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IN
THE
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
ON THE 1st OF FEBRUARY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 4308 of 2024
BETWEEN:BHANWARSINGH S/O SHRI DEEPSINGH, AGED ABOUT
40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: LABOUR GRAM BARKHEDA,
DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....PETITIONER
(BY SHRI VIKAS JAIN - ADVOCATE)
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER THROUGH POLICE STATION MALHARGARH,
DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENT
(BY SHRI ANENDRA SINGH PARIHAR - PANEL LAWYER)
This petition coming on for admission this day, th e court passed the
following:
ORDER
This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has
been preferred by petitioner/accused for quahsment of FIR No.270/2020,
registered at Police Station Malhargarh, District Mandsaur on 22.09.2022 for
offence punishable under Section 8/15 and 29 of the NDPS Act, and all
proceedings subsequent thereto including that of criminal proceedings bearing
Sessions Trial No.96/2022 pending in the Court of Special Judge (NDPS Act),
District Mandsaur.
2. The fact of the case are that on 23.12.2020 on receipt of a secret
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
information, the Police found a car bearing registration No.RJ-27-CJ-4854 in a
unattended condition at Chandari Road in District Mandsaur and recovered
total 80 kilograms contraband dodachura from co-accused Narayan. Thereafter,
the memorandum of co-accused Narayan was recorded under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act in which he stated to have procured the contraband from the
present petitioner for the purpose of its transportation and sale. on the basis of
the aforesaid memorandum the petitioner has been implicated for the present
offence. Upon conclusion of the investigation charge sheet has been filed by
the Police before the Court concerned and charges as aforesaid have been
framed against him by the trial Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
innocent and has falsely been implicated in the case. He was neither present on
the spot nor was any contraband recovered from his possession. The petitioner
is not the owner of the vehicle. His implication is only on the basis of the
disclosure statements of co-accused person Narayan recorded under Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act in which he deposed that the alleged contraband
has been procured from the petitioner. However, no fact as such could be
discovered on the basis of the aforesaid statement therefore there is no legally
admissible evidence within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act amounting to discovery of fact. Apart from this, there is no other evidence
available on record to connect the petitioner with the present crime. It is hence
submitted that the FIR as well as the final report qua the petitioner deserves to
be quashed.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State has supported the
impugned FIR as well as the final report and has prayed for rejection of the
petition submitting that there is sufficient material available on record against the
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
petitioner.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
6. From perusal of the material available on record, it appears that no
recovery has been made from the possession of the petitioner. Neither is he the
owner of the vehicle in which the contraband was being transported nor was he
present in the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident. He was not
apprehended from the spot. He has been implicated only on the basis of
disclosure statements of co-accused Narayan recorded under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act in which he deposed that the alleged contraband has been
procured by them from the petitioner. The call details available on record are
not in respect of the petitioner hence there is nothing to demonstrate that he has
been in contact with the other co-accused. No recovery of any phone or SIM
card has been made from the petitioner. Co-accused has not stated that he was
in contact with the petitioner on the mobile number as has been alleged by the
prosecution.
7. Recently, this Court in the case of Dilip Kumar Vs. State of M.P.,
M.Cr.C. No.2748/2022 decided on 12.04.2022 has held in paragraph No.15
to 18 as under:15. A close scrutiny of the charge sheet reveals that apart from the aforesaid memo
and the bank statement of Dangi brothers, there is no other material available on
record to suggest that the present petitioner Deelep had also facilitated the sale of
fake fertilizer which was prepared by Suresh Dangi and other accused persons.
There is also no evidence available on record to suggest that the present petitioner
Deelep obtained from Suresh Dangi any amount over and above the requisite
amount of the sale of gypsum granules to him, which can be said to be connected
with the sale of fake fertilizer.
16. Regarding admissibility of the confessional statement given by a co-accused
and of the petitioner, a reference may be had to the decision rendered by the
Supreme Court, authored by Vivian Bose, J. in the case o f Kashmira Singh v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), the relevant paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
same read, as under: “8. Gurubachan’s confession has played an important part in implicating
the appellant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way
the confession of an accused person can be used against a co-accused? It
is evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because,
as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. King.
“It does not indeed come within the definition of ‘evidence’ contained
in Section 3 of the Evidence Act., It is not required to be given on
oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by
cross-examination.”
Their Lordships also point out that it is
“obviously evidence of a very weak type … It is a much weaker type
of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to
any of those infirmities.”
They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made the
foundation of a conviction and can only be used in “support of other
evidence”. In view of these remarks it would be pointless to cover the
same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as
misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in
support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it
be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a
witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category
regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to believe him except
insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence Jenkins
in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chucker-butty where he said that such a
confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against
a co-accused” or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re
Periyaswami Moopan
“the provision goes no further than this--where there is evidence
against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction,
then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown
into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence”.
10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this.
The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the
evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from
consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely
be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession,
then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases
may arise where the Judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as
it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. In such an event the Judge may call in aid the confession and
use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in
believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared
to accept.
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
11. Then, as regards its use in the corroboration of accomplices and
approvers. A co-accused who confesses is naturally an accomplice and
the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate
another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way
lessened when the “evidence” is not on oath and cannot be tested by
cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the same rule of caution in the
case of a witness who though not an accomplice is regarded by the Judge
as having no greater probative value. But all these are only rules of
prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a conviction can be based on
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice provided the Judge has
the rule of caution, which experience dictates, in mind and gives reasons
why he thinks it would be safe in a given case to disregard it. Two of us
had occasion to examine this recently in Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan. It follows that the testimony of an accomplice can in law be
used to corroborate another though it ought not to be so used save in
exceptional circumstances and for reasons disclosed. As the Privy
Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. King:
“The tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly
prevalent in India, as judges have noted on innumerable occasions,
and it is very difficult for the court to guard against the danger … The
only real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent with
the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in some
measure implicates such accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Testing the facts of the case at hand on the anvil of the aforesaid dictum of the
Supreme Court, this Court finds that the only material evidence against the present
petitioner is the memo prepared under Section 27 of the Evidence Act by the coaccused and certain bank transactions of the co-accused in which he has sent
certain amount to the present petitioner through NEFT. In such facts and
circumstances of the case, if the petitioner who is in the business of manufacturing
Gypsum Granules and Allied products, and if in the legitimate business transaction
the aforesaid granules were purchased by the other accused persons and in turn
they use it in the manufacture of fake fertilizer, such act, in the considered opinion
of this Court, would not amount to an offence for the present petitioner and he
cannot be held guilty for the aforesaid act of the co-accused persons in the absence
of any other material available on record to connect the petitioner with the offence,
as has already been observed above.
18. Resultantly, the petition stands allowed and the charge sheet, so far as it relates
to the present petitioner is concerned, as also the further proceedings initiated in the
trial Court against him stands quashed.
8. On a perusal of the case diary as well as the charge-sheet filed in the
matter, this Court is of the opinion that against the present petitioner, there is no
tangible evidence collected by the prosecution except the memos prepared
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act at the instance of other co-accused
persons.
9. In view of the aforesaid, the petition deserves to be and is accordingly
allowed. FIR registered at Crime No.270/2020 at Police Station Malhargarh,
District Mandsaur as well as the consequent proceedings pursuant thereto
including that of Sessions Trial No.96/2022 pending in the Court of Special
Judge, (NDPS Act), District Mandsaur in respect of the petitioner are hereby
quashed and the petitioner is discharged for offences punishable under Section
8/15 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
(PRANAY VERMA)
JUDGE
jyoti
Signed by: JYOTI
CHOURASIA
Signing time: 02-Feb-24
10:26:25 AM
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