Ch. Joseph vs The Telangana State Road Transport Corporation & Other

3. The MOS dated 17.12.1979 entered into u/s.12 (3) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 between the employer and the union representing the workmen under Clause 14 would indicate that the drivers found with “colour blindness” would be provided an alternate job and all service benefits would stand protected – However, the Corporation has relied upon the subsequent agreement, namely Memorandum of Settlement (MOS) dated 22.12.1986 to stave off the claim for alternate employment raised by the appellant in the instant case – A plea has been raised in the Counter affidavit filed by the Corporation that the MOS dated 17.12.1979 has been superseded by the agreement of 1986 – The said contention is rejected – The agreement dated 22.12.1986 does not refer to the agreement dated 17.12.1979 – In fact, Clause 5 (d) of the settlement agreement 22.12.1986 would indicate, suitable alternate jobs would have to be identified and only in the event of not being possible to identify such job, recourse to payment of additional monetary benefit as per the proposal sent to the government will be given after government’s approval – The Settlement dated 22.12.1986 does not specifically supersede the settlement agreement of 17.12.1979 – It is only by way of a communication dated 10.11.2014, the benefit of alternate employment given to the drivers declared unfit due to “colour blindness” has been sought to be taken away which benefit was extended till that date. [Paras 14, 16, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3]

4. Retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment – This principle is inherent in the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21 – The failure to explore alternate employment before resorting to medical retirement is not merely a procedural lapse—it is a substantive illegality that violates the appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment. [Para 17]

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.12(3) – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Regn. 6A(5)(b) – Whether Clause 14 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, remains valid, binding, and enforceable despite the subsequent 1986 settlement and internal administrative circulars: Held: 1. The appellant’s entitlement to re-deployment arises from Clause 14 of the binding Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, executed u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which specifically provides for alternate employment to drivers declared colour blind, with pay protection and continuity of service – This clause remains valid and enforceable. [Para 10.2]

2. The Memorandum of Settlement dated 17.12.1979, was executed between the Corporation and its recognised union u/s.12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – The Memorandum of Settlement is not a mere administrative circular—it is a binding statutory contract forged between labour and management. [Para 18]

3. The enforceability of this settlement is not diminished by the subsequent settlement dated 22.12.1986, which the Corporation claims to be governing the field – Clause 5(d) of the 1986 settlement provides that drivers who are medically unfit may, “to the extent possible”, be provided alternative employment, and where not feasible, will be granted Additional Monetary Benefit (AMB) – Crucially, this clause does not contain any express language annulling or modifying Clause 14 of the 1979 agreement – Also, the absence of a termination clause in the 1986 settlement, coupled with the Corporation’s continued adherence to Clause 14 in other cases even after 1986, confirms that the earlier agreement remained operational – Accordingly, this Court finds that 1986 settlement does not explicitly abrogate or nullify Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement. [Para 21]

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Whether the respondents complied with their duty to make a bona fide assessment of alternative employment options for the appellant, as required by law, policy, and principles of natural justice:

Held: 1. From the record, it is evident that the Corporation made no effort whatsoever to assess the feasibility of assigning the appellant to a non-driving post – There is no file noting, committee report, vacancy statement, or suitability assessment relating to the appellant – His representation requesting the post of Shramik remained unanswered – No comparative evaluation was conducted, and no individualized inquiry was held – The only justification offered is that the Corporation’s circulars bar such alternate employment. [Para 24]

2. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the respondents examined even the most basic parameters—availability of vacancies, suitability of tasks, or the appellant’s qualifications – This total failure undermines the Corporation’s claim of compliance with either the 1979 or 1986 framework, and renders the retirement order void for non-consideration of appellant’s claim in proper perspective. [Para 27]

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – s.47 – APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 – Whether the reliance placed by the High Court on B.S. Reddy was legally tenable in the context of the appellant’s independent rights under a binding industrial settlement: Held: 1. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in applying the judgment in B.S. Reddy, which dealt with the limited scope of s.47 of the 1995 Act, and did not consider claims arising independently under industrial settlements – The present case stands on an entirely different legal footing. [Para 10.5]

2. The B.S. Reddy judgment did not deal with the enforceability of a clause in an agreement/settlement entered into u/s.12(3) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or the Corporation’s obligations under bilateral agreements with its workers – The High Court overlooked the fundamental distinction between statutory rights under disability law and contractual service conditions enforceable through settlements. [Para 29]

3. The Court in Mohamed Ibrahim clarified that employees with conditions like colour blindness, although not falling within the defined categories of the statute, must still be accommodated wherever their functional capacity permits – To do otherwise would result in a regressive interpretation of the law, undermining the very foundation of equal opportunity in public employment. [Para 36]

4. Even though in the present case the appellant had an enforceable right under a statutory industrial settlement—placing his claim on firmer footing—this Court finds it necessary to reaffirm that even in the absence of such contractual rights, employees who acquire disabilities during service must not be abandoned or prematurely retired without being afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity for reassignment. [Para 37]