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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 21.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 29.09.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 29.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010450702026
W.P.(C) 13883/2026, CM APPL. 64918/2026, CM APPL.
64919/2026, CM APPL. 64920/2026 and CM APPL.
64921/2026
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
versus
COMMISSIONER, ADJUDICATION, CGST DELHI WEST
AND ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010877412024
W.P.(C) 16623/2024 and CM APPL. 70347/2024
DIPANSHU AGGARWAL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manorath Rathi, Mr.
Rakesh Jain and Ms. Vijay
Laxmi Rathi, Advs.
versus
COMMISSIONER OF GOODS AND SERVICE TAX,
CENTRAL TAX, (DELHI WEST) & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010882432024
W.P.(C) 16685/2024 and CM APPL. 70601/2024
RAJESH AGGARWAL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manorath Rathi, Mr.
Rakesh Jain and Ms. Vijay
Laxmi Rathi, Advs.
versus
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
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COMMISSIONER OF GOODS AND SERVICE TAX
CENTRAL TAX DELHI AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010634232025
W.P.(C) 13363/2025 and CM APPL. 54793/2025
M/S SUN FLAME TRADING PVT LTD & ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Priyadarshi Manish and
Ms. Anjali J. Manish, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
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CNR No. DLHC010676232025
W.P.(C) 14149/2025
ASHISH JAIN
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shivender Sharma, Ms.
Urooj Chaudhary and Ms. Esha
Sharma, Advs.
versus
THE COMMISSIONER, DGGI ADJUDICATION, CGST. &
ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Tripathi, SSC with
Mr. Shubham Mishra and Mr.
Akshay Sagar, Advs.
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CNR No. DLHC010725072025
W.P.(C) 14747/2025, CM APPL. 60515/2025 and CM APPL.
60516/2025
RAJNISH JAIN
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Abhishek Garg & Mr. Yash
Gaiha, Advs.
versus
JOINT COMMISSIONER ADJUDICATION CGST DELHI
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
NORTH & ORS.
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.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC with
Mr. Apurv Yadav and Mr.
Naman Choula, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010725082025
W.P.(C) 14748/2025, CM APPL. 60517/2025 and CM APPL.
60518/2025
AVDHESH MITTAL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Abhishek Garg & Mr. Yash
Gaiha, Advs.
versus
JOINT COMMISSIONER ADJUDICATION CGST DELHI
NORTH & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC with
Mr. Apurv Yadav and Mr.
Naman Choula, Advs.
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CNR No. DLHC010726162025
W.P.(C) 14757/2025, CM APPL. 60736/2025 and CM APPL.
60737/2025
SANJIV KADIAN
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Abhishek Garg & Mr. Yash
Gaiha, Advs.
versus
JOINT COMMISSIONER ADJUDICATION CGST DELHI
NORTH & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC with
Mr. Apurv Yadav and Mr.
Naman Choula, Advs.
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CNR No. DLHC010726702025
W.P.(C) 14794/2025, CM APPL. 60821/2025 and CM APPL.
60822/2025
AMIT GUPTA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Abhishek Garg & Mr. Yash
Gaiha, Advs.
versus
JOINT COMMISSIONER ADJUDICATION CGST DELHI
NORTH & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC with
Mr. Apurv Yadav and Mr.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
Naman Choula, Advs.
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CNR No. DLHC010862892025
W.P.(C) 16821/2025 and CM APPL. 69126/2025
NARESH GOEL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Akhil Krishan Maggu, Mr
Vikas Sareen, Mr. Alok Kumar
Pandey, Mr. Kunal Prakash,
Ms. Oshin Maggu, Mr. Aryan
Nagpal, Mr. Harish Pal, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ravi Kant Srivastava,
Senior Panel Counsel with Mr.
Robert Laishram, Adv. for UOI.
Ms. Anushree Narain, SSC
with Mr. Apurv Yadav and Mr.
Naman Choula, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010227122025
W.P.(C) 5193/2025 and CM APPL. 23619/2025
ANIL KUMAR MISRA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sandeep Chilana, Mr.
Devansh Garg, Mr. Priyojeet
Chatterjee and Ms. Khushi
Chaurasia, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vedansh Anand, SPC with
Mr. Nipun Jain, GP for UOI
and Mr. Bhagvan Swarup
Shukla, CGSC with Ms Saumya
Srivastav Adv
Mr. Shubham Tyagi, SSCCBIC with Ms. Navruti Ojha,
Adv.
CNR No. DLHC010251262025
W.P.(C) 5643/2025 and CM APPL. 25699/2025
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
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versus
THE
COMMON
ADJUDICATING
AUTHORITY
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL TAX,
CGST DELHI WEST AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010260622025
W.P.(C) 5795/2025 and CM APPL. 26396/2025
VARUN KHANNA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Naveen Malhotra and Mr.
Ritvik Malhotra, Advs.
versus
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER CGST NEW DELHI
110066 AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
Mr. Aditya Singla, SSC.
CNR No. DLHC010279592025
W.P.(C) 6062/2025
M S ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL TRADING PVT LTD &
ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Priyadarshi Manish and
Ms. Anjali Jha Manish, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Tanvi Nigam, SPC for R1/UOI.
CNR No. DLHC010321212025
W.P.(C) 6862/2025 and CM APPL. 31095/2025
MADHAV AGARWAL
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sandeep Chilana, Mr.
Devansh Garg, Mr. Priyojeet
Chatterjee, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vedansh Anand, SPC with
Mr. Nipun Jain, GP for UOI.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
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Mr. Shubham Tyagi, SSCCBIC with Ms. Navruti Ojha,
Adv.
CNR No. DLHC010321712025
W.P.(C) 6913/2025 and CM APPL. 31279/2025
ABHIMANYU SHARMA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Priyojeet Chatterjee, Mr.
Sandeep Chilana, Mr. Devansh
Garg, Ms. Khushi Chaurasia,
Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Shubham Tyagi, SSCCBIC with Ms. Navruti Ojha,
Adv.
Mr. Himanshu Pathak, SPC
along with Mr. Mohit Gupta
Adv.
CNR No. DLHC010441592025
W.P.(C) 9864/2025, CM APPL. 41182/2025 and CM APPL.
57139/2026
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
versus
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DGGI, DZU AND ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010050562026
W.P.(C) 1964/2026 and CM APPL. 9577/2026
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
versus
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, ADJUDICATION, CGST
DELHI WEST AND ANR.
.....Respondents
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
Through:
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Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC011079542025
W.P.(C) 53/2026, CM APPL. 287/2026, CM APPL. 288/2026
and CM APPL. 289/2026
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
versus
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vedansh Anand, SPC with
Mr. Nipun Jain, GP for UOI.
Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CNR No. DLHC010011252026
W.P.(C) 573/2026 and CM APPL. 2854/2026
PARAG GARG
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chinmaya Seth, Ms. Palak
Mathur, Mr. Karanveer Singh,
Mr. Rupesh Gutpa, Advs.
versus
ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER CGST DELHI WEST AND
ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Vedansh Anand, SPC with
Mr. Nipun Jain, GP for UOI.
Mr. Anurag Ojha, SSC, Mr.
Dipak Raj, Mr. Aryaman Singh
Chouhan,
Mr.
Aditya
Chaudhary, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHARAT PARASHAR
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1. The present batch of Petitions have been filed assailing various
Show Cause Notices (SCNs) and consequential Orders-in-Original
(OIO), wherein the Petitioners have been fastened with a personal
liability in form of a penalty under Section 122 (1A) of the Central
Goods and Services Act, 20171.
2.
Admittedly, there exists a statutory alternative remedy of
Appeal under Section 107 of the Act of 2017. However, since the
present Petitions raises a substantial question of law, we deem it
appropriate to entertain the Petitions and adjudicate the questions
raised before us by way of the present judgment.
3.
The principal questions that arise for consideration in the
present batch of Petitions are as follows:
i.
Whether it is permissible to order recovery of penalty
under Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 against a non-taxable
person?
ii.
whether the penalty as envisaged under Section 122(1A)
of the Act of 2017 applies prospectively to offences committed
after 01.01.2021, the date on which the provision came into
effect?
4.
Learned counsel representing the Petitioners have filed a
common written submission in W.P.(C) 5193/2025, W.P.(C)
6862/2025 and W.P.(C) 6913/2025. Accordingly, for the purpose of
hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 2017’
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
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adjudicating the controversy arising in the present batch, the aforesaid
Petitions shall be treated as the lead cases.
BRIEF BACKGROUND:
5.
dated
Pithily put, the present Petitions arise out of a common SCN
27.07.2023,
subsequent
to
which
the
Adjudicating
Authority(AA) by way of a common OIO dated 22.01.2025 passed
under Section 74 of the Act of 2017 against M/s Worlds Window
Impex India Private Limited2, confirmed a demand on the allegation
that the Company had engaged in circular trading and had irregularly
availed Input Tax Credit (ITC) amounting to Rs. 24,99,88,069/through invoices allegedly issued without actual supply of goods.
6.
Besides confirming the demand and penalty against the
Company, the AA also imposed separate personal penalties of Rs.
24,99,88,069/- each upon the three Petitioners under Section 122(1A)
of the Act of 2017, along with a penalty of Rs.25,000/- each under
Section 125 of the Act of 2017, on the ground that they had served as
directors of the Company at different points in time.
7.
Aggrieved by the imposition of personal penalties under
Sections 122(1A) and 125 of the Act of 2017, the Petitioners have
preferred the present Petitions challenging the legality and validity of
the impugned OIO insofar as it pertains to them.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
8.
Learned counsel representing the Petitioner has made the
hereinafter referred to as ‘the Company’
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
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following submissions:
8.1
It is the case of the Petitioners that neither the SCN nor
the OIO attributes any specific act, omission, or role to them in
the alleged fraudulent transactions, and the SCN merely called
upon them to show cause as to why penalty should not be
imposed under Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, without
setting out any allegations against them individually.
8.2
Additionally, it is also the case of the Petitioners that Mr.
Madhav Agarwal and Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma were appointed as
directors to the Company only in August 2020, after the period
during which the alleged transactions took place, while Mr. Anil
Kumar Misra had resigned as director on 07.08.2020. According
to the Petitioners, they were employee-directors, were neither
promoters nor shareholders of the Company, and no finding has
been recorded that they were beneficiaries of the alleged
transactions.
8.3
The principal submission of learned counsel is that
Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is a new and independent
penal provision introduced by Section 126 of the Finance Act,
2020 with effect from 01.01.2021. It was argued that the
legislative history, including the recommendations of the 38th
GST Council Meeting, demonstrates that the provision was
enacted to fasten penal liability upon the actual beneficiaries or
masterminds of fraudulent ITC transactions, in addition to the
taxable person availing or passing on such credit.
8.4
It was further submitted that neither the Finance Bill,
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
2020 nor the Notes on Clauses conferred retrospective operation
upon Section 122(1A), whereas several other provisions of the
Finance Act, 2020 were expressly made retrospective from
01.07.2017. The Legislature, despite notifying Section 122(1A)
and other amendments through the same notification, consciously
withheld retrospective effect from Section 122(1A), thereby
evincing a clear legislative intent that the provision would
operate only prospectively from 01.01.2021.
8.5
Relying upon CIT, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Pvt.
Ltd.3, it was contended that where the Legislature prescribes a
specific date for commencement of a penal provision, the tax
administration cannot apply it to transactions preceding its
enforcement.
8.6
In addition to the aforestated, with respect to the
application of the Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, it has been
argued that the provision having come into force only on
01.01.2021, could not be invoked in respect of transactions
undertaken prior thereto, as such retrospective application would
offend Article 20(1) of the Constitution. Reliance was placed
upon CCE, Ahmedabad v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd.4, and Ritesh
Agarwal and Anr. v. SEBI and Ors.5, to contend that a penal
liability which was not in existence on the date of the alleged act
could not be retrospectively imposed merely because the
provision formed part of a fiscal statute. It was further submitted
(2015) 1 SCC 1
(2004) 1 SCC 597
(2008) 8 SCC 205
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
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that the issue stood directly considered in Amit Manilal Haria
and Ors. v. Joint Commissioner, CGST and Central Excise and
Anr.6, wherein Section 122(1A) was held inapplicable to acts
preceding 01.01.2021.
8.7
It was contended that, in the present case, the alleged
transactions/availment pertained to the period from 01.07.2017 to
31.03.2019, or at the highest up to 30.08.2020, with no alleged
availment continuing after 01.01.2021. Consequently, the
subsequent issuance of the SCN and the OIO could not
retrospectively create a penal liability.
8.8
Learned counsel also sought to distinguish Bhupender
Kumar v. Additional Commissioner (Adjudication), CGST and
Ors.7, on the ground that the decision proceeded on the finding of
a continuing process, whereas no such continuing availment was
alleged in the present case.
8.9
Learned counsel further submitted that, in any event, the
Company’s statutory GST returns establish that no outward
supplies were made, and no ITC was availed after 01.01.2021.
Consequently, there was no transaction after the commencement
of Section 122(1A) to which the provision could be applied.
8.10
It was also argued that the jurisdictional requirements for
invocation of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 are wholly
absent. The provision applies only where the person proceeded
against has retained the benefit of the impugned transaction and
2026 SCC OnLine Bom 1510
2025 SCC Online Delhi 4848
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
W.P.(C) 13883/2026 & connected matters
14:43:52
the transaction was undertaken at such person’s instance. Neither
the SCN nor the OIO alleges or establishes that any of the
Petitioners retained any benefit, directed the transactions, or
acted as the beneficiary or mastermind behind the alleged
availment of ITC. The Petitioners, it was submitted, were merely
employee-directors and neither promoters nor shareholders of the
Company.
8.11
It was also contended that the impugned SCN and OIO
are violative of the principles of natural justice, as they contain
no specific allegations regarding the individual role, participation
or culpability of any Petitioner. It was submitted that the AA
proceeded solely on the basis of their designation as directors and
failed to consider their replies and submissions, rendering the
OIO a non-speaking order suffering from non-application of
mind.
8.12
Lastly, it was submitted that the AA has imposed
penalties equal to the entire alleged inadmissible ITC not only
upon the Company but also separately upon each of the three
Petitioners under Section 122(1A), resulting in multiple penalties
arising out of the same alleged transaction. Such simultaneous
imposition, without establishing an independent statutory basis or
individual culpability for each Petitioner, was argued to be
arbitrary, disproportionate and contrary to the scheme of the Act
of 2017.
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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9.
Per contra, learned counsel representing the Respondent has
made the following submissions:
9.1
At the outset, it has been argued that the applicability of
Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act to the facts of a particular
case, including the correctness of the penalty imposed
thereunder, falls within the jurisdiction of the adjudicating and
appellate authorities constituted under the Act. Since no
challenge has been raised to the constitutional validity of Section
122(1A) of the Act of 2017, the Petitioner ought to avail the
statutory remedies under Sections 73/74, 107, 108 and 111 of the
Act of 2017. Reliance was placed on Mafatlal Industries Ltd.
And Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.8.
9.2
It was further submitted that the present case involves, at
best, an alleged erroneous exercise of jurisdiction and not a want
of jurisdiction. Relying on Embassy Property Developments Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.9, it was contended that such
errors are amenable to correction in the statutory appellate
hierarchy and do not warrant exercise of writ jurisdiction so as to
bypass the efficacious alternative remedy.
9.3
Learned counsel argued that Section 122(1A) of the Act
of 2017 does not operate retrospectively merely because the
conduct to which it applies may have commenced prior to its
introduction. The underlying acts, which are fraudulent availment
or passing on of ITC and issuance or use of invoices without
(1997) 5 SCC 536
(2020) 13 SCC 308
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corresponding supply, were already prohibited under the Act of
2017.
9.4
Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 merely prescribes a
specific penal consequence for such contraventions and does not
impair any vested right of the taxpayer. Reliance was placed on
Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra10, Shanti Conductors (P)
Ltd. and Anr. v. Assam SEB and Ors.11, and Zile Singh v. State
of Haryana and Ors.12, to argue that a provision is not
retrospective merely because some facts antecedent to its
enactment are relevant to its operation; the determinative
consideration is whether it affects completed transactions, vested
rights or imposes a new disability in respect of past conduct.
9.5
In regard to the aforestated, it had been argued that the
Petitioners had no vested right to commit or remain free from the
statutory consequences of a contravention of the Act of 2017.
Section 122(1A) was introduced to address an existing statutory
mischief and to prescribe the consequence for conduct already
prohibited under the Act of 2017.
9.6
It is argued, that in any event, whether the Petitioner
actually committed the alleged contraventions is a disputed
question of fact requiring appreciation of evidence, which cannot
appropriately be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. Reliance was
placed on Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v.
AIR 1954 SC 158
(2019) 19 SCC 529
(2004) 8 SCC 1
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Bharati Industries and Ors13, to contend that disputed questions
of fact ought ordinarily to be left to the statutory adjudicatory
process.
9.7
Controverting the application of Article 20(1) of the
Constitution, it had been argued that Section 122(1A) does not
attract the prohibition contained under the aforesaid Article, since
the penalty thereunder is a civil/fiscal consequence of a statutory
contravention and does not amount to punishment for a criminal
offence. The underlying conduct was already proscribed under
the Act of 2017, and Section 122(1A) merely provides for the
fiscal consequence of such infraction. Reliance was placed on
SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal14, wherein the Supreme Court, while
considering
an
adjudicatory
penalty,
distinguished
such
proceedings from criminal prosecution and held that the
protection under Article 20(1) is not attracted to such civil
penalties.
9.8
It was, therefore, submitted that the subsequent
prescription of penalty under Section 122(1A) does not amount
to creation of an ex post facto offence or punishment within the
meaning of Article 20(1). Accordingly, it was contended that the
challenge based on the constitutional proscription against ex post
facto laws is misconceived.
9.9
Learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner is not
entitled to discretionary relief under Article 226, particularly
(2005) 12 SCC 725
(2010) 3 SCC 765
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when the allegations concern fraudulent availment of ITC and the
factual question of the person responsible for such availment
requires examination on the basis of evidence. Reliance was
placed on the decision of this Court in Gurudas Mallik Thakur
v. Commissioner of Goods and Service Tax15, , wherein it was
held that questions concerning responsibility for availment of
ITC and the applicability of Section 122(1A) are essentially
factual and ought to be canvassed before the statutory appellate
authority.
9.10
It was further submitted that a person invoking the
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 must
make full and candid disclosure of all material facts. Reliance
was placed on K.D. Sharma v. SAIL and Ors.16, Ramjas
Foundation and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.17 and Prestige
Lights Ltd. v. SBI18, to contend that suppression or distortion of
material facts disentitles a litigant to discretionary relief. In the
absence of complete disclosure regarding the Petitioner’s alleged
involvement in the disputed ITC transactions, the writ petition, it
was argued, ought not to be entertained.
9.11
Learned counsel further argued that Section 122(1A) of
the Act of 2017 ought to be construed purposively so as to
prevent a person from deriving or retaining benefit from an act
prohibited by law. Reliance was placed on Maxwell on the
2025:DHC:2957-DB
(2008) 12 SCC 481
(2010) 14 SCC 38
(2007) 8 SCC 449
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Interpretation of Statutes and R v. Andrewes19, to contend that
the benefits flowing from an illegal or wrongful act can
legitimately be interdicted.
9.12
Lastly, it was argued that the principle of purposive
interpretation applies equally to fiscal legislation, particularly
where the provision is remedial in nature. Reliance was placed on
Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr.20 and Allied Motors (P)
Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi21, It was argued that Section 122(1A), read in
the context of the statutory scheme governing fraudulent
availment and passing on of ITC, should therefore be interpreted
in a manner which advances the legislative purpose and
suppresses the mischief sought to be remedied.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
10.
Before proceeding to consider the rival contentions and express
our views thereon, which shall govern the determination of the
personal liability sought to be fastened upon the Petitioners, we deem
it appropriate to first reproduce the relevant provisions of the Act of
2017, which shall form the foundation for our ensuing analysis. The
relevant provisions are as follows:
122. Penalty for certain offences.—(1) Where a taxable person who—
(i) supplies any goods or services or both without issue of any invoice
or issues an incorrect or false invoice with regard to any such supply;
(ii) issues any invoice or bill without supply of goods or services or
both in violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder;
(iii) collects any amount as tax but fails to pay the same to the
[2022] UKSC 24
(2017) 15 SCC 133
(1997) 3 SCC 472
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Government beyond a period of three months from the date on which
such payment becomes due;
(iv) collects any tax in contravention of the provisions of this Act but
fails to pay the same to the Government beyond a period of three
months from the date on which such payment becomes due;
(v) fails to deduct the tax in accordance with the provisions of sub section (1) of Section 51, or deducts an amount which is less than the
amount required to be deducted under the said subsection, or where
he fails to pay to the Government under subsection (2) thereof, the
amount deducted as tax;
(vi) fails to collect tax in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(1) of Section 52, or collects an amount which is less than the amount
required to be collected under the said subsection or where he fails to
pay to the Government the amount collected as tax under sub-section
(3) of Section 52;
(vii) takes or utilises input tax credit without actual receipt of goods
or services or both either fully or partially, in contravention of the
provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder;
(viii) fraudulently obtains refund of tax under this Act;
(ix) takes or distributes input tax credit in contravention of Section 20,
or the rules made thereunder;
(x) falsifies or substitutes financial records or produces fake accounts
or documents or furnishes any false information or return with an
intention to evade payment of tax due under this Act;
(xi) is liable to be registered under this Act but fails to obtain
registration;
(xii) furnishes any false information with regard to registration
particulars, either at the time of applying for registration, or
subsequently;
(xiii) obstructs or prevents any officer in discharge of his duties under
this Act;
(xiv) transports any taxable goods without the cover of documents as
may be specified in this behalf;
(xv) suppresses his turnover leading to evasion of tax under this Act;
(xvi) fails to keep, maintain or retain books of account and other
documents in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules
made thereunder;
(xvii) fails to furnish information or documents called for by an officer
in accordance with the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder or furnishes false information or documents during any
proceedings under this Act;
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(xviii) supplies, transports or stores any goods which he has reasons
to believe are liable to confiscation under this Act;
(xix) issues any invoice or document by using the registration number
of another registered person;
(xx) tampers with, or destroys any material evidence or document;
(xxi) disposes off or tampers with any goods that have been detained,
seized, or attached under this Act, he shall be liable to pay a penalty
of ten thousand rupees or an amount equivalent to the tax evaded or
the tax not deducted under Section 51 or short deducted or deducted
but not paid to the Government or tax not collected under Section 52
or short collected or collected but not paid to the Government or input
tax credit availed of or passed on or distributed irregularly, or the
refund claimed fraudulently, whichever is higher.
[(1A) Any person who retains the benefit of a transaction covered
under clauses (i), (ii), (vii) or clause (ix) of sub-section (1) and at
whose instance such transaction is conducted, shall be liable to a
penalty of an amount equivalent to the tax evaded or input tax credit
availed of or passed on.]
[(1-B) [Any electronic commerce operator, who is liable to collect tax
at source under Section 52,]—
(i) allows a supply of goods or services or both through it by an
unregistered person other than a person exempted from registration
by
a notification issued under this Act to make such supply;
(ii) allows an inter-State supply of goods or services or both through it
by a person who is not eligible to make such inter-State supply; or
(iii) fails to furnish the correct details in the statement to be furnished
under sub-section (4) of Section 52 of any outward supply of goods
effected through it by a person exempted from obtaining registration
under this Act, shall be liable to pay a penalty of ten thousand rupees,
or an amount equivalent to the amount of tax involved had such
supply been made by a registered person other than a person paying
tax under Section 10, whichever is higher.]
(2) Any registered person who supplies any goods or services or both
on which any tax has not been paid or short-paid or erroneously
refunded, or where the input tax credit has been wrongly availed or
utilised,—
(a) for any reason, other than the reason of fraud or any wilful
misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax, shall be liable to a
penalty of ten thousand rupees or ten per cent. Of the tax due from
such person, whichever is higher;
(b) for reason of fraud or any wilful misstatement or suppression of
facts to evade tax, shall be liable to a penalty equal to ten thousand
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rupees or the tax due from such person, whichever is higher.
(3) Any person who—
(a) aids or abets any of the offences specified in clauses (i) to (xxi) of
sub-section (1);
(b) acquires possession of, or in any way concerns himself in
transporting, removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, supplying, or
purchasing or in any other manner deals with any goods which he
knows or has reasons to believe are liable to confiscation under this
Act or the rules made thereunder;
(c) receives or is in any way concerned with the supply of, or in any
other manner deals with any supply of services which he knows or has
reasons to believe are in contravention of any provisions of this Act or
the rules made thereunder;
(d) fails to appear before the officer of central tax, when issued with a
summon for appearance to give evidence or produce a document in an
inquiry;
(e) fails to issue invoice in accordance with the provisions of this Act
or the rules made thereunder or fails to account for an invoice in his
books of account, shall be liable to a penalty which may extend to
twenty-five thousand rupees.
132. Punishment for certain offences.—(1) [Whoever commits, or
causes to commit and retain the benefits arising out of, any of the
following offences], namely:—
(a) supplies any goods or services or both without issue of any
invoice, in violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules made
thereunder, with the intention to evade tax;
(b) issues any invoice or bill without supply of goods or services or
both in violation of the provisions of this Act, or the rules made
thereunder leading to wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax
credit or refund of tax;
[(c) avails input tax credit using the invoice or bill referred to in
clause (b) or fraudulently avails input tax credit without any invoice
or bill;]
(d) collects any amount as tax but fails to pay the same to the
Government beyond a period of three months from the date on which
such payment becomes due;
(e) evades tax or fraudulently obtains refund and where such offence
is not covered under clauses (a) to (d);”
11.
Notably, the two issues concerning the applicability and effect
of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, as identified in paragraph no.3
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hereinabove, are not matters arising for consideration for the first time
before Court. These questions have already been considered by
various High Courts, including this Court, the Bombay High Court
and the Gauhati High Court. Therefore, it is appropriate to briefly
notice the views expressed by the Courts in the decisions rendered on
these issues.
12.
The Bombay High Court in Bharat Parihar v State of
Maharashtra and Ors.22, while examining the interplay between
Sections 83 and 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, noticed the deliberate use
of the distinct expressions ‘taxable person’ and ‘any person’, and held
that the two expressions could not be construed as referring to the
same category of persons. It was reasoned that if only taxable persons
could be caught, then anyone who benefits from a fraud but lives
outside the state, or isn’t registered under GST, would escape entirely,
which couldn’t have been the lawmakers’ intention. In view thereof, it
was held that ‘any person’ in Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is
wide enough to include people who are not themselves taxable
persons.
13.
The Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari v.
Union of India23, taking an opposite view from one expressed in
Bharat Parihar (Supra), held that Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017
ordinarily concerns a taxable person who retains the benefit of a
transaction covered by Section 122(1)(i), (ii), (vii), or (ix), and at
whose instance the transaction is conducted. Dealing with the facts of
the case, it was held that the employees cannot be made liable without
[2025] 142 GSTR 164 (Bom)
(2024) 132 GSTR 346 (Bom)
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material establishing personal retention of benefit and personal
involvement in conducting the transaction. Vicarious liability is not
attracted merely because the alleged tax liability belongs to the
company.
14.
Thereafter, the Bombay High Court again in its judgment in
Amit Manilal Haria (Supra), following the reasoning of Shantanu
Sanjay Hundekari (Supra), while stressing upon the twin requirement
contemplated under Section 122(1A), held that employees who are not
shown to be taxable persons, and against whom there is no finding
that they retained the benefit or caused the transactions to be
conducted, cannot be penalised under Section 122(1A) of the Act of
2017. In addition, the Court with respect to the temporal applicability
of Section 122 (1A) held that, the provision was inserted w.e.f.
01.01.2021 and since the period under the SCN therein spanned from
July 2017 to January, 2021 (partly pre-dating the provision), there
could not have been any retrospective application of any penalty
provision. The Court expressly invoked Article 20(1) of the
Constitution and observed that a person could not be penalised under
the law/provision which was not in force for the period in which such
alleged acts are stated to have been committed. Accordingly, it held
the SCN and the consequential order could not be sustained for the pre
01.01.2021 period, independent of the finding pertaining to taxable
person.
15.
This Court in Gurudas Mallik (Supra), while dealing with two
directors of a company on whom penalty under Section 122(1A) had
been imposed alongside the company, its promoter, and its CEO,
examined Sections 2(84), 83, 122(1) and 122(1A) of the Act of 2017
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and held that the statute makes a clear distinction between the taxable
person and any person. The Court expressly adopted the reasoning of
Bharat Parihar (Supra), to hold that the purpose of Section 122 (1A)
is to hold accountable persons who are responsible for creating bogus
invoices, fraudulently availing ITC without actual receipt of goods or
services or distributing ITC in violation of Section 20 of the Act of
2017. Since companies act through their management, liability may
extend to persons who retain the benefit of such transactions.
16.
This Court in particular distinguished Amit Manilal Haria
(Supra) and the subsequent SLP (C) No. 55427/2024 titled Union of
India v. Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari & Anr. filed against the
judgment of Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (Supra), on the footing that
the Petitioners therein were employees, and the Order in Amit Manilal
Haria (Supra) was merely an interim order. Further, while observing
that the Supreme Court had expressly kept the legal questions open
rather than deciding it, the Court declined to follow the narrower view
taken by the Bombay High Court as binding on facts involving
directors with an active managerial role.
17.
Subsequently, this Court in Bhupender Kumar (Supra), while
dealing with the temporal application of Section 122(1A) held that the
same is to be considered with reference to the date of the SCN, which
was issued on 08.03.2024, when the provision was already in force.
Therefore, the provision could apply even to fraudulent transactions
occurring before its enactment. Further, it was also held that the
fraudulent availment of ITC appeared to be a continuous process
rather than a one-time act.
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18.
Finally, the Gauhati High Court in its judgment dated
08.06.2026 titled Mayank Bansal v The Union of India and 5 Ors24,
with respect to the scope of expression any person under Section 122
(1A) of the Act of 2017, expressly adopted the reasoning provided by
this Court in Gurudas Mallik Thakur (Supra) and rejected the
Bombay High Court’s view in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (Supra)
and Amit Manilal Haria (Supra). The Court held that the expression
‘any person’ under Section 122(1A) is distinct from ‘taxable person’
and ‘registered person’ and includes individuals responsible for, and
retaining the benefit of, fraudulent transactions undertaken through a
juridical entity. Rejecting the narrower view taken by the Bombay
High Court, the Court observed that a company, Limited Liability
Partnership (LLP), partnership firm, or other juridical person, being an
inanimate ‘taxable person’ can only act through natural persons, and
as such restricting Section 122(1A) to the taxable person would defeat
its purpose, because it would fail to reach the individuals who actually
orchestrate the fraud through the corporate/firm vehicle.
19.
With respect to the temporal application of Section 122(1A) of
the Act of 2017, the Court held that the said provision does not create
a new offence or violation, but merely identifies the person liable for
penalty in respect of violations already contemplated under Section
122(1) of the Act of 2017. Accordingly, its application does not
constitute retrospective imposition of a penal provision. Relying on
Jawala Ram and Ors. v. State of Pepsu (now Punjab) and Ors.25, the
Court further held that Article 20(1) of the Constitution applies to
2026:GAU-AS:8028
1961 SCC OnLine SC 47
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offences and punishments of a criminal nature and not to every civil
penalty.
20.
On the aforesaid reasoning, the Court was of the view that
Section 122(1A) being complementary to Section 122(1) may be
invoked where it was in force on the date of issuance of the SCN.
Thus, following the principle laid down in Bhupender Kumar
(Supra), the Court upheld its application to transactions commencing
from 2017-18, notwithstanding that the provision came into force
subsequently.
21.
Having noticed the divergent views expressed by the various
High Courts, we shall now proceed to examine, on an independent
consideration of the matter, the scope and meaning of the expression
‘any person’ and the temporal applicability of Section 122(1A) of the
Act of 2017.
In re: Issue i
22.
Before examining the rival contentions on the first issue, it is
necessary to notice the statutory scheme and, in particular, the
conditions which must necessarily be satisfied before liability under
Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 can be attracted. A plain reading
of Section 122(1A) makes it evident that the provision operates only
where two conditions are cumulatively satisfied: first, that the person
concerned has retained the benefit of a transaction covered by clauses
(i), (ii), (vii) or (ix) of sub-section (1) of Section 122; and second, that
such transaction has been conducted at his instance.
23.
It follows from the above that these two conditions being
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conjunctive and not disjunctive, must be independently established
before the liability contemplated under Section 122(1A) of the Act of
2017 can be fastened upon an individual. To clarify it further, the
enquiry under Section 122 (1A) does not arise in isolation, rather it
presupposes the establishment of a contravention falling within
clauses (i), (ii), (vii) or (ix) of Section 122(1), namely, supply of
goods or services without issuance of an invoice, issuance of an
invoice without supply, wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax
credit, or wrongful distribution of input tax credit. It is only upon such
contravention being established against the taxable person that the
further enquiry arises as to who retained the benefit of such
transaction and at whose instance the transaction was conducted.
24.
At this stage, it is also relevant to notice the manner in which
the Legislature has consciously employed different expressions in the
sub-sections of Section 122. Sub-section (1) refers to a ‘taxable
person’, a term defined under Section 2(107) of the Act of 2017, to
mean a person who is registered or liable to be registered under
Section 22 or Section 24. In contrast, sub-section (1A), with which we
are presently concerned, employs the expression ‘any person’. Subsection (1-B), dealing with electronic commerce operators, is confined
to a specific category of registered intermediaries. In turn, sub-section
(2) uses the expression ‘any registered person’, which is defined under
Section 2(94) to mean a person registered under Section 25, other than
a person having a Unique Identity Number. Sub-section (3), once
again, employs the expression ‘any person’.
25.
The aforesaid distinction becomes even more apparent when
Section 2(84) of the Act of 2017 is noticed. The expression ‘person’
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therein, has been defined in the widest terms and includes an
individual, a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), a company, a firm, a
LLP, an association of persons, a body corporate, a co-operative
society, a local authority, the Government, a society, a trust and every
artificial juridical person not falling within the preceding categories.
26.
This deliberate and repeated variation in language, within the
same Section, cannot be treated as a matter of legislative accident and
must be read together. The Legislature while enacting different subsections of the very same provision, in the same breath, has
consciously employed different expressions, being, ‘taxable person’ in
sub-section (1), ‘any person’ in sub-sections (1A) and (3), and ‘any
registered person’ in sub-section (2).
27.
It is a settled principle of interpretation that where the
Legislature has deliberately used different expressions in the same
statutory scheme, each expression must ordinarily be given its distinct
meaning. As such, to construe ‘any person’ in Section 122(1A) as
meaning nothing more than a ‘taxable person’ would, in substance,
amount to reading into the provision words which the Legislature
consciously chose not to employ.
28.
Such a construction would also defeat the object of Section
122(1A) of the Act of 2017. Fraudulent ITC transactions are often
structured through fictitious or shell entities created in the names of
persons having little or no connection with the underlying business, a
peon, driver, domestic help, or even a person whose identity
documents have been misused, while the actual orchestration of the
transactions and retention of the financial benefit rests with persons
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operating behind such entities.
29.
In such a scenario, if the expression ‘any person’ in Section
122(1A) were to be confined only to the ‘taxable person’, i.e., the
entity or individual in whose name the GST registration stands, the
consequence would be that the very person whose identity may have
been misused could be proceeded against, while the actual mastermind
and beneficiary, who may never have been registered under the GST
regime, would escape the provision. Such a construction would defeat
rather than advance the object of the provision.
30.
The aforesaid position stands further reinforced by the
legislative history of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017. The
provision was inserted by the Finance Act, 2020 with effect from
01.01.2021, pursuant to the recommendation of the 38 th GST Council
Meeting held on 18.12.2019, specifically to address the menace of
fake invoicing and to fasten liability upon the real beneficiaries of
such fraudulent transactions, over and above the taxable person in
whose name the registration exists. Therefore, the intent, was plainly
to enlarge, and not to restrict, the class of persons who could be
proceeded against.
31.
It is in this statutory and legislative setting that the divergent
judicial views placed before us fall for consideration. The Bombay
High Court in Bharat Parihar (Supra), while examining the interplay
between Section 83 and Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, noticed
that the two expressions ‘taxable person’ and ‘any person’ are used
contra-distinctively, and held that ‘any person’ in Section 122(1A)
would include a non-taxable person. We are in respectful agreement
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with this reasoning, for the reasons already indicated above.
32.
However, this Court is unable to persuade itself to the contrary
reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court in Shantanu Sanjay
Hundekari (Supra) and Amit Manilal Haria (Supra). A company, a
LLP, a partnership firm, or any other juridical person recognised
under Section 2(84) is, by its very nature, incapable of acting except
through natural persons who manage and control its affairs. If subsection (1A) is confined only to the ‘taxable person’, it would in most
cases stand confined to an artificial entity that can never, on its own,
retain a benefit or direct a transaction, thereby rendering the provision
otiose in precisely those cases of corporate or organised fraud which it
was intended to address.
33.
We are also unable to reconcile this narrower construction with
the fact that sub-section (3) of Section 122, dealing with aiding,
abetting and similar ancillary conduct, already uses the expression
‘any person’ without any suggestion that it is confined to a taxable
person; there is no principled basis to read the identical expression
differently within sub-sections of the very same Section.
34.
We find the wider view we have adopted to be consistent with
and reinforced by the judgment of this Court in Gurudas Mallik
(Supra), where it was held that the statute makes a clear and deliberate
distinction between ‘taxable person’ and ‘any person’, and that the
purpose of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is to hold accountable
those who retain the benefit of transactions conducted through an
inanimate corporate vehicle.
35.
We are also in respectful agreement with the subsequent
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judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Mayank Bansal (Supra),
which expressly adopted the reasoning of this Court in Gurudas
Mallik (Supra) and declined to follow the narrower view taken in
Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (Supra) and Amit Manilal Haria
(Supra), for substantially the same reasons this Court has recorded
above.
36.
For completeness, it may be noted that the Supreme Court,
while dismissing the SLP in Shantanu Sanjay Hundekari (Supra),
did so on the facts of that case, without affirming the Bombay High
Court’s interpretation of ‘any person’, which question was expressly
left open. Thus, the said order does not preclude the view taken herein.
37.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the expression ‘any person’
occurring in Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 is not confined to a
‘taxable person’ as defined under Section 2(107), but extends to every
person, whether or not registered or liable to be registered under the
Act of 2017, who satisfies the twin requirements contemplated under
Section 122 (1A) of the Act of 2017.
In re: Issue (ii)
38.
We now turn to the second issue, namely, whether Section
122(1A) of the Act of 2017 applies only prospectively to transactions
occurring on or after 01.01.2021, the date on which the provision was
brought into force.
39.
At the outset, it is pertinent to note the close statutory parallel
between Sections 122 and 132 of the Act of 2017. The contraventions
contemplated under clauses (i), (ii), (vii) and (ix) of Section 122(1)
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substantially correspond to the offences enumerated in clauses (a), (b),
(c) and (e) of Section 132(1) respectively, relating, inter alia, to
supply without invoice, issuance of invoices without supply, and
wrongful availment or utilisation of input tax credit. Thus,
substantially the same class of fraudulent transactions may attract
penalty under Section 122 and, where the prescribed monetary
threshold is crossed, prosecution under Section 132 of the Act of
2017.
40.
The statutory parallel assumes greater significance when the
amendments to both provisions, brought into force with effect from
01.01.2021, are noticed. Section 122 was amended by insertion of
sub-section (1A), making liable ‘any person’ who retains the benefit
of the specified transaction and at whose instance such transaction is
conducted. Simultaneously, the opening words of Section 132(1) were
amended from ‘Whoever commits any of the following offences’ to
‘Whoever commits, or causes to commit and retains the benefit arising
out of, any of the following offences’. Thus, the two provisions came
to employ substantially corresponding expressions for identifying the
person upon whom the consequences of the fraudulent transaction
may fall.
41.
Prior to the said amendment, a dichotomy existed between the
two provisions, arising from two distinct gaps. The expression
‘whoever commits’ in the unamended Section 132 was wide as to the
class of persons covered, it was not confined, for instance, to a person
holding the status of a taxable person, but narrow as to the role
required, in that it extended only to a person who himself committed
the offence, and not to one who merely caused it to be committed and
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retained its benefit.
42.
Conversely, the unamended Section 122 of the Act of 2017 was
narrow as to the class of persons covered, fastening liability only upon
the taxable person in respect of the specified contraventions, so that a
person who caused the transaction to be undertaken and retained its
benefit, without himself being the taxable person, fell outside its
sweep. The simultaneous amendment of Section 122 by insertion of
sub-section (1A) and of Section 132(1) was evidently intended to
remove this dichotomy and bring the civil and criminal consequences
into closer statutory alignment.
43.
Sections 122(1A) and 132 of the Act of 2017 nevertheless
remain distinct in the nature of the consequence each imposes. While
the former is a monetary penalty, the latter creates offences which,
upon the statutory requirements being satisfied, may result in
prosecution and imprisonment, graded with reference to the amount
involved. Where the amount of tax evaded, or input tax credit wrongly
availed or utilised, or refund wrongly taken exceeds Rs. 5 crores,
imprisonment may extend to five years with fine; where it exceeds Rs.
2 crores but does not exceed Rs. 5 crores, imprisonment may extend to
three years with fine; and where it exceeds Rs. 1 crore but does not
exceed Rs. 2 crores, imprisonment may extend to one year with fine.
44.
This
graded
criminal
consequence under
Section
unquestionably attracts the constitutional protection under Article
20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of a penalty
greater than that prescribed by the law in force at the time of
commission of the act. On the view we have taken, this protection
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confines the operation of Section 132 to conduct occurring on or after
01.01.2021. It would be incongruous to hold that Section 132 is so
confined, while the corresponding monetary penalty under Section
122(1A) of the Act of 2017, arising from substantially the same
conduct and introduced through the same legislative exercise, is
treated as available for conduct predating that amendment. In the
absence of clear words to that effect, we are unable to attribute such
an intention to the Legislature.
45.
The monetary penalty envisaged under Section 122(1A), though
civil in form and unlike Section 132, which creates an offence
punishable with imprisonment, is nevertheless penal in consequence
and is imposed for specified contraventions. Its applicability must,
therefore, bear a nexus with the date of the underlying act or
transaction. The subsequent issuance of a SCN cannot alter the date on
which the alleged contravention was committed.
46.
The contrary view that the temporal applicability of Section
122(1A) is to be determined by the date of issuance of the SCN, rather
than the date of the underlying transaction, does not commend
acceptance. A SCN may be issued either promptly or after a
considerable lapse of time. To make the applicability of a penal
provision dependent upon the date of such notice would mean that
identical transactions could attract different legal consequences solely
by reason of the time at which the Department initiates proceedings.
Such an interpretation would impermissibly make the operation of a
penal provision contingent upon a subsequent administrative act.
47.
This conclusion is also consistent with and reinforced by the
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constitutional protection under Article 20(1) of the Constitution,
discussed above. The mere fact that Section 122(1A) forms part of a
provision imposing civil penalties cannot, by itself, warrant
retrospective application where the consequence is penal in character
and the provision was not in force when the underlying transaction
occurred.
48.
Therefore, the legislative scheme, when viewed as a whole,
indicates that the amendment was intended to govern conduct falling
within its sweep from the date on which the amended provision came
into force. The fact that proceedings in respect of such conduct may be
initiated subsequently cannot enlarge the temporal operation of the
provision.
49.
Accordingly, it is held that the applicability of Section 122(1A)
must be determined with reference to the date of the underlying act or
transaction, and not the date of issuance of the SCN. Consequently,
only transactions or acts occurring on or after 01.01.2021, subject to
satisfaction of the statutory twin conditions under Section 122(1A) as
construed under Issue (i) above, can attract the penalty contemplated
thereunder.
50.
In regard to the aforestated, we have also considered the
judgment of this Court in Bhupender Kumar (Supra) as well as the
judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Mayank Bansal (Supra), both
of which held that the applicability of Section 122(1A) is to be tested
with reference to the date of the SCN, and that a continuing fraudulent
scheme spanning the cut-off date would attract the provision in its
entirety. As regards Bhupender Kumar (Supra), in particular, it is
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evident from a perusal of the judgment that the attention of the
Division Bench therein, does not appear to have been drawn to Article
20 of the Constitution and the observations appear to have been obiter
observations, made in the course of relegating the parties to alternative
statutory remedy. With the greatest respect, for the reasons set out
above, we are unable to adopt this reasoning as a general proposition
governing the temporal applicability of a penal provision of this
nature.
51.
Instead, we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed
by the Bombay High Court in Amit Manilal Haria (Supra), where it
was held, invoking Article 20(1) of the Constitution, that a person
cannot be penalised under a provision that was not in force at the time
the alleged act was committed, and there could be no retrospective
application of Section 122(1A) to the period prior to 01.01.2021. We
adopt this reasoning on the question of temporal applicability alone,
while, as recorded under Issue (i) above, respectfully declining to
follow the same judgment insofar as it confines the expression ‘any
person’ to a ‘taxable person’.
Re: Objection as to Maintainability/Alternative Remedy
52.
Learned counsel for the Respondents had urged, relying upon
Mafatlal
Industries
Ltd.
(Supra)
and
Embassy
Property
Developments Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), that the Petitioners ought to be
relegated to the alternative and efficacious remedy of appeal under
Section 107 of the Act of 2017, and the present petitions, at best, raise
questions of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction rather than want of
jurisdiction. We are unable to accept this submission as a bar to the
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exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 in the present batch.
53.
As noticed at the outset, the present Petitions raise substantial
and recurring questions of law concerning the interpretation and
temporal applicability of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, upon
which divergent views have been expressed by this Court, the
Bombay High Court and the Gauhati High Court. The resultant
uncertainty warranted an authoritative determination of the questions
of law. In such circumstances, the existence of an alternative statutory
remedy under Section 107 would not, in our considered view,
preclude this Court from exercising its discretionary jurisdiction,
particularly where the questions raised are purely legal and of general
application. The determination herein would, thereafter, govern the
consideration of the individual cases by the competent statutory
authorities.
54.
However, we make it clear that our consideration is confined
strictly to the two questions of law framed hereinabove. We have
expressed no opinion on the factual question as to whether any
particular Petitioner has, in fact, retained the benefit of the transaction
or caused the same to be conducted at his instance; whether the
transaction in question occurred before or after 01.01.2021; or whether
the allegations against any individual Petitioner satisfy the twin
requirements of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017, as construed by
us, are questions involving appreciation of facts and evidence.
Accordingly, they are left open for determination by the Appellate
Authority under Section 107 of the Act of 2017, in accordance with
the law declared in this judgment.
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CONCLUSION:
55.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the questions
framed in paragraph no.3 as follows:
i.
the expression ‘any person’ occurring in Section 122(1A) of the
Act of 2017 is not confined to a ‘taxable person’, and includes any
person, whether or not registered or liable to be registered, who retains
the benefit of a transaction covered under clauses (i), (ii), (vii) or (ix)
of Section 122(1), and at whose instance such transaction is
conducted.
ii.
Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 applies prospectively and is
attracted only in respect of transactions or acts committed on or after
01.01.2021, irrespective of the date on which the Show Cause Notice
is issued.
56.
Having answered the questions of law as above, the Petitioners
are at liberty to file statutory appeals under Section 107 of the Act of
2017 against the respective impugned Orders-in-Original.
57.
The Appellate Authority shall determine, in light of the
observations made hereunder, as to whether the facts of each case
satisfy the requirements of Section 122(1A) of the Act of 2017 as
construed above, and whether the transactions attributed to each
Petitioner fall within the period on or after 01.01.2021.
58.
The Appeals, if filed within a period of 4 weeks from the date
of judgment, shall not be dismissed on the ground of limitation and
shall be considered on merits.
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59.
In view of the aforesaid terms, the present Petitions, along with
the pending applications, are disposed of, with liberty to approach the
Appellate Authority.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
BHARAT PARASHAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 29, 2026
sp/hr
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