The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this Court finds that the appellants have failed to show sufficient cause to condone the enormous delay of 4828 days i.e., more than 13 years, in filing the present appeal. The averments made in the affidavit accompanying the application are vague, general, and unsupported by any cogent material. Further, reasons stated in the affidavit such as migration for labour work, displacement after acquisition, receipt and utilisation of compensation and subsequent discussion with the advocate do not constitute a satisfactory or acceptable explanation for condoning such an - 14 MFA No.104803 of 2019 inordinate delay. Entertaining such applications would amount to revival of a dead and settled right, which is impermissible under law.
18. If such enormous delay is condoned without sufficient cause, it would confer an undue advantage on litigants who are fence sitters, lack diligence, and approach the Court at their convenience, thereby defeating the very object of the law of limitation. It would also unsettle rights of the parties that have attained finality by the reference Court long ago and cause serious prejudice to the respondent, besides opening floodgates for similarly placed persons to reopen concluded proceedings. The concept of finality of litigation and public policy underlying limitation laws cannot be ignored. In the absence of sufficient cause, the appellants are not entitled for condonation of delay, and the application is liable to be dismissed.
19. In view of the aforementioned discussions, this Court proceeds to pass the following: - 15 MFA No.104803 of 2019 (i) IA No.1/2020 is hereby dismissed. (ii) In view of inordinate delay of 4828 days in filing the present appeal, the present appeal shall not survive for consideration. Hence, the present appeal is dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal and other pending applications, if any shall stand dismissed. Sd/-
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
-1MFA No.104803 of 2019
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.104803 OF 2019 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
MOHANKUMAR
B SHELAR
1.
BHIMAPPA PANDAPPA RAGHA
(SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS)
1.A
PANDAPPA BHIMAPPA RAGHA,
AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.B
TIMMANNA BHIMAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 60 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.C
VENKAPPA BHIMAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 55 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.D
SUSILA SANGAPPA TIPPARADDY
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.E
TAYAWWA ERANNA TIPPARADDY
AGE: 57 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.F
GEETA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.G
SNEHA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 20 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
MOHANKUMAR B SHELAR
Location: High Court of
Karnataka, Dharwad Bench
Date: 2026.01.27 16:48:10
+0530
®
-2MFA No.104803 of 2019
1.H
RASHMI BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 18 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
1.I
KRISHNA BASAPPA RAGHA
AGE: 17 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O: KOLUR, TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. BASAVARAJ S. BYAKOD, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
UPPER KRISHNA PROJECT, BILAGI,
TQ: BILAGI, DIST: BAGALKOT.
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. ABHISHEK MALIPATIL, HCGP)
THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 54(1) OF LAND
ACQUISITION ACT, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS APPEAL BY
MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 22.06.2006
PASSED BY THE CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) BAGALKOT IN LAC
NO.908/2005 AND ENHANCE THE COMPENSATION AMOUNT
FROM RS.1,84,000 PER ACRES TO 2,34,000 PER ACRES, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS MFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT
ON
PRONOUNCEMENT
07.01.2026
THIS
DAY,
AND
COMING
JUDGMENT
WAS
ON
DELIVERED
THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM:
FOR
THE HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K.MANMADHA RAO
-3MFA No.104803 of 2019
CAV JUDGMENT
The present appeal is filed by the appellants-private
parties to allow the
present appeal and
modify the
judgment and award dated 22.06.2006, passed in LAC
No.908/2005 and enhance the compensation amount from
Rs.1,84,000/- per acres to Rs.2,34,000/- per acres on the
file of the Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Bilagi (herein after referred
to as ‘the Reference Court’ for short).
2.
The
appellants/respondent
herein
is
claimants/respondent before the Reference Court.
3.
For convenience of reference, the parties herein
are referred to as arrayed before the before this Court.
4.
I.A.No.1/2020 is filed by the appellants with the
accompanying affidavit to condone the delay of 4828 days
in filing the present appeal.
IA No.1/2020
Submissions on behalf of the appellants
5.
Shri Pandappa Bhimappa Ragha states that he is
the appellant in the present appeal and is swearing this
-4MFA No.104803 of 2019
affidavit on his own behalf and on behalf of the other
appellants, being conversant with the facts of the case.
6.
The appellant submits that he is poor and
uneducated, and the acquired land was the sole source of
livelihood for his family, having potential for sugarcane
cultivation. Due to acquisition, the family was displaced and
forced to migrate to different places, including Goa, for
labour work. Though compensation was received, the same
was exhausted towards family needs and internal disputes,
leaving the appellants without financial means and stability.
7.
He further submits that after returning to his
parental home, he contacted his counsel and was advised to
file an appeal before this Court for enhancement. However,
due to poverty, illiteracy, displacement, and continuous
struggle for livelihood after acquisition, the appeal could not
be filed within the prescribed period. The delay is bona fide,
unintentional, and caused by circumstances beyond the
control of the appellants.
-5MFA No.104803 of 2019
8.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for
the appellants placed reliance on the following judgments:•
Ningappa Thotappa Angadi through LR’s v.
The Special Land acquisition Officer reported
in (2020) 19 SCC 599;
“7. We find that the issue raised in this appeal is
no
longer
res
integra.
This
Court
in Dhiraj
Singh v. State of Haryana [Dhiraj Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 127: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ)
236] held that : (SCC p. 131, paras 14-15)
“14. The appellants are identically situated and
there is no reason to meet out a different
treatment to them. We also note that, while in
these cases, the High Court had refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the LPAs of the
appellants, other LPAs were allowed by the High
Court itself by condoning the delay of the same
magnitude in the same circumstances.
15. Equities can be balanced by denying the
appellants' interest for the period for which they
did not approach the court. The substantive rights
of the appellants should not be allowed to be
defeated
on
technical
grounds
by
taking
hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In
the matter of compensation for land acquisition,
we are of the view that approach of the court has
to be pragmatic and not pedantic.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.
xxx
-6MFA No.104803 of 2019
9. It is undeniable that this Court vide judgment
dated
11-11-2016
passed
Angadi v. LAO [Ningappa
in Ningappa
Thotappa
Thotappa
Angadi v. LAO,
2016 SCC OnLine SC 1864] has set aside the order
of the High Court and restored the compensation as
was awarded by the Reference Court. In the cited
case, this Court held as follows : (SCC OnLine SC
para 4)
“4. We have heard the learned counsel for the
parties to some length and carefully perused the
material on record. We are of the considered
opinion
that
the
impugned
judgment
[LAO v. Veerabhadrappa Marithammappa, 2008
SCC OnLine Kar 833] and order of the High Court
deserves to be set aside and judgment and order
passed by the Reference Court restored. We say
so because, this Court has in a similar appeal
directed against the very same order set aside the
impugned
judgment
and
restored
the
enhancement granted by the Reference Court. We
see no reason to take a different view in the
present case. We, accordingly, allow this appeal
and while setting aside the impugned judgment
insofar as the same relates to the appellant,
restore the judgment and order passed by the
Reference Court. The parties shall, however, bear
their own costs.”
•
Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana and others
by
order
dated
23.04.2025
No.670/2020; and
passed
in
SLP
-7MFA No.104803 of 2019
“12. This Court has noticed that in Delhi Air Tech
Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Anr.10, with
reference to Coffee Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v.
Commission of Commercial Tax Karnataka¹¹ that while
the State has the power of eminent domain, the owner
of a land can only be divested thereof in accordance with
the procedure established by law after appropriately
compensating them. This is in view of Article 300 A and
31A of the Constitution of India.”
•
Bhag Singh & Others v. Union Territory of
Chandigarh
through
the
Land
Acquisition
Collector, Chandigarh reported in AIR 1985 SC
1576.
“3. We are of the view that when the learned
Single Judge and the Division Bench took the view
that the claimants whose land was acquired by
the State of Punjab under the notifications issued
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled
to enhanced compensation and the case of the
appellants
stood
on
the
same
footing,
the
appellants should have been given an opportunity
of paying up the deficit court fee so that, like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced
compensation at the same rate as the others. The
learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
should not have, in our opinion, adopted a
technical approach and denied the benefit of
enhanced compensation to the appellants merely
because they had not initially paid the proper
amount of court fee. It must be remembered that
this was not a dispute between two private
citizens
where
it
would
be
quite
just
and
-8MFA No.104803 of 2019
legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim
made by him and not to award him any higher
amount than that claimed though even in such a
case there may be situations where an amount
higher than that claimed can be awarded to the
claimant as for instance where an amount is
claimed as due at the foot of an account. Here
was a claim made by the appellants against the
State
Government
for
compensation
for
acquisition of their land and under the law, the
State
was
bound
to
pay
to
the
appellants
compensation on the basis of the market value of
the
land
acquired
and
if
according
to
the
judgments of the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench, the market value of the land
acquired was higher than that awarded by the
Land
Acquisition
Collector
or
the
Additional
District Judge, there is no reason why the
appellants should have been denied the benefit of
payment of the market value so determined. To
deny
this
benefit
to
the
appellants
would
tantamount to permitting the State Government
to acquire the land of the appellants on payment
of less than the true market value. There may be
cases where, as for instance, under agrarian
reform
legislation,
the
holder
of
land
may,
legitimately, as a matter of social justice, with a
view to eliminating concentration of land in the
hands of a few and bringing about its equitable
distribution, be deprived of land which is not
being personally cultivated by him or which is in
-9MFA No.104803 of 2019
excess of the ceiling area with payment of little
compensation or no compensation at all, but
where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive
the holder of his land without payment of the true
market value when the law, in so many terms,
declares that he shall be paid such market value.
The State Government must do what is fair and
just to the citizen and should not, as far as
possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is
received or recovered without protest or where
the
State
Government
would
otherwise
be
irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical
plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the
citizen. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the
present case, the Division Bench as well as the
learned Single Judge should have allowed the
appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and
awarded to them compensation at the higher rate
or rates determined by them.”
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent-State:9.
The respondent-State opposes the application for
condonation of delay and contends that admittedly, the
appeal has been filed after an inordinate delay of 4828
days, for which no sufficient or acceptable explanation has
been offered.
- 10 MFA No.104803 of 2019
10.
It is well settled that every day’s delay must be
explained by showing sufficient cause. The reasons assigned
in the affidavit, namely that, after acquisition the appellants
went to Goa for labour work. Hence, the averments made
by the appellants for condonation of delay are vague, bald,
and do not satisfactorily explain the enormous delay as
mandated under law.
11.
failed
to
The respondent submits that the appellants have
show any
diligence
or
bona
fide
effort
in
prosecuting their remedy within the prescribed period. If
such inordinate delay is condoned, it would cause serious
hardship and prejudice to the respondent, whereas no
prejudice
would
be
caused
to
the
appellants
if
the
application is dismissed. In support of his contention, the
learned counsel for the respondent-State placed reliance on
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma
(Dead) by her LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board and
Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein
- 11 MFA No.104803 of 2019
it has been held that no litigant should be permitted to be
lethargic or apathetic and misuse the process of law.
12.
Further, reliance was placed on the decisions of
the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition
v. Katiji reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 and Basawaraj
and
another
v.
Special
Land
Acquisition
officer
reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81, wherein it has been held
that the expressions “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented
approach” or “advancement of substantial justice” cannot
be invoked to defeat the law of limitation or to revive stale
and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act,
and
that
Courts
are
not
justified
in
condoning
inordinate delay even by imposing conditions. All averments
not specifically traversed are denied and the appellants are
put to strict proof thereof.
13.
In support of his contentions, learned counsel for
the respondent-State placed reliance on the following
judgments:•
Shivamma
v.
Karnataka
Housing
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969;
Board,
- 12 MFA No.104803 of 2019
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law.
•
Prakash
and
others
v.
Special
Land
Acquisition Officer by order dated 12.06.2024
passed in MFA No.8540/2015(LAC)
14.
Heard learned counsel appearing on either side
and perused the judgment relied upon by the counsel for
the parties.
15.
Having considered the contentions advanced, it is
observed that the Apex Court and the Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court in the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the
respondent-State held that the approach of the Courts in
condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient
cause is shown. However, in the instant case, the appellants
failed
to
establish
sufficient
cause
to
condone
such
enormous delay of more than 13 years.
16.
Further, the aforesaid judgments of the Apex
Court in Katiji’s case (supra), Basawaraj’s case (supra),
and Shivamma’s case (supra), on law of limitation is well
settled,
wherein
it
has
been
consistently
held
that
- 13 MFA No.104803 of 2019
expressions such as “liberal approach”, “justice-oriented
approach” or “advancement of substantial justice” cannot
be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to revive
stale and time-barred claims under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. It has further been held that Courts would
not be justified in condoning inordinate delay by imposing
conditions; as such an approach would undermine the
object and sanctity of the law of limitation.
17.
In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, this
Court finds that the appellants have failed to show sufficient
cause to condone the enormous delay of 4828 days i.e.,
more than 13 years, in filing the present appeal. The
averments
made
in
the
affidavit
accompanying
the
application are vague, general, and unsupported by any
cogent material. Further, reasons stated in the affidavit
such as migration for labour work, displacement after
acquisition, receipt and utilisation of compensation and
subsequent discussion with the advocate do not constitute a
satisfactory or acceptable explanation for condoning such an
- 14 MFA No.104803 of 2019
inordinate
delay.
Entertaining
such
applications
would
amount to revival of a dead and settled right, which is
impermissible under law.
18.
If such enormous delay is condoned without
sufficient cause, it would confer an undue advantage on
litigants who are fence sitters, lack diligence, and approach
the Court at their convenience, thereby defeating the very
object of the law of limitation. It would also unsettle rights
of the parties that have attained finality by the reference
Court
long
ago
and
cause
serious
prejudice
to
the
respondent, besides opening floodgates for similarly placed
persons to reopen concluded proceedings. The concept of
finality of litigation and public policy underlying limitation
laws cannot be ignored. In the absence of sufficient cause,
the appellants are not entitled for condonation of delay, and
the application is liable to be dismissed.
19.
In view of the aforementioned discussions, this
Court proceeds to pass the following:
- 15 MFA No.104803 of 2019
ORDER
(i)
IA No.1/2020 is hereby dismissed.
(ii)
In view of inordinate delay of 4828 days
in filing the present appeal, the present appeal shall
not survive for consideration. Hence, the present
appeal is dismissed.
Accordingly,
the
appeal
and
other
pending
applications, if any shall stand dismissed.
Sd/-
(DR. K.MANMADHA RAO)
JUDGE
KGK,CT:VP
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