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THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
(Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)
DATED : 31st August, 2022
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------SINGLE BENCH : THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, JUDGE
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RSA No.10 of 2019
Appellants
:
Chabilal Sapkota and Another
versus
Respondents
:
Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
Second Appeal under Section 100 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Appearance
Mr. J. B. Pradhan, Senior Advocate with Ms. Prarthana
Ghataney and Ms. Ranjeeta Kumari, Advocates for the
Appellants.
Ms. Gita Bista, Advocate for the Respondents.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JUDGMENT
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1.
This Second Appeal assails the Judgment dated 29-09-
2018 of the Learned First Appellate Court in Title Appeal No.08 of
2017, which upheld the Judgment of the Learned Trial Court
dismissing the suit of the Plaintiffs/Appellants, vide its Judgment
dated 31-05-2017, in Title Suit No.25 of 2014.
2.
This Second Appeal was admitted on the following
substantial questions of law formulated for determination;
(i)
Whether the Learned Courts below were correct in their
construction and interpretation and thereby the legal effect
of the Deeds dated 12-01-1965 (Exhibit D1) and 06-011972 (Exhibit D2) of the matter in lis?
(ii)
Whether the concurrent findings of the Learned Courts
below that Schedule “C” property was transferred to the
Respondent/Defendant No.2 by way of exchange is correct
and in consonance with the provision of Section 118 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
3(i).
The Title Suit was one for declaration, injunction,
recovery of possession and consequential reliefs. A brief narration
of the facts are necessary to comprehend the dispute between the
parties. The Plaintiffs‟/Appellants‟ claim to be absolute owners of
the property covered by Schedule „A‟ to the Plaint, which includes
Plot Nos.237 and Plot Nos.1027 and 1028, situated at Samdong,
East Sikkim, inherited from their father, late Hari Narayan Sapkota
vide Exhibit “P3/D1”, the Partition Deed dated 12-01-1965, which
property prior in time belonged to their grandfather. The Plaintiffs‟
claim that on the death of their father in the year 1974, when they
were still minors, their widowed mother took them and left for her
paternal home after handing over Schedule „A‟ lands in the care of
both the Defendants/Respondents, their younger paternal uncles.
The Defendants allegedly cultivated the Schedule „A‟ land and gave
their mother share crops therefrom and sometimes money in lieu
of crops. On their return after ten years to Schedule „A‟ land, they
started
cultivating
the
property
except
Schedule
„C‟
lands
comprising of Plot Nos.1027 and 1028 from where the Defendants
continued to give them crop or cash in lieu thereof, till the year
2007.
From 2008 neither crops nor money was forthcoming,
consequently in January, 2013, the Plaintiffs objected to the
Defendants‟ possession of the Schedule „C‟ property, who however
refused to return their property.
The Plaintiffs‟ case is that their
mother had permitted the Defendants to cultivate the Schedule „C‟
property on the Plaintiffs‟ behalf and the Defendants are licencees
thereof. Hence, the prayers in the Plaint which included a prayer
seeking a declaration that the Defendants have no right, title and
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
interest over the Schedule „C‟ property and recovery of possession
thereof.
(ii)
The Defendants while repelling the Plaintiffs‟ case
referred to a document Exhibit „D2‟ dated 06-01-1972, vide which
certain clarifications had been made to the Partition Deed Exhibit
“P3/D1” dated 12-01-1965.
According to them, the contents of
Exhibit „D2‟ clarified that during the execution of the Partition Deed
no portion of the properties was set aside as “Jiwni” (maintenance)
for their mother‟s upkeep during her lifetime.
Exhibit „D2‟
accordingly detailed the shares of each of the brothers to be set
aside for their mother‟s maintenance, from their respective
partitioned shares. In the alternative, to deposit the specified
amount of paddy for the same purpose. In the event of failure by
any son to give his paddy field or deposit the crop, the land set
aside would be handed over to Defendant No.2 by the Panchayat.
That, the Plaintiffs‟ father and Defendant No.1 were to expend one
share each for the funeral/death rite expenses of their mother,
while Defendant No.2 would bear the twice expenses.
The
Defendants‟ claim that on their mother‟s death in 1975 as the
Plaintiffs‟ mother refused to contribute her share of expenses for
the funeral/death rite, her land was given to Defendant No.2. The
land so given for “Jiwni” by the Plaintiffs‟ mother as revealed by
Exhibit „D4‟ was Plot No.237 and bounded as follows;
East
:
West :
Paddy field of the plaintiffs (Appellants)
Paddy field of Narad Muni Sapkota
North : Paddy field of plaintiffs
South : Kholsa.
The Defendants averred that before leaving for her paternal
home, the Plaintiffs‟ mother made a request to them to exchange
four rows of paddy field in Plot No.237 given as “Jiwni” by her with
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
Plot Nos.1027 and 1028.
Defendant No.2 complied with the
request.
(iii)
On the basis of these averments, the following issues
were drawn up and determined by the Learned Trial Court, viz;
(iv)
“1)
Whether the plaintiffs are the absolute owner of
landed property falling under plot No.237, 1027
and 1028 (as per survey operation of 1978-80)
situated at Samdong, East Sikkim (onus on the
plaintiffs);
2)
Whether the defendants have encroached and
constructed upon Schedule „B‟ property; (onus
on the plaintiffs);
3)
Whether the Defendants can claim rights over
schedule „C‟ property on the basis of the deed
dated 06.01.1972. (onus on the defendants);
4)
Whether the plaintiffs are bound by the deed
dated 06.01.1972. (onus on defendants).”
In Issue No.1, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs
were unable to establish that they are the bona fide legal and
absolute owners of Schedule „C‟ property and decided the Issue
against the Plaintiffs.
Issue No.2, was decided against the Plaintiffs, the Learned
Trial Court having concluded that the spot verification revealed that
the disputed construction was being carried on in the land of
Defendant No.1 (Plot No.241) and not Schedule „B‟ (Plot No.237).
While considering Issue No.3, the Court concluded that the
Defendant No.2 had been in continuous uninterrupted peaceful
possession of Schedule „C‟ property but could not claim Schedule
„C‟ vide Exhibit „D2‟ in particular and decided the Issue against the
Defendants.
In Issue No.4, the Learned Trial Court concluded that the
Plaintiffs are bound by the Deed dated 06-01-1972. The suit of the
Plaintiffs came to be dismissed on their failure to prove their case.
4(i).
Being aggrieved thereof, the Plaintiffs were before the
Court of Learned District Judge, Special Division - II, East Sikkim,
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
at Gangtok.
The Learned First Appellate Court while remarking
that so far as Issue No.3 was concerned the Defendants did not file
any Cross Appeal assailing the findings of the Learned Trial Court,
which had thereby attained finality, upheld the findings of the
Learned Trial Court in all the other Issues in its entirety and
dismissed the Appeal. Aggrieved thereof, the Plaintiffs/Appellants
are before this Court.
(ii)
Pertinently, while pausing here momentarily, it is worth
observing that both Courts below have left the ownership of
Schedule „C‟ lands in limbo and have failed to decisively hold as to
who the Schedule „C‟ lands belonged to for the reason that in Issue
No.1, it was the concurrent finding that the Plaintiffs were unable
to establish that they were the bona fide owners of Schedule „C‟
property.
In Issue No.3, both Courts concluded that although
Defendant No.2 had been in continuous possession of Schedule „C‟
property but could not claim the property vide Exhibit „D2‟ in
particular.
5.
as
The Plaintiffs/Appellants shall hereinafter be referred to
the
“Appellants”
and
the
Defendants/Respondents
as
“Respondents”.
6(i).
Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants before this
Court, contended that only the property in Schedule „C‟ is now in
dispute, the parties being in agreement that Schedule „B‟ land (Plot
No.237), belongs to the Appellants and it was held so by the
Learned Trial Court and the Learned First Appellate Court. It was
canvassed that despite the concurrent findings of the Learned
Courts below that Schedule „B‟ property (Plot No.237) belonged to
the Appellants, no declaration to this effect in terms of the Prayers
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
made in (a) and (b) and as a corollary Prayer (d) of the Plaint were
made in favour of the Appellants.
It was further contended that in Exhibit „D2‟ the Nepali
(ii)
word “Jimma” translated into English as “Hand over”, tantamounts
to transfer of the land for the upkeep of their mother during her
lifetime and is not to be interpreted as an arrangement of retention
of land by the Defendant No.2 for his benefit, even after her
passing.
Further, Exhibit „D2‟ categorically provided that the
Partition Deed Exhibit “P3/D1” would be considered “valid” for
which the Nepali word “Sadar” has been employed.
Hence, the
contents of Exhibit „D2‟ being subject to the contents of Exhibit
“P3/D1” are to be read holistically, bearing in mind the objective of
its execution, i.e., to provide for the maintenance of their mother.
That, in order to consider the real nature of the document one has
to look into the recitals thereof and not the title. On this aspect,
strength was drawn from B. K. Muniraju vs. State of Karnataka and
Others1. It was next contended that mere handing over of Schedule
„C‟ land for the maintenance of the Appellants‟ grandmother by
their mother cannot be termed as an “exchange” for Schedule „B‟
land as wrongly urged by the Respondents, since both Schedule „B‟
and „C‟ lands belong to the Appellants.
That, it would be an
incongruous proposition for the Appellants‟ mother to exchange
one plot of the Appellants‟ land with another that belonged to
them. Drawing strength from Section 54 and Section 118 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter, the “TP Act”), it was
urged that both provisions are to be read in consonance with each
other which demonstrates that no “Exchange” as envisaged by Law
has taken place. It was next urged that Section 52 of the Indian
(2008) 4 SCC 451
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
Easements Act, 1882 defines “Licence” and handing over four rows
of paddy fields for the maintenance of the Appellants‟ grandmother
does not create any rights of ownership for the Respondents on
Schedule „C‟ land by claims of exchange but was licence granted by
the Appellants‟ mother. That, the Sikkim Registration of Document
Rules, 1930, requires registration of document on transfer of
immovable property, but Schedule „C‟ land despite claims of
possession has not been registered in the name of Respondent
No.2. Contending that Exhibit “P3/D1” and Exhibit „D2‟ required no
registration reference was made to Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala and
Others2 where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court propounded that a family
agreement need not be registered. That, accordingly the Appellants
are entitled to a declaration that the Respondents have no right,
title and interest over the Schedule „C‟ land and a declaration for
Schedule „B‟ property in terms of the Prayers made in the Plaint.
7(i).
Contesting and repelling the arguments of the Learned
Senior Counsel for the Appellants, Learned Counsel for the
Respondents contended that the averments in Paragraph 13 of the
Plaint referred to only Schedule „A‟ land being handed over to the
Respondents and not Schedule „C‟. That, the question of exchange
of Schedule „C‟ property only came up later with Exhibit „D2‟ being
introduced by the Respondents, thus there is a variance in the
pleadings and proof of the Appellants. That, the averments in the
Plaint do not specify as to when Schedule „C‟ property was handed
over to the Respondents for cultivation nor was it proved, neither is
the term “share crop” elucidated by the Appellants. That, Schedule
„C‟ property has been in the possession of Respondent No.2 since
1975, who is cultivating it and not Respondent No.1 as wrongly
(2020) 19 SCC 57
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
alleged by the Appellants but the title to the property is not with
Respondent No.2 as correctly held by the Learned Trial Court.
That, although the issue of “Exchange” was averred in the Written
Statement, the Appellants neither denied it nor made an effort to
clarify their position by amending their Plaint. That, Section 118 of
the TP Act relied on by the Appellants was not applicable at the
relevant time as the Act was extended and enforced in Sikkim only
on 01-09-1984 whereas the “exchange” took place in 1975. That,
the Appellants have failed to approach the Court with clean hands
as the Appellants‟ mother is unaware of the Plot numbers that her
sons are laying claim to and their Appeal deserves a dismissal. To
buttress her submission that the person seeking equity must do
equity, reliance was placed on Kishore Samrite vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others .
and Others ,
Relying upon Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal
it was argued that no amount of evidence can be
looked into upon a plea which was never averred in the pleadings
and that there is no averment in the Plaint about handing over of
Schedule „C‟ land to the Respondents.
Learned Counsel however
conceded that family agreement needs no registration for which
reliance was placed on Ripudaman Singh vs. Tikka Maheshwar Chand5.
(ii)
The rival contentions of Learned Counsel were heard at
length and all records meticulously perused.
8(i).
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter, the “CPC”), deals with Second Appeal and Section
100(4) of the CPC provides that where the High Court is satisfied
that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall
formulate that question.
(2013) 2 SCC 398
AIR 2009 SC 1103
(2021) 7 SCC 446
Section 103 of the CPC lays down the
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
power of the High Court to determine issues of facts in any Second
Appeal, if the evidence on record is sufficient to determine any
issue necessary for the disposal of the Appeal;
(ii)
(a)
which has not been determined by the lower
Appellate Court or both by the Court of first
instance and the lower Appellate Court, or
(b)
which has been wrongly determined by such
Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such
question of law as is referred to in Section 100.
In Narayan Sitaramji Badwaik (Dead) Through Lrs. vs.
Bisaram and Others6, it was observed that;
“10. It is a settled position of law that a second
appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, lies only on a substantial question of law
[refer Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari
(deceased) by LRs, (2001) 3 SCC 179]. However, this
does not mean that the High Court cannot, in any
circumstance, decide findings of fact or interfere with
those arrived at by the Courts below in a second
appeal. In fact, Section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure explicitly provides for circumstances under
which High Court may do so. …………..
11. A bare perusal of this section clearly
indicates that it provides for the High Court to decide
an issue of fact, provided there is sufficient evidence
on record before it, in two circumstances. First, when
an issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal has
not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or
by both the Courts below. And second, when an issue
of fact has been wrongly determined by the Court(s)
below by virtue of the decision on the question of law
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ……”
(iii)
In State of Punjab vs. Mohinder Singh7 where the First
Appellate Court in deciding age acted on irrelevant material, e.g.,
Horoscope and ignored the School Certificate, the dismissal of the
Appeal by the High Court observing that the Appeal involved no
substantial question of law was held to be improper and set aside.
It is now settled law and this Court is aware that the High Court
cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate
Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower
Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
2021 SCC OnLine SC 319
AIR 2005 SC 1868
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
provisions of law applicable or a settled position on the basis of
pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon
inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. [See Kondiba
Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Others8]
9(i).
While
first addressing
the
arguments of Learned
Counsel for the Respondent that the TP Act was not applicable in
the State in the year 1975 we may relevantly refer to the decision
of a Division Bench of this Court in Bishnu Kala Karki Dholi and
Others vs. Bishnu Maya Darjeeni9 [Civil First Appeal No.8 of 1976,
decided
on
06-03-1978].
Speaking
for
the
Court,
A.
M.
Bhattacharjee, J., while considering and observing that the TP Act
had not been extended and enforced in the State of Sikkim then,
held as follows;
“9.
………………………………………..
………………………………………..
The observations quoted above should be read
with the observations of the Supreme Court in the
above noted decision in Namdeo versus Narmada Bai
(AIR 1953 Supreme Court 228 at 230) quoted
hereinbelow:“It is axiomatic that the Courts must apply the
principles of justice, equity and good
conscience to transactions which come up
before them for determination even though the
statutory provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act are not made applicable to these
transactions. It follows, therefore, that the
provisions of the Act which are but a statutory
recognition of the rules of justice, equity and
good conscience also governs those transfers.”
And when so read will lead to the conclusion
that even though the Transfer of Property Act does
not formally apply in Sikkim, the Courts in Sikkim, in
discharging their paramount duty to act, in the
absence of statutory provisions, according to the
principles of justice, equity and good conscience,
should reasonable and properly apply the principles
contained in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property
Act relating to redemption of mortgage and
unenforceability of any clog on the right of
redemption. This is what was also done by the
Rajasthan High Court in Devkaran versus Murari Lal
(ILR 1958 Rajasthan 811) in a case arising from the
(1999) 3 SCC 772
1978 (1) Sikkim Law Journal 23
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
former State of Alwar before the extension of the
Transfer of Property Act thereto and this decision has
been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Murarilal
versus Devkaran (AIR 1965 SC 225) and relying in
the observations made therein (at page 231), I would
hold that it would be reasonable to assume that the
Civil Courts established in Sikkim, like Civil Courts all
over India, were and are required to administer
justice according to the principles of equity and
justice where there was or is no specific statutory
provision to deal with the question before them and,
therefore, it would be just and proper to apply the
principles contained in Section 60 of the Transfer of
Property Act relating to the right of redemption and
clog on the equity of redemption.”
(emphasis supplied)
(ii)
In Jas Bahadur Rai v. Putra Dhan Rai10, decided on 29-07-
1978, the Division Bench of this High Court, while considering
whether the provisions of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, should
be applied in Sikkim sans extension or enforcement of the Law on
the point in Sikkim, held as follows;
“3.
The Indian Easements Act, 1882, was never
formally adopted in Sikkim prior to its incorporation in
the Union of India; nor the same has been extended
to Sikkim by any notification under Article 371-F (n)
of the Constitution of India or otherwise; and neither
there was nor there is any corresponding statutory
law relating to easement or licence in force in Sikkim.
But when a point for decision was not covered by the
provision of any law in force in Sikkim, the Courts in
Sikkim, from long before its incorporation in the Union
of India, have followed the principles of laws in force
in India in deciding such a point, if such principles
appeared to them to be based on or in consonance
with the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. …………………………………….
4.
………………………………………………..….
5.
………………….
In my view, therefore, the
provisions of Section 60, Indian Easements Act, 1882
can be invoked and should be applied in Sikkim in the
absence of any corresponding law in Sikkim on the
point. I would repeat that if this amounts to making
of laws by Courts, the Courts in Sikkim will have to
continue to do so until the field is occupied or is
substantially occupied by specific laws. ……….”
(iii)
In Sonam Topgyal Bhutia v. Gompu Bhutia11, decided on
14-06-1979, by a Division Bench of this High Court, which
concerned a matter pertaining to Wills and whether Buddhists in
1978 (3) Sikkim Law Journal 6
AIR 1980 Sikkim 33
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
Sikkim can legally make testamentary disposition, this High Court
inter alia observed;
“27. But though there is no legislation in
Sikkim relating to Wills, the Courts in Sikkim have
followed and applied the provisions of the Indian
Succession Act, 1925 in all matters relating to Wills
including granting of Probates and Letters of
Administration. The question, therefore, is whether
the provisions relating to Wills in the Indian
Succession Act, 1925, which have never been
formally adopted in or extended to Sikkim by any
formal legislative authority are to be regarded as
laws in force in Sikkim?. ................ Therefore, the
provisions relating to Wills in the Indian Succession
Act, 1925, having so long been “recognised”
“applied” and “acted on” by the Courts of justice in
Sikkim in the administration of justice in matters
relating to Wills, are also to be regarded as Laws in
force in Sikkim.”
(emphasis supplied)
(iv)
In Asharam Agarwala v. Union of India12, it was held that
though the Arbitration Act, 1940, had never been formally made
applicable in Sikkim, yet the provisions of the Arbitration Act
having so long been recognized, applied and acted upon by the
Courts of Justice in Sikkim in the administration of justice in
matters relating to Arbitration, are to be regarded as the law in
force in Sikkim, though not as direct statutory laws.
(v)
In Nil Kumar Dahal and Another vs. Indira Dahal and
Others13, this High Court observed that;
“36. ……………… where there is no existing old Law on
a particular subject in Sikkim or where the Law is
scanty or inadequate, the Courts in Sikkim also being
Courts of equity, justice and good conscience, have to
turn to the Laws of the country. It is but apposite to
notice that the Courts in Sikkim, even prior to being
part of the Indian Union have followed principles of
Law in force in India if the principles were based on
justice, equity and good conscience, as already
reflected in the plethora of ratio of this High Court
referred to above. ………”
The discussions above soundly quells the arguments of the
Learned Counsel for the Respondents about the non-extension of
the TP Act to the State of Sikkim with Bishnu Kala Karki Dholi
(supra) having dealt with it specifically.
1978 (4) Sikkim Law Journal 18
SLR (2020) SIKKIM 815
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
10(i).
The air having been cleared on that facet, it is now
necessary to consider the first substantial question of law supra.
Exhibit „D2‟ is the document executed on 06-01-1972, pursuant to
the Partition Deed, Exhibit “P3/D1” executed on 12-01-1965.
Exhibit „P3‟ was executed between the three sons of one late Tika
Ram
Sapkota,
viz.,
Hari
Narayan
Sapkota
(father
of
the
Appellants), Narad Muni Sakpota (Respondent No.1) and Abi Lall @
Abi Narayan Sapkota (Respondent No.2).
There is no dispute
whatsoever between the parties regarding the execution or the
contents of this document.
It is borne out by the evidence on
record that on execution of Exhibit “P3/D1” the three brothers
named above took possession of the respective shares of their
ancestral property. Exhibit „D2‟ was also executed between the
above named three brothers, i.e., Hari Narayan Sapkota, Narad
Muni Sapkota and Abi Narayan Sapkota, who sought to correct the
discrepancy in Exhibit “P3/D1” in which, according to them, no
property for the maintenance of their mother, known as “Jiwni” in
the local parlance, had been set aside from the partitioned
property.
The document Exhibit „D2‟ which is scribed in Nepali
roughly translated into English would be that;
“We the three sons are in agreement that on 12-011965, our father had partitioned property between us and
the said Partition Deed is correct/accepted. On the said date,
an error occurred in not setting aside “Jiwni”.
reason,
on
06-01-1972
in
the
presence
of
For this
Panchayat
Members detailed herein, from the partition share of the two
brothers (Hari Narayan Sapkota and Narad Muni Sapkota)
who were living separately, four rows each from the tail end
land of their respective partition shares and seven rows of
land from the tail end land of the partition share of youngest
brother (Abi Narayan Sapkota) as he had been given a little
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
extra land during the partition, are being set aside for the
purpose (“Jiwni”).
The boundary of such land set aside from the share of
the (Kancha) youngest brother (for clarity Respondent No.2)
is as follows;
East – Own paddy field.
West – Paddy field of Nim Tshering.
North – Kholsa.
South – Dry field of Nochi.
The harvest of which is approximately (illegible) muris.
The boundary of land set aside from share of (Kahila)
fourth brother (for clarity Respondent No.1) is as follows;
East – Own paddy field.
West – Paddy field of Nim Tshering.
North – Own paddy field.
South – Kholsa.
Harvest approximately two muris.
The boundary of land set aside from the share of
(Sahila) third brother (for clarity Appellants father) is as
follows;
East – Own paddy field.
West – Paddy field of Narad.
North – Own dry paddy field.
South – Kholsa.
Harvest approximately two muris.
Within the boundary demarcated by the Panchayat, three
pieces of land (paddy fields) are being set aside for mother‟s
upkeep/maintenance for her lifetime, because these lands fall
in our partition shares we will cultivate it and from the third
son by birth one „muri‟, from the fourth son by birth one
„muri‟ and the youngest one two „muris‟ would be given to
mother. In the event that anyone defaults in payment of
shares of paddy for the maintenance the “Panch” can hand
over the property demarcated for such maintenance to the
brother who is the care giver for mother or else four „muris‟
of paddy will be set aside and all will continue to cultivate
their own partitioned fields. The two brothers who were living
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
separately from the mother would bear one share each for
the death rites of the mother, while the brother with whom
the mother was living would bear the expenses equivalent to
two shares. While holding the previous Partition Deed as
central and true/accepted no one will interfere in the
possession of each other‟s partitioned lands. That, the
document is prepared with the consent of all for providing
maintenance
to
mother
for
her
lifetime
and
all
affix
signatures in the presence of “Panch”. If any brother has any
issue/disagreement, the “Panch” would decide the matter on
the basis of the said document.”
(ii)
It is necessary to highlight here that the real intention
of a document can be ascertained from the meaning of the words
employed therein.
At the outset, Exhibit „D2‟ mentions that the
contents of Exhibit „P3‟, Partition Deed is “Sadar”. Learned Counsel
for both the parties are in agreement that the word “Sadar” in
Nepali translated into English is “correct/valid”.
According to the
Nepali-Nepali-English Dictionary, Bhagyamin Publisher, Complete New
Edition 1983 (Reprinted on March 1989), at page No.562, defines the
word “Sadar” as “central place/acceptance”. Thus, the Nepali word
“Sadar”
employed
acceptance.
in
Exhibit
„D2‟
would
be
correct/central/
In other words, it was agreed between the three
brothers that Exhibit “P3/D1” would be the central document, the
contents of which were correct/acceptable to all the parties
executing Exhibit „D2‟.
(iii)
The parties dispute the interpretation and intention of
the word “Jimma” appearing in Exhibit „D2‟.
According to the
Appellants although the word meant “Handing over” it was not to
be in perpetuity. The Respondents in contra interpret it to mean a
penalty for default in payment of “Jiwni” and funeral expenses of
the mother. The Nepali word “Jimma” according to Nepali-Nepali-
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
English Dictionary, Bhagyamin Publisher, Complete New Edition 1983
(Reprinted on March 1989), at Page No.222, means “responsibility;
care; custody”.
In my considered opinion, the word has to be
interpreted in its correct perspective while bearing in mind the
intent and purport of the document which has to be read
holistically.
(iv)
The document was undisputedly executed for the
purpose of setting aside “Jiwni” land for the mother of the brothers
mentioned therein.
The term “Jiwni” employed in the document
according
Nepali-Nepali-English
to
the
Dictionary,
Bhagyamin
Publisher, Complete New Edition 1983 (Reprinted on March 1989), at
Page No.224, means “maintenance; property set apart for old age;
means of support”. The translation of the Nepali word “Jiwni” as
reflected above, requires no further elucidation.
The document
explicitly lays down the area of land along with boundaries that
have
been
set
aside
by
each
brother
for
their
mother‟s
maintenance during her lifetime. If any brother were to default in
the payment of shares of paddy for “Jiwni” then the Panchayat
were empowered by the document to give “Jimma”/“custody” of
the property demarcated for such maintenance, to the youngest
brother with whom their mother was living. It is specified therein
that after such property was handed over to the “custody” of the
younger brother, the brothers would continue to cultivate their own
partitioned properties. The document further lays down details of
expenditure to be borne by the brothers in the event of their
mother‟s demise.
(v)
The document nowhere indicates or intends that if the
brothers failed to pay their share for their mother‟s death rites,
their land would stand forfeited to the youngest brother.
Exhibit
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
„D2‟ does not envisage confiscation of any brother‟s property by
the youngest brother and penalising the defaulter by retention of
the property by him, beyond their mother‟s lifetime.
The purport
of the document was to provide for their mother‟s maintenance
during
her
lifetime
and
not
for
the
unjust
enrichment
of
Respondent No.2. The condition of the “Panch” giving custody of
the property in default of payment of “Jiwni” in Exhibit „D2‟,
precedes the condition of payment of expenses for funeral/death
rites of their mother. Admittedly, the Appellants‟ mother did not
bear the funeral expenses, the document nevertheless mentions no
penalty for such default by way of confiscation of partitioned
property, for the benefit of Respondent No.2. In this context, the
provisions of Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
are relevant, apposite and self-explanatory for the interpretation of
Exhibit “P3/D1” and Exhibit „D2‟ which are extracted hereinbelow;
“91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants
and other dispositions of property reduced to form
of documents.−When the terms of a contract, or of a
grant, or of any other disposition of property, have
been reduced to the form of a document, and in all
cases in which any matter is required by law to be
reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall
be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant
or other disposition of property, or of such matter,
except the document itself, or secondary evidence of
its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is
admissible
under
the
provisions
hereinbefore
contained.
92.
Exclusion
of
evidence
of
oral
agreement.−When the terms of any such contract,
grant or other disposition of property, or any matter
required by law to be reduced to the form of a
document, have been proved according to the last
section, no evidence of any oral agreement or
statement shall be admitted, as between the parties
to any such instrument or their representatives in
interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying,
adding to, or subtracting from, its term:
Proviso (1).−…………………….…….
Proviso (2).−…………………………..
Proviso (3).−……………………..……
Proviso (4).−……………………………
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
Proviso (5).−……………………………
Proviso (6).−…………………………..”
11(i).
At this juncture, the second substantial question of law
requires a discussion being connected to the first question.
It is
apparent that the Respondents‟ claim that four rows of paddy fields
in Plot No.237 was the “Jiwni” property set aside by the Appellants‟
father.
That, the mother of the Appellants sought to „exchange‟
the four rows in Plot No.237 by requesting the Respondents to
hand over the said land to her in lieu of which she would hand over
Plot Nos.1027 and 1028 to them.
(ii)
Firstly, there is no evidence of such exchange furnished
by the parties but indubitably Schedule „C‟ stands recorded in the
name of the Appellants.
The handing over of Schedule „C‟ as
“Jiwni” and purportedly taking back four rows of fields from
Schedule „B‟, from Respondent No.2, does not qualify as exchange
nor does it fulfil the legal parameters set out by the provisions of
Section 118 along with Section 54 of the TP Act, which reads as
follows;
“118. “Exchange” defined.−When two persons
mutually transfer the ownership of one thing for the
ownership of another, neither thing or both things
being money only, the transaction is called an
“exchange”.
A transfer of property in completion of an
exchange can be made only in manner provided for
the transfer of such property by sale.”
“54. “Sale” defined.−“Sale” is a transfer of
ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or
part-paid and part-promised.
………………………………………………………………………”
It is indeed settled law that a document of Title is not proof
of ownership and that possession of the property has to be taken
into consideration, but in the instant matter, there are no materials
to indicate possessory Title of the Respondent No.2.
The
Respondent No.2 claims possession of Schedule „C‟ lands from
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
1975 with no effort made to correct the Record of Rights in
compliance with the provisions of the Sikkim Registration of
Document Rules, 1930. More importantly, no document of transfer
of Schedule „C‟ lands by way of gift or sale have been furnished by
the Respondent No.2, while it is an admitted position that the
Records of Rights were prepared on the basis of Exhibit “P3/D1”
and accepted by all parties.
No one can deny that possession
may prima facie raise a presumption of Title but such presumption
can hardly arise when the facts are known. It is settled law that
when the facts disclose no title in either party, possession is the
decisive
factor,
undisputedly
the
Title
herein
is
with
the
Appellants.
The Supreme Court in Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of
A.P. vs. Collector
and Others14 while
discussing the provision of
Section 110 of the Evidence Act held as follows;
“19. Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads
thus:
“110. Burden of proof as to ownership.—
When the question is whether any person is
owner of anything of which he is shown to be in
possession, the burden of proving that he is not
the owner is on the person who affirms that he
is not the owner.”
20. It embodies the principle that possession of
a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of
the possessor and casts burden of proof on the party
who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is
rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima
facie lawful and when the contesting party has no
title.”
In the matter at hand, it is not denied that the Title is with
the Appellants. We may also profitably refer to the decision in Nair
Service Society Ltd. vs. K. C. Alexander and Others15 which referred to
the ratio supra and observed:
“(15) ………………… That possession may prima
facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but
(2003) 3 SCC 472
AIR 1968 SC 1165
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are
known. When the facts disclose no title in either
party, possession alone decides. …………………”
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries
(iii)
Private
Limited
Another16,
(2)
through
Director
vs. State of Haryana and
was considering whether the transfer of immovable
property can be executed by General Power of Attorney (GPA)
sales or Sale Agreements (SA).
While holding in the negative it
was elucidated that immovable property can be legally and lawfully
transferred/ conveyed only by a Registered Deed of Conveyance.
At this juncture, profitable reference is made to Section 5 of
the TP Act which defines the “transfer of property” as under;
“5. “Transfer of property” defined.─In the
following sections “transfer of property” means an act
by which a living person conveys property, in present
or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to
himself, or to himself and one or more other living
persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such
act.
………………………………………………..”
In the instant matter, on pain of reiteration, the property was
partitioned vide Exhibit “P3/D1” upon which the brothers took their
shares in 1965 in terms of the Deed.
Appellants‟
father
After the death of the
around 1974/1975, the
Respondents took
possession of Schedule „A‟ which included Schedule „C‟ lands.
There is no Registered Deed of Conveyance between the parties to
indicate that the Appellants or their mother had at any time
transferred the above mentioned immovable property to the
Respondents in terms of the provisions of law.
(iv)
It is an admitted fact that consequent upon the
partition in 1965 in terms of Exhibit “P3/D1” the brothers took
possession of their respective shares. The father of the Appellants
passed away in 1974 and thereafter from 1975 the Respondent
(2012) 1 SCC 656
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
No.2 took possession, but the Title, admittedly prepared on the
basis of Exhibit “P3/D1” continued to remain in the joint names of
the Appellants.
As no exchange has taken place in terms of
Section 118 of the T.P. Act and the Respondent No.2 is evidently in
possession of the property by way of licence as defined in Section
52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, it thus concludes that
Schedule „C‟ belongs to the Appellants.
(v)
The Learned Courts below failed to consider that all
parties were in acceptance of the contents of Exhibit “P3/D1” as
correct and that possession followed thereof, with Schedule „A‟
property being recorded in the joint names of the Appellants.
Schedule „A‟ property includes Schedule „C‟ property. Both the
Learned Courts below held that the document Exhibit „D2‟ dated
06-01-1972 is binding upon the Appellants but failed to discuss its
contents, intent or purpose.
The Learned Trial Court also
erroneously observed that as per Exhibit “P3/D1” it is not clear
which plots of land are going to be partitioned amongst the
Plaintiffs‟ father and his uncles and that the Plaintiffs failed to show
any documents to prove that Schedule „C‟ land was actually
mutated as per Exhibit “P3/D1”, when the reality is that the
Defendant/Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have no argument with Exhibit
“P3/D1” and admitted that the Records of Rights were issued in
terms of the said Deed.
The Respondents‟ contention is in fact
confined to the claim that the Respondent No.2 has remained in
possession of the Schedule „C‟ lands since 1975.
12.
In light of the foregoing discussions hereinabove, I am
constrained to differ with the concurrent findings of the Learned
Courts below pertaining to Exhibit “P3/D1” and Exhibit “D2”.
RSA No.10 of 2019
Chabilal Sapkota and Another vs. Narad Mani Sapkota and Another
13.
The concurrent findings of the Learned Trial Court with
regard to Schedule „B‟ property being the absolute property of the
Appellants is upheld.
(a)
It is accordingly declared that the Appellants are the
absolute owners of Schedule „B‟ property.
(b)
Consequently, both Respondents have no right, title or
authority to enter into the Schedule „B‟ property.
14.
The concurrent findings of the Learned Courts below
that Schedule „C‟ property was exchanged by the Appellants‟
mother with a portion of land in Schedule „B‟, set aside for “Jiwni”,
is incorrect, neither is it in consonance with the provisions of
Section 118 read with Section 54 of the T. P. Act.
(a)
It is declared that the Respondents Nos.1 and 2 have
no right, title and interest over Schedule „C‟ property.
(b)
It is further declared that the Appellants are entitled to
recovery of possession of Schedule „C‟ property from
the Respondents.
15.
This Second Appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
16.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
17.
No order as to costs.
18.
Records of the Courts below be remitted forthwith
along with a copy each of the Judgment for information.
( Meenakshi Madan Rai )
Judge
31-08-2022
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