Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:
s. 173 – Delay of 45 days in filing appeal against order of Motor Accident Claim Tribunal – Application for condonation of delay and appeal dismissed by High Court – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: s. 173 provides limitation period for filing appeal – The provision also gives sufficient discretionary powers to the Court to condone delay in filing the appeal if it is satisfied that there existed “sufficient cause” - The provision being a beneficial legislation “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretation to serve the object of the Act – In the present case delay of 45 days has been properly explained – The strict approach taken in the impugned order was hypertechnical and hence not sustainable – Delay is condoned – Matter remanded to High Court to be decided on merit – Limitation – Delay.
Delay:
Condonation of delay – Criteria to be adopted – Held: There is no straight jacket formula for condonation of delay – The Courts are required to take into consideration entire facts and circumstances of the case as well as conduct of the parties while considering condonation of delay – Keeping in view substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities and provisions cannot be viewed strictly as compared to commercial claims.
Interpretation of Statutes:
Beneficial legislation – Interpretation of – Held: Interpretation of beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance of the purpose which the statute seeks to serve. Words and Phrases:
Expressions “may” and “sufficient cause” — Interpretation of, in the context of s. 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a self-contained code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, for passing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. The interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks to serve. [Paras 8 and 9][509-F-G]
Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation. (2009) 9 SCC
61 : [2009] 13 SCR 1139; Vimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 : [2018] 13 SCR
753 – relied on.
2.1 Section 173 of the Act provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay. [Para 12][511D]
2.2 Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion. It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion.“It is used in a statute to indicate that something may be done which prior to it could not be done”. [Para 13][511-E]
Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder (1982) 1 SCC 159 : [1982] 2 SCR 146; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. [1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973 – relied on.
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 14th Edn. - referred to.
2.3 The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section
173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon the Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. Such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courts must have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities. If the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that Court has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that there existed “sufficient cause”. [Paras 14, 16 and 17][511-F; 512-CF] Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 166 : [1977] 2 SCR 964 – relied on.
Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad AIR 1963 SC 120 : [1963] 3 SCR 312; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2 SCC 806 : [1969] 2 SCR 675 – referred to.
2.4 Although the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, but even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under the Limitation Act Courts have taken a liberal interpretation. [Para 18][512-G]
Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321 : [2008] 11 SCR 1; Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 : [2010] 8 SCR 597; Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 – relied on.
2.5 Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in view the substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. [Para 22][514-F-G] P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 : [2018] 12 SCR 143 – relied on.
2.6 The legislative intent of Motor Vehicles Act is to provide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect their substantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not be as strict as commercial claims. [Para 22][515-E]
2.7 Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. [Para 23][515F-G]
3. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover, in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days. Therefore, the strict approach taken in the impugned order is hyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. [Para 24][515-H; 516-A-B]
4. As the adjudication on the merits of the case has not taken place, the matter is remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration on merits. [Para 25][516-C]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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