore rupees, no notice under this subsection shall be served except with the prior approval of the Chief
Commissioner of Customs.
Explanation : Where the service of the notice is stayed by an order
of a court, the period of such stay shall be excluded in computing
the aforesaid period of one year or six months or five years, as the
case may be.
(2) The proper officer, after considering the representation, if any,
made by the person on whom notice is served under sub-section
(1), shall determine the amount of duty or interest due from such
person (not being in excess of the amount specified in the notice)
and thereupon such person shall pay the amount so determined.
(2A) Where any notice has been served on a person under subsection (1), the proper officer –
(1) in case any duty has not been levied or has been short-levied, or
the interest has not been paid or has been part paid or the duty or
interest has been erroneously refunded by reason of collusion or
any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, where it is
possible to do so, shall determine the amount of such duty or the
interest, within a period of one year: and
(2) in any other case, where it is possible to do so, shall determine
the amount of duty which has not been levied or has been shortlevied or erroneously refunded or the interest payable which has
not been paid, part paid or erroneously refunded, within a period of
six months,
from the date of service of the notice on the person under subsection (1).
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
(2B) Where any duty has not been levied, or has been short-levied
or erroneously refunded, or any interest payable has not been paid,
part paid or erroneously refunded, the person, chargeable with the
duty or the interest, may pay the amount of duty or interest before
service of notice on him under sub-section (1) in respect of the
duty or the interest, as the case may be, and inform the proper
officer of such payment in writing, who, on receipt of such
information, shall not serve any notice under sub-section (1) in
respect of the duty or the interest so paid:
Provided that the proper officer may determine the amount of
short-payment of duty or interest, if any, which in his opinion has
not been paid by such person and, then, the proper officer shall
proceed to recover such amount in the manner specified in this
section, and the period of “one year” or “six months” as the case
may be, referred to in sub-section (1) shall be counted from the
date of receipt of such information of payment.
Explanation 2. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that
the interest under Section 28AB shall be payable on the amount
paid by the person under this sub-section and also on the amount of
short-payment of duty, if any, as may be determined by the proper
officer, but for this sub-section.
(2C) The provisions of sub-Section (2B) shall not apply to any case
where the duty or the interest had become payable or ought to have
been paid before the date on which the Finance Bill 2001 receives
the assent of the President.
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the expression "relevant
date" means,(a) in a case where duty is not levied, or interest is not charged, the
date on which the proper officer makes an order for the clearance
of the goods;
(b) in a case where duty is provisionally assessed under section 18,
the date of adjustment of duty after the final assessment thereof;
(c) in a case where duty or interest has been erroneously refunded,
the date of refund;
(d) in any other case, the date of payment of duty or interest.”
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
10. Sub-section (2A) and (2B) to Section 28 of the Act were inserted with
effect from 11th May 2001 by the Finance Act, 2001. Two Notifications
bearing Nos. 250-Cus and 251-Cus were issued on 27th August 1983 by
the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under
Section 4 (1) of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive), to
be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in
the State of Maharashtra.
The decision in Sayed Ali
11. At this stage, it is necessary to examine in some detail the decision of
the Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (supra). The facts of the case were that
Respondent No. 1 was a partner of Respondent No. 2 firm, M/s.
Handloom Carpet, which was engaged in the business of carpet
manufacture and export. The firm was charged with having misused the
Export Passbook Scheme by selling goods cleared duty free in the open
market or selling the passbook on premium in violation of the ITC
restriction imposed on such sale. The investigations in the matter were
conducted by the Marine and Preventive Wing of the Customs.
12. On 28th August 1991, the Assistant Collector of Customs
(Preventive), Mumbai issued to Respondent No. 2 firm as well as
Respondent No. 1, Sayed Ali alleging violation of the provisions of
Section 111 (d) of the Act. This was followed by an adjudication order
being passed on 3rd February 1993 by the same Officer who issued the
SCN, i.e., Assistant Collector of Customs (Preventive), confirming the
demands raised in the SCN. Aggrieved by the above order, the
Respondents preferred an appeal before the Collector of Customs
(Appeals). By an order dated 14th December 1993 the Collector of
Customs (Appeals) allowed the appeal of the Respondents by holding that
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
since the subject matter involved a demand of duty beyond a period of six
months, the SCN was required to be issued by the Collector, and not by
the Assistant Collector. Nevertheless, the Collector (Appeals) granted
liberty to the Customs Department to re-adjudicate the case by issuing a
proper SCN.
13. Consequently, on 16th April 1994, the Collector of Customs
(Preventive) issued SCN calling upon the Respondents to show cause as
to why the goods under seizure valued at Rs. 1,04,118.52 should not be
confiscated, and customs duty in the sum of Rs. 5,07,274 should not be
levied in terms of Section 28 (1) of the Act by involving the extended
period of limitation. Penalties under Sections 112 (a) and 112 (b) (i) and
(ii) of the Act were also proposed.
14. In reply to the said SCN, the Respondents questioned the jurisdiction
of the Collector of Customs (Preventive) on the ground that the
jurisdiction thereof vested in the Commissioner by virtue of Notification
No. 251/83 which was more specific and limited in nature. It was
accordingly contended that the said notification will prevail over
Notification No. 250/83 which was broad in nature. These objections
were rejected by the Collector of Customs (Preventive) by an order dated
19th August 1996. It was observed inter alia as under:
“The goods imported and cleared duty free were thus rendered
liable for confiscation under the provisions of Customs Act,
1962 and the Customs (Preventive) Commissionerate created
for the purpose of prevention of smuggling and detention of
cases or smuggling including commercial frauds is thus (sic)
competent to investigate and adjudicate the case.”
15. The Collector of Customs (Preventive) confirmed the demand of duty
in the sum of Rs. 5,07,274 under Section 28 (1) of the Act. The Collector
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
also ordered confiscation of two consignments of dyes, sulphur blue and
sulphur blue green. Aggrieved by the above order, the Respondents went
in appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate
Tribunal („CEGAT‟). A preliminary objection was raised before the
CEGAT by the Respondents regarding jurisdiction of the Collector of
Customs (Preventive). In this regard the CEGAT in the said impugned
order observed as under:
“It is very clear that the Commissioner of Customs
(Preventive) does not have jurisdiction to issue the impugned
show-cause notice and in view thereof he could not have the
jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter when imports have taken
place at Bombay Customs House.”
16. Aggrieved by the above order of the CEGAT, the Customs
Department went in appeal before the Supreme Court. The plea of the
Department before the Supreme Court was that once the Commissioner
(Preventive) had been appointed as Collector of Customs (Preventive),
Bombay by virtue of Notifications Nos. 250/83 and 251/83, issued by the
Central Government under Section 4 of the Act, the Commissioner
(Preventive) became „proper officer‟ in terms of Section 2 (34) of the Act
and was, therefore, competent to issue an SCN under Section 28 of the
Act since the goods were cleared for home consumption in Bombay. Inter
alia reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union
of India v. Ram Narain Bishwanath (1998) 9 SCC 285 and the larger
bench of the Tribunal in Konia Trading Co. v. Commissioner of
Customs (2004) 170 ELT 51 (Tri.) and another decision of the Tribunal
Manohar Bros. (Capacitors) v. Collector of Customs-II, Bombay 1998
(98) ELT 821 (Tri), which attained finality by the dismissal of the
Revenue‟s appeal by the Supreme Court in CCE & Customs v. Manohar
Bros. (Capacitors) (2011) 3 SCC 580.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
17. The Supreme Court, after analysing the relevant provisions of the Act
including the definition of „proper officer‟ under Section 2 (34) of the
Act, observed as under:
“It is clear from a mere look at the provision that only such
officers of Customs who have been assigned specific functions
would be “proper officers” in terms of Section 2 (34) of the
Act. Specific entrustment of function by either the Board or
the Commissioner of Customs is therefore, the governing test
to determine whether an “officer of Customs” is the “proper
officer”.
20. From a conjoint reading of Sections 2 (34) and 28 of the
Act, it is manifest that only such a Customs Officer who has
been assigned the specific functions of assessment and
reassessment of duty in the jurisdictional area where the
import concerned has been affected, by either the Board or the
Commissioner of Customs, in terms of Section 2 (34) of the
Act is competent to issue notice under Section 28 of the Act.
Any other reading of Section 28 would render the provisions
of Section 2 (34) of the Act otiose inasmuch as the test
contemplated under Section 2 (34) of the Act is that of specific
conferment of such functions.
21. Moreover, if the Revenue‟s contention that once territorial
jurisdiction is conferred, the Collector of Customs
(Preventive) becomes a „proper officer‟ in terms of Section 28
of the Act is accepted, it would lead to a situation of utter
chaos and confusion, inasmuch as all officers of Customs, in a
particular area be it under the Collectorate of Customs
(Imports) or the Preventive Collectorate, would be „proper
officers‟. In our view, therefore, it is only the officers of
Customs, who are assigned the functions of assessment, which
of course, would include reassessment, working under the
jurisdictional Collectorate within whose jurisdiction the bills
of entry or baggage declarations had been filed and the
consignments had been cleared for home consumption, will
have the jurisdiction to issue notice under Section 28 of the
Act.”
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
18. The Supreme Court observed that nothing has been brought on record
to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive) who had issued SCN
was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as „proper officer‟
either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. It was
accordingly observed as under:
“We are convinced that Notifications Nos. 250-Cus. And 251Cus. both dated 27th August 1983, issued by the central
government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section
(1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of
Customs (Preventive), etc. to be the Collector of Customs for
Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of
Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to
exercise power entrusted to the „proper officers‟ for the
purpose of Section 28 of the Act.”
19. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Department that the
source of power to act as „proper officer‟ was Sections 4 and 5 of the Act
and not sub-section (34) of Section 2 of the Act. The Supreme Court
observed that Sections 4 and 5 “merely authorise the Board to appoint
officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be
exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the
Act, an officer of Customs has to be designated as „proper officer‟ by
assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the
Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly.”
20. The Supreme Court also distinguished the earlier decision in Ram
Narain Bishwanath (supra) stating that none of the statutory provisions
were considered in that case and that “the issue arising for consideration
in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said
decision is of no avail to the Revenue.”
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
21. With Sayed Ali (supra) making it clear that there has to be a specific
order or notification issued by the Board assigning the functions to the
specific officers of the Customs to enable him to act as „proper officer‟
for various purposes under the Act, it became necessary for the central
government to clarify the legal position.
CBEC Instruction
22. Immediately after the decision of the Supreme Court in Sayed Ali
(supra) on 18th February 2011, instructions were issued on 15th April
2011 by the CBEC to all officers of the Customs Preventive and DRI
inter alia as under:
“2. In view of Hon‟ble Supreme Court order, while other
alternative measures are being considered to address the matter, it
has been decided by the Board that henceforth all show cause
notices under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 in respect of
cases investigated DRI/Customs Preventive formations are
required to be issued by jurisdictional Commissioners from where
imports have taken place. Board also desires the field formations to
examine the pending show cause notices and wherever the cases
are not hit by limitation, show cause notices may be got issued
afresh by jurisdictional Commissionerates in supersession of the
earlier show cause notices and in the light of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court judgment in the matter.
3. As for the cases which would be hit by limitation if notices are
issued afresh now, necessary legal options are being explored.
4. Difficulty faced, if any, may be brought to notice of the Board.”
Section 28 amended by Finance Act 2011
23. On 8th April 2011, the Finance Act, 2011 was notified in the Official
Gazette. It proposed to make series of amendments to the Act one of
which was recasting of Section 28 of the Act. Clause 42 of the Finance
Act stipulated that for the earlier Section 28 of the Act the following
sections would be substituted:
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
28. Recovery of duties not levied or short-levied or
erroneously refunded. - (1) Where any duty has not been
levied or has been short-levied or erroneously refunded, or any
interest payable has not been paid, part-paid or erroneously
refunded, for any reason other than the reasons of collusion or
any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts,(a) the proper officer shall, within one year from the
relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable
with the duty or interest which has not been so levied or
which has been short-levied or short-paid or to whom
the refund has erroneously been made, requiring him to
show cause why he should not pay the amount specified
in the notice;
(b) the person chargeable with the duty or interest, may
pay before service of notice under clause (a) on the
basis of,(i) his own ascertainment of such duty; or
(ii) the duty ascertained by the proper officer,
the amount of duty along with the interest payable thereon
under section 28AA or the amount of interest which has not
been so paid or part-paid.
(2) The person who has paid the duty along with interest or
amount of interest under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall
inform the proper officer of such payment in writing, who, on
receipt of such information shall not serve any notice under
clause (a) of that sub-section in respect of the duty or interest
so paid or any penalty leviable under the provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder in respect of such duty or
interest.
(3) Where the proper officer is of the opinion that the amount
paid under clause (b) of sub-section (1) falls short of the
amount actually payable, then, he shall proceed to issue the
notice as provided for in clause (a) of that sub-section in
respect of such amount which falls short of the amount
actually payable in the manner specified under that sub-section
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
and the period of one year shall be computed from the date of
receipt of information under sub-section (2).
(4) Where any duty has not been levied or has been shortlevied or erroneously refunded, or interest payable has not
been paid, part-paid or erroneously refunded, by reason of,(a) collusion; or
(b) any wilful mis-statement; or
(c) suppression of facts,
by the importer or the exporter or the agent or employee of
the importer or exporter, the proper officer shall, within five
years from the relevant date, serve notice on the person
chargeable with duty or interest which has not been so levied
or which has been so short-levied or short-paid or to whom
the refund has erroneously been made, requiring him to show
cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the
notice.
(5) Where any duty has not been levied or has been shortlevied or the interest has not been charged or has been partpaid or the duty or interest has been erroneously refunded by
reason of collusion or any wilful mis-statement or
suppression of facts by the importer or the exporter or the
agent or the employee of the importer or the exporter, to
whom a notice has been served under sub- section (4) by the
proper officer, such person may pay the duty in full or in
part, as may be accepted by him, and the interest payable
thereon under section 28AA and the penalty equal to twentyfive per cent. of the duty specified in the notice or the duty so
accepted by that person, within thirty days of the receipt of
the notice and inform the proper officer of such payment in
writing.
(6) Where the importer or the exporter or the agent or the
employee of the importer or the exporter, as the case may be,
has paid duty with interest and penalty under sub-section (5),
the proper officer shall determine the amount of duty or
interest and on determination, if the proper officer is of the
opinionW.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
(i) that the duty with interest and penalty has been paid
in full, then, the proceedings in respect of such person
or other persons to whom the notice is served under
sub-section (1) or sub- section (4), shall, without
prejudice to the provisions of sections 135, 135A and
140 be deemed to be conclusive as to the matters
stated therein; or
(ii) that the duty with interest and penalty that has been
paid falls short of the amount actually payable, then
the proper officer shall proceed to issue the notice as
provided for in clause (a) of sub-section (1) in respect
of such amount which falls short of the amount
actually payable in the manner specified under that
sub-section and the period of one year shall be
computed from the date of receipt of information
under sub-section (5).
(7) In computing the period of one year referred to in clause
(a) of sub-section (1) or five years referred to in sub-section
(4), the period during which there was any stay by an order
of a court or tribunal in respect of payment of such duty or
interest shall be excluded.
(8) The proper officer shall, after allowing the concerned
person an opportunity of being heard and after considering
the representation, if any, made by such person, determine
the amount of duty or interest due from such person not
being in excess of the amount specified in the
notice.
(9) The proper officer shall determine the amount of duty or
interest under sub-section (8),(a) within six months from the date of notice in respect
of cases falling under clause (a) of sub- section (1);
(b) within one year from the date of notice in respect
of cases falling under sub-section (4).
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
(10) Where an order determining the duty is passed by the
proper officer under this section, the person liable to pay the
said duty shall pay the amount so determined along with the
interest due on such amount whether or not the amount of
interest is specified separately.
Explanation 1 -- For the purposes of this section, "relevant
date" means,(a) in a case where duty is not levied, or interest is not
charged, the date on which the proper officer makes an
order for the clearance of goods;
(b) in a case where duty is provisionally assessed
under section 18, the date of adjustment of duty after
the final assessment thereof;
(c) in a case where duty or interest has been
erroneously refunded, the date of refund;
(d) in any other case, the date of payment of duty or interest.
Explanation 2. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
that any non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund before the date
on which the Finance Bill, 2011 receives the assent of the
President, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of
Section 28 as it stood immediately before the date on which such
assent is received.”
24. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Finance Bill, 2011
stated that “Section 28 is being substituted so as to make provisions more
coherent and clear as also to harmonize the demand period in normal
cases to one year.” What is important as far as Section 28 is concerned is
that the power of reopening the assessment is still to be exercised by
„proper officer‟. There is no distinction carved out vis-a-vis the two types
of assessment or the time period when the reassessment is to be made.
Where the reason for reopening is other than “collusion or any wilful misW.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
statement or suppression of facts” reopening has to be done within one
year from the „relevant date‟. Where it falls within the categories
demarcated in terms of Section 28 (4) as amended, the time period is „five
years‟.
25. The concept of „relevant date‟ has been elaborated in Explanation 1.
This is more or less conforms to the erstwhile Section 28 (3) of the Act.
What is new as far as the recasting of Section 28 is concerned, is that
Explanation 2 begins with the expression „For the removal of doubts‟. It
categorically states that for any non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund
prior to the date on which the Finance Bill, 2011 receives assent of the
President, it should continue to be governed by the provisions of Section
28 as it stood immediately prior to the date on which such assent is
received. In other words any non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund
prior to 6th July 2011 would be governed by the un-amended Section 28.
The 6th July 2011 Notification
26. On 6th July 2011 itself, Notification No. 44 of 2011-Customs was
issued which purportedly designates „proper officer‟ for the purpose of
Sections 17 and 28 of the Act. The said notification reads as under:
“In Exercise or the powers conferred by sub-Section (34 of Section
2 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), the Central Board of
Excise and Customs hereby assigns the functions of the proper
officer to the following officers mentioned in column (2) of the
Table below, for the purposes of Section 17 and 28 of the said Act,
namely:
Sl.No.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Table
Designation of the officers
(1)
(2)
1.
Additional Director Generals, Additional Directors or Joint
Directors, Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors in the
Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence.
2.
Commissioners of Customs (Preventive), Additional
Commissioners or Joint Commissioners of Customs
(Preventive), Deputy Commissioners or Assistant
Commissioners of Customs (Preventive).
3.
Additional Director Generals, Additional Directors or Joint
Directors, Deputy Directors or Assistant Directors in the
Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence.
4.
Commissioners
of
Central
Excise,
Additional
Commissioners or Joint Commissioners of Central Excise,
Deputy Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners of
Central Excise.
The Validation Act 2011
27.
The above Notification did not clarify the status of SCNs already
issued prior to 6th July 2011. On 2nd August 2011 the Customs
(Amendment and Validation), Act, 2011 was introduced in Parliament
proposing to add another sub-section 11 after sub-section 10 of Section
28 of the Act.
28. The Statement of Objects and Reasons („SOR‟) appended to the said
Bill explained the rationale behind insertion of Section 28 (11), as under:
“The Customs Act, 1962 consolidates and amends the law
relating to customs. Clause (34) of section 2 of the said Act
defines the expression “proper officer” in relation to the
functions under the said Act to mean the officer of customs who
is assigned those functions by the Central Board of Excise and
Customs or the Commissioner of Customs. Recently, a question
has arisen as to whether the Commissioner of Customs
(Preventive) is competent to exercise and discharge the powers of
a proper officer for issue of a notice for the demand of duty. The
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in Commissioner of Customs
versus Sayed Ali and Anr. (Civil Appeal Nos. 4294-4295 of
2002) held that only a customs officer who has been specifically
assigned the duties of assessment and re-assessment in the
jurisdiction area is competent to issue a notice for the demand of
duty as a proper officer. As such the Commissioner of Customs
(Preventive) who has not been assigned the function of a “proper
officer” for the purposes of assessment or re-assessment of duty
and issue of show cause Notice to demand Customs duty under
Section 17 read with Section 28 of the Act in respect of goods
entered for home consumption is not competent to function as a
proper officer which has not been the legislative intent.
2. In view of the above the Show Cause Notices issued over the
time by the Customs officers such as those of the
Commissionerates of Customs (Preventive), Directorate General
of Revenue Intelligence and others, who were not specifically
assigned the functions of assessment and re-assessment of
customs duty may be construed as invalid. The result would be
huge loss of revenue to the exchequer and disruption in the
revenue already mobilized in cases already adjudicated.
However, having regard to the urgency of the matter, the
Government issued notification on 6th July, 2011 specifically
declaring certain officers as proper officers for the aforesaid
purposes.
3. In the circumstances, it has become necessary to clarify the
true legislative intent that Show Cause Notices issued by
Customs officers, i.e., officers of the Commissionerates of
Customs (Preventive), Directorate General of Revenue
Intelligence (DRI), Directorate General of Central Excise
Intelligence (DGCEI) and Central Excise Commissionerates for
demanding customs duty not levied or short levied or erroneously
refunded in respect of goods imported are valid, irrespective of
the fact that any specific assignment as proper officer was issued
or not. It is, therefore, purposed to amend the Customs Act, 1962
retrospectively and to validate anything done or any action taken
under the said Act in pursuance of the provisions of the said Act
at all material times irrespective of issuance of any specific
assignment on 6th July, 2011.
4. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
29. Section 28 (11) of the Act reads as under:
“(11) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
any judgment, decree or order of any court of law, tribunal or
other authority, all persons appointed as officers of Customs
under sub-Section (1) of Section 4 before the 6th day of July
2011 shall be deemed to have and always had the power of
assessment under Section 17 and shall be deemed to have been
and always had been the proper officers for the purposes of
this Section.”
30. The fact that sub-section (11) of Section 28 opens with a non-obstante
clause referring to “anything to the contrary contained in any judgment,
decree or order of any Court of law, tribunal or other authority” reveals
the legislative intent to overcome the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Sayed Ali (supra). The second aspect is that the legislature intended the
amendment to be retrospective and introduced the words “shall be
deemed to have been and always had been the proper officers”. The SOR
also makes it clear that the purpose was to amend the Act “retrospectively
and to validate anything done or any action taken under the said Act” at
all material times irrespective of issuance of any specific assignment on
6th July 2011.
The Circular dated 23rd September 2011
31. Soon after the above insertion of Section 28 (11), another Circular
was issued on 23rd September 2011 withdrawing the earlier instructions
dated 15th April 2011 with immediate effect. According to the said
Circular, Notification No. 44/2011-Customs (N.T.) dated 6th July 2011
whereby the officers of the DRI, DGCEI, Commissionerate of Customs
(Preventive) and Central Excise Commissionerates were assigned the
functions of the „proper officer‟ and the amendment to Section 28 of the
Act settled the issue of validity of SCNs issued by them. The only
additional clarification was that the said officers would not exercise
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
authority in terms of Section 28 (8) of the Act. It was clarified that “in
other words, there shall be no change in the present practice and officers
of DRI and DGCEI shall not adjudicate the Show Cause Notices issued
under Section 28 of the said Act.”
Petitions in this Court
32. Two things happened after the issuance of the above instructions. One
was that the adjudication proceedings in terms of the SCNs already issued
prior to 6th July 2011, even by the DRI, and DGCEI continued on the
strength of the above amendment. Consequently, as in the case of Sony
India Private Limited [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 8196 of 2013], for
instance, an SCN came to be issued on 12th/15th April 2013 by the DRI in
respect of the period even prior to 6th July 2011, i.e., from 1st April 2008
onwards. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 441 of 2013 (Mangali Impex
Limited) the Court passed the following order on 28th January 2013:
“The main issue sought to be raised in this writ petition is that
the show cause notice dated 31st October 2003 issued under
Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 has been issued by the
Assistant Commissioner of Customs (SIIB), Special
Intelligence & Investigation Branch who, according to the
Petitioner, was not the proper officer in terms of the said Act
and in particular the provisions of Section 2 (34) of the said
Act. It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that Explanation 2 after sub-section 11 of Section 28
of the said Act makes it clear that the provisions of the said
sub-section would be applicable only on and from the date the
Finance Bill, 2011 received the assent of the President and that
insofar as show cause notices issued prior to that date are
concerned, the provisions of Section 28 as they stood
immediately before that date would continue to operate. In the
present case, the show cause notice was issued way back in
2003, at which point of time sub-section (11) of Section 28
was not in the statute book.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
There is some confusion to when Explanation 2 was
introduced in the statute book and as to whether Explanation 2
has at all been passed by Parliament or not.
The learned counsel for the Respondents wishes to take
instructions in this regard.
Renotify on 4th February 2013.”
33. On the next date of hearing, i.e., 4th February 2013, while directing to
issue notice in the said writ petition, the Court passed the following
interim order:
“We notice that sub-section (11) of Section 28 of the Customs
Act, 1962 was introduced through the Customs (Amendment
and Validation) Act, 2011 on 16th September 2011.
Previously, the provisions of Section 28, which were
introduced by the Finance Act, 2011, which came into effect
on 1st April 2011, did not contain sub-section (11). However,
it did contain Explanation 2 after sub-section (10) of Section
28 of the said Act. Prima facie, there appears to be an apparent
conflict between Explanation 2 and sub-section (11) which
was introduced subsequently. The conflict arises because subsection (11) is a non-obstante provision, but is non-obstante in
relation to any judgment, decree or order of any court of law,
tribunal or other authority and not in relation to the other
provisions of the Act which includes Explanation 2 of Section
28 which had come into force earlier. It is for this reason that
we are issuing notice.
Notice is accepted by the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No. 2. Notice is also accepted by the learned
counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1. Notice shall be sent
to Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. The counter affidavits be filed
within four weeks and rejoinder affidavits, if any, be filed
within two weeks thereafter.
List on 9th April 2013.
In the meanwhile, the proceedings may go on and the
adjudication order may be passed by the adjudicating
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
authority. However, that order shall not be given effect to until
further directions from this Court.”
34. Similar interim orders permitting the proceedings to go on but that the
adjudication shall not be given effect to, were passed in each of the writ
petitions.
35. On behalf of the Petitioners, arguments have been addressed by Mr.
V. Lakshmi Kumaran, learned counsel, Mr. C. Hari Shankar and Mr.
Arshad Hidyatullah, learned Senior counsel, Mr. Rajesh Mahna and Mr.
Naveen Malhotra, learned counsel. On behalf of the Respondents, Mr.
S.K. Dubey, learned counsel for the DRI, Mr. Satish Kumar and Mr.
Rahul Kaushik, learned counsel for the Customs have addressed
arguments.
Submissions of counsel for the Petitioners
36. The submissions on behalf of the Petitioners could be summarized as
under:
(i) The amendment by which Section 28 (11) of the Act was introduced
does not cure the defects pointed out in Sayed Ali (supra). Relying on
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co.
Limited v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 449 and State of Haryana
v. Karnal Co-op Farmers Society Limited 1993 (2) SCC 363, it was
submitted that Section 28 of the Act confers such powers of the proper
officer to multiple sets of customs officers without any territorial or
pecuniary jurisdictional limit and for which reason the “utter chaos and
confusion” envisaged by the Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (supra) would
still subsist. It was further submitted that the legislature, through its
validating provision, has conferred arbitrary and unguided powers which
cannot be conferred on a large number of custom officers without any
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
limit.
(ii) In the absence of any guidelines on how to exercise such power, it
can become arbitrary and would be in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Reliance was placed on the decisions in State of Punjab v.
Khan Chand (1974) 1 SCC 549 and Air India v. Nergesh Meerza
(1981) 4 SCC 335 and also to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Sri Balaji Rice Company v. CTO (1984) 55 SCT 292 (AP) and
Kerala High Court in Sivaramakrishnan v. State of Kerala 1995 (1)
ILR 92 (Ker) .
(iii) Section 28 (11) would be applicable only in respect of short-levy or
non-levy or erroneous refund arising on or after 8 th April 2011. It is
submitted that the new Section 28 substitutes the previous Section 28 of
the Act with effect from 8th April 2011. Therefore, Section 28 (11)
would also be taken to have been inserted with effect from 8th April
2011. The newly inserted Section 28 (11) provides that all officers of
customs prior to 6th July 2011 shall be deemed to have been and always
had been proper officers for the purposes of „this section‟. It is further
submitted that the phrase „this section‟ in Section 28 (11) refers to the
new Section (inserted with effect from 8th April 2011) and not to the old
Section 28, as it existed prior to 8th April 2011. Explanation 2 to Section
28 provides that any non-levy or short-levy prior to 8th April 2011 would
continue to be governed by the provisions of Section 28 as it stood
immediately prior to 8th April 2011.
(iv) Mere deeming of all the officers of the customs to be „prior officers‟
without validating the SCNs issued prior to 8 th April 2011 would not
validate such SCNs by merely the amending Section 28 of the Act.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Satchidananda Misra
v. State of Orissa 2004 8 SCC 599, it was submitted that the very
purpose of a Validating Act is to remove the cause of ineffectiveness or
invalidity. However, there is no specific provision in the Customs
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 2011 which validates the past
actions/SCNs.
(v) The impugned SCNs purport to empower the DRI, DGCEI to issue
SCNs even for the period prior to 8th April 2011 and therefore, those
SCNs were without jurisdiction and void ab initio. Section 28 of the Act
confers authority on „the proper officer‟ and not „a proper officer‟ or
„any proper officer‟. Relying on the decisions in Consolidated Coffee
Limited v. Coffee Board (1980) 3 SCC 358 and Shri Ishar Alloys Steels
Limited v. Jayaswals Neco Limited (2001) 3 SCC 609, it was submitted
that the use of the definite article „the‟ is very significant as opposed to
„an‟ or „any‟. Only those officers who have been assigned the functions
of „the proper officer‟ for the purposes of Section 17 (Assessment of bill
of entry) will be considered as „the‟ proper officer for Section 28 of the
Act.
(vi) Without prejudice to the above submissions, it was contended that
once a particular officer exercises jurisdiction, it would exclude the
jurisdiction of all the other officers. Reliance was placed on the
decisions in India Household and Healthcare Limited v. LG
Household and Healthcare Limited (2007) 5 SCC 510 and Kenapo
Textiles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1992) 84 STC 88 (P&H).
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Submissions of counsel for the Respondents
37. On behalf of the Respondents, it was pointed out that with the
Bombay High Court in Sunil Gupta v. Union of India 2015 (315) ELT
167 (Bom.) upholding the constitutional validity of Section 28 (11) of the
Act and accepting the plea of the Department that by virtue of insertion of
Section 28 (11), the SCNs issued prior to 8th April 2011 by the DRI, the
notices issued by officers of the DRI, the DGCEI etc., i.e., officers who
may not have been expressly assigned the functions of „proper officers‟
under Section 2 (34) of the Act, stood validated. It was submitted that
although the said decision is a subject matter of a Special Leave Petition
(Civil) in the Supreme Court, this Court should nevertheless follow the
decision of the Bombay High Court.
38. Secondly it was submitted that in order to understand the scope of
Section 28 (11) of the Act, the SOR has to be referred to. It states that the
said Amendment was meant to be retrospective i.e. to validate anything
done in relation to the non-levy, short levy or erroneous refund prior to 8th
April 2011. It is accordingly submitted that Section 28 (11) would
override the Explanation below sub-section 10 of Section 28 of the Act to
the extent that the SCN was issued prior to 8th April 2011. As far as
actions now taken, after the insertion of Section 28 (11) of the Act, since
it is a deeming provision, it empowers the officers of the DRI, DGCEI
etc. to issue SCNs even for the period prior to 8th April 2011 subject to
the time limits under Section 28 (4) of the Act being adhered to.
39. It was submitted that in the normal course, the customs duty is only
assessed by the jurisdictional custom officers of the Board. The officers
of the Customs (Preventive) have been appointed for the purposes of
investigating evasion of customs duty in their specified jurisdictions. The
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
issuing and adjudication of SCNs under Section 28 of the Act usually is
undertaken by the jurisdictional Customs officer.
40. According to the Respondents, it is a well-settled legal proposition
that the legislature can make a retrospective legislation after curing the
defects that led to their invalidation in the first place. A validation Act
can be enacted to retrospectively negate the effect of the judgments and
orders of competent courts provided the validating legislation removes
the cause of invalidity or the basis that had led to those decisions. It was
submitted that inadvertent defects in statutes should be permitted to be
corrected by the legislature through the device of „small repairs‟. There is
no vested right in any of the Petitioners, as a result of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (supra). Reliance was placed on the
following passage in Craies on Statue Law (7th Edition) where it is stated
“If a statue is passed for the purpose of protecting a public against some
evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively although by
such operation, it will deprive some person or persons of a vested right.
Thus, public interest at large is once again relevant consideration in
determining the constitutional validity of a retrospective legislation."
41.
It is submitted by the Respondents that a combined reading of
Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the Act and the retrospective amendment
brought about by Validation Act, 2011 would reveal that all the past cases
where the SCN had been issued under Section 28 of the Act by any
officer appointed as officer of Customs, prior to 6th July 2011 stands
validated. The plea of conflict between Explanation 2 to Section 28 and
Section 28 (11) of the Act is untenable, unjustified and misconceived.
Reliance was placed on the decision in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v.
Broach Borough Municipality (1969) 2 SCC 283 and Sulochana Amma
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
v. Narayanan Nair (1994) 2 SCC 14.
42. A distinction is sought to be drawn between the specific functions of a
Customs Officer under Section 6 of the Act and the power to appoint an
officer of the Customs under Section 4 of the Act. It is submitted that the
functions under Section 6 of the Act are totally different from assigning
the power of issuing an SCN to a Customs Officer under Section 4 of the
Act.
Analysis of Section 28 (11) of the Act
43. The first issue is to be considered whether Section 28 (11) cures the
defects pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sayed Ali (supra). In
examining this issue, the Court would like to examine whether the
decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sunil
Gupta (supra) is required to be followed by the Court.
44. A perusal of Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the Act reveals that it
opens with the words „For removal of doubts.‟ This Explanation is
supposed to be a clarification by the legislature itself. It is categorically
stated that any non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund prior to the date
on which the Finance Bill, 2011 receives the assent of the President, shall
continue to be governed by the provisions of Section 28 as it stood
immediately before the date on which such assent is received.
Explanation 2 remains in the statute even after the insertion of Section 28
(11) of the Act which seeks to deal with the very same period, i.e., the
period prior to the date on which the Finance Act, 2011 receives the
assent of the President i.e., 8th April 2011. Although what is intended to
be done by the legislature, as is evident from the SOR appended to the
Validation Act, 2011, is to validate the notices issued prior to 8th April
2011, the opening words of sub-section (11) of Section 28 is a nonW.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
obstante clause only in a limited sphere. It makes sub-section (11) apply
notwithstanding anything contained in any " judgment, decree or order of
the Court". It does not make it apply notwithstanding anything contained
elsewhere in the same statute or in any other law for the time being in
force.
45. There could be different kinds of non-obstante or clarificatory
provisions that can be enacted. For e.g., Section 18 (1) of the Act opens
with the words „notwithstanding anything contained...”. Section 12 of the
Act opens with the words “except as otherwise provided in this Act, or
any other law for the time being in force, duties of customs ...” Section
28A opens with the words “notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act”. As far as Section 28AA is concerned, it begins with a non-obstante
clause that encompasses not only any judgment, decree, order, or
direction but “in any provision of this Act or the rules thereunder”. It is
therefore, conscious that the decision taken by the legislature was to
overcome the defects pointed out in a judgment.
46. Section 28 (11) of the Act opens with a non-obstante clause which
overrides 'anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree or
order of any court' but does not override any other provisions of the Act
or any other Act for the time being in force. In other words Section 28
(11) neither explicitly or implicitly seeks to overcome the legal position
brought about by Explanation 2 which states that non-levy, short-levy or
erroneous refunded prior to 8th April 2011 will continue to be governed
by the unamended Section 28 of the Act as it stood prior to 8th April
2011, notwithstanding enactment of Section 28 (11) of the Act.
Considering that Explanation 2 opens the words „For the removal of
doubts‟ the Court cannot presume a legislative intent to the contrary.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
47. Although it was repeatedly stressed by learned counsel for the
Respondents that Section 28 (11) and Explanation 2 to Section 28 can be
harmonized and that for that purpose the SOR appended to the Validation
Act, 2011 must be referred to, the Court is unable to undertake that
exercise without doing violence to the express language of the
Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the Act. In the first instance, it requires to
be noticed that the SOR appended to the Validation Act, 2011 makes no
reference to Explanation 2 to Section 28 at all. It is not for the Court to
undertake a task that the legislature itself did not undertake, viz., rewrite
Section 28 (11) to make it override Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the
Act. The words „this section‟ appearing in Section 28 (11) can only mean
Section 28 as newly enacted. However, it does not in any manner affect
Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the Act as far as the period prior to 8th
April 2011 is concerned. In other words, the newly enacted Section
28(11) would not empower the officers of the DRI and DGCEI to either
proceed to adjudicate SCNs already issued by them for the period prior to
8th April 2011 or to issue SCNs for a period prior to 8th April 2011.
The judgment of the Bombay High Court
48. In Sunil Gupta v. Union of India (supra) the Petitioner was served
with an SCN dated 5th February 2009 by the DRI on the ground that the
electronic goods imported had been mis-declared. The challenge to the
SCN and the consequent adjudication was on the basis that the DRI was
not competent to issue the notice. A reference was made to an earlier
Notification No. 19/90-Cus. (NT) dated 26th April 1990 which dealt with
appointment of officials of the DRI as Customs Officers for the area
mentioned in column 1 of the Notification which referred to the different
states in India or to the whole of India. On the basis of the above
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Notification and the subsequent Notification dated 6 th July 2011, the
Bombay High Court negatived the plea that the Central Government and
the CBEC have not “entrusted or assigned the functions of the proper
officer to the Additional Director of DRI”. It held that the Notification
dated 6th July 2011 refers to Section 17 and 28 of the Act and therefore
there was no force in the argument that DRI was not competent to issue
the SCN.
49. The judgment in Sunil Gupta v. Union of India (supra), proceeds on
the basis of the effect of Section 28(11) of the Act and that it has been
given retrospective effect. The judgment does not consider the apparent
conflict between Section 28 (11) of the Act on the one hand and
Explanation 2 to Section 28 of the Act on the other hand. It proceeds on
the basis that Section 28 (11) validates all actions taken prior to 8 th April
2011 and that Section 28 (11) is a valid exercise of legislative power.
50. In dealing with Explanation 2, the Bombay High Court observed: “the
Explanation 2 clarifies that they will proceed in terms of the un-amended
provision. The position dealt with by insertion of Section 28(11) is
distinct and that is about competence of the officer”. There was no
attempt made at reconciling the contradictory positions emerging from
Explanation 2 to Section 28 and Section 28(11) of the Act. In the
considered view of the Court, the decision of the Bombay High Court
fails to address the essential problem in allowing Explanation 2 to Section
28 to remain in the statute book even while Section 28(11) was inserted.
The concept of a 'proper officer'
51. It was urged by Mr. Dubey that while Section 28(11) talks of the
officers who are competent to deal with the questions of the powers of
assessment under Section 17, Explanation 2 to Section 28 did not. It
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
merely talks about the subject matter namely non-levy, short levy or
erroneous refund. According to him, for determining which officer is
competent to undertake the exercise in such a situation, reference has to
be made necessarily only to Section 28(11) which opens with a nonobstante clause. It talks of persons appointed as Customs Officers even
prior to 6th July 2011. Therefore, even the issue of non-levy, short levy or
erroneous refund which arose prior to 8th April 2011 would be governed
by Section 28 of the Act as it stood prior to that date. It would not affect
the competence of the officers of the DRI or the DGCEI whose
competence has been recognised by Section 28(11) of the Act. According
to him, therefore, the two provisions were reconcilable.
52. There is merit in the contention of the Petitioners regarding assigning
of functions to an officer of the Customs for the purposes of designating
him as a „proper officer‟. Section 2(34) specifically talks of an officer of
Customs being assigned functions by the CBEC or by the Commissioner
of Customs. If all officers of the Customs appointed as such prior to 6th
July 2011 are deemed to be „proper officers‟, then the administrative
chaos that is likely to result, as was pointed out in the Sayed Ali case,
would persist. The powers conferred would be overbroad since it would
be without any territorial or pecuniary jurisdictional limit. This type of a
validation, therefore, does not remove the defect pointed out in the Sayed
Ali case.
53. There are two specific assignments of functions in the present context.
One is the assignment of the functions under Section 17 and the other is
the power of reassessment under Section 28 of the Act. The mere
empowering of officers as „proper officers‟ will not tantamount to
“assigning them any specific function of every assessment or
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
reassessment” even if it is taken that because the power of assessment
under Section 17 has been mentioned there should have been a „deemed
assignment of that power. Clearly, such power of assessment has to be in
relation to a territorial or pecuniary jurisdictional limit.
The scope of the Validation Act
54. In this context a brief discussion of what a validation legislation is
expected to do is required to be examined. It is perfectly possible and
valid for the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the Court
which examines and pronounces on the constitutional validity of a statute.
In The Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. The Buckingham
and Carnatic Co. Ltd. 1969 (2) SCC 55, a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court explained that in order to remove the defects pointed out,
the legislature can make what has been called „small repairs‟. The Court
pointed out that giving retrospective effect to such curing of the defect
“outweighs the individual‟s interest in benefitting from the defect”. In
that case, the imposition of tax retrospectively by enacting the Madras
Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 after removing the defect pointed out while
striking down an earlier version of the Act was held to be not
unreasonable.
55. However, what is essential is that the defect pointed out must be
totally removed. In Krishnamurthi and Co. v. State of Madras (1973) 1
SCC 75 it was explained as under:
“It is axiomatic that the Government needs revenue to
carry on the administration and fulfil its obligation to the
citizens. For that purpose it resorts to taxation. The total
amount needed is apportioned under different heads. The
fiscal enactments brought on the statute book in that
connection are sometimes challenged by the tax payer in
courts of law. The courts then scrutinise the legal
provision to decide whether the levy of tax is legally
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
valid or suffers from some infirmity. In case the court
comes to the conclusion that the levy of tax is not valid
as the legal provision enacted for this purpose does not
warrant the levy of tax imposed because of some defect
in phraseology or other infirmity, the Legislature quite
often passes an amending and validating Act. The object
of such an enactment is to remove and rectify the defect
in phraseology or lacuna of other nature and also to
validate the proceedings, including realisation of tax,
which have taken place in pursuance of the infirmity.
Such an amending and validating Act in the very nature
of things has a retrospective operation. Its aim is to
effectuate and carry out the object for which the earlier
principal Act had been enacted. Such an amending and
validating Act to make “small repairs” is a permissible
mode of legislation and is frequently resorted to in fiscal
enactments.”
56. In Vijay Mills Company Limited v. State of Gujarat (1993) 1 SCC
345, the above principles were reiterated in the following passage:
“[T]here are different modes of validating the provisions
of the Act retrospectively, depending upon the intention
of the legislature in that behalf. Where the Legislature
intends that the provisions of the Act themselves should
be deemed to have been in existence from a particular
date in the past and thus to validate the actions taken in
the past as if the provisions concerned were in existence
from the earlier date, the Legislature makes the said
intention clear by the specific language of the validating
Act. It is open for the Legislature to change the very
basis of the provisions retrospectively and to validate the
actions on the changed basis.”
57. In Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan (2003) 5 SCC 298, the Court
explained the device of enacting a validation statute in the following
words:
“14. ...It is well settled that Parliament and State
Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation within
the fields assigned to them and subject to some
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
constitutional limitations, can legislate prospectively as
well as retrospectively. This power to make retrospective
legislation enables the legislature to validate prior
executive and legislative Acts retrospectively after curing
the defects that led to their invalidation and thus makes
ineffective judgments of competent courts declaring the
invalidity. It is also well settled that a validating Act may
even make ineffective judgments and orders of
competent courts provided it, by retrospective legislation,
removes the cause of invalidity or the basis that had led
to those decisions.”
...
“25. ...[I]t is open to the legislature to alter the law
retrospectively,
provided the alteration is made in
such a manner that it would no more be possible for the
Court to arrive at the same verdict. In other words, the
very premise of the earlier judgment should be
uprooted, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of
the circumstances upon which it was founded.”
58. In Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 588,
the above principles were reiterated and it was further emphasised that
“public interest at large is one of the relevant considerations in
determining the constitutional validity of a retrospective legislation”.
59. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003)
3 SCC 57, emphasis was laid on harmonising two seemingly conflicting
provisions in order to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy either
within a section or between two different sections of the same statute.
This was a further development of the principles of harmonising the two
conflicting provisions explained in Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain
AIR 1997 SC 1006 as under:
"(1) It is the duty of the Courts to avoid a head on clash
between two Sections of the Act and to construe the
provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other
in such a manner as to harmonise them.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
(2) The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be
used to defeat the other provisions unless the Court, in
spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them.
(3) It has to be borne in mind by all the Courts all the
time that when there are two conflicting provisions in an
Act, which cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, is possible, effect should be
given to both. This is the essence of the rule of
“harmonious construction”.
(4) The Courts have also to keep in mind that an
interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a
“dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious
construction.
(5) To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision
or to render it otiose”.
60. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirumagal Mills Ltd. (1972) 1 SCC 176,
it was explained as under:
“The principle which has been laid down clearly is that
validation of tax which has been declared to be illegal
may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity
are capable of being removed and are in fact removed.
Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction
where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before.
Sometimes this is achieved by re-enacting retrospectively
a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction
making the tax already collected to stand under the reenacted law. The Legislature can give its own meaning
and interpretation of the law under which the tax was
collected and by legislative that makes the new meaning
binding upon the Courts. None of these methods has been
adopted in the present case. See Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd.
v. Broach Borough Municipality”.
61. Keeping the above principles in mind when Section 28 has been reW.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
casted by Act 8 of 2011 with effect from 8th April 2011 read with Section
28(11) which was introduced by the Customs (Amendment and
Validation) Act, 2011 with effect from 16th September 2011, the position
that emerges is as under:
(i) Section 28(11) states that all persons appointed as Customs
Officers prior to 6th July 2011 will be deemed to always have had
the power of assessment under Section 17 and shall be deemed to
always have been „proper officers‟. Further, this is notwithstanding
anything to the contrary in any judgment, decree or order of any
Court of law. While the said provision is intended to overcome the
defect pointed out in the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Sayed Ali case, Section 28(11) of the Act does not state that it
would operate notwithstanding anything contained either in the Act
or any other Act for the time being in force. In other words, the
legislature has not made it explicit that Section 28(11) would
prevail notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation 2 to
Section 28 of the Act.
(ii) On the contrary, Explanation 2 which, as it presently stands,
appears after Section 28(11) of the Act as already stood enacted
with effect from 8th April 2011 opens with the words „for the
removal of doubts‟. It is made clear that non-levy, short-levy or
erroneous refund prior to 8th April 2011 would be governed by
Section 28 “as it stood immediately before the date on which such
assent is received”.
(iii) Section 28(11), as it presently stands, was not in the statute
book prior to 8th April 2011. Therefore, no reference can be made
to Section 28(11) of the Act for determining not only the procedure
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
but the very basis on which a non-levy, short-levy or erroneous
refund occurring prior to 8th April 2011 should be dealt with.
(iv) Prior to 8th April 2011 and even subsequent thereto, only a
„proper officer‟ who has been „assigned‟ specific functions by the
CBEC or the Commissioner as amended by Section 2(34) of the
Act could undertake the task of non-levy, short-levy or erroneous
refund. Therefore, for any non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund
prior to 8th April 2011, an officer of the Customs who has not been
specifically assigned such function in terms of the Act cannot
exercise such power.
(v) Section 28(11) therefore, does not validate the show cause
notices issued by the DRI, DGCEI Officers who are not „proper
officers‟ for the purposes of Section 2(34) of the Act if it amounted
to undertaking any assessment or re-assessment of a non-levy,
short-levy or erroneous refund prior to 8th April 2011.
(vi) It is only for a period between 8th April 2011 and 6th July 2011
that such deemed „proper officer‟ can be said to have been given
retrospective power to deal with non-levy, short-levy or erroneous
refund for any period subsequent to 8th April 2011, i.e., the date on
which Section 28(11) read with Explanation 2 could be said to
have come into force.
Section 28 (11) gives untrammelled power
62. There is merit in the contention that Section 28(11) is overbroad in as
much as it confers jurisdiction on a plurality of officers on the same
subject matter which would result in chaos, harassment, contrary and
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
conflicting decisions. Such untrammelled power would indeed be
arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
63. A reference requires to be made at this stage to the decision in Sri
Balaji Rice Company v. Commercial Tax Officer (supra). In that case,
the challenge was to the validity of a government order issued by the
Government of Andhra Pradesh whereby Assistant Commissioners and
Commercial Tax Officers (Intelligence) were empowered to exercise
powers of assessment over the entire State of Andhra Pradesh. In other
words, the powers are not restrictive to serve local areas in respect of
which under Section 4 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act,
1957, they could exercise powers. It was in the above context the Andhra
Pradesh High Court observed that “If plurality of officers are invested
with the powers of assessing the same dealer, it will result in great
hardship and inconvenience to the dealers in travelling to the offices of
different officers and producing accounts before different officers and
will greatly handicap the dealers in making their representations and it
will also lead to conflicting and contradictory orders of assessment”.
Accordingly, the Notification allocating jurisdiction to the Assistant
Commissioners and Commercial Tax Officers (Intelligence) over the
entire State of Andhra Pradesh were held to be ultra vires the power of
the Commissioner.
64. In Sivaramakrishnan v. State of Kerala (supra), it was observed as
under:
“34. The existence of a multiplicity of officers of the same status
exercising power over the same area can lead to chaos and
confusion and conflicting orders. It may even lead to multiplicity
of proceedings regarding the same subject matter causing hardship
and inconvenience to dealers. Questions may also arise as to who
should be the revisional or appellate authority in relation to a
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
particular proceeding. Section 3(2) has therefore advisedly limited
the area of operation of any particular officer to certain local limits,
and not unlimited throughout the State. The conferment of such
power throughout the State is not therefore in consonance with
Section 3(2) and is ultra vires the said provision.
35. A provision similar to Section 3(2), namely Section 4 of the
Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 was considered by a
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Ramachandra
Rao and Jagannadha Rao, JJ.) in Sri Balaji Rice Company v.
Commercial Tax Officer and it was held at page 304 that any
fixation of the territorial jurisdiction of an officer which is not
limited to local limits but extends to the whole of the State of
Andhra Pradesh was clearly ultra vires the powers conferred on
Government under Section 4. Reliance was placed on the
observations of Beaumont, C. J. speaking for the Bench in
Dayaldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income Tax which was a
case under Section 4 of the Income Tax Act, 1992. The Bench also
held that the conferment of concurrent jurisdiction on several
officers in respect of the same area was likely to result in
discriminatory consequences, resulting in violation of Article 14. I
am in agreement with this reasoning.”
65. The attempt by the Department to refer to the SOR to justify
overlooking Explanation 2 in favour of Section 28(11) cannot be possibly
countenanced. The statute has to be read for what it actually states. It is
only where there is some ambiguity which requires clarification that a
reference can be made to the SOR as an external aid of construction.
However, there cannot be a presumption of validity by reference to such
SOR. (See Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v. Krishna Rangnath
Mudholkar AIR 1963 SC 703 para 20)
Effect of Section 28 (11)
66. The mere fact that Section 28(11) has been given retrospective effect
does not solve the essential problem pointed out by the Supreme Court in
the Sayed Ali case, which is the absence of the assigning of functions to
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
„proper officers‟ under Section 2(34) of the Act. The even more serious
problem is the impossibility of reconciling two contradictory provisions,
viz., Explanation 2 to Section 28 and Section 28(11) of the Act.
67. The words 'this Section' in the newly inserted sub-section (11) of
Section 28 obviously refers to Section 28 as enacted with effect from 8th
April 2011 and not the Section 28 which existed prior to that date. The
effect of Section 28(11) is to treat all officers of the Customs to be
„proper officers‟ only for the purposes of new Section 28 of the Act and
not the earlier Section 28 of the Act. In particular, there is no validation
of the SCNs issued prior to the amendment of Section 28 of the Act. As
observed in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan
(supra), a legal consequence cannot be deemed nor, therefrom, can the
events that should have preceded it. The past actions of the officers of the
DRI and DGCEI who are not designated as „proper officer‟ in issuing
SCNs for the period prior to 8th April 2011 have not been validated.
68. There is also merit in the contention of the Petitioners that Section
28(11) confers validity only on „the proper officer.‟ As explained in
Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v. Coffee Board (supra), the use of article „the‟
as opposed to „an‟ or „any‟ is indeed significant. Only officers who have
been assigned the functions of the „proper officer‟ for the purposes of
Section 17, i.e., assessment of the bills of entry can be considered as the
proper officer for the purposes of Section 28(11) of the Act. As further
explained in Shri Ishar Alloys Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd.
(supra), the article „the‟ always denotes a particular thing or person.
69. The Court also finds merit in the contention that if jurisdiction is
exercised by one officer of the Customs or of the DRI or DGCEI, it
should impliedly oust the jurisdiction of other officers over the same
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
subject matter. The doctrine of comity of jurisdiction requires that for the
proper administration of justice there should not be an overlapping of the
exercise of powers and functions. The decision of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Kenapo Textiles Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana
(supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in India Household and
Healthcare Ltd. v. LG Household and Healthcare Ltd. (supra) are
relevant in this context.
Conclusion on the effect and validity of Section 28 (11)
70.1 The net result of the above discussion is that the Department cannot
seek to rely upon Section 28(11) of the Act as authorising the officers of
the Customs, DRI, the DGCEI etc. to exercise powers in relation to nonlevy, short-levy or erroneous refund for a period prior to 8 th April 2011 if,
in fact, there was no proper assigning of the functions of reassessment or
assessment in favour of such officers who issued such SCNs since they
were not „proper officers‟ for the purposes of Section 2(34) of the Act and
further because Explanation 2 to Section 28 as presently enacted makes it
explicit that such non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund prior to 8th
April 2011 would continue to be governed only by Section 28 as it stood
prior to that date and not the newly re-cast Section 28 of the Act.
70.2 Section 28 (11) interpreted in the above terms would not suffer the
vice of unconstitutionality. Else, it would grant wide powers of
assessment and enforcement to a wide range of officers, not limited to
customs officers, without any limits as to territorial and subject matter
jurisdiction and in such event the provision would be vulnerable to being
declared unconstitutional.
70.3 As regards the period subsequent to 8th April 2011, it is evident that
if the administrative chaos as envisaged by the Supreme Court in Sayed
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Ali (supra) should not come about, there cannot be any duplicating and/or
overlapping of jurisdiction of the officers. It would have to be ensured
through proper co-ordination and administrative instructions issued by the
CBEC that once a SCN is issued specifying the adjudicating officer to
whom it is answerable, then that adjudication officer, subject to such
officer being a 'proper officer' to whom the function of assessment has
been assigned in terms of Section 2 (34) of the Act, will alone proceed to
adjudicate the SCN to the exclusion of all other officers who may have
the power in relation to that subject matter.
70.4 The question as to the constitutional validity and effect of Section 28
(11) of the Act is answered accordingly.
71. The Court next turns to the individual cases.
Sony India Pvt. Ltd.
72. Writ Petition (C) No. 8196/2013 by Sony India Private Limited is
against ten SCNs issued by the Additional Director General, DRI,
Bangalore on 12th and 15th April 2013 in respect of alleged non-levy,
short-levy or erroneous refund for period beginning with 1 st April 2008
and bearing the following numbers: DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/NDLS, DRI
F.No.S/IV/32/2011/Nhava
Mumbai,
DRI
Sheva,
DRI
F.No.S/IV/32/2011/ACC
F.No.S/IV/32/2011/ACC
Chennai,
DRI
F.No.S/IV/32/2011/Chennai Sea, DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/ACC Kolkata,
DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/Kolkata Sea, DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/Kochi,
DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/Dadri and DRI F.No.S/IV/32/2011/ACC B'lore.
73. The SCNs state the names of the Commissionerates to which the
SCNs are answerable. These were the corresponding Commissionerates
of the various places where imports took place which are the sea ports of
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Chennai, Kolkata and Bengal. This also included the ports at Nhava
Sheva, the Chennai sea port, the sea port at Kolkata and ICD at Dadri.
Subsequently however a common adjudicating authority was appointed
viz., the Commissionerate of Customs (Imports), New Delhi.
74. In light of the law explained hereinbefore, insofar as any of the above
SCNs relate to the period prior to 8th April 2011 they are clearly without
jurisdiction since the ADG, DRI could not have exercised such power for
a period prior to 8th April 2011. Further in terms of Explanation 2 to
Section 28 as has presently been enacted with effect from 8 th April 2011,
for the period prior to 8th April 2011, Section 28 of the Act as it stood
prior to that date will apply and not the new Section 28 of the Act.
75. That being the position, the proceedings pursuant to the above SCNs
issued by the ADG, DRI regarding non-levy, short-levy or erroneous
refund prior to 8th April 2011, cannot be legally sustained and are hereby
quashed. All proceedings consequent thereto are also hereby quashed.
However, insofar as the SCNs cover the period subsequent to 8th April
2011, the adjudication proceedings shall go on in accordance with law.
76. Writ Petition (C) No. 8196/2013 and the pending application, if any,
are accordingly disposed of.
Mangali Impex Ltd.
77. The prayer in W.P. (C) No. 441 of 2013 by Mangali Impex Ltd. is for
quashing of the SCN dated 31st October 2003 issued under Section
28/124 of the Act.
78. The petition has a long history beginning with samples having been
drawn from 27 consignments of Calcium Stearate that were exported by
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
the Petitioner as well as J.K. Impex between November 1998 and January
1999. The Special Intelligence and Investigation Branch („SIIB‟), which
is a unit of the Customs Department, raided the premises of the Petitioner
and the residence of its Director on 9th August 2000 on the basis that the
export consignment was of Calcium Carbonate and not Calcium Stearate.
The Director of the Petitioner was taken into custody and series of
investigations and criminal cases ensued. Later on 3rd February 2006, a
closure report filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation („CBI‟) was
accepted by the concerned Court.
79. As far as the SCN issued to the Petitioner by the Assistant
Commissioner of Customs, SIIB was concerned, a petition being Writ
Petition (C) No. 4167/2011 was filed in this Court challenging it. One of
the main grounds urged therein was that the officer who issued the SCN
was not properly authorised to do so. The said writ petition was disposed
of by recording statement of learned counsel for the Petitioner that he has
no objection if the assessment proceedings are taken to their logical
conclusion.
80. It is stated in the present writ petition that the Petitioner was given the
liberty to challenge the constitutional validity of Section 28(11) of the
Act. Indeed, in the order dated 19th May 2012, the Court noted that the
Petitioner had contended that Section 28(11) of the Act is
unconstitutional and observed “it is open to the Petitioner to challenge
constitutional validity of the said sub-section in accordance with law. In
view of the narration of Section 11 to Section 28 of the Act, the present
writ petition to this extent is infructuous”. It is pursuant to the above
observation that the present writ petition was filed in which notice was
issued on 28th January 2013.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
81. The orders passed by the Court on 28th January 2013 and 4th February
2013 have already been adverted to. It was made clear by the Court that
the adjudicating authority may pass an adjudication order but such order
will not be given effect to. The difference between this petition and the
one by Sony India Private Limited is that the impugned SCN in the
present case has been issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs,
SIIB under Section 124 of the Act. The fact, however, remains that the
Assistant Commissioner, SIIB was not empowered or assigned the
function of a „proper officer‟ under Section 2(34) of the Act at the time he
issued the SCN. Consequently, the observations of the Supreme Court in
the Sayed Ali (supra) case will clearly apply to the case at hand.
82. In view of the aforesaid discussion in the main portion of the
judgment, the Department cannot seek to rely on Section 28(11) of the
Act to validate the SCN issued by the Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, SIIB to the Petitioner on 31st October 2003. As has already been
held by the Court, Section 28 (11) of the Act cannot validate SCNs or
proceedings pursuant thereto in relation to non-levy, short-levy or
erroneous refund for a period prior to 8th April 2011 if such SCNs have
been issued or proceedings conducted by officers of the Customs, DRI or
DGCEI or as in the present case by the SIIB, who are not 'proper officers'
within the meaning of Section 2 (34) of the Act. In that view of the
matter, the SCN issued to the Petitioner on 31 st October 2003 and all
proceedings pursuant thereto are hereby quashed.
83. W.P. (C) No. 441 of 2013 and the pending application, if any, are
disposed of in the above terms.
M/s. Lakshman Overseas
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
84. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 1185/2013 by M/s. Lakshman
Overseas, M/s V-4 Manufacturing Co., M/s Everest Exports and Mr.
Ashwani Aggarwal is to an impugned SCN dated 30th April 2010 issued
to the Petitioner by the ADG, DRI, Delhi pursuant to a search conducted
at the residential premises of Petitioner No.4 Mr. Ashwani Aggarwal on
8th September 2005.
85. In the petition there is also a challenge to a subsequent notice issued
to Petitioner No. 4 on 12th February 2013 asking him to attend the hearing
pursuant to the above SCN. The challenge to the SCN is essentially on
the ground that Respondent No. 3 was not authorised to issue such SCN
as he was not a „proper officer‟ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of
the Act.
86. By the order dated 22nd February 2013 while issuing notice in the
present petition, the Court directed that the adjudication order will not be
given effect to.
87. A counter affidavit has been filed in the present writ petition where it
is denied that at the time when the SCN was issued i.e. 30 th April 2010,
the ADG, DRI was not assigned the function of assessment under Section
17 and reassessment under Section 28 of the Act and was, therefore, not a
„proper officer‟ for the purposes of Section 2(34) of the Act.
88. For the reasons already explained, the recourse to Section 28(11) of
the Act as introduced with effect from 8th July 2011 cannot be had to
validate the impugned SCN particularly in view of Explanation 2 to
Section 28 as it presently stands.
89. Consequently, the Court quashes the impugned SCN dated 18 th April
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
2010, and SCN dated 12th February 2013 and all proceedings consequent
thereto. Writ Petition (C) No. 1185/2013 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Pace International
90. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 7383/2013 by Pace
International is to a SCN dated 9th March 2011 issued by the
Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) to the Petitioner pursuant to the
putting on hold various consignments of woollen carpets sought to be
exported by the Petitioner on 10th November 2010 at the ICD, Patparganj,
New Delhi. The challenge is also to the Circular dated 29th September
2011 issued pursuant to the insertion of sub-section 11 to Section 28.
91. It is stated that the said SCN was initially adjudicated upon by the
Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) who by an order dated 3rd
October 2012 sustained the demand raised against the Petitioner.
92. The appeal filed by the Petitioner against the said order was allowed
by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal („CESTAT‟)
by an order dated 29th July 2013 applying the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Sayed Ali (supra) case.
93. Thereafter, on enactment of Section 28(11) of the Act, a Circular
dated 23rd September 2011 was issued seeking to validate the actions
prior to 6th July 2011. A fresh SCN was issued under Section 124 of the
Act on 9th March 2011 by the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive).
94. While directing notice to be issued in the present petition, the Court
directed that the adjudication order will not be given effect to.
95. In light of what has been held in the earlier part of the present
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
judgment, it is clear that in relation to the events that took place prior to
8th April 2011 no SCN could have been issued to the Petitioner by the
Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) who admittedly is not a „proper
officer‟ in terms of the Section 2(34) of the Act. Section 28(11) of the Act
cannot be resorted to for validating the said SCN and proceedings
pursuant thereto.
96. Consequently, the Court quashes the impugned SCN dated 9 th March
2011 and the subsequent Circular dated 23rd September 2011 issued by
the Department consequent upon the enactment of Section 28 (11) of the
Act. Writ Petition (C) No. 7383/2013 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
K.S. Traders
97. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 211/2014 by M/s. K.S. Traders
is to a SCN dated 30th January 2004 issued by the ADG, DRI to the
Petitioner alleging over invoicing and recovery of draw back under Rules
16 and 16-A of the Customs & Central Excise Duty Draw Back Rules,
1995 read with Sections 75(1), 76(1) (b) and 75-A(2) of the Act.
98. This was in relation to export of readymade garments made by the
Petitioner to Russia in the period between June 1999 and June 2002. It is
not in dispute that at the time impugned SCN was issued, the ADG, DRI
who issued it, was not a „proper officer‟ in terms of Section 2(34) of the
Act as well as for the purposes of Section 28 of the Act.
99. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court quashes impugned SCN
dated 30th January 2004 and all proceedings consequent thereto. Writ
Petition (C) No. 211/2014 and the pending application, if any, are
disposed of in the above terms.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited
100. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 225/2014 by Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Ltd. (BSNL) is to a SCN dated 3rd April 2013 issued by the DRI,
Delhi to BSNL as well as an order dated 23rd May 2013 passed by the
Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) under Section 4 of the Act
assigning several cases including the case on hand to the Commissioner
of Customs (Import & General) for the purposes of adjudication under
Section 4 of the Act and consequent order dated 16th December 2013
passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Import & General).
101. The brief facts are that BSNL invited tenders for planning,
engineering, supply, installation, testing and commissioning etc. of
2G/3G Combo Network (Phase V) under tender dated 22nd March 2006.
Ericsson India Private Limited („EIPL‟) was declared as the successful
bidder and an advance purchase order was issued by BSNL. Purchase
orders were placed by the BSNL in each of the circles on the basis of
requirements etc. BSNL filed bills of entry for deposit of customs duty.
102. Suspecting that there was collusion between BSNL and EIPL by
suppressing the fact of importing the software required for the hardware
thereby suppressing the true value of the hardware and evading the
customs duty payable on the software relatable to hardware, a search was
conducted in the premises of EIPL which led to issuance of the SCN
dated 3rd April 2013.
103. Pursuant to the notice issued in the present petition, a counter
affidavit was filed by the DRI. There is no denial of the fact that at the
time when the SCN was issued to the Petitioner by the DRI there was no
assignment of the functions of assessment or reassessment under the Act
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
in favour of the DRI in so far as it pertains to events that occurred prior to
8th April 2011.
104. For the reasons explained hereinbefore, Section 28(11) of the Act
cannot be relied upon to validate the SCN issued in relation to non-levy,
short-levy or erroneous refund for a period prior to 8th April 2011 by
officers of the DRI even subsequent to the deeming fiction brought about
by Section 28(11) of the Act.
105. Consequently, the Court quashes the impugned SCN dated 3rd April
2013 and all proceedings consequent thereto including the impugned
orders dated 23rd May 2013 and 16th December 2013.
106. Writ Petition (C) No. 225/2014 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
Sennheiser Electronics India Pvt. Ltd.
107. The SCN under challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 863/2014 by
Sennheiser Electronics India Pvt. Ltd. is dated 24th December 2011 and
was issued by the ADG, DRI in relation to alleged short levy of customs
duty for the period 28th January 2011 to 28th February 2013.
108. For the reasons already mentioned, the said SCN and all the
proceedings consequent thereto for the period from 28th January 2011 up
to 8th April 2011 cannot be sustained in law and are hereby quashed. The
adjudication proceedings as regards further period beyond 8th April 2011
will proceed in accordance with law.
109. Writ Petition (C) No. 863/2014 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Comet Impex
110. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 3803/2014 by M/s. Comet
Impex is to an impugned SCN dated 31st October 2008 issued by the
ADG, DRI, Delhi to the Petitioner in relation to reassessment of imported
goods during the period prior to 8th April 2011. The challenge is also to
the impugned Circular No. 44/2011-Cus dated 23rd September 2011
issued consequent upon the insertion of Section 28(11) of the Act.
111. Admittedly, the case pertains to a period prior to 8 th April 2011.
Further it is not in dispute that at the time when the SCN was issued, the
ADG, DRI was not assigned the functions of reassessment under Section
28 of the Act and, therefore, was not a „proper officer‟ for the purposes of
Section 2(34) of the Act.
112. For the reasons already discussed, the impugned SCN dated 31 st
October 2008 and the Circular dated 23rd September 2011 are hereby
quashed.
113. Writ Petition (C) No. 3803/2014 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
Rajesh Gupta
114. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 5262/2014 by Rajesh Gupta
is to the SCN dated 14th March 2011 issued by the ADG, DRI in relation
to alleged imports made through the ICD, Tughlakabad during the period
prior thereto.
115. In light of the above discussion, with the ADG, DRI not being the
„proper officer‟ under Section 2(34) of the Act at the time when the SCN
was issued, Section 28(11) of the Act cannot be referred to for validating
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
the acts and the SCN issued by the ADG, DRI. Since it pertains to a
period prior to 8th April 2011 it is governed entirely by Section 28 as it
originally stood, i.e., prior to 8th April 2011.
116. In that view of the matter, the Court quashes the impugned SCN
dated 14th March 2011 issued by the ADG, DRI and all proceedings
pursuant thereto.
117. Writ Petition (C) No. 5262/2014 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
Daikin Airconditioning India Private Ltd.
118. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 5877/2014 by Daikin
Airconditioning India Pvt. Ltd. is to one consolidated SCN dated 29th
May 2014 was issued to the Petitioner for alleged short levy during the
period 27th May 2009 to July 2013.
119. There are three separate Commissionerates at Nhava Sheva, Chennai
and Kolkata to which the Petitioner has been made answerable in terms of
the said SCN.
120. As far as the period involved covers the period 27 th May 2009 to 8th
April 2011, it cannot be sustained in law since during the said period the
ADG, DRI had no power of assessment or reassessment. To that extent
the impugned SCN and all proceedings pursuant thereto for the period
prior to 8th April 2011 are hereby quashed. However, for the period
subsequent to 8th April 2011 the proceedings may go on in accordance
with law.
121. Writ Petition (C) No. 5877/2014 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
122. The prayer in Writ Petition (C) No. 4162/2015 filed by Godrej and
Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. is inter alia to the SCN dated 2nd April
2009 issued by the DRI and for declaring Section 28(11) of the Act to be
constitutionally invalid. Reference is made to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Sayed Ali (supra).
123. It is not in dispute that at the time the SCN was issued, the DG, DRI
or any other officer of the DRI was not specifically assigned the task of
reassessment and, therefore, was not a „proper officer‟ under Section
2(24) of the Act. Accordingly, the impugned SCN and all proceedings
consequent thereto are hereby quashed.
124. Writ Petition (C) No. 4162/2015
and the pending application, if
any, are hereby quashed.
Satyam Marketing Through: Its Proprietor
125. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 4841/2015 by M/s. Satyam
Marketing is to an SCN dated 2nd December 2013 issued by the ADG,
DRI to the Petitioner in relation to 190 bills of entry for the period prior
to 8th April 2011. A list of the bills of entry for the period prior to 8 th
April 2011 has been appended to as Annexure B to the SCN. The ADG,
DRI who issued the SCN was admittedly not a „proper officer‟ for the
purposes of Section 2(34) of the Act.
126. Consequently, the impugned SCN dated 2 nd December 2013 and all
proceedings consequent thereto to the extent they pertain to the period
prior to 8th April 2011 are hereby quashed. The proceedings for the
subsequent period may go on in accordance with law.
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
127. Writ Petition (C) No. 4841/2015 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
Manoj Saboo @ Manoj Maheshwari
128. In light of the decision in Satyam Marketing v. Union of India
(W.P. (C) No. 4841/2015), the SCN dated 2nd December 2013 issued by
the ADG, DRI to the Petitioner Manoj Saboo and all proceedings
pursuant thereto, which have been challenged in the present Writ Petition
(C) No. 5191/2015 are hereby quashed to the extent they pertain to the
period prior to 8th April 2011. The proceedings for the subsequent period
may go on in accordance with law.
129. Writ Petition (C) No. 5191/2015 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
Hansraj Bhatia & Co. through its Proprietor Shri Sanjeev Bhatia
130. The challenge in Writ Petition (C) No. 9379/2015 by Hansraj Bhatia
& Co. is to the SCN dated 12th March 2014 issued by the ADG, DRI in
relation to imports made for the period 24th June 2009 to 8th April 2011.
While 8 bills of entry pertain to ICD, Tughlakabad, 6 pertain to Mumbai
Port and 2 pertain to ICD, Mulund in Bombay.
131. For the reasons already explained, the said SCN is unsustainable in
law and the said SCN and all proceedings pursuant thereto are hereby
quashed.
132. Writ Petition (C) No. 9379/2015 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
M/s. J. R. International
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
133. The SCN impugned in the present petition Writ Petition (C) No.
11041/2015 by M/s. J. R. International is dated 7th November 2013 issued
by the ADG, DRI. This, however, pertains to bills of entry in relation to
imports of „Narrow Woven Fabrics‟ from China during the period 8 th
November 2008 to 30th November 2010, i.e., a period prior to 8th April
2011.
134. For the reasons already discussed, the said SCN dated 7 th November
2013 and all proceedings consequent thereto are hereby quashed.
135. Writ Petition (C) No. 11041/2015 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Cortel India
136. The challenge in this Writ Petition (C) No. 11285/2015 by Cortel
India is to a SCN dated 9th June 2014 issued by the ADG, DRI invoking
Section 124 of the Act and Section 28 read with Section 9A of the
Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in relation to the imports of Color Picture
Tubes made through the ICD, Tughlakabad as well as ICD, Dadri for the
period May 2009 to January 2011.
137. For the reasons already mentioned, the said impugned SCN and all
proceedings pursuant thereto are unsustainable in law and are hereby
quashed.
138. Writ Petition (C) No. 11285/2015 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Bhagwati Components Manufacturing Co. through its Director Mr.
Surjit Singh
139. The challenge in this Writ Petition (C) No. 11806/2015 by Bhagwati
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
Components Manufacturing Co. is to an SCN dated 10th September 2004
issued by the ADG, DRI in relation to the alleged mis-declaration of
value of export of Alloy Steel Forgings (Machined) from ICD,
Tughlakabad and CFS, Patparganj by the Petitioner for the purpose of
availing higher DEPB credit for the period prior to 8th April 2011;
Adjudication Order dated 18th December 2009 passed by Commissioner
of Customs (Adjudication) and order dated 4th September 2015 by the
CESTAT consequent thereto.
140. For the reasons already mentioned, the impugned SCN and all
proceedings consequent thereto stand hereby quashed.
141. Writ Petition (C) No. 11806/2015 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Eastron Overseas Inc.
142. The challenge in this Writ Petition (C) No. 11853/2015 by Eastron
Overseas Inc. is to a SCN bearing F. No. 23/17/2011-DZU(Eastron)/5951
(Show cause notice No. 50/2014) dated 20th November 2014 issued by
the ADG, DRI under Section 124 of the Customs Act read with Section
9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 in relation to import of Color Picture
Tubes in the year 2010.
143. For the reasons already mentioned, the impugned SCN and all
proceedings consequent thereto are unsustainable in law and hereby set
aside.
144. Writ Petition (C) No. 11853/2015 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Divya Electronics
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
145. The challenge in this Writ Petition (C) No. 11854/2015 by Divya
Electronics is to a SCN bearing F. No. 23/17/2011-DZU(Anju &
Divya)/4805 (Show cause notice No. 47/2014) dated 23rd September 2014
issued to the Petitioner by the ADG, DRI in relation to Color Picture
Tubes imported from January 2009 to February 2011.
146. For the reasons already mentioned, the impugned SCN and all
proceedings consequent thereto are unsustainable in law and hereby set
aside.
147. Writ Petition (C) No. 11854/2015 and the pending application, if
any, are disposed of in the above terms.
Rajesh Tripathi
148. The facts of this Writ Petition (C) No. 563/2016 are that searches
were conducted in the residential premises of the Petitioner Rajesh
Tripathi who is the publisher/owner/controller of Ghaziabad Samasya,
Bharat Samasya and Aaj Ki Roshni all newsprint and Light Weight
Coated („LCW‟) paper on 28th December 2005 on intelligence that the
said parties were evading customs duty by allegedly mis-declaring and
undervaluing the import in connivance with the various Registrars of
Newspapers in India. Consequent thereto, a SCN bearing DRI F No.
23/118/2005-DZU-Ghaziabad Samasya was issued on 17th December
2007 by the DRI to be adjudicated by the Commissioner of Customs. This
resulted in an adjudication order passed by the Commissioner of Customs
confirming the demand. The appeal filed before the CESTAT against the
said order is still pending and the CESTAT has required the Petitioner to
deposit the 10% duty amount as a pre-deposit.
149. In as much as the SCN was issued by the ADG, DRI who at the time
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
of issuance of the said SCN had not been assigned functions by the CBEC
of assessment or reassessment and, therefore, is not a „proper officer‟
under Section 2(34) of the Act. The impugned SCN and all proceedings
consequent thereto are hereby stand quashed.
150. Writ Petition (C) No. 563/2016 and the pending application, if any,
are disposed of in the above terms.
S.MURALIDHAR, J
VIBHU BAKHRU, J
MAY 3, 2016
Rm
W.P. (C) 441/2013 & connected matters
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