Service Law – Recruitment – Public employment – Delhi Police – Post of constable – Standing Order No.398/2010 Policy for deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted) – Selection authority / Screening Committee rejected candidature of respondents candidates as they had faced criminal proceedings – CAT allowed the applications of respondents – Writ petitions – Direction of High Court that the respondents be considered for appointment – Held: Not justified – Reading of the applicable Standing Order made it clear that in relation to certain offences, acquittal or exoneration of an accused candidate, per se would not entitle her or him to consideration – Public service – Like any other, pre-supposes that the state employer has an element of latitude or choice on who should enter its service – Norms, based on principles, govern essential aspects such as qualification, experience, age, number of attempts permitted to a candidate, etc. – Judicial review is permissible to ensure that those norms are fair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in a non-discriminatory manner – However, suitability is entirely different; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, is greatest, as long as the process of decision making is neither illegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides – High Court’s approach appears to hint at the general acceptability of behaviour which involves petty crime or misdemeanor – Such generalizations, leading to condonation of the offender’s conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided – Each case is to be scrutinized by the concerned public employer, through its designated officials – More so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. Service Law – Public employment – Recruitment /Appointment – Judicial Review – Scope – Held: Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guess the suitability of a candidate for any public office or post – Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the materials), or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny on why a candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts’ decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive power of determining suitability of an individual for appointment.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1. Standing order No.398/2010 policy for deciding cases of candidates provisionally selected in Delhi Police involved in criminal cases (facing trial or acquitted) is relevant for an appropriate decision in this case. Annexure A to the policy refers to offences involving moral turpitude. Clause 3 of the Standing Order, which refers to the Screening Committee, comprises of senior police officers. This committee assesses candidates’ (previously implicated for an offence, but against whom charges are terminated, for any reason), suitability for appointment. Clause 6 prescribes that candidates who faced charges involving serious offences or offences involving moral turpitude and who are later acquitted giving benefit of doubt or because the witnesses turned hostile due to fear of reprisal by the accused person shall not generally be considered suitable for government service. Each of such cases is to be considered by the Screening Committee manned by senior officers. It is evident from a reading of the applicable Standing Order along with Annexure-A that in relation to certain offences, acquittal or exoneration of an accused candidate, per se would not entitle her or him to consideration. [Paras 12, 13][11-H; 14-D-G]
2. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second guess the suitability of a candidate for any public office or post. Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to the materials), or illegality by the public employer, an intense scrutiny on why a candidate is excluded as unsuitable renders the courts’ decision suspect to the charge of trespass into executive power of determining suitability of an individual for appointment. [Para 26] [20-D-E]
3. Public service – like any other, pre-supposes that the state employer has an element of latitude or choice on who should enter its service. Norms, based on principles, govern essential aspects such as qualification, experience, age, number of attempts permitted to a candidate, etc. These, broadly constitute eligibility conditions required of each candidate or applicant aspiring to enter public service. Judicial review, under the Constitution, is permissible to ensure that those norms are fair and reasonable, and applied fairly, in a non-discriminatory manner. However, suitability is entirely different; the autonomy or choice of the public employer, is greatest, as long as the process of decision making is neither illegal, unfair, or lacking in bona fides. [Para 29] [22-C-E]
4. The High Court’s approach, evident from its observations about the youth and age of the candidates, appears to hint at the general acceptability of behaviour which involves petty crime or misdemeanour. The impugned order indicates a broad view, that such misdemeanour should not be taken seriously, given the age of the youth and the rural setting. This court is of opinion that such generalizations, leading to condonation of the offender’s conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be avoided. Certain types of offences, like molestation of women, or trespass and beating up, assault, causing hurt or grievous hurt, (with or without use of weapons), of victims, in rural settings, can also be indicative of caste or hierarchy-based behaviour. Each case is to be scrutinized by the concerned public employer, through its designated officials- more so, in the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. [Para 30] [22-F-H]
5. The common impugned judgment and the orders of the CAT, quashing the orders issued by the appellant, declining appointment to the respondent candidates, are hereby set aside. [Para 31] [23-A]
Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr v Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 : [2013] 13 SCR 432 ; Avtar Singh v. UOI & Ors, (2016) 8 SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445 ; Joginder Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh & Ors., (2015) 2 SCC 377 : [2014] 11 SCR 155 ; Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration & Ors v. Pradeep Kumar & Anr., (2018) 1 SCC 797 : [2018] 1 SCR 112 ; Anil Bhardwaj v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, (2020) SCC Online (SC) 832 ; M.V. Thimmaiah v. Union Public Service Commission, (2008)
2 SCC 119 : [2007] 13 SCR 624 ; Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v Dr. B.S. Mahajan, (1990) 1 SCC 305 ; Union Public Service Commission v. M. Sathiya Priya, (2018) 15 SCC 796 : [2018] 6 SCR 701 – relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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