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HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
A_G_A_R_T_A_L_A
WP(C) No. 797 of 2023
1.
Bikramjit Debbarma, aged about 47 years, son of late Badal
Debbarma, resident of Kajali Villa, Dhaleshwar Road No.1, P.O.
Dhaleshwar, Agartala, Tripura, Pin-799007.
..........Petitioner
_V_E_R_S_U_S_
1.
The State of Tripura, to be represented by the Secretary, Department
of Education, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New
Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, Pin-799010.
2.
Tripura Board of Secondary Education (To be represented by the
Secretary, Tripura Board of Secondary Education) Government of
Tripura, P.N. Complex, Gurkhabasti, Kunjaban, Agartala, West
Tripura.
3.
The President, Tripura Board of Secondary Education Government of
Tripura, P.N. Complex, Gurkhabasti, Kunjaban, Agartala, West
Tripura.
4.
The Secretary, Tripura Board of Secondary Education Government of
Tripura, P.N. Complex, Gurkhabasti, Kunjaban, Agartala, West
Tripura.
5.
The Director, Secondary Education, Government of Tripura,
Dhaleshwar, Agartala, Tripura, Pin-799001.
..........Respondents
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
For Petitioner(s)
:
For Respondent(s)
:
Date of hearing
:
Date of delivery of judgment
and order
:
Whether fit for reporting :
Mr. P. Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. S. Bhattacharjee, Advocate.
Mr. K. Nath, Advocate.
Mr. D. Sarma, Addl. G.A.
Mr. Ratan Datta, Advocate.
28.11.2024
29.11.2024
YES
JUDGMENT & ORDER
Heard P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.
S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also heard D.
Sarma, learned Addl. G.A. and Mr. Ratan Datta, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents.
[2]
The present petition has been filed under Article-226 of the
Constitution of India directing the respondents to pay the arrear pay and
salary of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.07.2021 till date with interest and thereafter
to continue to pay the pay and salary of the petitioner. Further, to sanction
earned leaves of the petitioner w.e.f. 13.07.2021 to 31.07.2021.
[3]
The facts in brief are that the petitioner filed this petition as the
pay and salary has not been paying by the respondents w.e.f. 13.07.2021 to
till date. Despite repeated representations, the petitioner has not been
forwarded with the arrear pay and salary though the petitioner regularly
attended his office and during such period, the petitioner is serving as
Deputy Secretary, TBSE.
[4]
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the same, the present
petition has been preferred before this Court for redress.
[5]
The case of the petitioner is that he was working as Deputy
Secretary in Tripura Board of Secondary Education [TBSE, for short] and
for three consecutive time i.e. on 13.07.2021 to 31.07.2021, 16.12.2021 to
25.04.2023 and from 28.04.2023 to till date he was un-authorizedly absent
according to the respondents and he has been issued a memorandum to
which he has submitted his explanation. Again, not being satisfied the
memorandum was issued to which he placed his explanation, the matter was
referred to the disciplinary committee and the competent committee has
resolved that he has committed grave irregularities and needs to be removed
from his service. Accordingly, the same has been recommended and in
which, the respondent has passed the termination order.
[6]
Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned senior counsel assisted by the Mr.
S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted
that the order of termination which is passed is completely contrary to the
eye of law as Article-14 has not been followed and also the principles of
natural justice. It has been further contended that no opportunity was given
to him for his proper explanation. He made an attempt to draw the attention
of this Court to say that the show cause notice was issued with any proper
enquiry being conducted by the respondents and no opportunity was given
for his explanation.
[7]
More so, his explanation was also not considered. Thus, the
termination order was disproportionate and the same is contrary to Rule-10
of TBSE Rule and in support he placed reliance on some principles laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in (i) Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union
of India and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178, (ii) D. K. Yadav v. J.
M. A. Industries Ltd. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259, (iii) State of Orissa v.
Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Another, reported in AIR (1967) SC 1269 (V
54 C 264) and (iv) Sandeep Kumar v. GB Pant Institute of Engineering
and Technology Ghurdauri and Others, arising out of SLP (C) No.(s)
8788-8789 of 2023.
[8]
Hon’ble Apex Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of
India and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178, has held that:
“17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it
was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be
willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may
amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful.
There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain
from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness,
accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held
guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a
Government servant.
18. In a Departmental proceeding, if allegation of un-authorised absence from
duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is
willful, in absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to
misconduct.
19. In the present case the Inquiry Officer on appreciation of evidence though
held that the appellant was un-authorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold
the absence is wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the Appellate
Authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant
guilty.”
[9]
In D. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Ltd. reported in (1993)
3 SCC 259, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:
“7. The principle question is whether the impugned action is violative of
principles of natural justice. In A.K. Kriapak and Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors., [1969] 2 SCC 262 a Constitution bench of this court held that the
distinction between quasi judicial and administrative order has gradually
become thin. Now it is totally clipsed and obliterated. The aim of the rule of
the natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules operate in the area not covered by law
validly made or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N. Sinha v. Union of
India & Anr. [1971] 1 SCR 791. It is settled law that certified standing orders
have statutory force which do not expressly exclude the application of the
principles of natural justice. Conversely the Act made exceptions for the
application of principles of natural justice necessary implication from specific
provisions in the Act like Ss.25F; 25FF; 25FFF; etc, the need for temporary
hands to cope with sudden and temporary spurt of work demands appointment
temporarily to a service of such temporary workmen to meet such exigencies
and as soon as the work or service are completed, the need to dispense with
the services may arise. In that situation, on compliance of the provisions of s.
25F resort could be had to retrench the employees in conformity therewith
particular statute or statutory rules or orders having statutory flavour may also
exclude the application of the principles of natural justice expressly or by
necessary implication. In other respects the principles of natural justice would
apply unless the employer should justify its exclusion on given special and
exceptional exigencies.
8. The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether
the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his
case and the authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is
not so much to act judicially but is to act fairly, namely' the procedure
adopted must be just, fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of the
case. In other words application of the principles of natural justice that no
man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent the authority to act
arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person.
9. It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will
affect the right of any person without first being informed of the case and be
given him/ her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. An order
involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of
natural justice. In Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Chief Election
Commissioner & Ors. [1978] 2 SCR 272 at 308F the Constitution Bench held
that 'civil consequence' covers infraction of not merely property or personal
right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non- pecuniary damages.
In its comprehensive connotion everything that affects a citizen in his civil
life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page
1487 defined civil rights are such as belong to every citizen of the state or
country they include rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil
action. In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei & Ors., this court held
that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be
made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must
be informed of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be
given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken.
Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in
violation of principles of natural justice.
11. The law must therefore be now taken to be well-settled that procedure
prescribed for depriving a person of livelihood must meet the challenge of
and such law would be liable to be tested on the anvil of Art. 14 and the
procedure prescribed by a statute or statutory rule or rules or orders affecting
the civil rights or result in civil consequences would have to answer the
requirement of Art. 14. So it must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial
function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of
natural justice. The aim of both administrative. inquiry as well as the quasi.judicial enquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is
calculated to secure justice or to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of
justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable only to quasi-judicial
enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically apply to both.”
[10]
In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Another,
reported in AIR (1967) SC 1269 (V 54 C 264) the Hon’ble Apex Court has
observed as under:
“It is true that some preliminary enquiry was made by Dr. S, Mitra. But the
report of that Enquiry Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent. 'The
rafter the first respondent was required to show cause why April 16, 1907,
should not be accept das the date of birth and without recording any evidence
the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry and decision were
contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true
that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order
which involves civil consequences as already stated must be made
consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first
respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after
giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or
explaining the evidence. No such steps were admittedly taken; the High Court
was, in our judgment, right in setting aside the order of the State.”
[11]
Per contra, Mr. Ratan Datta, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents has supported the order of termination since the respondent was
being responsible officer at the level of Deputy Secretary, TBSE, he ought
to have set an example before the department for being a noble officer but
instead, he mislead the department and he was un-authorizedly absent. He
further contended that opportunity was given to the petitioner and Article-14
was followed by issuing show cause notice wherein, his explanation was
considered. Even before the committee also, opportunity was given to him
before passing the order. Full and proper opportunity has been provided to
the petitioner and the authority had strictly followed the Rules and
Regulations of TBSE at the time of passing the order dated 21.01.2024.
[12]
The opportunity of personal appearance was also given and in
his personal appearance he stated that whatever he wanted to say he had
given already in black and white writing towards his explanation.
Thereafter, the order of termination was passed and thus, the order passed
incompliance of Rule-10 of TBSE Rule. It has been further contended that
the respondent was competent enough to decide the issue but Mr. Roy
Barman, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted
that the principle laid down under Section-29 has not been followed.
[13]
According to him, the committee was not competent enough to
pass termination order, but, according to this Court it is not necessary as the
principle laid down in Life Insurance Corporation of India and Others v.
OM Prakash in Civil Appeal No.4393 of 2010 wherein, it has been held the
officer who has abandoned the office requires no consideration and prayed
to dismiss the writ petition in limine. For the purpose of reference, the
relevant paragraphs may be reflected hereinbelow:
“11. Relief was granted to the respondent by the High Court on the ground
that the termination order was passed without affording a reasonable
opportunity or conducting an inquiry into the charge of absence from duty.
But in granting such relief, the Court overlooked that it was a case of the
respondent abandoning his services without informing his employer about his
whereabouts. Subsequently, it came to light that he joined the FCI on
09.05.1997.
12. Such conduct of the respondent could not have been condoned by the
employer and therefore, in our assessment, treating the respondent to have
abandoned his service and taking appropriate action against him, in terms of
the LIC Staff Regulation, cannot be faulted. It is also necessary for us to say
that as the delinquent was guilty of suppression of the fact of his employment
with the FCI, he was disentitled to equitable relief from the High Court in
exercise of powers under Article-226 of the Constitution.”
[14]
Prima facie, the question falls before this Court whether there
was any unauthorized absence and whether the termination order which is
passed is passed by following the principles of natural justice by giving him
reasonable opportunity. So admittedly, it is seen from the record that on
13.07.2021 to 31.07.2021, 16.12.2021 to 25.04.2023 and from 28.04.2023 to
till date the petitioner was absent and the said absenteeism was unauthorized
and including the said period also he not to chosen to attend the office and
indicate that he has also not placed on record by way of any affidavit of his
office colleagues or details of relevant files he attended or attendance
register or even to say that he was present in the office and he has also not
led any other oral evidence or any other documentary evidence his office
colleague and thus, it cannot be construed that he was regularly attending
the office on the alleged 3 spells of period.
[15]
Now, other issue falls for consideration whether the principles
of natural justice was followed and whether the signatory of the termination
order is under Rule-10 of Tripura Board of Secondary Education, 1982 or
Section-29 of 1973 Act. More than, two opportunities were given to him by
way of show cause notice calling his explanation vide memo dated
30.10.2023 and dated 28.11.2023 to which he has submitted his explanation
and finally personal hearing was also afforded and thereafter, the order has
been passed. The said order was passed by the competent authority under
Rule-10 and since, Rule-10 has been followed, there was no violation of
principles of natural justice and the power under Section-29 that the
Government has not pass the order is un-warranted and the said order is well
within the ambit of the competent authority.
[16]
Finally, for any un-artistic drafting by any concern clerk or by
any officer, the petitioner cannot take the advantage of such un-artistic
drafting. The essence of the case is whether the petitioner was unauthorizedly absent and whether reasonable opportunity was given to him or
not. In such a case, this Court is convince with the argument of Mr. Ratan
Datta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents on both the points and
the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
[17]
In that view of the matter, the writ petition stands dismissed. As
a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
A.Ghosh
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