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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL VERMA
ON THE 8th OF JANUARY, 2024
SECOND APPEAL No. 1430 of 2021
BETWEEN:DAULAL S/O RATANLAL MAHAJAN, AGED
ABOUT 58 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O
PROPRIETOR SHREE KRISHNA VASTRALAY
PURANA
HOSPITAL
ROAD,
KHARGONE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANT
(BY SHRI AKHIL GODHA -ADVOCATE)
AND
JAGDISH S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED
ABOUT 79 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/
1. O JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA
MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
KAILASH S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED
ABOUT 77 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN
2. R/O - JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA
MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
VRANDAVAN S/O CHOTULAL MAHAJAN, AGED
ABOUT 69 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/
3. O - JAIN MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA
MANDIR, KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
DINESH S/O JAGDISH MAHAJAN, AGED ABOUT 49
YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN R/O - JAIN
4. MANDIR PATH, NEAR BAAKI MATA MANDIR,
KHARGONE, DISTRICT KHARGONE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
5. JAGDISH S/O RATANLAL MAHAJAN, AGED
ABOUT 66 YEARS, OCCUPATION: NOT KNOWN
R/O -HOSPITAL MARG, KHARGONE, DISTRICT
KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH)
...RESPONDENTS
(SHRI VIJAY KUMAR ASSUDANI – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS NO.1
TO 4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------This appeal coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
JUDGMENT
Heard on admission.
1.
Present second appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short
“CPC”) against the impugned judgment and decree dated 4.9.2021
passed by the 4th District Judge, West Nimar, Khargone (M.P.) in
Regular Civil Appeal No.51/2019 affirming the judgment and decree
dated 14.11.2019 passed by the 2 nd Civil Judge, Class-2, Khargone in
RCS-A No.69/2018 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs, whereby the suit
has been decreed.
2.
The facts of the case in brief are that respondents No.1 to
4/plaintiffs have filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of rent
and eviction from the suit premises by stating that respondents No.1 to
3 are real brothers and they are member of joint Hindu family. The
disputed shop situated at Purana Hospital Road, Mahatma Gandhi
Marg, Khargone is of their ownership and suit property was constructed
by the Municipality and it was purchased by the respondent No.2
Kailash Chand in auction under the right of occupation. Respondents
No.1 and 2 have let out the suit shop to the appellant in the year 1974 at
the rate of Rs.300/- per month and the tenancy is oral and starts from
first day of every month. The appellant is tenant in the suit shop and
running a business in the name of Shree Krishna Vastralay and the
relation between the respondents and appellant is of landlord and tenant
and with the consent of respondents, the rent of the suit shop was
increased to Rs.3500/- per month in the year 2009 and again enhanced
to Rs.7500/- per month in the year 2014 and up to 2017 the appellant
has paid the rent. Respondent No.4, who is the son of respondent No.1,
wants to start his business of cutlery in the suit shop. Respondents have
issued a legal notice through his advocate for terminating the tenancy of
the appellant and demanded the possession of the suit shop, but the
appellant has not vacated the suit premises. Therefore, the suit was filed
by the respondents.
3.
Appellant/defendant filed his written statement before the trial
Court and denied all the allegations and pleadings of the plaint by
stating that the suit shop was let out to the appellant only by the
respondent No.2 and, therefore, the relation between the respondent
No.2 and the appellant is of landlord and tenant and respondents have
no bonafide need of the suit shop as they are having other alternative
accommodation in their vacant possession. The suit shop is not the joint
Hindu family property of the respondents and respondents in order to
harass the appellant, have preferred the suit on the false grounds.
4.
On the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court has framed the issues
and permitted both the parties to lead their evidence. The trial court
after recording the evidence and hearing both the parties, decreed the
suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs. Then the appellant/defendant
preferred first appeal before the first appellate court, but the first
appellate court upon re-appreciating the entire evidence available on
record, affirmed the findings of fact so recorded by the trial Court.
Therefore, the appellant has filed this second appeal.
5.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the judgment
and decree passed by both the courts below are illegal and are not based
on proper appreciation of evidence. Both the courts below have failed to
consider the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by both the
parties. The trial court has ignored the provisions of M.P.
Accommodation Control Act and decided the suit under the provisions
of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The trial court without considering
the nature of the dispute and the pleadings of both the parties, passed
the impugned judgment and decree. The first appellate court has also
ignored the same. Both the courts below have failed to consider the
entire pleadings of both the parties and decided the matter contrary to
the pleadings and evidence. The findings given by both the courts
below are erroneous, perverse and contrary to the provisions of law.
Respondents have failed to prove any legal grounds for terminating the
tenancy of the appellant. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid, he prays
that the appeal deserves to be admitted on the substantial questions of
law as proposed by the appellant.
6.
Learned counsel for the respondents opposes the prayer and prays
for its rejection by submitting that the trial court as well as the first
appellate court, after considering the pleadings and evidence adduced
by both the parties, has passed the impugned judgment and decree
which is based upon the cogent evidence. The concurrent findings of
fact recorded by both the courts below do not deserve for any
interference. Hence, he prays that the appeal be dismissed at motion
stage.
7.
I have gone through the judgment and decree passed by both the
courts below and also perused the entire record with due care.
8.
The first contention made by counsel for appellant is that both the
courts below have wrongly interpreted the provisions of section 3 of
MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short “Act of 1961”) and the
instant eviction suit was between both the private parties, but both the
courts below have decided the suit contrary to pleadings of the parties
and also contrary to the issues framed as per pleadings of the parties
and no specific finding was given on the said issue.
9.
Learned counsel for appellant placed reliance upon judgments of
Hon'ble Supreme court in the matter of Parwati Bai Vs. Radhika
reported in 2003 Legal Eagle (SC) 464,
Bachhaj Nahar P Vs.
Nilima Mandal and another reported in 2009 AIR(SCW) 287,
Malluru Mallappa (D) through Lrs Vs. Kuruvathappa and others
reported in 2020AIR(SC) 925 and Dr. Pooja Vs. State of MP
reported in 2022(3) MPLJ 30.
10.
From perusal of the plaint averment and evidence adduced by
both the parties before the trial court it appears that respondent/plaintiff
in para 2 of plaint categorically mentioned that suit shop was
constructed by Nagar Palika Khargone and the plaintiff has purchased
the same suit land in an auction under right of occupation and suit land
belongs to plaintiff lease title. Plaintiff Kailashchand (PW-1) in paras 2
and 7 of his deposition admits that suit land was constructed by Nagar
Palika Khargone and he has purchased the suit shop in auction by way
of right of occupation and his counsel sent a notice to defendant of 15
days. Plaintiff Kailash was cross examined by appellant on this point in
para 21 and 22 of his cross examination. Plaintiff Dinesh (PW-02) at
para 2 of his cross examination also mentioned that suit shop was
constructed by Nagar Palika Khargone and plaintiff Kailash Chandra
purchased it in his name under lease title. Even the appellant/defendant
Daulal Mahajan (DW-1) in para 2 of his deposition categorically admits
the same fact. Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid pleadings and
evidence it cannot be said that both the courts below have considered
the aforesaid facts without any pleading and evidence.
11.
Section 3(1) of Act of 1961 provides as under:“Section 3. Act not to apply to certain accommodation (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to(a) accommodation which is the property of the
Government (Central Govt. or any State Govt.)
(b) accommodation which is the property of a local
authority used exclusively for non-residential purposes.”
12.
With regard to the applicability of the Act, learned counsel for
respondent submits that by virtue of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, the suit
premises were exempted from the purview of the aforesaid Act and
position between both the parties that suit premises was used
exclusively for non residential purpose and initially constructed by
municipality Khargone which is a local authority. The arguments of
counsel for appellant was that for the following two reasons the
provisions of Act do not apply to the present case and section 3(1)(b) of
Act cannot be brought into play. Firstly the suit is based on contract of
tenancy in respect of the suit premises between the plaintiff and
defendant who are private parties. It is not a suit between the
municipality as a landlord and its tenant. Secondly the contract of
tenancy between the parties is a composite contract relating to tenancy
of the suit premises.
13.
After hearing the counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the
record, I am of the considered view that the Act does not apply to the
suit premises and its provisions cannot be brought into play for decision
of the instant case. The first part of the reasoning of learned counsel for
appellant deserves to be repelled on the short ground that the immunity
from the operation of the Act is in respect of the premises and is not
with respect to the parties as is evident on a plain reading of the
expression “Nothing in this Act shall apply.........”. Accommodation
which is the property of a local authority used exclusively for non
residential purpose.
14.
It is well settled by a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex court in case
of Messrs Bhatia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd Vs. D.C. Patel,
reported in (1953) 4 SCR 185 wherein pari materia provisions
contained in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947 came up for consideration of this court. It was held
that the exemption is not conferred on the relationship of landlord and
tenant but on the premises itself making it immune from the operation of
the Act. In identical facts, as the present case is, the decision of this
court was followed by the High court of Madhya Pradesh in Radhevlal
Somsingh Vs. Ratansingh Kishansingh 1977 MPLJ 335 and it was
held that the immunity from operation of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is in respect of the premises and not
with respect to the parties. If a tenant in municipal premises lets out the
premises to another, a suit by the tenant for ejectment of his tenant and
arrears of rent would not be governed by the Act as the premises are
exempt under Section 3(10(b) of Act though the suit is not between the
municipality as landlord and against its tenant. It was also held that the
singular question to be examined in the present case is whether the
tenancy was terminated in accordance with the provisions of Section
106 of Transfer of Property Act. The receipt of notice to the defendant is
admitted in the written statement. The defendant has not raised any
specific objection as to the validity of the notice. An objection as to
invalidity or infirmity of notice under section 106 of Transfer of
Property Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will
be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. It cannot,
therefore, be said that the notice in the present case suffered from any
infirmity. A copy of the notice was exhibited and proved by the plaintiff
as Ex.P-4.
15.
It is noteworthy that in a suit between landlord and tenant for
possession on determination of tenancy, tenant is bound to handover
possession to the landlord. He cannot escape from his obligation of
delivering possession to his landlord by contending that he has entered
into a contract of tenancy with a person who has paramount title over his
landlord. Section 108(q) of Transfer of Property Act clearly indicates
that tenant is bound to put his landlord into possession, which was taken
on rent by him and he has not escaped from his obligation by voluntarily
entering into the contract of a person from whom his lessor was holding
the lease.
16.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this court is of the considered
opinion that the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below
are based upon due appreciating of oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record. The findings recorded by both the courts
below are concurrent finding of fact.
17.
Learned counsel for appellant has failed to show that how the
findings of fact recorded by both the courts below are illegal, perverse
and based on no evidence. Thus no substantial question of law arises for
consideration in present second appeal.
18.
The Hon'ble Apex court in number of cases has held that in
exercise of power under section 100 of CPC, the Court can interfere
with the findings of fact only if same is shown to be perverse and based
on no evidence.(See Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin 2012(8) SCC
148.)
19.
Accordingly present second appeal sans merit and is hereby
dismissed at motion stage. No order as to cost.
C.C. as per rules.
(ANIL VERMA)
JUDGE
Trilok/-
SAVNER
Date: 2024.01.10 12:58:21 +05'30'
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