Delhi Development Authority vs Bhim Sain Goel and Ors.

HELD: 1.1 Notification came to be issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 21.03.2003. This was followed up by declaration under Section 6 on 18.03.2004 which was followed up by Award passed on 22.08.2005. An interim order was passed undoubtedly which effectively prevented the appellant from taking possession of the lands in question. Though the writ petition came to be dismissed on 20.08.2007, the respondents carried the lis to this Court and it is again not in dispute that the interim order continued to haunt the appellants as it prevented the appellants from taking possession of the lands which it could otherwise have taken. With the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 with effect from 01.01.2014, even when the civil appeal was pending, the respondents filed a fresh round of litigation in the form of a writ petition. Therein the claim was that the earlier Award has lapsed on the basis of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This argument has found favour with the High Court in the impugned judgment. It is the case of the appellant that except for 81 days, there was an interim order prevailing, which effectively prevented the appellant from taking possession of the lands at the instance of the respondents. [Para 10][1173-C-F]

1.2 There cannot be any doubt that the respondents cannot take shelter under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. This is for the simple reason that it is by their conduct in approaching the Courts and obtaining interim orders that the appellant was prevented from taking possession of the lands. This is indeed one such case where the respondents have launched litigation, obtained orders and it has clearly prevented the appellant from taking possession and therefore, the impugned judgment of the High Court would have to be set aside. [Para 12][1176-A-C]

1.3 It is true that a notification has been issued under Section 3A of the 1956 Act also. It is equally true that acting upon the notification after calling for the objections, declaration has been made under Section 3D of the 1956 Act. The scheme of the 1956 Act essentially consists of issuance of notification under Section 3A corresponding to Section 4 of the 1894 Act, followed up by an inquiry ordinarily and culminating in a declaration under Section 3D. It is undoubtedly true that the legal effect of the declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act is that the property would vest thereupon. [Para 13][1176-D-F]

1.4 This Court is presented with a situation where, on the one hand, the vesting has already taken place under Section 16 of the 1894 Act. No doubt, under Section 16, possession is to be taken on passing of the Award. But here, it is only solely on account of the conduct of the respondents in filing a writ petition and orders being passed by courts that possession could not be taken. On the other hand, during the pendency of the challenge against the impugned judgment, undoubtedly, proceedings have been launched under the 1956 Act. Here, the land in question was needed for a public purpose-construction of the road. It is apparently, no doubt, during the pendency of the litigation before this Court that proceedings under Section 3A have been taken, followed up by declaration under Section 3D. [Para 14][1176-F-H]

1.5 On the one hand, it is a case where the so-called subsequent developments had taken place during the pendency of the appeal before this Court. On the other hand, the authority obviously realizing the need to acquire the land for public purpose that is for construction of road resorted to the provisions of the 1956 Act. The principle that the Government cannot acquire the land which has already vested in it must be borne in mind. The other aspect must be borne in mind is realizing the fact that the lands in question are the subject matter of the appeal and what is more, they would stand vested in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court the lands have been excluded when the final Award was passed under the 1956 Act. The respondents do not have a case that they have laid any challenge to the exclusion of their lands in the final Award. Whatever that may be, the fact remains that all these developments took place during the pendency of the appeal. [Para 16][1178-G-H; 1179-A-B]

1.6 When the Court finally decides the lis, it is undoubtedly, open, particularly this Court, having powers as it has under Article 142, to do complete justice between the parties and the counsel for the respondents is seeking to invoke the said jurisdiction. [Para 17][1179-B-C]

1.7 If it is the principle of estoppel which can be invoked as it would appear from the line of argument taken by the counsel for the respondents, it is not tenable. Estoppel flows from equity. [Para 18][1179-C-D]

1.8 It could be contended that it may not be fair to allow the appellant to proceed under the 1956 Act and for the proceedings to culminate in the vesting of the property under Section 3D of the 1956 Act and having elected to take proceedings under the 1956 Act apparently on the basis of the impugned judgment namely that the proceeding under the 1894 Act stood lapsed, the authorities cannot be permitted to resile from their action. It would be wholly inequitable on facts to deprive the appellant of its rights when it is finally adjudicated in its favour in the facts of this case. It is also a case where the appellant has promptly approached this Court against the impugned judgment. Furthermore, in the facts the balancing of equity must be worked out in favour of the appellant. In other words, the mere fact that proceedings were taken during the pendency of the case and it had reached the stage of declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act cannot suffice to cloth the respondents with a right to claim the fruits of the said proceedings, when on the final disposal of the appeal it was found that in law as declared by this Court in the Constitution Bench, the land already would stand vested under the 1894 Act and as already noticed there cannot be vesting twice over. [Para 20][1180-C-F]

1.9 Having regard to the fact that barring 81 days the respondents succeed on the strength of interim order passed from preventing the appellant from taking possession of the lands must be the crucial aspect. [Para 21][1180-F-G]

1.10 The public authority which had set the law in motion under the earlier regime cannot be put to a loss when at the end of the day or on the day of reckoning it is found that they must succeed in law. The appellant is fully justified in contending that but for the orders passed by the High Court and this Court, the possession would have been taken, and the land would have vested under the law. This Court must proceed on the basis that but for the interim orders passed which cannot survive the final disposal of the cases, the land would have stood vested with the Government under the earlier regime. The subsequent vesting which is attributed to Section 3D of the 1956 Act, must pale into insignificance and cannot estop the appellant from contending that in law the land would vest under the notification/ award issued under the 1894 Act.There is no right for the respondents to plead equity for they have by their acts effectively prevented the public authority from enjoying the fruits of law by which, in the exercise of power embedded in the 1894 Act, the land is vested with the appellant, and the land is one which is needed for an important public project like construction of the road for that matter.It would be completely antithetical to public interest were the Government be compelled to shell out public funds under the 2013 Act to acquire land which already belongs to it. This Court cannot be oblivious to the said sublime principle as well.The restitutionary principle must be borne in mind. Realizing that the lands are already vested, the lands are already excluded under the final award. The inevitable outcome is that the appellant must succeed. The impugned judgment is set aside. [Para 22-25][1180-G-H; 1181-A-E]

1.11 However, in the facts of this case and in the interest of justice, it is fit to direct that if the respondents have not filed any application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act seeking reference and claiming enhanced compensation pursuant to the Award dated 22.08.2005, the respondents should be granted an opportunity to make an application under Section 18 and the matter be adjudicated under the earlier Act. The impugned judgment came to be passed based on the law as it was laid down by this Court. Accordingly, it is directed that in case, the respondents have already not filed an application within the meaning of section 18 of the 1894 Act, they are permitted to file application under Section

18 of the 1894 Act within the stipulated period. In case such an application is made, it would be dealt with in accordance with law as it stood under the 1894 Act. The application would not be dismissed on the ground of delay. This order is passed in the peculiar facts of this case and taking note of the fact that it is with the judgment rendered that this Court is giving imprimatur to the Award dated 22.08.2005 under the 1894 Act. [Para 26][1181F-H]

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Others (2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahesh Sharma and Another (2010) 9 SCC 782 : [2010] 11 SCR 1002 – referred to.

SPENCER BOWER: RELIANCE-BASED ESTOPPEL

5th Edition – referred to.