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THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.4265 of 2022
CNR-ODHC010921262022
(In the matter of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973)
Bijayalaxmi Information
Technology and Marketing
Private Limited
…….
Petitioner
…….
Opp. Party
-VersusSri Jadav Behera
For the Petitioner
:
Mr. Mohit Agarwal, Advocate
For the Opp. Party
:
Mr. U.C. Mishra, Advocate
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 18.05.2026 ::
S.S. Mishra, J.
Date of Judgment: 30.07.2026
The present CRLMC has been instituted by the
petitioner under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
challenging the judgment dated 24.12.2019 passed by the learned
Sessions Judge, Angul in Criminal Revision No. 10 of 2015. The
petitioner further seeks quashing of 1.C.C. No. 16 of 2013, along with
the entire criminal proceeding arising therefrom, which is presently
pending before the learned J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Angul for the alleged
commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2.
Heard Mr. Mohit Agarwal, learned Counsel for the petitioner and
Mr. U.C. Mishra, learned Counsel for the opposite party.
3.
The brief facts leading to filing of the present CRLMC are that the
opposite party, as complainant, instituted I.C.C. Case No. 16 of 2013
before the learned J.M.F.C., Angul alleging, inter alia, that accused No.1,
the Managing Director of Bijaya Laxmi Information Technology and
Marketing Pvt. Ltd., had issued three cheques, namely Cheque No.
279658 dated 04.11.2012 for Rs.4,60,000/-, Cheque No. 279647 dated
05.11.2012 for Rs.20,00,000/-, and Cheque No. 279660 dated
23.11.2012 for Rs.18,40,000/-, all drawn on IndusInd Bank, Angul
Branch, aggregating to a sum of Rs.43,00,000/-. The complainant
presented the said cheques through his banker, ICICI Bank Ltd., on
14.12.2012, but the same were dishonoured upon presentation.
Thereafter, complying with the statutory requirements prescribed under
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the complainant instituted the
aforesaid complaint against the Directors of the company.
Upon recording the initial statement of the complainant, the
learned S.D.J.M., Angul took cognizance of the offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and issued process
only against Smt. Bijaya Manjari Satpathy, one of the Directors of the
company, out of the five persons arrayed as accused. Subsequently, the
case was transferred to the Court of the learned J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Angul,
where an application under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was filed on behalf of the complainant seeking impleadment
of the company as an accused in the proceeding. Subsequently, the
present petitioner has been arrayed as an accused being the issuer of
cheque vide the impugned order and the same has been assailed in the
present petition.
4.
Mr. Agarwala, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that
the impugned judgment dated 24.12.2019 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge, Angul is liable to be set aside as the petitioner Company was
neither impleaded as a party nor was afforded any opportunity of hearing
in the criminal revision proceedings, in violation of Section 401(2) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. He further submitted that the petitioner has
an independent right to challenge the revisional order, the earlier order
passed by this Court in CRLMC No. 390 of 2016 having no bearing on
the petitioner's right, as it was not a party to the said proceeding.
5.
Mr. Agarwala further contended that the learned Sessions Judge
failed to appreciate that prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act can be maintained only upon strict compliance with the
mandatory requirements of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act. According
to him, the dishonoured cheques were issued by the petitioner Company,
yet no statutory demand notice under Section 138(b) of the Act was ever
served upon the Company. In the absence of such notice, no cause of
action could have arisen against the petitioner Company and, therefore,
its subsequent impleadment as an accused by invoking Section 319
Cr.P.C. was legally impermissible.
6.
Placing reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
N. Harihara Krishnan v. J. Thomas1 and Jamin v. State of Uttar
Pradesh2, learned counsel submitted that the mandatory statutory
requirements under the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be
circumvented by subsequently impleading the drawer Company and that
2018 (13) SCC 663
2025 INSC 330
any order adversely affecting a proposed accused without affording an
opportunity of hearing is unsustainable in law.
7.
In the light of the above submissions, Mr. Agarwala, learned
counsel for the petitioner, prayed for setting aside the judgment dated
24.12.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Angul in Criminal
Revision No. 10 of 2015. He further prayed for quashing the complaint
proceeding in 1.C.C. No. 16 of 2013 pending before the learned J.M.F.C.
(L.R.), Angul.
8.
Per contra, Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party,
supported the impugned judgment and submitted that the present petition
is not maintainable as the issue sought to be raised by the petitioner
already stands concluded by the order dated 23.09.2022 passed by this
Court in CRLMC No. 390 of 2016. He contended that the petitioner is
attempting to re-agitate the very same issue once again in this
proceeding, which is impermissible in law.
9.
Learned counsel further submitted that the application filed before
the trial court for impleadment of the petitioner Company was, in
substance, one seeking amendment of the complaint to cure a technical
defect at a stage when the trial had not commenced. According to him,
no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by its subsequent
impleadment as an accused.
10.
Mr. Mishra further contended that the statutory demand notice
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been issued to
the Managing Director of the petitioner Company in her official capacity
and not in her personal capacity. He submitted that such notice
substantially amounted to notice to the Company itself and, therefore,
the contention that no statutory notice had been issued to the petitioner
Company is devoid of merit.
11.
Placing reliance upon the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in Himanshu v. TCNS Clothing Co. Ltd.3, learned counsel
submitted that the subsequent impleadment of the Company is legally
sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He further
submitted that, in any event, the issue had already been considered by
this Court in the earlier proceeding between the parties.
On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. Mishra prayed for dismissal of the
present CRLMC.
2025 DHC 7593
12.
Upon a careful consideration of the rival submissions and the
materials available on record, this Court finds no merit in the contention
advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the complaint proceeding is
liable to be quashed on the ground that no separate statutory notice under
Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been issued to the
petitioner Company.
13.
It is not in dispute that the cheques in question were issued by the
petitioner Company, in discharge of the alleged liability of the Company.
The statutory demand notice was admittedly addressed to and served
upon the Managing Director in her official capacity. A company, being a
juristic person, can act and acquire knowledge only through the
individuals who are entrusted with the management of its affairs. The
Managing Director occupies the highest executive position in the
Company and is vested with substantial powers relating to the conduct of
its business of the company. Consequently, service of the statutory
notice upon the Managing Director, in her representative capacity,
cannot be viewed in isolation from the Company itself.
14. The contention of the petitioner that the subsequent impleadment of
the Company under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is impermissible solely because
no separate notice was addressed in the name of the Company is equally
devoid of substance. The statutory object underlying Section 138(b) of
the Negotiable Instruments Act is to afford an opportunity to the drawer
to make payment upon receipt of notice. Where such notice has been
served upon the Managing Director representing the Company and the
Company itself has subsequently been brought on record as an accused,
the requirement of notice cannot be interpreted in an unduly technical or
hyper-technical manner so as to defeat the very object of the enactment.
15.
The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the
decisions in N. Harihara Krishnan (supra) and Jamin (supra) does not
advance the petitioner's case. The facts obtaining in the present case are
materially distinguishable. Here, the complaint itself proceeds on the
basis that the cheques were issued on behalf of the Company by its
Managing Director, who was duly served with the statutory notice in that
capacity. The revisional court has merely permitted the Company, being
the principal drawer of the cheque, to be brought on record so that the
complaint may proceed in accordance with law. Such a course cannot be
said to have caused any prejudice warranting interference in the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
16.
This Court is also not persuaded by the submission that the
revisional order deserves to be set aside on account of non-impleadment
of the petitioner in the revision proceeding. The petitioner seeks to
invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to veto a prosecution at its
threshold on grounds which are essentially technical in nature. The
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent abuse of
the process of Court and to secure the ends of justice. It cannot be
exercised to stifle a prosecution where the complaint, read as a whole,
discloses the essential ingredients of the offence and where the alleged
procedural defect has neither occasioned failure of justice nor caused any
demonstrable prejudice.
17.
The Negotiable Instruments Act is a beneficial legislation enacted
to enhance the credibility of commercial transactions. The provisions
relating to issuance of statutory notice cannot be construed in a manner
that enables a drawer of the cheque to evade liability on technical
grounds and objections, particularly when the Managing Director, who
was admittedly in control of the affairs of the Company, had received the
statutory notice in her representative capacity. Acceptance of the
petitioner's contention would amount to permitting a purely technical
objection to frustrate the object of the statute and would encourage
avoidance of liability rather than advance the cause of justice. The
observations of the Karnataka High Court in Maxworth Realty India
Ltd. v. M.K. Veerendra Babu4, lend support to the above view. The
relavant paragraphs from the Judgment are as follows:
“15. On close reading of the said Section, it states that
if the person committing an offence under Section 138,
is a Company, every person who, at the time of the
offence was committed, was incharge and responsible
to the Company for the conduct of its business shall
also be deemed to be guilty. The reason for creating
vicarious liability is plainly that a juristic entity i.e., a
Company would be run by living persons who are in
charge of its affairs and who guide the action of that
Company and if such juristic entity is guilty,
ultimately it is the persons who are responsible for its
affairs and they must be held responsible and
convicted. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Krishna Texport & Capital Markets Ltd. v. Ila A.
Agrawal reported in (2015) 8 SCC 28, has come to the
conclusion that there is no requirement of sending of
individual notices to the Directors of the Company as
Section 141 of the N.I. Act does not lay down any
requirement that individually notice has to be served
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to such persons, as
the persons who are at the helms of the affairs of the
Company, naturally be aware of the notice of demand
issued to such Company. The said lapses can be
rectified in this behalf. At paragraph-16 of the
aforesaid decision, it has been observed as under:—
“16. Section 141 states that if the person committing
an offence under Section 138 is a company, every
Director of such company who was in charge of and
2019 SCC OnLine Kar 1652 (Affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Kesava Vrs. M.K.
Veerendra Babu reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3463)
responsible to that company for conduct of its
business shall also be deemed to be guilty. The
reason for creating vicarious liability is plainly that
a juristic entity i.e. a company would be run by
living persons who are in charge of its affairs and
who guide the actions of that company and that if
such juristic entity is guilty, those who were so
responsible for its affairs and who guided actions of
such juristic entity must be held responsible and
ought to be proceeded against. Section 141 again
does not lay down any requirement that in such
eventuality the Directors must individually be issued
separate notices under Section 138, The persons who
are in charge of the affairs of the company and
running its affairs must naturally be aware of the
notice of demand under Section 138 of the Act issued
to such company. It is precisely for this reason that
no notice is additionally contemplated to be given to
such Directors. The opportunity to the “drawer”
company is considered good enough for those who
are in charge of the affairs of such company. If it is
their case that the offence was committed without
their knowledge or that they had exercised due
diligence to prevent such commission, it would be a
matter of defence to be considered at the appropriate
stage in the trial and certainly not at the stage of
notice under Section 138.”
16. Keeping in view the aforesaid ratio, as the
Company being a legal entity, it cannot acquire
knowledge as a human being, knowledge of a
Company actually means, knowledge of the people
who are having control over such Company.
Generally it is the Chairman or Managing Director
of a Company who will be having knowledge.
Section 2(54) of the Companies Act, 2013 defines
the Managing Director as: “Managing Director
means a director who, by virtue of the articles of a
company or an agreement with the company or a
resolution passed in its general meeting, or by its
Board of Directors, is entrusted with substantial
powers of management of the affairs of the
company and includes a director occupying the
position of Managing Director, by whatever name
called.”
17. As per the definition, the Managing Director is
a person who is entrusted with substantial power of
the management of the affairs of the Company.
Notice served on the Managing Director would thus
imply that the Company is made aware of the
dishonour of the cheque and of the demand for
payment of the disnonoured cheque as
contemplated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners-accused has
relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy (cited supra),
wherein at paragraphs-6, 7, 11 and 13, it has been
observed that in the absence of notice of demand being
served on the Company and without compliance with
the Proviso to Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the
Company could not be held liable. In that case at
paragraph-4, it has been observed that the cheque was
issued by a Director of Lakshmi Cement and Ceramics
Industries Ltd., a public limited company and the
complaint was initiated against an individual without
arraying the Company as an accused. Under such
circumstances, the Company was not arrayed as an
accused as contemplated under Section 141 of the N.I.
Act. In that light, the Hon'ble Apex Court has come to
the conclusion that in the absence of notice of demand
served on the Company is held to be non-compliance
of Section 138 of the N.I. Act. hence, the said ratio
laid down is not applicable to the facts of the present
case.
18. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that accused
No. 1 is a Company and accused No. 2 is the
Managing Director of accused No. 1. When the
statutory notice is issued to the Chairman and
Managing Director of the Company and when both
Company and the Managing Directors are the persons
who are at the helms of the affairs of the Company,
Company is vicariously liable. Under such
circumstances, the contention of the learned Senior
Counsel that there is no cause of action as the notice
has not been served, is not having any force and the
same is liable to be rejected.”
18.
The conduct of Petitioner clearly indicates that it’s an attempt to
prolong the proceedings, rather than addressing the matter on its merits.
Such dilatory tactics cannot be encouraged, as they frustrate the object of
the law and unnecessarily delay the administration of justice. Permitting
an accused to evade the legal process through repeated and untenable
objections would prejudice the rights of the complainant and undermine
the very purpose for which the statutory remedy that has been enshrined
under the N.I. Act.
19.
In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this Court finds no
illegality, impropriety or jurisdictional error in the judgment dated
24.12.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Angul in Criminal
Revision No.10 of 2015 warranting interference in exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The impugned order does
not suffer from any perversity so as to justify quashing of the complaint
proceeding.
20.
Accordingly, the CRLMC being devoid of merit stands dismissed.
Consequently, the interim order, if any, stands vacated. The learned trial
Court shall proceed with I.C.C. No.16 of 2013 in accordance with law,
uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment, which has been
rendered only for the purpose of deciding the present petition.
………………….
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Dated the 30th of July, 2026/ Subhasis Mohanty
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY
Designation: Personal Assistant
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Date: 30-Jul-2026 13:38:03
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