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Civil

Daulal vs Jagdish

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Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Date
8 January 2024
Case No.
SA 1430/2021
Result
Disposed
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19. Accordingly present second appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed at motion stage. No order as to cost. C.C. as per rules.

Full Judgment Text

Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs, CC BY 4.0). The court's own copy is the authoritative text.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE BEFORE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA ON THE 8th OF JANUARY, 2024 SECOND APPEAL No. 1430 of 2021 BETWEEN:DAULAL S/O RATANLAL MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O PROPRIETOR SHREE KRISHNA VASTRALAY PURANA HOSPITAL ROAD, KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) .....APPELLANT (BY SHRI AKHIL GODHA -ADVOCATE) AND JAGDISH S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/ 1. O JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) KAILASH S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN 2. R/O - JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) VRANDAVAN S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/ 3. O - JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) DINESH S/O JAGDISH MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/O - JAIN 4. MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) 5. JAGDISH S/O RATANLAL MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/O -HOSPITAL MARG, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) ...RESPONDENTS (SHRI VIJAY KUMAR ASSUDANI – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO.1 TO 4) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed the following: JUDGMENT Heard on admission. 1. Present second appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”) against the impugned judgment and decree dated 4.9.2021 passed by the 4th District Judge, West Nimar, Khargone (M.P.) in Regular Civil Appeal No.51/2019 affirming the judgment and decree dated 14.11.2019 passed by the 2 nd Civil Judge, Class-2, Khargone in RCS-A No.69/2018 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs, whereby the suit has been decreed. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that respondents No.1 to 4/plaintiffs have filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of rent and eviction from the suit premises by stating that respondents No.1 to 3 are real brothers and they are member of joint Hindu family. The disputed shop situated at Purana Hospital Road, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Khargone is of their ownership and suit property was constructed by the Municipality and it was purchased by the respondent No.2 Kailash Chand in auction under the right of occupation. Respondents No.1 and 2 have let out the suit shop to the appellant in the year 1974 at the rate of Rs.300/- per month and the tenancy is oral and starts from first day of every month. The appellant is tenant in the suit shop and running a business in the name of Shree Krishna Vastralay and the relation between the respondents and appellant is of landlord and tenant and with the consent of respondents, the rent of the suit shop was increased to Rs.3500/- per month in the year 2009 and again enhanced to Rs.7500/- per month in the year 2014 and up to 2017 the appellant has paid the rent. Respondent No.4, who is the son of respondent No.1, wants to start his business of cutlery in the suit shop. Respondents have issued a legal notice through his advocate for terminating the tenancy of the appellant and demanded the possession of the suit shop, but the appellant has not vacated the suit premises. Therefore, the suit was filed by the respondents. 3. Appellant/defendant filed his written statement before the trial Court and denied all the allegations and pleadings of the plaint by stating that the suit shop was let out to the appellant only by the respondent No.2 and, therefore, the relation between the respondent No.2 and the appellant is of landlord and tenant and respondents have no bonafide need of the suit shop as they are having other alternative accommodation in their vacant possession. The suit shop is not the joint Hindu family property of the respondents and respondents in order to harass the appellant, have preferred the suit on the false grounds. 4. On the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court has framed the issues and permitted both the parties to lead their evidence. The trial court after recording the evidence and hearing both the parties, decreed the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs. Then the appellant/defendant preferred first appeal before the first appellate court, but the first appellate court upon re-appreciating the entire evidence available on record, affirmed the findings of fact so recorded by the trial Court. Therefore, the appellant has filed this second appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are illegal and are not based on proper appreciation of evidence. Both the courts below have failed to consider the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by both the parties. The trial court has ignored the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act and decided the suit under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The trial court without considering the nature of the dispute and the pleadings of both the parties, passed the impugned judgment and decree. The first appellate court has also ignored the same. Both the courts below have failed to consider the entire pleadings of both the parties and decided the matter contrary to the pleadings and evidence. The findings given by both the courts below are erroneous, perverse and contrary to the provisions of law. Respondents have failed to prove any legal grounds for terminating the tenancy of the appellant. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid, he prays that the appeal deserves to be admitted on the substantial questions of law as proposed by the appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents opposes the prayer and prays for its rejection by submitting that the trial court as well as the first appellate court, after considering the pleadings and evidence adduced by both the parties, has passed the impugned judgment and decree which is based upon the cogent evidence. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below do not deserve for any interference. Hence, he prays that the appeal be dismissed at motion stage. 7. I have gone through the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below and also perused the entire record with due care. 8. The first contention made by counsel for appellant is that both the courts below have wrongly interpreted the provisions of section 3 of MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short “Act of 1961”) and the instant eviction suit was between both the private parties, but both the courts below have decided the suit contrary to pleadings of the parties and also contrary to the issues framed as per pleadings of the parties and no specific finding was given on the said issue. 9. Learned counsel for appellant placed reliance upon judgments of Hon'ble Supreme court in the matter of Parwati Bai Vs. Radhika reported in 2003 Legal Eagle (SC) 464, Bachhaj Nahar P Vs. Nilima Mandal and another reported in 2009 AIR(SCW) 287, Malluru Mallappa (D) through Lrs Vs. Kuruvathappa and others reported in 2020AIR(SC) 925 and Dr. Pooja Vs. State of MP reported in 2022(3) MPLJ 30. 10. From perusal of the plaint averment and evidence adduced by both the parties before the trial court it appears that respondent/plaintiff in para 2 of plaint categorically mentioned that suit shop was constructed by Nagar Palika Khargone and the plaintiff has purchased the same suit land in an auction under right of occupation and suit land belongs to plaintiff lease title. Plaintiff Kailashchand (PW-1) in paras 2 and 7 of his deposition admits that suit land was constructed by Nagar Palika Khargone and he has purchased the suit shop in auction by way of right of occupation and his counsel sent a notice to defendant of 15 days. Plaintiff Kailash was cross examined by appellant on this point in para 21 and 22 of his cross examination. Plaintiff Dinesh (PW-02) at para 2 of his cross examination also mentioned that suit shop was constructed by Nagar Palika Khargone and plaintiff Kailash Chandra purchased it in his name under lease title. Even the appellant/defendant Daulal Mahajan (DW-1) in para 2 of his deposition categorically admits the same fact. Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid pleadings and evidence it cannot be said that both the courts below have considered the aforesaid facts without any pleading and evidence. 11. Section 3(1) of Act of 1961 provides as under:“Section 3. Act not to apply to certain accommodation (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to(a) accommodation which is the property of the Government (Central Govt. or any State Govt.) (b) accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes.” 12. With regard to the applicability of the Act, learned counsel for respondent submits that by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, the suit premises were exempted from the purview of the aforesaid Act and position between both the parties that suit premises was used exclusively for non residential purpose and initially constructed by municipality Khargone which is a local authority. The arguments of counsel for appellant was that for the following two reasons the provisions of Act do not apply to the present case and section 3(1)(b) of Act cannot be brought into play. Firstly the suit is based on contract of tenancy in respect of the suit premises between the plaintiff and defendant who are private parties. It is not a suit between the municipality as a landlord and its tenant. Secondly the contract of tenancy between the parties is a composite contract relating to tenancy of the suit premises. 13. After hearing the counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the record, I am of the considered view that the Act does not apply to the suit premises and its provisions cannot be brought into play for decision of the instant case. The first part of the reasoning of learned counsel for appellant deserves to be repelled on the short ground that the immunity from the operation of the Act is in respect of the premises and is not with respect to the parties as is evident on a plain reading of the expression “Nothing in this Act shall apply.........”. Accommodation which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non residential purpose. 14. It is well settled by a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in case of Messrs Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd Vs. D.C. Patel, reported in (1953) 4 SCR 185 wherein pari materia provisions contained in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 came up for consideration of this court. It was held that the exemption is not conferred on the relationship of landlord and tenant but on the premises itself making it immune from the operation of the Act. In identical facts, as the present case is, the decision of this court was followed by the High court of Madhya Pradesh in Radhevlal Somsingh Vs. Ratansingh Kishansingh 1977 MPLJ 335 and it was held that the immunity from operation of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is in respect of the premises and not with respect to the parties. If a tenant in municipal premises lets out the premises to another, a suit by the tenant for ejectment of his tenant and arrears of rent would not be governed by the Act as the premises are exempt under Section 3(10(b) of Act though the suit is not between the municipality as landlord and against its tenant. It was also held that the singular question to be examined in the present case is whether the tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. The receipt of notice to the defendant is admitted in the written statement. The defendant has not raised any specific objection as to the validity of the notice. An objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under section 106 of Transfer of Property Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. It cannot, therefore, be said that the notice in the present case suffered from any infirmity. A copy of the notice was exhibited and proved by the plaintiff as Ex.P-4. 15. It is noteworthy that in a suit between landlord and tenant for possession on determination of tenancy, tenant is bound to handover possession to the landlord. He cannot escape from his obligation of delivering possession to his landlord by contending that he has entered into a contract of tenancy with a person who has paramount title over his landlord. Section 108(q) of Transfer of Property Act clearly indicates that tenant is bound to put his landlord into possession, which was taken on rent by him and he has not escaped from his obligation by voluntarily entering into the contract of a person from whom his lessor was holding the lease. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this court is of the considered opinion that the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below are based upon due appreciating of oral as well as documentary evidence available on record. The findings recorded by both the courts below are concurrent finding of fact. 17. Learned counsel for appellant has failed to show that how the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below are illegal, perverse and based on no evidence. Thus no substantial question of law arises for consideration in present second appeal. 18. The Hon'ble Apex court in number of cases has held that in exercise of power under section 100 of CPC, the Court can interfere with the findings of fact only if same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence.(See Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin 2012(8) SCC 148.) 19. Accordingly present second appeal sans merit and is hereby dismissed at motion stage. No order as to cost. C.C. as per rules. (ANIL VERMA) JUDGE Trilok/- SAVNER Date: 2024.01.10 12:58:21 +05'30'

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