The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
9. In view of the above, there is no cogent explanation given by the applicant, which warrants condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. We are unable to accept the explanation given by the applicant in the said application. The said application has been filed in a mechanical manner and without any believable explanation whatsoever. In such circumstances, there is no ground to condone the delay in filing this appeal.
10. CAN 1 of 2025 stands dismissed.
11. As a consequence, MAT 2282 of 2025 arising out of of alongwith the connected interlocutory application, being CAN 2 of 2025 also stand dismissed.
Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
D/L.11
August 13, 2026.
KAUSHIK
MAT 2282 of 2025
CAN 1 of 2025
CAN 2 of 2025
Bapi Haldar
Vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Limited & Ors.
Mr. Prosenjit Mukherjee
Mr. Babita Pramanik
… for the appellant
Mr. Puspendu Chakraborty
… for the IOCL
1. This is an application under section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963.
2. Briefly, the appeal is directed against a judgment dated
13 January, 2025 passed in WPA 9631 of 2022 (Bapi
Haldar Vs. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors.).
By the
impugned
Judge
judgment,
the
Learned
Single
dismissed the writ petition on the ground that there
was no satisfactory explanation in response to the
show-cause notice issued by the respondent no. 1,
Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL). The appeal has
been filed on 23 December, 2025. In this background,
the appellant seeks condonation of 313 days in the
filing of this appeal. The grounds for delay, as averred
in the said application, are set out below:
“3. That your appellant/applicant states that by
profession is unemployed. The distance from Kolkata to
the appellant/applicant’s residence is more than 250
kms. The appellant/applicant got the knowledge that the
instant writ petition has been duly dismissed. The
appellant/applicant due to long distance and scarcity of
fund could not contact with the Learned Advocate on
record
to
challenge
the
instant
appeal.
The
appellant/applicant being a resident of remote village
also could not requested the concerned Clerk for
submission of the application of the certified copy.
4. On the basis of the request of the appellant/applicant
of second week of November, 2025 the concerned clerk
submitted application for certified copy of the impugned
order dated 13.01.2025 on 20.11.2025 and the same
was delivered on 01.12.2025. The appellant/applicant
has no deliberate intention to prefer the instant appeal in
a delay of period of 313 days.
5.
That your appellant/applicant had spent huge
money to construct the godown and shop room for
running the LPG distributorship. The petitioner also took
loan to construct the same. The petitioner also has not
received the amount already paid before the respondent
authorities and due to all these above mentioned facts,
the appellant/applicant could not prefer this appeal
within a period of 30 days from the date of order.”
3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as
follows:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain
cases.—
Any appeal or any application, other than an application
under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after
the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period.
Explanation.—The fact
that
the
appellant or
the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment
of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the
prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the
meaning of this section.”
4. In Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1969 it has been held as follows:
“120. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being
shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can
be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and
acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish
between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An
“explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts
and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and allows the person
to point out that something that has happened is not his
fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be
taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”.
Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse”
as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference
between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine,
is real. [See: Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10
SCC 531]
148. The recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condonation of delay is not an inter-parte proceeding.
Condonation of delay essentially is a question that the
court has to decide on the basis of the material on records
and the relevant law. The role of the parties is only
confined to brining on record the relevant material to
assist the court in exercising its discretion. Unlike
adversarial proceedings in a lis where competing claims
and counterclaims of parties are adjudicated, the
adjudication under Section 5 is primarily inquisitorial in
nature, with the court being called upon to assess, on an
objective consideration of facts and circumstances,
whether the explanation offered is sufficient and
reasonable so as to warrant an extension of time, from
the material it has relied upon for furnishing such
explanation.”
5. In
Esha
Bhattacharjee
v.
Raghunathpur
Nafar
Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 it has been held as
follows:
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles
that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic,
justice-oriented,
non-pedantic
approach
while
dealing with an application for condonation of delay,
for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice
but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence
on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and cause
public mischief because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it
cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for
to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is
so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle cannot
be given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.
21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinised and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
founded on objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given some
acceptable latitude.”
6. It is now well settled that a prayer for condonation of
delay is not to be granted in a routine or mechanical
manner. There must be an explanation to demonstrate
sufficient cause as to why the appeal could not be filed
within the stipulated time period.
7. On a reading of the averments made in the application,
the appellant admits that a certified copy of the
impugned order dated 13 January, 2025 was only
applied for on 20 November, 2025 i.e. after a period of
approximately to ten months from the date of passing
of the impugned order.
There is no explanation
whatsoever in the application as to what the appellant
was doing during the interregnum. There is not even a
modicum of an excuse provided by the appellant to
explain as to why no steps were taken to obtain a
certified copy of the impugned judgment during this
period.
8. In order to succeed in an application under section 5,
the appellant is obliged to explain the ground for delay
in filing the appeal. The alleged cause for delay given
by the applicant that he is unemployed and lives 250
kilometers away from Kolkata is unacceptable.
In
addition, the applicant has submitted that he could not
contact his Advocate in view of scarcity of funds and
long
distance.
This
is
also
unsatisfactory
and
insufficient. Significantly, the appellant is part of the
public distribution system of the country. It is not the
case of the applicant that channels or means of
telecommunication were not available at his place of
residence. It is also significant to note that the
applicant had acted with promptitude while filing the
writ petition. It appears from the records that he had
assailed, inter alia, a letter of intent dated May 2, 2022
in the writ petition and such writ petition had been
filed on May 20, 2022. It is thus inconceivable that a
litigant who could file a writ petition so quickly could
not file an appeal with the same degree of promptitude.
All the averments in the application are fanciful and
unbelievable.
The
applicant
has
failed
to
show
sufficient cause for the inordinate delay in filing this
appeal.
9. In view of the above, there is no cogent explanation
given by the applicant, which warrants condonation of
the delay in filing the appeal. We are unable to accept
the explanation given by the applicant in the said
application. The said application has been filed in a
mechanical
manner
and
without
any
believable
explanation whatsoever. In such circumstances, there
is no ground to condone the delay in filing this appeal.
10. CAN 1 of 2025 stands dismissed.
11. As a consequence, MAT 2282 of 2025 arising out of
WPA
of
alongwith
the
connected
interlocutory application, being CAN 2 of 2025 also
stand dismissed.
12. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied
for, be given to the parties on priority basis on
compliance of all formalities.
(Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.)
(Rishad Medora, J.)
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