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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A.(J) No.11 of 2022
Bishnu Ghosh,
S/O late Anil Ghosh
Resident of Village-Chandrapur Khil,
P.S. R.K. Pur, District : Gomati, Tripura.
----Convict-Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
Represented by the Secretary,
Home Department, Government of Tripura
---- Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s)
:
Mr. S. Lodh, Adv.
For Respondent(s)
:
Mr. S. Ghosh, Addl. P.P.
Mr. K. Pandey, Adv.
Mr. S. Majumder, Adv.
Date of hearing
:
13.12.2023
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order
:
09.01.2024
Whether fit for
reporting
:
NO
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
[Biswajit Palit, J]
This is an appeal by the convict-appellant Shri Bishnu Ghosh
against the judgment dated 23.03.2022 and order of conviction and sentence
dated 25.03.2022 passed by the Learned Additional Session Judge, Gomati
Judicial District, Udaipur, in connection with case No. ST(GT/U) 38 of 2016
under Section 498A/302 of IPC. By the said judgment Learned Trial Court has
sentenced the convict-appellant to suffer RI for 2 (two) years and to pay fine
of Rs 3000/- i.d to suffer SI for 2 (two) months for the offence punishable
under Section 498A of IPC and also sentenced the convict under Section 302
of IPC to suffer RI for life and to pay fine of Rs 5000/- i.d. to suffer SI for a
further period of 3 (three) months with a direction that both the sentences
would run concurrently. The prosecution against the appellant was lodged on
the basis of a written FIR laid by the informant namely Smti Kajal Karmakar,
w/o Shri Tapan Karmakar, Jalefa, Sabroom, PS Sabroom, District South
Tripura to O/C, R.K Pur Women PS, alleging inter alia that prior to six months
back from the date of lodging the FIR on 28.10.2015 her daughter Smti
Sangita Karmakar was given marriage to one Shri Bishnu Ghosh, S/O Late
Anil Ghosh of Chandrapur Colony under PS R.K. Pur, as per Hindu Rites and
Customs. At the time of marriage, they had given cash amount of
Rs.1,00,000/-, gold ornaments of 3 Bhoris and wooden furnitures as a dowry.
But after the marriage, the informant‟s daughter was subjected to cruelty
both mentally and physically by her husband and other near relatives of the
husband namely Smt. Usha Ghosh, W/O Late Anil Ghosh, Prasenjit Ghosh,
S/O Late Anil Ghosh, Sanju Das, S/O unknown, Jiban Biswas, S/O unknown,
and Subrata Chakraborty, S/O unknown on demand of money of Rs.30,000/and more gold ornaments. According to the informant, when the daughter of
the informant expressed her parent‟s inability to fulfill the demand due to
their poverty then she was subjected to assault and not only that she was
kept in starvation. The informant‟s daughter was also not permitted to visit
her parental house unless the demand could be fulfilled. On 28.10.2015, in
the morning, there was a quarrel among the daughter of the informant, her
husband and mother-in-law and there the victim was brutally assaulted by
them. At about 12:30 hours, the husband of the informant‟s daughter called
the informant through phone and asked her to come to their residence as
their daughter‟s condition was very critical. The informant alleged that her
daughter has been killed by her husband and mother-in-law by setting ablaze
fire on her after pouring kerosene oil. Hence she laid the FIR.
2.
Based
on
the
said
complaint,
R.K
Pur
women
P.S
case
No.108/2015 under Section 498A/302 of IPC was registered and the WSI
Madhabi Debbarma took up investigation of the case. On completion of the
investigation the final report sending up the appellant for facing the trial was
filed with the charges under Section 498A, 302/34 of IPC in the jurisdictional
Court. Since the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC is exclusively
triable by the Court of Sessions, so the case was committed to the Learned
Sessions Judge, Gomati Judicial District Udaipur and subsequently, the case
was transferred to the Court of Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gomati
District Udaipur for disposal. It is to be noted here that charge-sheet was
submitted against the present appellant and his mother Smti Usha Rani
Ghosh by the I.O. but by the said judgment Smti Usha Rani Ghosh was
acquitted from the charge of this case. Before the Learned Trial Court, charge
was framed against the present appellant under Section 498A/302 read with
Section 34 of IPC for committing murder of the victim Smti Sangita
Karmakar. The appellant denied the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed to
be tried.
3.
In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution in total has
adduced 15 numbers of witnesses and relied upon some documentary
evidences which were marked as exhibits in the case. After recording the
prosecution evidence, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C to have his response on the incriminating materials those surfaced in
the evidence. The appellant renewed his claim of innocence and denied those
incriminating materials as fabricated and he also took the plea that he has
been falsely implicated in this case. He took the plea that as a driver by
profession he used to go out everyday and used to return back at night and
he could know from his neighbours that his wife and mother had on some
occasions involved in hot altercation on the issue of cooking so there might be
some issue between his mother and his deceased wife. However, having
appreciated the evidence on record, Learned Trial Court returned the finding
of conviction as the prosecution had been successful in establishing the
charge against the present appellant.
4.
Learned Counsel, Mr. S. Lodh appearing for the appellant in
course of hearing strenuously argued that there is no eye-witness and legal
evidence and on the basis of surmise the appellant has been convicted. He
further submitted that there is serious perversity in the finding of conviction.
Learned Counsel also added that to substantiate the charge under Section
498A of IPC the prosecution before the Learned Trial Court could not adduce
any single evidence to believe that the victim was subjected to cruelty for
unlawful demand of dowry by the present appellant and furthermore there is
no evidence on record that the present appellant committed murder of his
wife by pouring kerosene oil on her body. He also stated that all the witnesses
adduced by the prosecution are heresay witnesses. Thus, in absence of any
cogent evidence in respect of involvement of the appellant, the finding of the
conviction cannot survive. It was further submitted that the evidence of the
witnesses of the prosecution are contrary to each other. So, in summing up
Learned Counsel submitted that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove
the charges framed against the present appellant but the Learned Trial Court
by the said judgment convicted the appellant and urged before the Court for
acquittal.
5.
On the other hand, Learned Additional P.P. appearing on behalf of
the prosecution submitted that this case is entirely based on circumstantial
evidence and from the evidence on record, it is very much clear that the
deceased prior to her death was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry by
the present appellant and as the demand could not be fulfilled the present
appellant committed murder of his wife by pouring Kerosene oil. So,
according to Learned Additional P.P. Learned Trial Court rightly after
elaborate discussions of the evidence on record delivered the judgment
against the present appellant. So, learned Additional P.P. urged this Court not
to interfere with the judgment of the conviction and the consequential order
of sentence.
6.
For appreciation of the submission made by the Learned Counsel
for the parties, it would apposite to note at the outset that there is no dispute
on record that the daughter of the informant was expired on 28.10.2015 due
to burning. Now we are to see as to whether that burning took place due to
ill-act committed by the present appellant or not. So, to analyze the matter,
let this Court take a short survey of the evidence as led by the prosecution
before the Learned Court below.
7.
PW-1, Smti Kajal Karmakar, is the informant. She deposed that
about two years back, the marriage of her daughter was solemnized with the
appellant Bishnu Ghosh of Chandrapur as per Hindu Rites and Customs. In
the marriage, cash money amounting to Rs.1,00,000/- along with gold
ornaments, furniture and other household articles were given. After the
marriage for a period of one month, her daughter lived peacefully at her
matrimonial home. Thereafter, her son-in-law Bishnu demanded Rs.30,000/from her but she refused on account of her financial stringency. Thereafter,
according to the informant, the present appellant and his mother started
physical and mental torture upon her (daughter). Not only that they stopped
providing food to her on regular basis but also she deposed that her daughter
was also being slapped by shoe on account of which she developed auditory
problem. About five to seven days prior to Durga Puja in the year 2015 she
went to the matrimonial home of her daughter to provide some gifts and at
that time, her daughter revealed the incidents of torture upon her. After the
marriage, her daughter for one time during „Fira Yatra‟ visited her house.
After eight days of her return, one day in the noon her son-in-law asked her
over mobile phone to visit home at Chandrapur as her daughter was in a
critical condition. Knowing the information, she along with her husband,
daughter and other relatives went to R.K. Pur Women PS and when she was
coming out from her house, she heard from someone that her daughter had
been killed by the appellant and his mother by sprinkling Kerosene Oil and
setting fire upon her. At PS, one Tutul Deb, recorded her ejahar as per her
narration, she put her signature on the complaint and identified her signature
marked as Exhibit-1. She further deposed that on the following day, she went
to District Hospital where after autopsy she could see the face of her
daughter. She also stated that younger brother of the appellant Prasenjit
Ghosh was present in the Hospital and no other family members were there.
During cross-examination she stated that in her ejahar she did
not narrate that she provided all the articles as per demand from the groom
side. Again, she deposed that in her ejahar she did not state that about five
to seven days prior to Durga Puja of 2015, she had gone to the matrimonial
house of her daughter to provide some gifts and at that time, she revealed
the incidents of torture upon her. Again, she stated that in her ejahar she did
not say that her daughter was slapped by shoe on account of which she
developed auditory problem. She further stated that she did not state in her
ejahar that Bishnu himself demanded Rs.30,000/- from her but she denied on
account of her financial stringency. She also stated that on the alleged day at
about 7:00 to 8:00 PM in the night, the witness along with her husband came
to R.K. Pur Women PS.
8.
PW-2, Smti Sanju Karmakar is the sister of the deceased. She
deposed that the marriage of her sister was solemnized with the appellant
and in the marriage, cash money of Rs.1,00,000/-, gold ornaments and other
articles were given and for a period of one month after the marriage, her
sister lived happily at her matrimonial home and after the marriage, her sister
visited twice her parental house. She further deposed that her sister over
mobile set informed her that her husband and mother-in-law used to cause
torture upon her on demand of money but due to poverty, they could not
fulfill the demand and as a result, torture upon her sister was increased. She
again stated that she visited the matrimonial home of her sister once or twice
when the appellant asked her not to visit his house till the demand of
Rs.30,000/- was fulfilled and he also expressed that in the event of nonfulfillment of demand her sister would not be permitted to visit her house.
She further stated that the appellant Bishnu had given the mobile number of
his immediate neighbour to make contact but subsequently, he stopped that
too. One month thereafter, Bishnu, i.e., the appellant again demanded
Rs.6000/- from her mother but her mother could not pay it and for that,
torture upon her sister was increased. Her sister was being slapped by shoe
on account of which she developed auditory problem. About 8 to 9 days prior
to the death of her sister, her mother visited her matrimonial home to provide
some gifts on the occasion of Durga Puja and on return, her mother told her
that Sangita (victim) revealed the incidents of torture upon her on account of
demand of Rs.6000/-. She further stated that thereafter one day in the noon,
the appellant informed her mother over mobile to visit his house as Sangita
was in critical condition. Thereafter, the witness along with her parents and
other relatives went to R.K. Pur Women PS where her mother laid the
complaint. On the following day in the morning, she along with others went to
Tepania District Hospital where the face of her sister was shown to them after
autopsy.
During cross-examination, she stated that she did not say to IO
that on the last occasion, when she visited her sister‟s matrimonial home,
that time, the appellant asked her not to visit again till the demand of
Rs.30,000/- was fulfilled and he would not allow her sister to visit their house
till the fulfillment of the demand.
9.
PW-3, Shri Anup Sarkar only deposed that wife of the appellant
died about 6-7 months back and after hearing the fact of incident, he went to
the residence of the appellant when police personnel were also present. That
time, police prepared inquest report over the dead body of the deceased and
the witness put his signature and identified his signature marked as Exhibit-2.
He further deposed that the police seized one plastic container, burnt pieces
of saree, some burnt soil sample, one pair of sleeper by preparing seizure list
and identified his signature marked as Exhibit-3 and identified the seized
alamats marked Exhibit-MO-1 series.
10.
PW-4, Shri Uttam Dey deposed that previous year on the
following day of Laxmi Puja, the wife of the appellant died. At that time, when
he was in his house, he heard the cry of Smti Usha Rani Ghosh that there was
fire. Immediately, he along with others rushed to the house of Bishnu Ghosh
where Usha Rani Ghosh told that there was a fire in the room of her
daughter-in-law. Accordingly, they broke open the door by kicking and saw
her body was in flames and she was lying on the ground. Immediately, they
poured water over the body. He further deposed that on that day, in the
morning, there was a dispute between the appellant and his mother. The
victim was rolling on the ground due to burn injuries and could not say
anything. This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution and his portion
of statement was marked subject to confirm by IO.
During cross-examination, he specifically stated that the appellant
is a driver by profession and he used to leave his house in the morning
between 6:00 am to 7:00 am. He again stated that on that day also, the
appellant left for his works as usual. He also stated that when he reached the
spot hearing the cry of Smti Usha Rani Ghosh, Bishnu Ghosh was not there.
He also stated that the visitors who were present, made a call to the Fire
Brigade, as well as to the appellant giving the information. He has further
stated that the door was bolted from inside and that is why, it could not be
opened from outside. Further, he stated that being immediate neighbours,
the victim used to visit their house and sit together with his family members
and used to share her family matters and during those conversation she used
to tell that financial condition of her husband was too bad and for that reason
she had to suffer a lot and out of that she had a feeling of committing suicide.
And again deposed that on the said day after the incident Fire Brigade
personnel and Police reached and examined the persons present there
including him and recorded the statements.
11.
PW-5, Shri Sushil Baidya deposed that the wife of the appellant
died about two years back in the month of Aswina. That day Smti Usha Rani
Ghosh raised a cry and he went to the spot. As per his knowledge there are
two rooms in the hut of Bishnu i.e the appellant wherein there are two doors
one for each. There, the bed room of the wife of Bishnu was opened by giving
push/thrash and he could see that Sangita (victim) was lying on the ground
with burn injuries over the body and there was some movement in her body.
This witness was declared hostile by the prosecution.
During cross-examination by the appellant-accused he deposed
that the door was bolted from inside and there was no other way to enter it
that‟s why it had to be broke open. Again stated that Uttam (PW-4) was
present and he himself broke opened the door by kicking. Again deposed that
Bishnu is a driver by profession and he used to leave for work in the morning
between 6:00 am to 7:00 am. Again deposed that out of the visitors
somebody made a call to Fire Brigade, as well as, Bishnu (appellant) giving
the information and on the same day after the incident, the Fire Brigade
personnel and police came and examined the persons including him.
12.
PW-6, Shri Ashim Das only deposed that before the death of
Sangita in the year 2015, one day her mother had told him that the
matrimonial life of her daughter was not peaceful on account of some money
demand from her and after the death of Sangita her mother told that she was
killed first and thereafter set on fire.
13.
PW-7, Shri Sankar Karmakar deposed that deceased Sangita was
his cousin. Her marriage was solemnized with the appellant and after the
marriage she was happy at her matrimonial home. After 6 to 7 months of
marriage his aunt told him that her son-in-law was demanding Rs.30,000/from her but he could not say as to whether the demand was fulfilled or not.
Subsequently, on another occasion his aunt told that her son-in-law had met
with an accident and for that he again demanded Rs.6000/- from the mother
of the victim. On the occasion of Durga Puja, his aunt had visited the
matrimonial home of the victim to present some gifts to her and that time
Sangita told her that there was some disturbance at her matrimonial life and
she was given shoe slap by her husband and some days thereafter Sangita
died. He further deposed that on the relevant day he along with his uncle and
aunt first went to the house of Pradhan and thereafter to the Woman PS.
During cross-examination, he deposed that he did not state to IO that his
aunt told him that her son-in-law was specifically making a demand of
Rs.30,000/- from her.
14.
PW-8, Shri Maran Madraji, Dom deposed that on 28.11.2015 he
was posted as Dom in the Tepania District Hospital and on that day, in his
presence darogababu seized samples of stomach, kidney, liver, scalp hair and
skin of deceased Sangita Karmakar by preparing a seizure list and he
identified his signature on the seizure list marked as Exhibit-4.
15.
PW-9,
Shri
Suman
Kumar
Chakraborti
deposed
that
on
18.12.2015 he was posted as Dy. Director in SFSL., Tripura. On that day their
office received one sealed packet from SDPO, Udaipur containing exhibits in
connection with R.K. Pur Women PS case No.108/2015 and the same was
endorsed to him for examination. On examination of the exhibits marked F
and G were found positive for the presence of residues of inflammable oil. The
exhibits marked C, E and H were negative for the presence of residues of
inflammable oil. The exhibits marked A, B and D were negative for the
presence of common organochloro, organophosphorous, carbamate, group of
pesticides, Benzodiazepine group of drugs. The remnants of the exhibits have
been returned separately under sealed cover. This is the report prepared by
him in two pages which on identification by witness is marked as Exhibit 5
and identified his signature marked as Exhibit-5/1 series.
16.
PW-10, Shri Parimal Shil deposed that marriage of Sangita took
place with the appellant. After two months of marriage one day Kajal
Karmakar came to him and told that there were some family related disputes
in the matrimonial home of her daughter and 15/20 days before the death of
Sangita, one day Kajal Karmakar came to his house again and informed that
her son-in-law met with an accident and for that reason the appellant had
asked Sangita to demand some money from her parental home and
accordingly Sangita made a call to her mother seeking financial help but
owing to their financial hardship Kajal Karmakar expressed her inability to
fulfill the demand and after few days Kajal Karmakar informed that Sangita
died.
17.
PW-11, Smti Dipali Karmakar deposed that Sangita i.e the victim
was her niece. Her marriage was solemnized with the appellant. Her
matrimonial life was peaceful for a period of one or two months. Thereafter,
the appellant started causing torture upon her physically on demand of
money from her parental home. On the occasion of first Durga Puja, following
the marriage Kajal karmakar went to the matrimonial home of Sangita to
present some gifts where she noticed the appellant was torturing physically to
the victim and for that Sangita developed some auditory problem. On
28.10.2015, the appellant in connivance with her mother committed murder
of Sangita. She went to PS and thereafter to Hospital.
During cross-examination she stated that the witness did not say
to police that Kajal told her that she herself had noticed the appellant Bishnu
inflicting physical torture upon Sangita when she had gone to present some
gifts on the occasion of Durga Puja.
18.
PW-12, Dr. Chandan Kumar Tripura is the Medical Officer. He
deposed that on 29.10.2015 as a Medical Officer of Gomati District Hospital,
Tepania, he along with Dr. Abhijit Datta and Dr. Rituparna Dey conducted
postmortem over the dead body of deceased Sangita in connection with RK
Pur PS GD entry No.668 dated 28.10.2015. During examination according to
him he did not find any external injury on the dead body. There was smell of
Kerosene oil on the whole body along with burnt clothings. 100% (superficial
and deep) mixed burn seen. Skin was peeling off. Burn was seen in the
nostrils. Nasopharynx, larynx were congested and odematous. Hands were
fisted and closed. Knee joint was flexed. Uterous was not bulky. Brain and
lungs were congested and odematous. Liver, spleen and kidney were
congested. The other body organs and bony structure were healthy and
intact. The witness further deposed that the opinion regarding death is 100%
mixed (superficial and deep) burn by kerosene oil and inhalation burn which
were antemortem and homicidal in nature and according to the witness the
age of death was 10 to 18 hours before the time of holding postmortem
examination. He further deposed that the report was prepared by Dr. Abhijit
Datta in his own hand writing. He identified the report prepared by Dr. Abhijit
Datta marked as Exhibit-6 and the signature of Dr. Datta marked Exhibit-6/1,
his signature marked Exhibit-6/2, identified the signature of Dr. Rituparna
Dey marked Exhibit-6/3. He further deposed that the viscera samples of the
deceased were sent to SFSL for examination. He further deposed that after
receipt of the report, the final opinion was prepared by Dr. Abhijit Datta
stating that there is no associated poisoning and the cause of death stands as
it stated earlier and the final opinion of Dr. Abhijit Datta bearing his signature
was identified by the witness marked as Exhibit-6/4.
During cross-examination he deposed that the symptoms found
on the dead body were also reflected in case of suicidal death by burn and
further deposed that the basis for expressing the opinion as a homicidal death
has not been reflected in the postmortem report.
19.
PW-13, Shri Arun Sharma deposed that one day police officer in
the house of the appellant seized one plastic drum, a piece of burnt cloth and
some soil samples by preparing seizure list. The witness identified his
signature on the seizure list marked as Exhibit-3/1 and the seized alamats
marked as Exhibit-MO-1 series.
20.
PW-14, Smti Debjani Deb deposed that on 29.10.2015, she was
posted as Executive Magistrate (DCM), Udaipur. On that day she conducted
inquest over the dead body of the deceased and identified the inquest report
marked as Exhibits 8 and the signatures marked as Exhibit-8/1,8/2 and 8/3.
During cross-examination, she deposed against column No.18 of
the inquest report, prime facie nothing could be ascertained.
21.
PW-15, Smti Madhabi Debbarma is the IO who on completion of
the investigation of the case, laid charge sheet against the present appellant
and another accused Smti Usha Rani Ghosh for their prosecution before the
Court. She also relied upon some documents which were marked as exhibits
in this case.
During cross-examination she stated that she conducted inquest
over the dead body of Sangita Karmakar at about 14:30 hours in connection
with GDE No.668 dated 28.10.2015. She further deposed that the time of
seizure of the plastic drum was shown as 15:00 hours against GD entry
No.667 dated 28.10.2015 and the same were seized after conducting inquest.
She further stated that she went to PO and conducted inquest prepared hand
sketch map with index and returned to the PS against the same GD entry.
22.
Learned Additional PP at the time of hearing of argument
submitted before the Court that the prosecution has been able to prove the
charge labeled against the accused-appellant under Section 498A/302 of IPC
and accordingly, the Learned Court below rightly delivered the Judgment
against the present appellant. It was further submitted by him that this case
was based on circumstantial evidence and from Exhibit-6 it is clear that brain
and
lungs
of
the
deceased
were
in
congested
condition
suggestive
strangulation and death prior to burning. The present appellant with a view to
camouflage a homicide into suicide put the dead body or in nearly dead
conditioned body on fire and placed plastic container filled with kerosene oil,
nearly to give it an appearance of suicide by the deceased. He also submitted
that in a case of this nature it is very difficult to find any suitable eye-witness
of the alleged occurrence of offence because this type of offences take place
inside a house within the four corners of the wall and generally, it is very
difficult for the common people to access and to watch the incident. So, only
the near relatives of the deceased or the neighbours who resides nearby the
house of the accused can whisper something about the alleged occurrence of
offence. The prosecution in this case has adduced in total 15 numbers of
witnesses as already stated and from the evidence of PW-1 Smti Kajal
Karmakar (mother of the deceased), PW-2 Smti Sanju Karmakar (sister of the
deceased), PW-6 Shri Ashim Das, PW-7 Shri Sankar Karmakar, PW-11 Smti
Dipali Karmakar, it is crystal clear that the deceased victim was subjected to
cruelty by the present appellant for demand of dowry and ultimately for nonfulfillment of the demand of dowry as provided in Section 498A of IPC the
present appellant committed murder of his wife (deceased). So, Learned
Additional PP on conclusion of his argument urged for upholding the
conviction and sentence delivered by Learned Trial Court below.
23.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh in course of
hearing fairly submitted that in this case the prosecution could not adduce
any independent witness to sustain conviction against the present appellant.
Just on the basis of some omnibus statement there was no scope to impose
conviction upon the appellant by the Learned Trial Court below and the
Learned Trial Court could not appreciate the evidence on record properly and
misconstrued the evidence on record of the prosecution and delivered the
judgment which is liable to be set aside. Learned Counsel further submitted
that even for the argument sake, if the evidence of PW-1 i.e the mother of
the deceased, PW-2 i.e the sister of deceased can be analyzed, it can be
found that they in course of their examination stated before the Court that
the victim was subjected to cruelty for non-fulfillment of demand of money
but they could not specifically say the date, time and place when the victim
was exactly subjected to cruelty by the present appellant and furthermore,
the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 are contradictory to each other and the other
witnesses as relied upon by the prosecution like PW-3 Shri Anup Sarkar, PW-6
Shri Ashim Das, PW-7 Shri Sankar Karmakar, PW-10 Shri Parimal Shil, PW-11
Smti Dipali Karmakar, could not say anything about the prosecution case,
rather they are heresay witnesses and they deposed after hearing some facts
from the mother of the deceased victim i.e PW-1. So, legally there is no scope
to place any reliance upon their evidence. Learned Counsel further submitted
that PW-4 Shri Uttam Dey and PW-5 Shri Sushil Baidya although they were
declared hostile by the prosecution but the prosecution from their evidence
could not derive any benefit in support of the prosecution case rather those
witnesses in course of their cross-examination very specifically stated that the
present appellant was not at home at the time of alleged occurrence. There
was no explanation from the side of the prosecution in this regard and the
Learned Court below at the time of appreciating the evidence on record totally
ignored the said part of the evidence deposed by the said witnesses during
their cross-examination. Because until and unless the prosecution could
establish the presence of the appellant to the residence at the time of alleged
occurrence then how the charges have been levelled against the appellant.
This material fact was totally ignored by the Learned Trial Court below at the
time of delivering the judgment of this case. He fairly submitted that it is the
settled principle of law that the evidence of heresay witnesses cannot be
discarded as a whole but from their evidence prosecution could not satisfy the
Court that the present appellant was present at residence at the time of
alleged occurrence of offence and furthermore, from their evidence also, the
prosecution could not satisfy the Court that the deceased victim was
subjected to cruelty for unlawful demand of dowry prior to her death. So,
Learned Counsel submitted before the Court that the prosecution has
measurably failed to uphold the charges levelled against the present appellant
and urged before the Court to set aside the judgment passed by the Learned
Court below and relied upon some citations which are discussed herein below.
24.
In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and another vs State of
Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No.507 of 2008 dated 14.09.2012
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373 Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in Para 8 of the
said judgment observed as under:
“Circumstantial Evidence
8. In
Sharad
Birdhichand
Sarda
v.
State
of
Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, this Court after
referring to various earlier decisions, formulated the
following conditions to be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established
based on circumstantial evidence:
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that
the circumstances concerned „must or should‟ and
not „may be‟ established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction between „may be
proved‟ and „must be or should be proved‟ as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State
of Maharashtra :(1973) 2 SCC 793 where the
following observations were made:
„19. … Certainly, it is a primary principle that
the accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental distance
between “may be” and “must be” is long and
divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.‟
(2) the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused,
that is to say, they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4)
they
should
exclude
every
possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say
so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case
based on circumstantial evidence.””
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel submitted that
although this case is based on circumstantial evidence but the prosecution by
adducing oral/documentary evidence on record could not show any chain of
circumstance to believe the prosecution story because from the evidence on
record nothing could be inferred regarding involvement of the present
appellant with the alleged occurrence of offence.
25.
In State of Uttar Pradesh vs Krishna Master and others in
Criminal Appeal No.1180 of 2004 dated 03.08.2010 reported in (2010)
12 SCC 324 Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in para 17 observed as under:
“17. In the deposition of witnesses, there are always normal
discrepancies, howsoever honest and truthful they may be.
These discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental
disposition, shock and horror at the time of occurrence and
threat to the life. It is not unoften that improvements in
earlier version are made at the trial in order to give a boost
to the prosecution case, albeit foolishly. Therefore, it is the
duty of the court to separate falsehood from the truth. In
sifting the evidence, the court has to attempt to separate the
chaff from the grains in every case and this attempt cannot
be abandoned on the ground that the case is baffling unless
the evidence is really so confusing or conflicting that the
process cannot reasonably be carried out. In the light of
these principles, this Court will have to determine whether
the evidence of eye-witnesses examined in this case proves
the prosecution case.”
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel submitted that in
view of the above principle, the Court is to determine whether the evidence of
the eye-witnesses examined in the case proves the prosecution case or not
but here in the case at hand there is no eyewitness or any evidence on record
from the side of the prosecution to justify conviction against the case.
Because according to Learned Counsel, prosecution first of all in this case
could not prove that the present appellant was very much available at his
residence at the time of alleged occurrence of offence and secondly, the
prosecution by the evidence on record failed to satisfy the Court that it is the
appellant who committed murder of his wife for unlawful demand of dowry.
26.
In Prabhudayal and others vs State of Maharashtra in
Criminal Appeal No.738 of 1992 dated 14.05.1993 reported in (1993) 3
SCC 573 Hon‟ble the Apex Court in para 35 of the said judgment further
observed as under:
“35. As pointed out by the High Court there is no direct
evidence to connect the appellants with the offence of
murder and the prosecution entirely rests its case only on
circumstantial evidence. There is a series of decisions of this
Court propounding the cardinal principles to be followed in
cases in which the evidence is of circumstantial nature. It is
not necessary to recapitulate all those decisions except
stating the essential ingredients as noticed by Pandian, J. in
the case reported as State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakesh
Mittal :(1992) 3 SCC 300, 309 to prove guilt of an accused
person by circumstantial evidence. They are:
“(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion is
drawn should be fully proved;
(2) the circumstances should be conclusive in nature;
(3) all the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent
with innocence;
(4) the circumstances should, to a moral certainty,
exclude the possibility of guilt of any person other
than the accused.””
Referring the said citation Learned Counsel submitted that here in
the case at hand prosecution could not place any conclusive circumstances to
believe the prosecution story to sustain conviction of the present appellant in
this case.
27.
In Vivek Kalra vs State of Rajasthan in Criminal Appeal
No.221 of 2007 dated 15.02.2013 reported in (2014) 12 SCC 439 in para
6 also observed as under:
“6. We have considered the submissions of the learned
counsel for the parties and we agree with the learned
counsel for the appellant that from the evidence of PW 11
one could not hold that the appellant had committed the
murder of the deceased to take revenge on his uncle (PW
11), who had not given him Rs 80,000 kept in the fixed
deposit. We are, however, of the opinion that where
prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence only, motive is
a relevant fact and can be taken into consideration
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but where the
chain of other circumstances establishes beyond reasonable
doubt that it is the accused and the accused alone who has
committed the offence, and this is one such case, the Court
cannot hold that in the absence of motive of the accused
being established by the prosecution, the accused cannot be
held guilty of the offence. In Ujjagar Singh v. State of
Punjab :(2007) 13 SCC 90, this Court observed:
“17. … It is true that in a case relating to circumstantial
evidence motive does assume great importance but to
say that the absence of motive would dislodge the entire
prosecution story is perhaps giving this one factor an
importance which is not due and (to use the cliché) the
motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be
fathomed with any degree of accuracy.””
Referring the aforesaid citation the Learned Counsel submitted
that prosecution in this case could not establish any chain of circumstances to
sustain conviction against the present appellant by adducing any cogent
material evidence on record. So, Learned Counsel urged before the Court to
discard the evidence on record of the prosecution.
28.
In Ramnaresh and others vs State of Chhattisgarh in
Criminal Appeal Nos.166-67 of 2010 dated 28.02.2012 reported in
(2012) 4 SCC 257 Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in para 49 observed as
under:
“49. In terms of Section 313 CrPC, the accused has the
freedom to maintain silence during the investigation as well
as before the court. The accused may choose to maintain
silence or complete denial even when his statement
under Section 313 CrPC is being recorded, of course, the
court would be entitled to draw an inference, including
adverse inference, as may be permissible to it in accordance
with law.”
In respect of examination of accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C
Learned Counsel referred the aforesaid citation and drawn the attention of the
Court that the prosecution could not satisfy the Court to draw an inference
including adverse inference against the present appellant to sustain his
conviction in this case.
29.
In Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli and others vs State of
Gujarat in Criminal Appeals No.1146 of 2008 with No.1166 of 2009
dated 20.10.2010 reported in (2011) 11 SCC 111 Hon‟ble the Supreme
Court in paras 16 and 17 discussed about the admissibility of evidence of
hostile witness which are as under:
“16. It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a
prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely
because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and
cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot
be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but
the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is
found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Vide
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana :(1976) 1 SCC 389
Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa :(1976) 4 SCC 233,
Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka :(1980) 1 SCC 30 and
Khujji v. State of M.P. :(1991) 3 SCC 627.)
17. In State of U.P v. Ramesh Prasad Misra :(1996) 10 SCC
360 this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness would
not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution
or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny
and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the
case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A
similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba
Shinde v. State of Maharashtra :(2002) 7 SCC 543, Gagan
Kanojia v. State of Punjab :(2006) 13 SCC 516, Radha Mohan
Singh v. State of U.P. :(2006) 2 SCC 450, Sarvesh Narain
Shukla v. Daroga Singh :(2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh
v. State :(2010) 9 SCC 567.”
Referring the aforesaid citation, Learned Counsel submitted that
PW-4 and PW-5 were declared hostile by the prosecution in this case.
Although according to Learned Counsel, it is settled legal proposition that the
evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto on the ground
that the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him but
the evidence of those witnesses required to be scrutinized closely and that
portion of the evidence which is inconsistent with the case of the prosecution
or defence can be relied upon. Here in the case at hand, prosecution as
already stated could not derive any benefit from their evidence in support of
the prosecution case rather those witnesses in course of their crossexamination very specifically stated before the Court that the present
appellant was not at home at the time of alleged occurrence of offence which
the Learned Trial Court below failed to appreciate at the time of assessing the
evidence on record and delivering the judgment and there was also no
explanation in this regard from the side of prosecution of this case.
30.
In Musheer khan alias Badshah Khan and another vs State
of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeals No.1180 of 2005 with
Nos.1181 and 1204-05 of 2005 dated 28.01.2010 reported in (2010) 2
SCC 748 Hon‟ble the Apex Court in para 39 also observed as follows:
“39. In a case of circumstantial evidence, one must look for
complete chain of circumstances and not on snapped and
scattered links which do not make a complete sequence. This
court finds that this case is entirely based on circumstantial
evidence. While appreciating circumstantial evidence, the
Court must adopt a cautious approach as circumstantial
evidence is “inferential evidence” and proof in such a case is
derivable by inference from circumstances.”
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel submitted that
while appreciating circumstantial evidence, the Court must adopt a cautious
approach as circumstantial evidence is “inferential evidence” and proof in
such a case is derivable by inference from circumstances in such a case but
here
in the
case the
prosecution could not establish any chain of
circumstances to sustain conviction against the present appellant of this case.
31.
In Govindaswamy vs State of Kerala in Suo Motu Review
Petition (Cri) No.1 of 2016 reported in AIR (2016) Supreme Court 5378
Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in para 6 further observed as under:
“6. The very elaborate argument advanced on this score is
capable of being answered by a reference to Section 6 and
Illustration (a)thereof of the Evidence Act, 1872 which
engrafts in the Evidence Act the principle of res gestae. The
statement made by the middle-aged man to P.Ws.4 and 40
being contemporaneous and spontaneous and that also
being the prosecution case and no attempt having been
made to discredit this part of the evidence tendered, we are
of the view that in a case where the liability of the accused is
to be judged on the touchstone of the circumstantial
evidence the aforesaid part of the deposition of P.Ws. 4 and
40 must go into the process of determination of the
culpability of the accused to rule out any other hypothesis
inconsistent with the guilt of the accused.”
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel again drawn the
attention of the Court that where the liability of the accused is to be judged
on the touchstone of the circumstantial evidence then it would be the duty of
the prosecution to determine the culpability of the accused to rule out any
other hypothesis in consistent with the guilt of the accused. Here in the case
at hand there was no such evidence from the side of the prosecution to
sustain conviction against the present appellant of this case and urged before
the Court to set aside the judgment passed by the Learned Court below.
32.
In Mangat Ram vs. State of Haryana in Criminal Appeal
No.696 of 2009 dated 27.03.2014 reported in (2014) AIR SCW 2085
Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in para 26 further observed as under:
“26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married
woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of
her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the
Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The legislative
mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her
husband or any relative of her husband has subjected her to
cruelty, the presumption as defined under Section 498A, IPC, may attract, having regard to all other circumstances
of the case, that such suicide has been abetted by her
husband or by such relative of her husband. The term “the
Court may presume, having regard to all the other
circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by her husband” would indicate that the
presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is
concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution
has not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry
demand, nor the reasoning adopted by the Courts below
would be sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to
fall under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. In this
connection, we may refer to the judgment of this Court
in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana :(2004) 12 SCC 257:(AIR
2004 SC 2790 : 2004 AIR SCW 1283), wherein this Court has
examined the scope of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act
and Sections
306, 107, 498-A etc.
and
held
that,
unlike Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, a statutory
presumption does not arise by operation of law merely on
the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section 113A of
the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish
that the woman concerned committed suicide within a
period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that
her husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those
facts are established, the Court is not bound to presume that
suicide has been abetted by her husband. Section 113-A,
therefore, gives discretion to the Court to raise such a
presumption having regard to all other circumstances of the
case, which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it
can consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was
subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word
„cruelty‟ in Section 498-A, IPC.”
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel drawn the
attention of this Court that prosecution in this case has failed to show that
there was a dowry demand from the side of the present appellant to raise
presumption to sustain conviction against the present appellant of this case.
33.
In Vipin Jaiswal (A-I) vs State of Andhra Pradesh in
Criminal Appeal No. 1431 of 2007 dated 13.03.2013 reported in (2013) 3
SCC 684 Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in para 11 observed as follows:
“11. In any case, to hold an accused guilty of both the
offences
under Sections
304-B and 498-A IPC,
the
prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
the accused. From the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4, we find that they
have made general allegations of harassment by the
appellant towards the deceased and have not brought in
evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the
appellant on the deceased.”
Referring the said citation Learned Counsel further drawn the
attention of the Court that to held an accused guilty of offences under Section
498A of IPC the prosecution is require to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused but here
in the case there is no such evidence from the side of prosecution witness
that the deceased was actually subjected to cruelty or harassment by the
accused prior to her death. Just on the basis of omnibus statement that the
present appellant demanded Rs.30,000/- from the mother of the deceased
victim i.e PW-1 and the evidence of PW-2 i.e the sister of the deceased whose
evidences are also contradictory to each other and furthermore, there is also
no evidence from the side of prosecution about the date, time when the
present appellant demanded money as dowry from PW-1 has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution in this case.
34.
In Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky vs State of Punjab in Criminal
Appeal No.1459 of 2005 dated 24.11.2006 reported in (2006) 12 SCC
306 Hon‟ble the Supreme Court in paras 14 and 15 observed as follows:
“14. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the
prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.
Only when the prosecution case has been proved the burden
in regard to such facts which was within the special
knowledge of the accused may be shifted to the accused for
explaining the same. Of course, there are certain exceptions
to the said rule, e.g., where burden of proof may be imposed
upon the accused by reason of a statute.
15. It may be that in a situation of this nature where the
court legitimately may raise a strong suspicion that in all
probabilities the accused was guilty of commission of
heinous offence but applying the well-settled principle of
law that suspicion, however, grave may be, cannot be a
substitute for proof, the same would lead to the only
conclusion herein that the prosecution has not been able to
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.”
Referring the said principle Learned Counsel again drawn the
attention of the Court that as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act it does not
relieve the prosecution to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt but in the
case at hand the prosecution both by oral/documentary evidence on record
could not prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt against the present
appellant and finally Learned Counsel asked for set aside the judgment
passed by the Learned Court below.
35.
Learned Counsel also referred another judgment of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court of India. In Criminal Appeals No.1105 of 2010 and
No.1128 of 2010 dated 17.10.2022 reported in (2022) SCC online SC
1440. In para 55 of the said judgment Hon‟ble Apex Court again observed as
under:
“55. It is noted that great weight has been attached to the
testimonies of the witnesses in the instant case. Having
regard to the aforesaid fact that this Court has examined the
credibility of the witnesses to rule out any tainted evidence
given in the court of law. It was contended by learned
counsel for the appellant that the prosecution failed to
examine any independent witnesses in the present case and
that the witnesses were related to each other. This Court in
a number of cases has had the opportunity to consider the
said aspect of related/interested/partisan witnesses and the
credibility of such witnesses. This Court is conscious of the
well-settled principle that just because the witnesses are
related/interested/partisan witnesses, their testimonies
cannot be disregarded, however, it is also true that when the
witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to
be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection. In the
case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2022) 8 SCC
381, this Court held that the testimony of such related
witnesses should be analysed with caution for its
credibility.”
Referring the aforesaid citation Learned Counsel submitted that
here all the witnesses of the prosecution whose evidence were relied by the
prosecution were related to each other so no reliance could be placed upon
their evidence and from their evidence also no incriminating materials came
out against the present appellant of this case.
36.
Lastly, Learned Counsel relied upon another judgment reported in
(2023) 9 SCC 164. In para 15 of the Criminal Appeal No.1012 of 2022
dated 13.09.2023 Hon‟ble Supreme Court submitted as under:
“15. When there is similar or identical evidence of
eyewitnesses against two accused by ascribing them the
same or similar role, the court cannot convict one accused
and acquit the other. In such a case, the cases of both the
accused will be governed by the principle of parity. This
principle means that the criminal court should decide like
cases alike, and in such cases, the court cannot make a
distinction between the two accused, which will amount to
discrimination.”
It was further submitted, here in the case at hand Learned Trial
Court below acquitted another accused but convicted the present appellant of
this case. But the Learned Court below did not follow the principle of parity in
delivering the judgment of this case.
37.
We have heard Learned Counsel at length of both the sides and
gone through the evidence on record very carefully and also perused the
citations referred by Learned Counsel for the appellant in course of hearing of
argument. Admittedly, there was no dispute on record regarding death of the
deceased victim due to the burning on the alleged day. Now, to sustain the
charge against the present appellant, prosecution has adduced 15 numbers of
witnesses. Here, from the evidence on record, it appears to us that PWs-1, 2,
7 and 11 were/are the relatives of the deceased victim. Amongst the said
witnesses, PW-1 is the mother of the deceased and PW-2 is the sister of the
deceased. PW-1 in course of her examination before the Court deposed that
her daughter was subjected to cruelty for demand of dowry by the present
appellant. But she could not say specifically the date, time and place when
the victim was subjected to cruelty for non-fulfillment of the demand of
dowry. PW-2, the sister of the victim also deposed in the same manner,
rather she deposed that her sister i.e the deceased was also subjected to
cruelty for Rs.6000/- which PW-1 during her examination remained silent.
Thus, it appears that, their evidences were contradictory to each other. More
so, from their evidence further it appears that in course of cross-examination,
PW-1 specifically stated that in her ejahar she did not say that 5 to 7 days
prior to Durga Puja of 2015 when she went to the residence of her daughter
that time, the victim disclosed the fact of incidents of torture upon her and it
appears that for the first time, the witness at the time of recording her
evidence stated the said fact to the Court. There was no explanation from the
side of the prosecution in this regard. She also stated that the victim was
subjected to slap by shoe for which she developed auditory problem and this
part of evidence also she deposed after appearing before the Court. There
was also no explanation from the side of the prosecution in this matter.
Again, she stated that in the ejahar she did not say that the present appellant
demanded Rs.30,000 which she failed to meet up on account of her financial
stringency of them. This part of evidence also she deposed only after
appearing before the Court. There was also no explanation from the side of
the prosecution. Similarly, PW-2 i.e sister of the victim in course of her crossexamination very specifically stated that she did not say to IO that when she
visited her sister‟s house that time, the present appellant asked her not to
visit his house till the fulfillment of payment of Rs.30,000/- and he would not
allow the victim to go to her parent‟s house till fulfillment of the demand. The
witness deposed that fact only after appearing before the Court. Thus, it
appears to us that the evidence of PWs-1 and 2 are not only contradictory but
they deposed the improved version after appearing for the first time before
the Court. No explanation was from the side of the prosecution in this regard
and PWs-7 and 11 only deposed after hearing the said fact from PWs-1 and 2.
PW-7 in course of his cross-examination specifically stated that he did not say
to IO that his aunt told him about the fact of demand of dowry of Rs.30,000/by the appellant from his mother-in-law. This witness also deposed the said
fact after appearing before the Court for the first time. Similarly, PW-11,
Dipali Karmakar, being the relative of the deceased deposed after hearing the
fact from the informant against the present appellant. But in course of her
cross-examination, she specifically stated that she did not say to IO that the
informant told her that she herself noticed the present appellant to
cause/inflict physical torture upon the victim when she went to the residence
of the appellant during Durga Puja to present some gifts. This part of
evidence was also disclosed by the witness after appearing before the Court
for the first time.
Thus, it appears that the prosecution in this case could not place
any cogent evidence regarding causing of cruelty upon the deceased victim by
the present appellant prior to her death for non-fulfillment of the demand of
dowry. Other witnesses like PW-6, PW-3 only deposed after hearing the fact
of incident. They could not say anything about the involvement of the present
appellant with the alleged occurrence. So, no reliance can be placed upon
their evidence. More interestingly, PW-4 Uttam Dey and PW-5 Sushil Baidya
to whom prosecution relied upon, but those witnesses were declared hostile
by the prosecution and these witnesses during their cross-examination very
specifically stated that the present appellant was not at home at the time of
alleged occurrence of offence. No explanation from the side of prosecution to
disbelieve this part of the evidence of the witnesses. As already discussed
that there was no dispute on record regarding the fact of death of the victim
by burning but in the case, prosecution both by oral/documentary evidence
on record has miserably failed to establish any chain of circumstance to
warrant of conviction against the present appellant with the alleged
occurrence of offence. Learned Trial Court at the time of delivering the
judgment has ignored those material part of evidence as emerged from the
evidence of PWs-4 and 5 and also could not assess the other evidence of the
prosecution i.e PWs-1, 2 and other evidence of the prosecution who were
heresay witnesses and thus, came to a wrong conclusion of finding of warrant
of conviction against the present appellant of this case. Further from the
evidence of PWs-4 and 5 who just appeared to the PO after the alleged
occurrence, it is clear that the door was locked from inside of the room and
on their appearance that was broken and if the appellant was absent on that
relevant point of time how the present appellant committed homicidal death
of his wife and thereafter pouring kerosene oil on her body as alleged by the
prosecution. There is no explanation from the side of prosecution in this
regard. From the medical evidence also, nothing can be inferred against the
appellant showing his involvement with the alleged offence. The citations as
referred by Learned Counsel for the appellant are very much relevant for the
decision of this case.
Thus, this Court does not find any reason to sustain conviction
against the present appellant of this case. In the result, the appeal filed by
the present appellant is hereby allowed. The judgment and sentence passed
by the Learned Court below is thus hereby set aside. The present appellant is
set at liberty and he be released from the custody, henceforth if not
warranted in connection with any other case.
38.
Send down the LCRs.
JUDGE
MOUMITA
DATTA
Deepshikha
DATTA
Date: 2024.01.10 02:34:29 -08'00'
JUDGE
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