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GAHC010185412014
2026:GAU-AS:14006
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
PRINCIPAL SEAT AT GUWAHATI
CRL.REV.P. NO. 230/2014
DIRECTOR, C.B.I
REP. BY THE D.I.G.(P),
HEAD OF BRANCH, SPECIAL CRIMES,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT 2ND FLOOR, A WING,
DF BLOCK, SALT LAKE, KOLKATA-700064, WEST BENGAL.
……Petitioner
VERSUS
1.
RIPUN BORA,
S/O LT. DAMBARUDHAR BORA
R/O HOUSE NO. 3, AMARNATH TEMPLE PATH,
BHAGADATTAPUR, BELTOLA, GUWAHATI,
PIN- 781028, DIST. KAMRUP, ASSAM.
2.
SHRI PULIN PHUKAN
S/O SHRI TILAK PHUKAN R/O BORIGAON
P.S. GOHPUR, PIN- 784168,
DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM.
3.
SRI MANIL DHAR (INFORMANT)
S/O LT. RAMU DHAR
R/O NATUN CHATRANG
P.O. and P.S. GOHPUR, PIN- 784168
DIST. SONITPUR, ASSAM (INFORMANT).
……Respondents
- BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the petitioner
: Ms. M. Kumar, S.C CBI
Advocate for the respondent No.1
Advocate for the respondent No.3
: Mr. A.M Bora, Sr. Adv
Mr. D. Gogoi
: Mr. D. Talukdar, Sr. dv.
Mr. N. Borah
: Mr. D. Bora
Date on which judgment is reserved
: 21.07.2026
Date of pronouncement of judgment
: 22.09.2026
Whether the pronouncement is of the
operative part of the judgment ?
: No
Whether the full judgment has been
pronounced?
: Yes
Advocate for the respondent No.2
JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) for the petitioner. Also heard Mr.
A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. D. Gogoi, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, Mr. D. Talukdar,
learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. N. Borah, learned counsel for
the respondent No. 2 and Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the
respondent No, 3/informant.
2.
In this petition, under Section 397/401, read with Section
482 of the Code of0020Criminal Procedure, 1973 (as amended)
read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner
has challenged the order, dated 10/02/2014, passed by the
learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup at Guwahati, in Sessions Case
No. 60 (K-G) of 2010.
3.
It is to be noted here that vide impugned order, dated
10/02/2014, the learned Sessions Judge, Kamrup District,
Guwahati has discharged the respondent No. 1, namely, Ripun
Bora of the offence under Section 120B/302 IPC and respondent
No.2, namely, Pulin Phukan, of the offence under Section 302 IPC
by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Background Facts:4.
The background facts leading to filing of the present
petition is briefly stated as under:
“Late Daniel Topno was a popular tea tribe leader of
Gohpur, under Sonitpur District, who was murdered on
27/09/2000, by some unknown persons, while he was
returning home on his bicycle. Then one of his relatives,
namely, Manik Dhara, had lodged one FIR in connection
with the said occurrence, with the Officer-in-Charge,
Gohpur Police Station, upon which Gohpur Police Station
Case No. 183 of 2000, under Section 302 IPC was
registered.
Though initially, the case was investigated by
Assam Police, subsequently, the case was handed over to
C.I.D Assam, and after investigation, C.I.D. had submitted
charge-sheet before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
Magistrate, Biswanath Chariali, against two persons,
namely, Narayan Gour and Uma Kanta Mizar alias Kale
Mizar, showing Kale Mizar as absconder in the chargesheet.
Thereafter, one Santosh Topno, (brother of the
deceased) Daniel Topno, had filed one writ petition, being
W.P.(C) No. 6198 of 2000, before this Court with a prayer
to hand over investigation of the case to CBI. Then, vide
order dated 17/05/2005, the said writ petition was
disposed of by this Court, directing the CBI to investigate
the case.
However, the State of Assam had filed one review
petition, being Review Petition No. 82 of 2005, before this
Court for recalling the order, on the ground that C.I.D.
had already completed investigation and submitted
charge-sheet against two persons on 30/10/2004. But,
the same was dismissed by this Court vide order, dated
26/08/2005.
Thereafter, on the strength of the order being
passed by this Court, CBI has registered one FIR, being
FIR No. RC-5/S-2005-Kolkata, and after completion of
investigation, submitted charge-sheet, being C.S. No. 04
of 2008, dated 30/12/2008, against accused/Ripun Bora (A-1), under Section 120B read with Section 302 IPC and
against accused Kamal Nath @ Ankur Nath -(A-2) and
Pulin Phukan -(A-3), under Section 302 IPC.
Upon the aforementioned charge-sheet, the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, to whom
the case was made over for disposal, had framed charges
under Section 120(B)/302 IPC against all the three
accused, vide order dated 01/09/2012.
The said order dated 01/09/2012, came to be
challenged before this Court by accused/Ripun Bora and
Pulin Phukan, vide Criminal Petition No. 579 of 2012 and
Criminal Petition No. 828 of 2012, respectively. Both the
petitions were disposed of by this Court, vide order dated
11/06/2013, by which the impugned order, dated
01/09/2012, was interfered with and the matter was
remanded
to
the
learned
Court
below
for
fresh
consideration. And while interfering with the impugned
order, this Court was also pleased to direct to transfer the
case from the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Kamrup, Guwahati to the Court of learned Sessions
Judge, so that the case can be examined with an open
mind.
Then, the learned Sessions Judge, after hearing the
learned counsel for both the parties and also considering
the record of GR Case No. 458 of 2000, which was
pending before the Court of learned Sub-Divisional
Judicial Magistrate, Biswanath Chariali, vide impugned
order, dated 10/02/2014, had discharged accused Ripun
Bora of the offences under Section 120B/302 IPC, and
Pulin Phukan, of the offence under Section 302 IPC, by
exercising the jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure.
5.
Being aggrieved, the CBI has preferred the present revision
petition challenging the legality, propriety and correctness of the
impugned order, dated 10/02/2014, on several grounds.
6.
However, during the course of hearing, this Court was
pleased to direct Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, CBI
for the petitioner, to confine her argument to the main grounds
and to file one brief written note upon the same. And accordingly,
she has filed the brief written note stating the main grounds of
assailing the impugned order, dated 10.02.2014, so passed by the
learned Sessions Judge.
Submission
of
learned
Standing
Counsel
for
the
petitioner:Page 6 of 47
7.
Ms. M. Kumari, learned Standing Counsel for the petitioner,
submits that the roles of accused/Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan
were brought to the light by the disclosure statement made by
co-accused Kamal Nath, who subsequently gave his confessional
statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the learned Special
Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup, Guwahati, on 29/05/2007.
7.1. Ms.
Kumari
also
submits
that
Kamal
Nath,
in
his
confessional statement, stated that about two months before the
murder, he along with Sri Krishna Hazarika, Sri Bishnu Saikia and
other Congress workers, attended a meeting at Chilarai Hotel,
Paltan Bazar, Guwahati, in which Senior Congress leaders, such as
Mani Kumar Subba and Ripun Borah(respondent No.1) were also
present and Kamal Nath claimed that in the said meeting, Mani
Kumar Subba had offered Rs. 12 lakhs to Sri Krishna Hazarika for
killing Daniel Topno, and Ripun Bora further assured that if he
won the election, he would give another Rs.13 lakhs, and in the
event of loosing, he would give Rs. 5 lakhs.
7.2. Ms. Kumari further submits that the subsequent act, by
which the victim/Daniel Topno was killed, has been described in
detail and in sequence, in his statement by accused Kamal Nath,
which demonstrate the active participation of the respondents
No.1 along with that of Pulin Phukan (respondent No.2), Krishna
Hazarika, and Bishnu Saikia. However, Krishna Hazarika and
Bishnu Saikia have already passed away. And in the charge-sheet
this has been described in detail.
7.3.
She also pointed it out that once the role of Ripun Bora
(respondent No.1) in the crime has been made clear from the
statement of accused/Kamal Nath, the motive behind such crime
may also be considered. According to her the investigation has
gone into electoral dynamics of the Gohpur constituency, and it
was found that the deceased, Daniel Topno, was a popular local
leader and that he had contested the last two Assembly elections
and though, he did not win either of them, he had secured
substantial number of votes, that is 16,000 in 1991 and 12,600 in
1996 Assembly Elections, wherein the margin between winning
candidate and the runner-up was 3,000 votes in the 1996
Assembly Elections. This shows him to be an important player and
capable of tilting the scale in the upcoming 2001 Assembly
Election as well, in which he had decided to contest.
7.4.
Ms. Kumari, further pointed out that the deceased Daniel
Topno was offered membership of Congress party by Ripun
Bora(respondent No.1, as well as by Mani Kumar Subba, but,
Topno had refused to join the party, however, he was in touch
with AGP party as well, and these are the factors that impacted
the political ambition of Ripun Bora(respondent No.1), and this
attributed the motive upon Ripun Bora (respondent No.1), to
eliminate Daniel Topno.
7.5. Ms. Kumari has also pointed it out that the learned Sessions
Judge ought to have taken note of both the charge-sheets, i.e.,
the charge-sheet filed by the CBI and also the charge-sheet
submitted by the C.I.D. and the statement of accused Kale Mizar,
made before a police officer, namely, Mr. N. Singh before framing
of charge, but the same were not taken note of and considered.
7.6. Ms. Kumari has further pointed it out that at the relevant
point of time, Kamal Nath was a juvenile, and as such, his case
was directed to be put up before the concerned Juvenile Justice
Board, vide order dated 18/12/2013, and the confession made by
the said juvenile was not taken note of by the learned Sessions
Judge while discharging the accused. Ms. Kumari also submits
that at the time of consideration of framing of charge, the Court
has to consider the existence of a prima facie case and grave
suspicion, and not to conduct a mini-trial, and on aforesaid counts
the impugned order of discharge, so passed by the learned
Sessions Judge suffers from manifest irregularity, and it requires
interference of this Court.
7.7. In support of her submissions, she has also referred to the
following decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court:
(i)
Mitesh @ T.V. Vaghela –vs.- The State of
Gujarat, Criminal Appeal No. 212 of 2012,
(2026 INSC 469)
(ii) State of Madhya Pradesh –vs.- Balveer Singh,
2025 INSC 261.
(iii) Vijaya Singh and Another –vs.- State of
Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No. 122 of
2013, (2024 INSC 905)
(iv)
Shakiluddin alias Babloo –vs.- The State,
Criminal Revision Petition No.150 of 2020
of Delhi High Court.
(v)
Dr. Anand Rai –vs- State of Madhya Pradesh
and Another, reported in Criminal Appeal
No. [.....] of 2026 (arising out of SLP
(Crl) No. 10711 of 2025).
Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent
No.1
8.
Per contra, Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the
respondent No. 1, taking this Court through the charge-sheet filed
by the C.I.D, submits that the C.I.D had found no material to
submit charge-sheet against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein.
However, the CBI has submitted charge-sheet against the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Kamrup (M), to whom the case was originally made over for
disposal, had framed charge against both of them, and when
challenged before this Court, the order of framing charges was
set aside by this Court, vide order dated 11/06/2013.
8.1. Mr. Bora has also pointed it out that in paragraph-36 of the
order, dated 11/06/2013, this Court was pleased to direct the
learned Sessions Judge to consider both the charge-sheets before
framing of charge. He further submits that Kamal Nath, who
allegedly made confession, was a juvenile, and his case was
splitted up and referred to the Juvenile Board, and he also
submits that barring the confession of the juvenile Kamal Nath,
there was no prima facie material against the present petitioners.
8.2.
He also pointed it out that the confession of juvenile Kamal
Nath was recorded after 6 years of the occurrence and the CBI
had apprehended Kamal Nath on the basis of one report
published in a local daily Newspaper, namely, „Ei Saptaha‟, on
28.06.2006, but, interestingly, the said newspaper was not seized
by CBI. He also submits that, in fact, no such newspaper was
published in Assam.
8.3. It is the further submission of Mr. Bora that even if it is
accepted that the said juvenile had made a confession, the said
confession is a confession of a co-accused, and the said coaccused was not tried along with the present respondent No.1. He
also pointed it out that when the confession of a co-accused can
be relied upon is provided in Section 30 of the Evidence Act and
in view of said provision confession of juvenile Kamal Nath cannot
be relied upon.
8.4. Further, Mr. Bora has pointed it out that the confessional
statement of juvenile Kamal Nath is exculpatory in nature, and
nowhere in the said statement, he had implicated himself being
part of the conspiracy and commission of the crime and on this
count also, his confessional statement is not admissible.
8.5. He also submits that in the confessional statement, juvenile
Kamal Nath had implicated one member of Parliament, namely,
Mani Kumar Subba, but he was exonerated and the CBI has only
presumed involvement of the present respondent No. 1 and the
said presumption is based upon another presumption, i.e. the
electoral dynamic, that has no value in the eye of law.
8.6. Mr. Bora, also pointed it out that while recording confession
under Section 164 of accused/ Kamal Nath, the learned
Magistrate had not followed the prescribed procedure and under
such circumstances, the impugned order, so passed by the
learned Sessions Judge, acquitting the respondent Nos. 1 and 2,
suffers from no material irregularity or illegality, requiring any
interference of this Court.
8.7. Further, Mr. Bora submits that the prosecution in the instant
case has also relied upon one purported statement of one Kale
Mizar @ Umakanta Mizar to frame charges against the
respondents and said Kale Mizar is an accused charge sheeted by
the CID in connection with Gohpur P.S case No.183/2000 and he
has not been facing the trial in the instant case as he was
declared absconder by Court. On the same principle of section 30
of Evidence Act, the statement of Kale Mizar cannot be used as
against the other co accused. In support of his submission, Mr.
Bora has also referred to one decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in Suresh Budharmal Kalani Vs. Sate of Maharastra,
reported in (1998) 7 SCC 337, and also referred another
decision in Esher Singh Vs. State of A.P., reported in
(2004) 11 SCC 585.
8.8. Notably, in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani(supra)
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as under:"Under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, 1872,
a confession of an accused is relevant and
admissible against a co-accused if both are
jointly facing trial for the same offence".
At the time of framing of charge, "the court
is required to confine its attention to only
those
materials
collected
during
investigation
which
can
be
legally
translated into evidence and not upon
further evidence (dehors those materials)
that the prosecution may adduce in the trial
which would commence only after the charges
are framed and the accused denies the
charges".
8.9. And in the case of Esher Singh (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has held that use of confession of an accused against coaccused is permissible when the co-accused after being charged
faces trial along with other co-accused. Otherwise if he is not
facing the same trial his confession has no evidentiary value
against the co-accused.
8.10.
Mr. Bora has also relied upon following decisions:
(i) Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel –vs.- State
of Gujarat and Another, reported in (2019) 16
SCC
547, to contend that co-accused must be
charged and tried together to rely upon his
confession against the accused.
(ii)
Kashmira
Singh
–vs.-
State
of
Madhya
Pradesh, reported in AIR 1952 SC 159, to contend
that Court cannot start with confessional statement.
(iii) Palvinder
Kaur
–vs.-
State
of
Punjab,
reported in AIR 1952 SC 354 and Aghnoo Nagesia
–Versus- State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1966
SC 119, to contend that self-exculpatory statement
of co-accused cannot be treated as confession.
8.11. Referring to another decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani (Supra) Mr. Bora
submits that presumption of fact on the basis of another
presumption is impermissible and under the given facts and
circumstances Mr. Bora has contended to dismiss this petition.
Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent
No.2
9.
On the other hand, Mr. D. Talukdar, learned Sr. Counsel for
the respondent No. 2, has subscribed the submission of Mr. A.M
Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1.
Submissions of learned counsel for the informant/
respondent No.3
10. Per contra, Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the informant/
respondent No. 3 submits that the impugned order suffers from
material irregularity as the learned Trial court has conducted a
mini trial at the stage of framing of charge, which is not
permissible in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of State of Tamil Nadu –vs- N. Suresh Ranjan
and Others, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 709. At this stage,
according to Mr. Bora, the Court is required only to examine
whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses a
prima-facie case/sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. It is not required to evaluate whether the material would
ultimately warrant a conviction.
10.1. Mr. D. Bora has also pointed it out that the materials, so
collected by the CBI, are sufficient to show the complicity of the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 with the offence alleged in the FIR. He
also submits that, in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the case of Om Wati (Smt) and Another –vs.- State
through Delhi Administration and Others, reported in
(2001) 4 SCC 333, the Courts have to see whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding or not, and whether a strong
prima
facie case is made out or not, at the stage of
consideration of charge and that Court can discharge the accused
only when accepting the prosecution evidence fully, before being
challenged in cross-examination, or rebutted by defence evidence,
cannot show commission of crime by the accused.
10.2. His further submission is that generally, High Court would
allow Trial Court to proceed and that evaluation of evidence
including evidentiary value of witnesses, is not permissible at the
stage of consideration of charge. In support of his said
contention, he has referred to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar –vs.- Central Bureau of
Investigation, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368. And under
such circumstances, Mr. Bora has contended to set aside the
impugned order and to remand the matter to the learned Trial
Court for trial after framing charges against the respondent Nos.1
and 2.
Discussion and Analysis:11. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both
the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the petition, the
grounds mentioned therein and the documents placed on record
and also the note submitted by Ms. Kumari, learned Standing
Counsel, CBI and also the written submission of Mr. A. M. Bora,
learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and the decision
referred to by learned counsel for all the parties.
12. Before a discussion is directed to the points raised by
learned counsel for all the parties, it would be pertinent to discuss
the scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court, in dealing with an
order of discharge, passed under Section 227 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
12.1.
In that case of
Sudershan Singh Wazir -Versus-
State (NCT of Delhi) & Others, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine 461, while dealing with the issue, Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that an order of discharge, under Section 227
Cr.P.C., means the person ceases to be an accused. Discharge
stands on a higher pedestal than an order of acquittal after a full
trial. Dealing with the scope of revisional jurisdiction to interfere
with the discharge order is very limited and this jurisdiction must
be exercised sparingly. It has also been held that the High Court
examines the legality, correctness, or propriety of the order, but it
does not conduct a mini-trial or re-appreciation of evidence as if
deciding the case on merits. It has also been held that
interference is justified only where the discharge order is grossly
erroneous and suffers from non-compliance with law and is based
on no evidence, and ignores material evidence, or reflects an
arbitrary/perverse exercise of judicial discretion.
12.2.
Relevant paragraphs are extracted herein below for ready
reference:“11. Under Section 226 of the CrPC, after the
order of commitment, when the accused appears
or is brought before the Court of Sessions,
the prosecutor has to open his case by
describing the charge levelled against the
accused by stating what evidence is proposed
to prove the guilt of the accused. At that
stage, the Sessions Court has to consider the
record of the case. The record of the case
will be the charge sheets. The Sessions Court
is
under
an
obligation
to
hear
the
submissions
of
the
accused
and
the
prosecution as provided in Section 227 of the
CrPC. After hearing the parties, if the
Sessions Court is of the opinion that there
is a ground for presuming that the accused
has committed an offence, it may proceed to
frame a charge in writing against the
accused. The charge can be framed only after
the Court comes to a conclusion that there is
a ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence.
12. After considering the material on the
charge sheet and the submissions of parties,
if the Court concludes that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused, the Court must discharge the accused
for the reasons recorded. Thus, an order of
discharge is passed when there is no
sufficient material to proceed against the
accused. When a discharge order is passed,
the person discharged ceases to be an
accused. The position of a discharged accused
is on a higher pedestal than that of an
accused who is acquitted after a full trial.
The reason is that a charge can be framed,
and an accused can be tried only when there
is sufficient material in the charge sheet to
proceed against him. An order of discharge is
passed when the charge sheet does not contain
sufficient material to proceed against the
accused. Therefore, he is discharged at the
threshold. After an accused is discharged
under Section 227 of the CrPC, he is set at
liberty as he ceases to be an accused.”
12.3. In the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala &
Anr. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398, Hon‟ble Supreme Court
has laid down following propositions:(i)
If two views are possible and one of them
gives
rise
to
suspicion
only
as
distinguished from grave suspicion, the
Trial Judge would be empowered to
discharge the accused.
(ii)
The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office
to frame the charge at the instance of
the prosecution.
(iii)
The Judge has merely to sift the evidence
in order to find out whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Evidence would consist of the statements
recorded by the Police or the documents
produced before the Court.
(iv)
If the evidence, which the Prosecutor
proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of
the accused, even if fully accepted
before it is challenged in crossexamination or rebutted by the defence
evidence, if any, “cannot show that the
accused committed offence, then, there
will
be
no
sufficient
ground
for
proceeding with the trial”.
(v)
It is open to the accused to explain away
the materials giving rise to the grave
suspicion.
(vi)
The court has to consider the broad
probabilities, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced
before the court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This,
however, would not entitle the court to
make a roving inquiry into the pros and
cons.
(vii)
At the time of framing of the charges,
the probative value of the material on
record cannot be gone into, and the
material brought on record by the
prosecution, has to be accepted as true.
(viii)
12.4.
There must exist some materials for
entertaining the strong suspicion which
can form the basis for drawing up a
charge and refusing to discharge the
accused.
The aforesaid propositions have subsequently, been
followed in the case of M.E Shivalingamurthy vs. Central
Bureau Of Investigation, Bengaluru, reported in (2020) 2
SCC 768. Besides, in this case Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held
as under:“28. It is here that again it becomes
necessary that we remind ourselves of the
contours of the jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Cr.PC. The principle established
is to take the materials produced by the
prosecution, both in the form of oral
statements and also documentary material,
and act upon it without it been subjected
to questioning through cross-examination
and everything assumed in favour of the
prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no
offence, as alleged, is made out against
the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure
to the benefit of the accused warranting
the Trial Court to discharge the accused.”
12.5. In the case of Amit Kapoor –vs.- Ramesh Chander
and another, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, also Hon'ble
Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of Section 227 Cr.P.C.
and relying upon its earlier decision in Union of India –vs.Page 21 of 47
Prafulla Kumar Samal and another, reported in (1979) 3
SCC 4, and an earlier decisions in State of Bihar –vs.Ramesh Singh, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 39, held that the
Judge has the power to sift and weigh the evidence only for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out. It is not a mini-trial or a
stage for detailed evaluation of evidence as if deciding guilt or
innocence.
12.6. It has also been held in the said case that if the material
discloses grave suspicion against the accused that has not been
properly explained, the court is justified in framing a charge and
proceed for trial. And if two views are possible, one giving rise
only to suspicion, the court may discharge the accused. At that
stage, the Judge is not to see whether the trial is ultimately going
to end in conviction or acquittal. The Judge has to exercise
judicial mind on the facts to determine whether a case for trial
has been made out. The provision aims to prevent wasting of
public time on cases that do not disclose a prima facie case and
to protect the accused from avoidable harassment. A strong
suspicion may be enough to frame a charge, even though it
would not take the place of proof at the trial stage. In the said
case, it has also been held that the jurisdiction of the High Court
is limited to correctness, legality, and propriety of the order and it
is not entitled to re-appreciate the evidence.
12.7. Further, in the said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with the scope of revisional jurisdiction, has held that the
revisional jurisdiction is very limited and cannot be exercised
routinely or as a matter of course. It is meant to correct a patent
defect, errors of jurisdiction or law, or to prevent abuse of the
process/gross injustice, and it is not an appeal in disguise. It is
also held that one built-in restriction is that revision is generally
not available against interlocutory orders [Section 397(2)].
Framing of charge is treated as an intermediate/final stage in
many contexts, but interference remains highly restricted. At the
stage of framing of charge, the Court looks only to the strong
suspicion that the accused has committed an offence. Meticulous
evaluation or appreciation of evidence, as if conducting a minitrial, is impermissible. The High Court should be reluctant to
interfere with an order of framing charges in revision unless the
case falls into exceptional categories. Revisional jurisdiction
should normally be exercised on a question of law. Where factual
appreciation is involved, interference is justified only if the finding
is perverse. The power must be exercised so that justice is done
and there is no abuse of the process of the Court. Mere suspicion
or possibility of a different view is not enough. Inherent powers
under Section 482 are wider than pure revisional power under
Section 397, but even then, it must be used sparingly, with
circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases, especially to
quash a charge. Section 482 does not completely oust the
limitation of Section 397, but nothing in the Code can affect the
amplitude of inherent power where an extraordinary situation
demand intervention to prevent abuse of the process.
12.8. It is also to be noted here that in the case of Prafulla
Kumar Samal (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as
under:(i)
The Judge must take the material produced by
the prosecution (which indicates oral
statements and documents) at face value,
without
cross-examination,
and
assume
everything in favor of the prosecution.
(ii)
If, even on that basis, no offence is made
out, the accused is entitled to discharge.
(iii) The Trial Judge is not a mere post office
to frame a charge at the instance of the
prosecution; he must sift the evidence to
determine whether there is sufficient
ground for proceeding.
(iv)
If two views are possible and one view
gives rise to suspicion as opposed to grave
suspicion, the Judge may discharge the
accused.
(v)
If the evidence the prosecution proposes to
adduce, even if fully accepted before being
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted
by defense evidence, cannot show that the
accused committed the offence, there is no
sufficient ground for trial. The defense of
the accused is not to be looked into at the
stage of discharge under Section 227.
(vi) The expression "record of the case" refers
to the documents and articles produced by
the prosecution.
(vii) The accused cannot rely on his own material
to seek discharge.
(viii)Grave
suspicion
based
on
prosecution
material is sufficient to frame a charge
and proceed to trial.
13.
In the instant case, the learned Sessions Judge has held
that, going through the statement of the witnesses examined by
the CBI, it is found that none has said anything against
accused/Ripun Bora or Pulin Phukan to indicate that they were
involved in the conspiracy and murder of Daniel Topno. Only
Police Officer, Mr. N. Singh has stated before the Investigating
Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was picked up by him during
investigation of the case relating to murder of Daniel Topno, and
during his interrogation, Kale Mizar reportedly stated before Mr.
Singh that Ripun Bora had instructed him to eliminate Daniel
Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join Congress or to
refrain from contesting the Assembly Election. The further version
of this Police Officer is that, under political pressure, the
statement of Kale Mizar was not recorded, and he was allowed to
abscond.
13.1. The learned Sessions Judge has also held that the above
statement of the Police Officer cannot be accepted to be a strong
material against accused/Ripun Bora, mainly for two reasons:(i) The prime being that the confessional statement made
before Police Officer is inadmissible.
(ii)
Secondly, it appears from the record that during the
relevant time, the said Police Officer was posted as
Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali, and
he was supervising the investigation of the case
regarding murder of Daniel Topno.
13.2.
The learned Sessions Judge has further held that from
the record of the Case Diary of the said case, Gohpur PS Case No.
183 of 2000, it appears that nowhere in the Case Diary or his
inspection note, it has been mentioned by the said supervising
Police Officer about this purported disclosure made by accused
Kale Mizar. Rather, if the said statement is believed, it lends
credence to the charge-sheet filed by the C.I.D. against accused
Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar.
13.3. Further, the learned Sessions Judge has held that it is
revealed that during the investigation of the case by Assam
Police, the statement of Kale Mizar was recorded, but in his said
statement, he did not mention anything that he was instructed by
accused/Ripun Bora to eliminate Daniel Topno. It may be
mentioned here that Kale Mizar, who was charge-sheeted by
C.I.D, was not examined as witness by CBI. The CBI has
mentioned in its charge-sheet that allegations made against
Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar in the charge-sheet filed by C.I.D
could not be substantiated by the investigation of CBI.
13.4. The learned Sessions Judge further held that it is wellsettled principle of law that, at the stage of framing of charge, if
there is no evidence except the confession of a co-accused, a
charge cannot be framed on the mere probability of the
prosecution that at some future date, the prosecution might
produce further evidence supplementing its case. A trial cannot be
allowed
to
proceed
on
contingent,
hyper-technical,
and
anticipatory evidence. In arriving at such a finding, it has relied
upon a decision of this Court in the case of Suresh Chandra Das
and
another
–vs.-
State
of
Meghalaya, reported in
MANU/GH/0026/1971: 1971 SCC OnLine Gau 5.
13.5. Notably, in the said case, this Court has held that
Magistrate can frame a charge against an accused only if the
documents furnished under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, discloses prima-facie legal evidence sufficient for a
reasonable opinion that there are grounds for presuming the
accused has committed an offence triable under the Cr.P.C. In the
absence of such material, the charge cannot stand and is liable to
be quashed. The said decision also refers to a decision of Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar,
reported in (1964) 6 SCR 623, where it has been held that
confession made by a co-accused is not substantive evidence
against another co-accused. It can be used only under Section 30
of the Evidence Act, to lend assurance to other independent
evidence, that is already sufficient to sustain a conviction. It
cannot form the sole or primary basis of conviction.
13.6. The learned Sessions Judge also held that the statement of
co-accused is inadmissible except under Section 30 of the
Evidence Act.
13.7. It is the further observation of the learned Sessions Judge
that if it is kept in mind that accused Kamal Nath, being now
declared as juvenile, is not tried jointly with accused/Ripun Bora
and Pulin Phukan, and therefore, his confessional statement
cannot obviously be used under Section 30 of the Evidence Act
against the other two co-accused above named, and if the
statement of Kamal Nath is excluded, then there is absolutely no
material on record to set up accusation against the accused Ripun
Bora and Pulin Phukan. The said confessional statement of
accused Kamal Nath, therefore, cannot be called in aid to frame
charge against the accused Ripun Bora and Pulin Phukan in
absence of any other material to endorse.
13.8. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge relied upon
following two decisions of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of:
(i)
Satish Mehra –vs.- Delhi Administration and
another, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 766, and
(ii)
Soma Chakravorty –vs.- State through Central
Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2007) 5
SCC 403,
And thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge has held that
suspicion alone, without anything more, cannot be the basis, or
held to be sufficient for framing charge. It has also held that there
are no materials against Ripun Borah and Pulin Phukan, except
the statement of witness N.K. Singh, and ultimately discharged
both of them under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
13.9. Notably, in the case of Satish Mehra(supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has held that at the stage of framing of charge
under Section 227/228 Cr.P.C. the Sessions Judge must
determine whether there is sufficient
ground for proceeding
against the accused. This is lower standard than proof beyond
reasonable doubt, required for conviction, but, it still requires a
real and bonafide prospect that the case would end in conviction.
The Court is not expected to conduct a mini trial, yet it is entitled
to and in appropriate cases obliged to look beyond the
prosecution material alone and take note of materials produced
by the accused if the materials clinched the issue and show that a
trial would be futile.
13.9.1.
It has also been held in the said case that where the
available material, viewed as a whole, discloses no reasonable
prospect of conviction, for example, because of the core evidence
is inherently incredible, appears tutored, is contradicted by the
contemporaneous independent investigation or medical findings
or is shown to be motivated by personnel animosity, the Court
should discharge the accused, under Section 227 Cr.P.C. rather
than frame a charge and for full trial.
13.9.2.
In the case of Soma Chakravorty (supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has held as under:“10. ………………..if
on
the
basis
of
material
on
record the Court could form an opinion that the
accused might have committed the offence, it can
frame
the
conclusion
charge,
is
though
required
to
for
conviction
be
proved
the
beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has committed
the
offence.
At
the
time
of
framing
of
the
charges the probative value of the material on
record cannot be gone into, and the material
brought on record by the prosecution has to be
accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a
charge the court must apply its judicial mind on
the
material
placed
on
record
and
must
be
satisfied that the commission of the offence by
the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the
accused
committed
the
offence,
can
only
be
decided in the trial.”
14. The finding of learned Sessions Judge, while examined in
the light of the submissions, so advanced by Ms. M. Kumari,
learned Standing Counsel for the CBI, and also in the light of the
submission advanced by Mr. A.M Bora, learned Sr. Counsel for the
respondent No. 1, and Mr. D. Talukdar, learned Sr. Counsel for
the respondent No.2, and Mr. D. Bora, learned counsel for the
informant/respondent No.3, this Court finds that the finding, so
recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, cannot be said to be
suffered from any irregularity or illegality or impropriety, requiring
exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
14.1. This Court finds that there is nothing wrong in the finding
so recorded by the learned Sessions Judge that none of witnesses
examined by CBI had stated anything against respondent No.1
and 2, to indicate that they were involved in the conspiracy and
murder of Daniel Topno, except however, the statement of Mr. N.
Singh, the Police Officer, who had stated before the Investigating
Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was picked up by him during
investigation, and during his interrogation, Kale Mizar stated
before him that respondent No.1 had instructed him to eliminate
Daniel Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join
Congress or to refrain from contesting the Assembly Election.
Further version of Mr. N. Singh is that, under political pressure,
the statement of accused Kale Mizar was not recorded, and he
was allowed to abscond.
14.2. However, the learned Sessions Judge had declined to
accept the statement of Mr. N. Singh, and that too very rightly,
firstly, the confessional statement made before a Police Officer is
inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and secondly,
Mr. N. Singh, was the supervising Officer of the case of murder of
Daniel Topno, being Gohpur P.S. Case No.183/2000 and he was
posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali at the
relevant point of time and in the Case Diary of Gohpur PS Case
No. 183 of 2000, he had mentioned nothing about this purported
disclosure of accused Kale Mizar.
14.3. Moreover, during investigation of the case by Assam
Police, the statement of Kale Mizar was recorded and nowhere in
his said statement he had mentioned that he was instructed by
respondent No.1 to eliminate Daniel Topno. Over and above, Kale
Mizar, was charge-sheeted by C.I.D as an accused, but he was
never examined as witness by CBI. Rather, in the charge sheet
submitted by CBI it had mentioned about absence of materials to
substantiate the allegations against Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar,
who were charge sheeted by C.I.D.
14.4. This Court finds that the finding above, so recorded by the
learned Sessions Judge, suffers from no illegality as the learned
Sessions Judge had assigned cogent reasons and the petitioner
CBI has measurably failed to demonstrate from the record any
perversity in the same.
15.
It is well settled proposition of law that, on the date of
consideration of charge, incriminating material must be on the
record and case diary has to show existence of prima-facie case
against the accused. Merely on the probability that the
prosecution might produce further evidence, supplementing its
case, at some future date, a charge cannot be framed. Criminal
trial cannot be allowed to proceed on contingent, hyper-technical,
and anticipatory evidence. The learned Sessions Judge had rightly
recorded a finding in this regard and Mr. Bora, learned counsel for
the respondent has rightly argued that there is no infirmity in the
finding above.
16.
This Court has also considered the submission of Ms. M.
Kumari, learned Standing Counsel, CBI is that the confessional
statement of co-accused Kamal Nath, who was admittedly not
being tried along with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, for being
juvenile at the time of commission of the offence and his case
was referred to Juvenile Justice Board, could have been used
against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by the learned Sessions
Judge.
16.1.
To appreciate the said submission of Ms. Kumari, this
Court deems it necessary to refer Section 30 of the Evidence Act,
1872 which reads as under:
"30. Consideration of proved confession
affecting person making it and other jointly
under trial for same offence.
--When more persons than one are being
tried jointly for the same offence, and
a confession made by one of such
persons affecting himself and some
other of such persons is proved, the
Court may take into consideration such
confession as against such other person
as well as against the person who makes
such confession.
[Explanation.--"Offence", as used in this
section, includes the abetment of, or attempt
to commit the offence]"
16.2. While dealing with this provision in the case of Suresh
Budharmal Kalani(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held
that under Section 30 of Evidence Act, a confession by one coaccused is relevant against a co-accused only if both are jointly
tried for the same offence. Once an accused has been discharged
and is no longer facing trial with others his confessional statement
cannot be used against the remaining accused.
16.3. In the case of Kashmira Singh vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, reported in AIR 1952 SC 159, Hon‟ble Supreme Court
has held that a confession of co-accused containing incriminating
materials against another person has only weak evidentiary value.
In absence of any other independent evidence, such a confession
cannot by itself form the basis of framing of charges under
Sections 227/228 Cr.P.C.
16.4.
In the case of Hardeep Singh Sohal & others vs.
State of Punjab through CBI, reported in (2004) 11 SCC
612, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that confession cannot be
admitted in evidence against the co- accused under Section 30 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, since, the accused who made the
confession was not tried along with the other accused.
16.5.
In the instant case, admittedly accused Kamal Nath, who
made the confessional statement, implicating the respondent
Nos.1 and 2, have not been jointly tried with respondent Nos.1
and 2, as he was a juvenile and his case was referred to Juvenile
Justice Board. In that view of the matter, and also in view of the
propositions laid down in the case of (i) Suresh Budharmal
Kalani(supra),
(ii)
Kashmira
Singh
(supra),
(iii)
Hardeep Singh Sohal(supra), this Court is unable to record
concurrence with the submissions of Ms. Kumari, learned Standing
Counsel for the CBI.
16.6.
For another reason also, the submission of Ms. Kumari
could not be accepted is that the alleged confessional statement
of accused Kamal Nath is exculpatory in nature. Mr. Bora, learned
counsel for the respondent No.1 has rightly pointed it out during
the course of hearing. And this Court finds substance in the same.
16.7. Having carefully gone through the alleged confessional
statement of accused Kamal Nath, this Court finds that the said
confessional statement is exculpatory in nature. Nowhere in the
said statement, Kamal Nath had implicated himself with the
offence alleged in the FIR. It is well settled in the case of
Palvinder
Kaur
(supra), a statement containing self-
exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if the
exculpatory part, if true, would negative the offence. A confession
must either admit the offence in terms or substantially all the
facts which constitute the offence. The court cannot accept only
the inculpatory portion while rejecting the exculpatory portion as
inherently incredible. The value of exculpatory statements against
co-accused is completely unreliable. An accused who absolves
himself while implicating others has a strong motive to shift
blame.
16.8.
In the case of Kanda Pandyachi @ Kandaswamy v.
State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1971) 2 SCC 641, Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held as under:-
“A
confession
has
to
be
a
direct
acknowledgment of guilt of the offence in
question and such as would be sufficient by
itself for conviction. If it falls short of
such a plenary acknowledgment of guilt it
would not be a confession even though the
statement is of some incriminating fact which
taken with other evidence tend to prove his
guilt.”
16.9.
Very recently Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of
Bernard
Lyngdoh
Phawa
&
Anr.
v.
The
State
of
Meghalaya reported in (2026 INSC 85), decided on 27 January
2026, reaffirmed the aforesaid proposition as under:“28. Yet again, as we found, the confession
of A1 is purely exculpatory and accuse A2 of
having strangulated his friend, leading to
his death. The exculpatory statements made by
A1 to absolve himself from the liability and
accuse A2 of having caused the death, cannot
at all be relied on against A2. Insofar as A2
is concerned, he does not speak of the murder
having been committed and merely admits that
the deceased took his last breath in A2’s
lap, which is not a confession as such……”
16.10.
In the instant case, from a careful perusal of the said
confessional statement of Kamal Nath reveals that he was
arrested by CBI on 27.04.2007 and detained at Guwahati Jail from
27.04.2007 till 03.05.2007. Thereafter, the learned Magistrate had
put the preliminary questions to ascertain the voluntariness of the
confession to be made by the accused. Thereafter, he was
remanded to jail hazoot for reflection from 17.05.2007, till
29.05.2007. He was produced before the learned Magistrate on
29.05.2007, at 1 pm and then the Magistrate again explained the
particulars of Section 164 Cr.P.C. and then being satisfied the
learned
magistrate
has
recorded
the
alleged
confessional
statement.
16.11. Thus, it becomes apparent that when the accused was
again produced from judicial custody on 29.05.2007, he was
never given time for reflection again while, since he was produced
before the Magistrate by the CBI. Over and above, it cannot be
said that at that time the accused was free from influence of the
CBI, as he was produced by CBI on 29.05.2007, and immediately
his statement was recorded.
16.12.
Thus, for failing to give time for reflection again on
29.07.2007, and to record satisfaction that the accused was
completely out of influence of police (CBI) and that the statement
of the accused is not on account of any extraneous influence on
him, it cannot be said that procedural safeguard was maintained
by the learned Magistrate.
16.13. It is well settled that procedural defects undermined
voluntariness and reliability. Reference in this context can be
made to a decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shivappa v.
State of Karnataka, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 76, wherein it
has been held that full and adequate compliance with Section 164
Cr.P.C., and related High Court rules/guidelines, is required not
merely in form, but in essence. Non-compliance goes to the root
of the Magistrate‟s jurisdiction to record the confession and
renders it unworthy of credence. It has been stressed that the
Magistrate
must
make
a
searching
inquiry
to
ascertain
voluntariness, e.g., questions about custody, treatment in
custody, police influence, reasons for confessing against selfinterest, and assurances of protection if the accused declines.
Failure to do so materially detract from the evidentiary value of
the confession, making it unsafe to act upon, as voluntariness is
foundational.
16.14. This proposition has been reiterated in later decisions,
including Rabindra
Kumar
Pal
alias
Dara
Singh
v.
Republic of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 490, wherein
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under:-
“64. The following principles emerge with regard
to Section 164 CrPC:
(i)
The provisions of Section 164 CrPC must
be complied with not only in form, but
in essence.
(ii)
Before
proceeding
to
confessional statement,
record
the
a searching
enquiry must be made from the accused
as to the custody from which he was
produced and the treatment he had been
receiving in such custody in order to
ensure that there is no scope for doubt
of any sort of extraneous influence
proceeding from a source interested in
the prosecution.
(iii)
A Magistrate should ask the accused as
to why he wants to make a statement
which surely shall go against his
interest in the trial.
(iv)
The maker should be granted sufficient
time for reflection.
(v)
He should be assured of protection from
any sort of apprehended torture or
pressure from the police in case he
declines
to
make
a
confessional
statement.
(vi)
A
judicial
confession
not
given
voluntarily is unreliable, more so,
when such a confession is retracted,
the conviction cannot be based on such
retracted judicial confession.
(vii) Non-compliance with Section 164 CrPC goes
to the root of the Magistrate's
jurisdiction to record the confession
and renders the confession unworthy of
credence.
(viii)
During the time of reflection, the
accused should be completely out of
police influence. The judicial officer,
who is entrusted with the duty of
recording confession, must apply his
judicial mind to ascertain and satisfy
his conscience that the statement of
the accused is not on account of any
extraneous influence on him.
(ix)
At the time of recording the statement
of the accused, no police or police
official shall be present in the open
court.
(x)
Confession of a co-accused is a weak type
of evidence.
(xi)
Usually
the
court
requires
some
corroboration from the confessional
statement before convicting the accused
person on such a statement.
17. Though, Ms. M. Kumari, learned counsel for the CBI, has
attributed some motive for killing Daniel Topno by
the
accused/respondent No. 1, yet, it is nothing but a presumption
based upon the presumable fact that in the election held in the
year 1991 and 1996, Daniel Topno had secured a sizable section
of the vote of Gohpur Legislative Assembly Constituency, leading
to defeat of respondent No. 1.
17.1.
Notably, in the case of Suresh Budharmal Kalani @
Papu Kalani (supra) Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that
presumption can be drawn only from facts not from other
presumption, by a process of probable and logical reasoning. In
the instant case, though Ms. Kumari submits that in view of the
vote secured by deceased Denial Topno, in the past elections held
in the year 1991 and 1996, who becomes a popular leader in the
meantime, would have been a factor in the election to be held in
the year 2001, to the respondent No.1, and therefore, the
respondent No.1 has a strong motive to eliminate the deceased
Denial Topno, is only a presumption.
17.2.
Thus, the electoral dynamics, which Ms. Kumari has
projected, is a presumption, based upon another presumption.
And in view of the proposition laid down in the case of Suresh
Budharmal Kalani @ Papu Kalani (supra), this Court is
unable to record concurrence to her submission.
18. This Court has carefully gone through the decisions referred
to and relied upon by Ms. Kumari, in support of her submission.
(i)
In the case of Mitesh @ T.V. Vagela (supra),
Hon‟ble
Supreme
Court
has
dealt
with
dying
declaration and held that reliable dying declaration
can be sole basis of conviction under Section 302
IPC, without need of corroboration.
(ii)
In the case of Balbeer
Singh(supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has primarily dealt with reliability of
child witness testimony and the cautious application
of child witness testimony and cautious application of
Section 106 of Evidence Act.
(i) In the case of Vijaya Singh (supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has dealt with principle governing
circumstantial
evidence
and
reiterated
the
Panchasheel Principle from Sharda Birdhichand
Sarad vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in
1984 AIR 1622, and held that evidence must be
examined as a whole not in isolation.
(ii) In the case of Sakiluddin(supra) Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has restated the settled principle laid down in
the case of Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra).
(iii) In the case of Dr. Anand Rai (supra) Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has held that protective statute like
SC/ST Act cannot be invoked mechanically. The
specific
statutory
requirement,
particularly
the
element of knowledge must be prima-facie satisfied
on the face of prosecution material.
18.1. However, in the given factual scenario, this Court afraid,
the aforementioned decisions, so referred by Ms. Kumari would
not come into her assistance.
19.
This Court has also considered the submission of Mr. D.
Bora, learned counsel for the informant-respondent No.3 and has
also gone through the decisions relied upon by him. But, in view
of the aforementioned discussion and findings, this Court is
unable to accept his submission and the decisions referred to by
him to the considered opinion of this Court also would not come
to his assistance.
20. To recapitulate, on the following grounds, the impugned
order of discharge warrants no interference of this Court:(i)
None of the witnesses examined by the CBI had stated
anything against respondent Nos.1 and 2 to indicate that
they were involved in the conspiracy and murder of
Daniel Topno.
(ii)
Though Mr. N. Singh, a Police Officer, had stated before
the Investigating Officer that accused/Kale Mizar was
picked up by him during investigation, and during his
interrogation,
Kale
Mizar
stated
before
him
that
respondent No.1 had instructed him to eliminate Daniel
Topno, since he did not accept the proposal to join
Congress or to refrain from contesting the Assembly
Election and that, under political pressure, statement of
said Kale Mizar was not recorded, yet, statement made
to Mr. N. Singh, is inadmissible for the same being a
Police Officer, and that he was the supervising officer of
the case of murder of Daniel Topno and was posted as
Sub-Divisional Police Officer of Biswanath Chariali, and
he
had
mentioned
nothing
about
this
purported
disclosure of accused Kale Mizar, in the Case Diary of
Gohpur PS Case No. 183 of 2000.
(iii)
During investigation of the case by Assam Police, the
statement of Kale Mizar was recorded and nowhere in
his said statement he had mentioned that he was
instructed by respondent No.1 to eliminate Daniel Topno.
(iv)
Though said Kale Mizar, was charge-sheeted by C.I.D as
an accused, the CBI has not examined him as witness,
instead in the charge sheet, CBI had mentioned about
absence of materials to substantiate the allegations
against Narayan Gour and Kale Mizar, who were charge
sheeted by C.I.D.
(v)
The alleged confessional statement of co-accused Kamal
Nath, is inadmissible in view of the fact that he was
admittedly not being jointly tried along with the
respondent Nos. 1 and 2, for being juvenile at the time
of commission of the offence, in view of Section 30 of
the Evidence Act, and also in view of the decision of
Hon‟ble
Supreme
Court
in
Suresh
Budharmal
Kalani(supra), and in the case of Kashmira Singh
(supra) and also in Hardeep Singh Sohal(supra).
(vi)
Moreover,
as
held
in
the
case
of
Kashmira
Singh(supra) Court cannot start with confession, much
less on the confession of co-accused, which has only
weak evidentiary value. In absence of any other
independent evidence, such a confession cannot by itself
form the basis of framing of charges under Sections
227/228 Cr.P.C.
(vii)
The alleged confessional statement of Kamal Nath, is
exculpatory
in
nature
and
nowhere
in
the
said
statement, Kamal Nath had implicated himself with the
offence alleged in the FIR. As held in the case of
Palvinder Kaur (supra), Pandyachi @ Kandaswamy
(supra),
and
in
Bernard
Lyngdoh
Phawa
&
Anr.(supra) a statement containing self-exculpatory
matter cannot amount to a confession.
(viii)
Moreover,
procedural
safeguard
while
recording
confession of accused Kamal Nath was not maintained
by the learned Magistrate. Non-compliance goes to the
root of the Magistrate‟s jurisdiction to record the
confession and renders it unworthy of credence, as held
in the case of Shivappa
(supra),
and also
in
Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh (supra)
(ix)
The motive of crime attributed by Ms. M. Kumari, learned
counsel for the CBI, for killing Daniel Topno by the
respondent No. 1, on the basis of electoral dynamics, is
a presumption based upon the presumable fact and in
view of decision in the case of Suresh Budharmal
Kalani @ Papu Kalani (supra), the same cannot be
a basis for framing of charge in absence of other
materials.
21.
In the result, this Court finds this revision petition devoid of
merit and accordingly, the same is dismissed leaving the parties
to bear their own costs.
22. Registry shall return the concerned file to the learned Court
below with the copy of this judgment & order.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant observed as under:
'In our view, once the finding of the concealment and
subsequent levy of penalties
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