Dheeraj Mor vs Hon’ble High Court of Delhi

16 & 233 – In cases where in-service incumbents were appointed by way of direct recruitment from bar (in view of various interim orders passed by Supreme Court in Dheeraj Mor and other cases, though later vacated), in view of dismissal of the writ petitions filed by judicial officers, they cannot continue as District Judges – To be reverted to their original post – In case their right in channel for promotion had already ripened, and their juniors were promoted, High Court to consider their promotion in accordance with prevailing rules – Per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (Supplementing) – Under Art.233, a judicial officer, regardless of her or his previous experience as an Advocate with seven years’ practice can not apply, and compete for appointment to any vacancy in the post of District Judge – Her/his chance to occupy that post would be through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed u/Art.234 and proviso to Art.309 – Exclusion- by the rules, from consideration of judicial officers, to the post of District Judges, in the quota earmarked for advocates with the requisite standing, or practice, conforms to the mandate of Arts. 233-235, and the rules are valid – Service Law – Higher Judicial Service – Interpretation of Statutes. Constitution of India – Arts. 233(1), 234, 235 – Held: Per Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ. – Governor of a State is the authority for the purpose of appointment, promotion, posting and transfer – Eligibility is governed by Rules framed u/Arts. 234 &

235 – Per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (Supplementing) – Governor of a State has the authority to make “appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State – While so appointing, the Governor is bound to consult the High Court – Art. 233 (1) cannot be construed as a source of appointment; it merely delineates as to who is the appointing authority – In matters relating to initial posting, initial appointment, and promotion of District Judges, the Governor has the authority to issue the order; thereafter it is up to the High Court, by virtue of Art.235, to exercise control and superintendence over the conditions of service of such District Judges – Service Law – Higher Judicial Service. Constitution of India – Art. 233(2) – Eligibility of judicial officers to compete as against the post of District Judge by way of direct recruitment – Participation in selection process vis-a-vis appointment – Plea of petitioners placing reliance on Vijay Kumar Mishra & Anr. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna & Ors. reported as [2016] 3 SCR 806 in which it was held that the bar prescribed u/Art.233(2) prohibits only the appointment of persons in service of Central/State Govt. and not their participation in the recruitment process and in case they are selected, they can resign and join the post – Held: Per Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ. – Vijay Kumar Mishra providing eligibility of judicial officer to compete as against the post of District Judge by way of direct recruitment, does not lay down the law correctly – Overruled – Per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (Supplementing) – Vijay Kumar Mishra, as far as it makes a distinction between consideration of a candidate’s eligibility at the stage of selection, and eligibility reckonable at the time of appointment, is incorrect – Eligibility of any candidate is to be reckoned not from the date of his or her selection, but in terms of the rules, or the advertisement for the post – Service Law – Higher Judicial Service.

Service Law – Higher Judicial Service – Recruitment to the posts of District Judges from two sources- in-service and from the Bar – Claim by candidates from judicial service as against the posts reserved for direct recruitment from the Bar – Held: Per Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ. – Makers of the Constitution visualised and the law administered in the country for last seven decades reveals that the aforesaid modes of recruitment and two separate sources are recognised – No room to entertain submission of discrimination based on Arts.14 & 16 – Art.233(2) starts with the negative “not,” which disentitles the claim of judicial officers against the post reserved for practicing advocates/pleaders – Per S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (Supplementing) – Since the Constitution itself makes a distinction between advocates on the one hand, and judicial officers, on the other, the argument of discrimination is insubstantial – Constitution of India – Arts.14, 16 & 233.

Constitution of India – Arts. 124, 217, 233(2) – Eligibility of judicial officers to compete as against the post of District Judge by way of direct recruitment – Plea that practice as an advocate and service as a judicial officer for 10 years is to be treated at par as per explanation added to Arts. 124 & 217 – Held: In Rameshwar Dayal, this question has been considered and it was held that Art.233(2) could not be interpreted in view of the explanations added to Arts. 124 & 217.

Words & Phrases – “appointment”, “advocates”, “pleaders” – Meaning of – Discussed – Constitution of India – Art.233. Answering the reference, the Court

PER ARUN MISHRA, J. [FOR HIMSELF AND VINEET

SARAN, J.]

HELD: 1.1 The Hindi translation of the Constitution signed by the members of the Constituent Assembly was published in 1950 under the authority of the President of the Constituent Assembly. The translation of the Constitution shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the Hindi language. Considering the version in the Hindi language as well as in the English language, the meaning is the same, and interpretation does not change. There is no room for any confusion that they are two different sources of appointment provided in Article 233. [Paras 9, 11][184-A, C-D]

1.2 Article 233(1) provides for appointments by way of posting and promotion. It is apparent from Article 233 that the appointing authority the Governor has to exercise the power of appointment in consultation with the High Court. The term ‘appointment’ is broader and includes appointment by way of direct recruitment or by way of promotion, and sometimes it may also include, if so provided in the rules, by way of absorption. Article 233(2) starts with a negative stipulation that a person who is not already in the service of the Union or the State, shall be eligible only to be appointed as District Judge if he has been an advocate or a pleader for not less than 7 years and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. The expression ‘in the service of the Union or of the State’ has been interpreted by this Court to mean the judicial service. A person from judicial service can be appointed as a District Judge. However, Article 233(2) provides that a person who is not in the service of the Union, shall be eligible only if he has been in practice, as an advocate or a pleader for 7 years; meaning thereby, persons who are in service are distinguished category from the incumbent who can be appointed as District Judge on 7 years’ practice as an advocate or a pleader. Article 233(2) nowhere provides eligibility of in-service candidates for consideration as a District Judge concerning a post requiring 7 years’ practice as an advocate or a pleader. Requirement of 7 years’ experience for advocate or pleader is qualified with a rider that he should not be in the service of the Union or the State. Article 233 provides two sources of recruitment, one from judicial service and the other from advocates or pleaders. There are two separate streams provided; one is for persons in judicial service, and the other is for those not in judicial service of the Union or the State and have practiced for seven years. The expression ‘in service of the Union or the State’ has been interpreted in Chandra Mohan to mean judicial service, not any other service of the Union or the State. Thus, it is clear that the members of the judicial service alone are eligible for appointment as against the post of District Judge as the only mode provided for the appointment of in-service candidates is by way of promotion. They can stake their claim as per rules for promotion or merit promotion as the case may be. This Court has excluded the persons from the Indian Civil Service, the Provincial Judicial Service, or other Executive Services, before Independence, recruitment to the post of District Judge was provided from other services also. Article 233(2) provides that if an advocate or a pleader has to be appointed, he must have completed 7 years of practice. It is coupled with the condition in the opening part that the person should not be in service of the Union or State, which is the judicial service of the State. The person in judicial service is not eligible for being appointed as against the quota reserved for advocates. Once he has joined the stream of service, he ceases to be an advocate. The requirement of 7 years of minimum experience has to be considered as the practising advocate as on the cut-off date, the phrase used is a continuous state of affair from the past. The context ‘has been in practice’ in which it has been used, it is apparent that the provisions refers to a person who has been an advocate or pleader not only on the cut-off date but continues to be so at the time of appointment. [Paras 12-14][184-D-H; 185-A-H]

Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [1967]

1 SCR 77 : AIR 1966 SC 1987 – followed.

1.3 In-service candidates cannot apply as against the post reserved for the advocates/pleaders as he has to be in continuous practice in the past and at the time when he has applied and appointed. Thus, the decision in Vijay Kumar Mishra cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. A person in judicial service is eligible to be appointed as District Judge, but it is only by way of promotion or by way of merit promotion, which concept has been evolved in All India Judges Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (2002) 4 SCC 247. [Paras 24, 25][204-C-E] Vijay Kumar Mishra & Anr. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna & Ors. (2016) 9 SCC 313 : [2016] 3 SCR 806 – overruled.

All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2002)

4 SCC 247 : [2002] 2 SCR 712 – relied on.

1.4 It is apparent from the decision of All India Judges Association that in order to prove the merit of in-service candidates, a limited departmental competitive examination has also been provided, so that they can take march to hold the post of District Judges on the basis of their merit. They are not deprived of any opportunity in their pursuit once they have joined the judicial stream, they are bound to follow the provisions. It was open to them not to join the subordinate services. They could have staked a claim by continuing to be an advocate to the Higher Judicial Service as against the post of District Judge. However, once they chose to be in service, if they had seven years’ experience at Bar before joining the judicial service, they are disentitled to lay a claim to the 25% quota exclusively earmarked for Advocates; having regard to the dichotomy of different streams and separate quota for recruitment. However, when someone joins a particular stream, i.e. a judicial service by his own volition, he cannot sail in two boats. His chance to occupy the post of District Judge would be by a two-fold channel, either in the 50% seniority/merit quota, by promotion, or the quota for limited competitive examination. The recruitment from the Bar also has a purpose behind it. The practicing advocates are recruited not only in the higher judiciary but in the High Court and Supreme Court as well. The members of the Bar also become experts in their field and gain expertise and have the experience of appearing in various courts. The makers of the Constitution visualised and the law administered in the country for the last seven decades clearly reveals that the aforesaid modes of recruitment and two separate sources, one from in-service and other from the Bar, are recognised. No room to entertain submission of discrimination based on Articles 14 and 16. Article 233(2) starts with the negative “not,” which disentitles the claim of judicial officers against the post reserved for the practicing advocates/pleaders. [Paras 2831][208-F-H; 209-A-G]

1.5 No benefit can be derived on the basis of certain observations and suggestions made by the Law Commission as to what may happen in case All India Judicial Service is formed. The existing provisions are not restrictive but provide wider choice to improve and strengthen the judicial system and in tune with Articles 14 and 16. [Paras 36, 37][212-B-D]

1.6 In Rameshwar Dayal, this Court held that Article 233(2) could not be interpreted in view of the explanations added to Articles 124 and 217. There is no violation of equal opportunity. There is no violation of any principle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. [Paras 42, 43][214-E; 215-G]

1.7 In service jurisprudence, it is always permissible to provide different sources of recruitment and quotas along with a qualification. Equal opportunity is given, and seniority and competence are criteria for promotion, and in merit promotion, seniority is not to be considered. [Para 44][216-C]

1.8 The reference is answered as under :-

(i) The members in the judicial service of the State can be appointed as District Judges by way of promotion or limited competitive examination.

(ii) The Governor of a State is the authority for the purpose of appointment, promotion, posting and transfer, the eligibility is governed by the Rules framed under Articles 234 and 235.

(iii) Under Article 232(2), an Advocate or a pleader with 7 years of practice can be appointed as District Judge by way of direct recruitment in case he is not already in the judicial service of the Union or a State.

(iv) For the purpose of Article 233(2), an Advocate has to be continuing in practice for not less than 7 years as on the cutH off date and at the time of appointment as District Judge. Members of judicial service having 7 years’ experience of practice before they have joined the service or having combined experience of 7 years as lawyer and member of judiciary, are not eligible to apply for direct recruitment as a District Judge.

(v) The rules framed by the High Court prohibiting judicial service officers from staking claim to the post of District Judge against the posts reserved for Advocates by way of direct recruitment, cannot be said to be ultra vires and are in conformity with Articles 14, 16 and 233 of the Constitution of India.

(vi) The decision in Vijay Kumar Mishra providing eligibility, of judicial officer to compete as against the post of District Judge by way of direct recruitment, cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. The same is hereby overruled.

In the cases where such in-service incumbents were appointed by way of direct recruitment from bar as no merit is found in the petitions and due to dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the judicial officers, as sequel no fruits can be ripened on the basis of selection without eligibility, they cannot continue as District Judges. They have to be reverted to their original post. In case their right in channel for promotion had already been ripened, and their juniors have been promoted, the High Court has to consider their promotion in accordance with prevailing rules. However, they cannot claim any right on the basis of such an appointment obtained under interim order, which was subject to the outcome of the writ petition and they have to be reverted. [Paras 47, 48][216-G-H; 217-A-H]

Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 816:[1961] SCR 874 – followed.

Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 225 : [1985] 2 SCR 112; Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik & Ors.

(2013) 5 SCC 277 : [2013] 1 SCR 402; Sushma Suri v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (1999) 1 SCC 330 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 187; All India Judges Association and Anr. v. Union of India (II) (2010) 15 SCC 170; P.

Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and Ors. (2014)

12 SCC 1 : [2014] 4 SCR 562; Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. v. All India Young Lawyers’ Association and Anr. (2009) 14 SCC 49 : [2009] 3 SCR 555 – relied on.

High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. State of Haryana (1975) 1 SCC 843 : [1975] 3 SCR 365; All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170; Punjab & Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab (2018) SCC OnLine SC 1728; O.P. Garg v. State of U.P. (1991) Supp. 2 SCC 51 : [1991] 2 SCR 424; The State of Assam and Anr. v. Kuseswar Saikia and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 1616 : [1970] 2 SCR 928; All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India and Ors. (1992)

1 SCC 119 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 206; All India Judges’ Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1998)

8 SCC 771; Pandurangam Rao v. State of Andhra

Pradesh and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1922 : [1976] 1 SCR 620; Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. and Ors. (II) AIR 1976 SC 1482; Prof. Chandra Prakash Aggarwal v. Chaturbhuj Das Parikh and Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 182 : [1970] 3 SCR 354; State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bal Mukund Sah and Ors. (2000) 4 SCC 640 : [2000] 2 SCR 299 – referred to.

The Construction of Statutes 202 (1940) by Crawford – referred to.

PER S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. (SUPPLEMENTING)

HELD : 1.1 A close reading of Article 233, other provisions of the Constitution, and the judgments discloses the following:

(a) That the Governor of a State has the authority to make “appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State (Article 233 [1]);

(b) While so appointing the Governor is bound to consult the High Court (Article 233 [1]: Chandra Mohan (supra) and Chandramouleshwar Prasad v Patna High Court [1970] 2 SCR 666);

(c) Article 233 (1) cannot be construed as a source of appointment; it merely delineates as to who is the appointing authority;

(d) In matters relating to initial posting, initial appointment, and promotion of District Judges, the Governor has the authority to issue the order; thereafter it is up to the High Court, by virtue of Article 235, to exercise control and superintendence over the conditions of service of such District Judges. (See State of Assam v Ranga Mahammad [1967] 1 SCR 454);

(e) Article 233 (2) is concerned only with eligibility of those who can be considered for appointment as District Judge. The Constitution clearly states that one who has been for not less than seven years, “an advocate or pleader” and one who is “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” (in the sense that such person is not a holder of a civil or executive post, under the Union or of a State) can be considered for appointment, as a District judge. Significantly, the eligibility- for both categories, is couched in negative terms. Clearly, all that the Constitution envisioned was that an advocate with not less than seven years’ practise could be appointed as a District Judge, under Article

233 (2).

(f) Significantly, Article 233 (2) ex facie does not exclude judicial officers from consideration for appointment to the post of District Judge. It, however, equally does not spell out any criteria for such category of candidates. This does not mean however, that if they or any of them, had seven years’ practise in the past, can be considered eligible, because no one amongst them can be said to answer the description of a candidate who “has been for not less than seven years” “an advocate or a pleader” (per Deepak Agarwal, i.e. that the applicant/candidate should be an advocate fulfilling the condition of practise on the date of the eligibility condition, or applying for the post). The sequitur clearly is that a judicial officer is not one who has been for not less than seven years, an advocate or pleader.

The net result of the decision in Chandra Mohan, and subsequent decisions which followed it, is that Article 233 (2) renders ineligible all those who hold civil posts under a State or the Union, just as it renders all advocates with less than seven years’ practice ineligible, on the date fixed for reckoning eligibility. Equally, those in judicial service [i.e. holders of posts other than District Judge, per Article 236 (2)] are not entitled to consideration because the provision (Article 233 [2]) does not prescribe any eligibility condition. Does this mean that any judicial officer, with any length of service as a member of the judicial service, is entitled to consideration under Article 233 (2)? The answer is clearly in the negative. This is because the negative phraseology through which eligibility of holders of civil posts, or those in civil service (of the State or the Union) and advocates with seven years’ service is couched. However, the eligibility conditions are not spelt out in respect of those who are in the judicial service. [Paras 24, 25][237-B-E; 238-A-D; 239-A-E]

1.2 The omission- in regard to spelling out the eligibility conditions vis-à-vis judicial officers, to the post of District Judge, in the opinion of this court, is clearly by design. This subject matter is covered by three provisions: Article 233 (1) – which refers to promotions to the post of District Judge; Article 234, which, like Article 233 (1) constitutes the Governor as the appointing authority in respect of judicial posts or services, (other than District Judges), and like Article 233 (1), subject to recommendation of the High Court concerned. This position is most definitely brought home by the fact that Article 235 vests in the High Courts the power of supervision and control of the judicial service, “including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge.” The corollary to this is that the Governor is appointing authority for the post of District Judge, and other judicial posts; both are to be filled after prior consultation with the High Court, and crucially, the promotion of judicial officers, to the post of District Judge, is regulated by conditions (read rules) framed by the High Court. The Constitution makers clearly wished to draw a distinction between the two sources of appointment to the post of District Judge. For one, i.e. Advocates, eligibility was spelt out in negative phraseology, i.e. not less than seven years’ practice; for judicial officers, no eligibility condition was stipulated in Article 233 (2): this clearly meant that they were not eligible to be appointed (by direct recruitment) as they did not and could not be considered advocates with seven years’ practise, once they entered the judicial service. The only channel for their appointment, was in accordance with rules framed by the High court, for promotion (as District Judges) of officers in the judicial service (defined as those holding posts other than District Judges, per Article 236 [b]). [Paras 26, 27][239-E-H; 240-A-C]

1.3 The classification or distinction made- between advocates and judicial officers, per se is a constitutionally sanctioned one. This is clear from a plain reading of Article 233 itself. Firstly, Article 233 (1) talks of both appointments and promotions. Secondly, the classification is evident from the description of the two categories in Article 233 (2): one “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” and the other “if he has been for not less than seven years as an advocate or a pleader”. Both categories are to be “recommended by the High Court for appointment.” The intent here was that in both cases, there were clear exclusions, i.e. advocates with less than seven years’ practice (which meant, conversely that those with more than seven years’ practice were eligible) and those holding civil posts under the State or the Union. The omission of judicial officers only meant that such of them, who were recommended for promotion, could be so appointed by the Governor. The conditions for their promotion were left exclusively to be framed by the High Courts. Since the Constitution itself makes a distinction between advocates on the one hand, and judicial officers, on the other, the argument of discrimination is insubstantial. Even today, judicial officers are entitled to be considered for appointment, by promotion, as District Judges, to the extent of 75% of the cadre relating to that post, in every State. It is therefore, held that the exclusion- by the rules, from consideration of judicial officers, to the post of District Judges, in the quota earmarked for Advocates with the requisite standing, or practice, conforms to the mandate of Articles 233-235, and the rules are valid. [Paras 30, 31][241A-D, G-H]

1.4 This court is also of the opinion that if rules of any State permit judicial officers to compete in the quota for appointment as District Judges, they are susceptible to challenge. The reason for this conclusion is that where a dichotomy is maintained, and two distinct sources for appointment are envisaged, like the present, enabling only judicial officers to compete in the quota earmarked for advocates would potentially result in no one from the stream of advocates with seven or more years’ practice, being selected. This would be contrary to the text and mandate of Article

233 (2), which visualized that such category of candidates would always be eligible and occupy the post of District Judge. Clear quotas for both sources have been earmarked by High Courts. If one those in one stream, or source- i.e. judicial officers- are permitted to compete in the quota earmarked for the other (i.e. advocates) without the converse situation (i.e. advocates competing in the quota earmarked for judicial officers- an impossibility) the result would be rank discrimination. Another strong reason drives us to this conclusion. The Constitution makers were aware that the judicial branch had to be independent, and at the same time, reflect a measure of diversity of thought, and approach. This is borne out by eligibility conditions spelt out clearly in regard to appointments at every level of both the lower and higher judiciary: the District court, the High Courts and the Supreme Court. In regard to judicial positions in each of these institutions, the Constitution enables appointments, from amongst members of the Bar, as its framers were acutely conscious that practising advocates reflect independence and are likely offer a useful attribute, i.e. ability to think differently and have novel approaches to interpretation of the laws and the Constitution, so essential for robustness of the judiciary, as well as society as a whole. This view is fortified by Article 217 (2), which spells out two sources from which appointments can be resorted to for the position of judge of a High Court: firstly, member of a judicial service of a State [Article 217 (a)] and an advocate with ten years’ experience [Article 217 (b)]. For the Supreme Court, Article 124 (3) (a) enables consideration of a person with five years’ experience as a High Court judge; Article 124(3)(b) enables consideration of an advocate with ten years’ experience at the bar in any High Court; Article 124(3)(c) enables consideration of a distinguished jurist. Significantly, advocates with stipulated experience at the bar are entitled, by express provisions of the Constitution [Articles 233 (2), Article 217 (b) and Article 124 (3) (b)] to be considered for appointment to the District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court, respectively. However, members of the judicial service can be considered only for appointment (by promotion) as District Judges, and as High Court judges, respectively. Members of the judicial service cannot be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court. Likewise, academics or distinguished jurists, with neither practise at the Bar, nor any experience in the judicial service, can be considered for appointment as District Judge, or as High Court judge. [Paras 32-34][242-A-H; 243-A-B]

1.5 The Constitution makers, in the opinion of this court, consciously wished that members of the Bar, should be considered for appointment at all three levels, i.e. as District judges, High Courts and this court. This was because counsel practising in the law courts have a direct link with the people who need their services; their views about the functioning of the courts, is a constant dynamic. Members of the judicial service of any State cannot claim to be appointed for vacancies in the cadre of District Judge, in the quota earmarked for appointment from amongst eligible Advocates, under Article 233. The decision in Vijay Kumar Mishra, as far as it makes a distinction between consideration, of a candidate’s eligibility, at the stage of selection, and eligibility reckonable at the time of appointment, is incorrect. There is clear authority to the proposition that eligibility of any candidate is to be reckoned, not from the date of his or her selection, but in terms of the rules, or the advertisement for the post. Therefore, the observation in Vijay Kumar Mishra that “the right of such a person to participate in the selection process undertaken by the State for appointment to any post in public service (subject to other rational prescriptions regarding the eligibility for participating in the selection process such as age, educational qualification etc.) and be considered is guaranteed under Art. 14 and 16 of the Constitution” is not correct. With respect, the distinction sought to be made, between “selection” and “appointment” in the context of eligibility, is without foundation. Vijay Kumar Mishra, to the extent that it is contrary to Ashok Kumar Sharma, as regards participation in the selection process, of candidates who are members of the judicial service, for appointment to the post of District Judge, from amongst the quota earmarked for advocates with seven years’ practice, was wrongly decided. To that extent, Vijay Kumar Mishra is overruled. [Paras 35-37][243-C-G; 244-G-H; 245-A, E]

Vijay Kumar Mishra & Anr. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna & Ors. (2016) 9 SCC 313 : [2016] 3 SCR

806 – overruled.

1.6 Under Article 233, a judicial officer, regardless of her or his previous experience as an Advocate with seven years’ practice cannot apply, and compete for appointment to any vacancy in the post of District Judge; her or his chance to occupy that post would be through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed under Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. [Para 38][245-F-G]

Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [1967]

1 SCR 77 : AIR 1966 SC 1987; State of Assam and Ors. v. S.N. Sen & Ors [1972] 2 SCR 251 – followed.

Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 225 : [1985] 2 SCR 112; Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik & Ors.

(2013) 5 SCC 277 : [2013] 1 SCR 402; State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi [1966] 1 SCR 771; High Court of Punjab and Haryana etc. v. State of Haryana [1975] 3 SCR 365; Chandramouleshwar

Prasad v. Patna High Court [1970] 2 SCR 666; State of Assam v. Ranga Mahammad [1967] 1 SCR 454;

Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Chander Shekhar & Ors (1997) 4 SCC 18 : [1997] 2 SCR 896 – relied on. Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 816 : [1961] SCR 874; Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. (2009) 8 SCC 273 : [2009] 10 SCR

921 State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand H.C.S. & Ors. [1976] 2 SCR 977; All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170; U.P. Public Service Commission v Alpana (1994) 2 SCC 723 : [1994] 1 SCR 131; Bhupinderpal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 262 – referred to.