The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
17. Consequently, the impugned order dated 25.04.2026 is set aside. The petitioner shall be at liberty to engage a counsel of her own choice to assist the learned Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor in the conduct of the prosecution before the trial Court. Such counsel shall function strictly under the supervision, guidance and control of the learned Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor and shall not independently conduct the prosecution. However, if such counsel seeks to submit written arguments on behalf of the complainant after the closure of evidence, the same shall be permissible only with the leave of the trial Court in terms of Section 338(2) of the BNSS.
18. The petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms along with pending applications if any. ( Sanjay Parihar ) Judge
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
Sr. No. 17
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
ATJAMMU
CRM (M) No. 598/2026
Batool Omais
.....Applicant(s)/Petitioner(s)
Through :- Mr. Zulker Nain Sheikh, Advocate
v/s
UT of J&K and Others
.....Respondent(s)
Through :-
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE
ORDER
22.06.2026
1.
By the present petition, the petitioner calls in question the order
dated 25.04.2026 passed by the Court of the Special Municipal
Mobile Magistrate, Jammu (hereinafter referred to as "the trial
Court"), whereby her application seeking permission to engage a
private counsel to assist the prosecution in the case titled "UT of J&K
vs. Omais-ul-Mehraj and Others", arising out of FIR No. 42/2024
registered under Sections 85, 316(2), 352, 351(2) and 3(5) of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, came to be
dismissed.
2.
Briefly stated, the case of the petitioner before the trial Court was
that she is the legally wedded wife of respondent No. 2, who, after
the solemnization of their marriage, subjected her to continuous
domestic violence, physical cruelty and emotional abuse. It was
further alleged that respondent No. 2 and the other private
respondents persistently demanded dowry after the marriage
solemnized on 15.09.2022 and the subsequent Rukhsati held on
27.08.2023.
3.
Acting upon the complaint lodged by the petitioner, FIR No. 42/2024
came to be registered initially under Sections 85, 115(2), 126(2),
316(2), 352, 351(2) and 49 of the BNS. Upon completion of
investigation, a charge-sheet was laid before the trial Court against
the private respondents. The petitioner also alleged matrimonial
fraud, threats of pronouncement of triple talaq through telephonic
communication, and criminal misappropriation of her Haq-Mehar
and bridal gold ornaments collectively valued at approximately
₹22.83 lakhs. During the pendency of the proceedings, she filed an
application under Section 338 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeking permission to engage a private
counsel to assist the prosecution.
4.
The trial Court declined the said prayer primarily on the ground that
the petitioner had failed to point out any specific circumstance
demonstrating either deficiency in, or prejudice arising from, the
manner in which the prosecution was being conducted by the State.
On the contrary, the trial Court recorded a finding that the learned
Assistant Public Prosecutor was diligently prosecuting the case.
5.
The trial Court further observed that grant of permission in a routine
manner, in the absence of any exceptional circumstance, would
amount to permitting parallel participation in the prosecution, which,
according to the trial Court, was not the legislative intent underlying
Section 338 of the BNSS. On the said reasoning, the application
came to be dismissed.
6.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the
application filed under Section 338 of the BNSS merely sought
permission to engage a private counsel to assist the learned Public
Prosecutor in the conduct of the prosecution and did not seek
permission to independently conduct the prosecution on behalf of the
complainant. It is contended that the trial Court has fallen into
manifest error by misconstruing the scope and ambit of Section 338
of the BNSS.
7.
It is further submitted that a complainant is not required to obtain
prior permission of the Court merely to engage a private counsel for
the purpose of assisting the Public Prosecutor. According to the
learned counsel, the requirement of obtaining permission arises only
where the complainant seeks leave to independently conduct the
prosecution or where the pleader engaged by the complainant intends
to submit written arguments after the closure of evidence with the
permission of the Court. Since no such prayer had been made in the
present case, the dismissal of the application is stated to be legally
unsustainable.
8.
During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly
submitted that the petitioner's prayer was confined only to engaging a
private counsel to assist the prosecution and not to supplant or
substitute the role of the learned Public Prosecutor. It is urged that
the trial Court proceeded on an erroneous assumption that the
petitioner intended to independently conduct the prosecution,
whereas no such relief had ever been sought.
9.
Given the aforesaid submissions, this petition is taken up for
disposal. Section 338 and 339 of BNSS are relevant for consideration
and areas under: “338. Appearance of Public Prosecutors: 1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of
a case may appear and plead without any written authority before
any Court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal.
2) If in any such case any private person instructs his advocate to
prosecute any person in any Court, the Public Prosecutor or
Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the
prosecution, and the advocate so instructed shall act therein under
the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public
Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit
written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case.”
“339. Permission to conduct prosecution
1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the
prosecution to be conducted by any person other than a police
officer below the rank of inspector; but no person, other than the
Advocate-General or Government Advocate or a Public
Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do
so without such permission:
Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the
prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the
offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.
2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or
by any advocate.”
10.
A conjoint reading of Sections 338 and 339 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, leaves no manner of doubt that the two
provisions operate in distinct spheres. Section 338, which is
substantially pari materia with Section 301 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, contemplates a situation where a pleader engaged
by a private person merely assists the Public Prosecutor in the
conduct of the prosecution. Section 339, corresponding to Section
302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, empowers the Magistrate to
permit the prosecution itself to be conducted by any person other
than a police officer, subject to the limitations engrafted therein. The
distinction between assisting the prosecution under Section 338 and
conducting the prosecution under Section 339 is fundamental and
cannot be obliterated.
11.
A Public Prosecutor is a statutory officer who represents the State
and is expected to act fairly, objectively and in aid of justice,
uninfluenced by any private interest. A pleader engaged by a private
complainant, on the other hand, represents the interest of the
complainant. It is for this reason that the legislature has consciously
restricted the role of such pleader under Section 338 to assisting the
Public Prosecutor, who alone remains in charge of, and responsible
for, the conduct of the prosecution. Where, however, the complainant
seeks to have the prosecution conducted by a person other than the
Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, the matter falls
within the ambit of Section 339, and such a course can be adopted
only with the permission of the Magistrate.
12.
Sub-section (2) of Section 338 further fortifies the legislative intent
by providing that a pleader instructed by a private person may, with
the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the
closure of evidence. Significantly, the requirement of obtaining the
Court's permission is confined to the submission of written
arguments and not to the mere engagement or appearance of a
counsel for assisting the Public Prosecutor. The expression "with the
permission of the Court" occurring in sub-section (2) qualifies only
the filing of written arguments and cannot be extended to read into
the provision a requirement that the complainant must first obtain
leave of the Court merely to engage a counsel for rendering
assistance to the Public Prosecutor. To construe the provision
otherwise would amount to importing into Section 338 a restriction
which the legislature has consciously omitted.
13.
Thus, the statutory scheme clearly envisages that while a privately
engaged counsel cannot independently conduct the prosecution under
the guise of Section 338, no prior permission of the Court is required
merely for engaging such counsel to assist the Public Prosecutor
during the course of the trial. The control and conduct of the
prosecution nevertheless continue to vest exclusively in the Public
Prosecutor.
14.
In Anthony D'Souza v. Mrs. Radhabai, 1984 (1) Bom CR 157, it
was held that the assistance contemplated under the corresponding
provision of the Code is subject to the control of the Public
Prosecutor and that, if the Public Prosecutor declines to permit such
assistance, the complainant or his advocate cannot insist upon
participating in the proceedings. The decision thus recognises that
the discretion to accept the assistance of a privately engaged counsel
primarily rests with the Public Prosecutor. The Court's permission
becomes necessary only when such counsel seeks leave to submit
written arguments in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 338. The
provision does not envisage any prior permission of the Court merely
for engaging a counsel to assist the Public Prosecutor.
15.
In the present case, the petitioner's application was confined to
seeking permission to engage a private counsel to assist the learned
Public Prosecutor during the trial. There was no prayer seeking
permission to independently conduct the prosecution. Once the
learned Public Prosecutor had raised no objection to the appearance
of such assisting counsel, there existed no legal impediment to the
petitioner engaging an advocate for the limited purpose contemplated
under Section 338. The trial Court, therefore, proceeded on an
erroneous understanding of the statutory provision in treating the
application as one seeking permission to conduct the prosecution
independently.
16.
It was never the petitioner's case that her counsel intended to
supplant the role of the Public Prosecutor or to assume independent
conduct of the prosecution. Even otherwise, such a course would fall
within the ambit of Section 339 and not Section 338. The trial Court,
by conflating the scope of the two provisions, declined a relief which
the petitioner was otherwise entitled to under law. The impugned
order, therefore, suffers from a patent misinterpretation of the
statutory scheme and consequent non-application of mind, rendering
it legally unsustainable.
17.
Consequently, the impugned order dated 25.04.2026 is set aside. The
petitioner shall be at liberty to engage a counsel of her own choice to
assist the learned Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor in
the conduct of the prosecution before the trial Court. Such counsel
shall function strictly under the supervision, guidance and control of
the learned Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor and shall
not independently conduct the prosecution. However, if such counsel
seeks to submit written arguments on behalf of the complainant after
the closure of evidence, the same shall be permissible only with the
leave of the trial Court in terms of Section 338(2) of the BNSS.
18.
The petition is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms along
with pending applications if any.
( Sanjay Parihar )
Judge
JAMMU
22.06.2026
Manik
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review