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2026:JHHC:29615
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
---M.A. No.449 of 2023
---1.Baijanti Gope, aged about 28 years, wife of deceased Banmali
Gope
2.Jema Godin, aged about 60 years, mother of deceased
Banmali Gope
3.Bharti Gope, aged about 11years, minor daughter of
deceased Yamuna Prasad Singh
4.Gaurav Gope, aged about 7 years, minor son of Banmali
Gope
Applicant Nos.3 and 4 being minor represented through
their natural guardian applicant no.1
Residents of village/ Mohalla-Chandipee, PO Nawagaon,
PS Jhinkpani, District West Singhbhum (Chaibasa), Pin Code
833215, Jharkhand
.... Appellants/ Applicants
--
Versus
--
Union of India, through the General Manager, South Eastern
Railway, Kolkata, PO and PS Garden Reach, District Kolkata,
W.B.
----
…. Respondent
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
--For the Appellants:-
Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Malityar, Advocate
Mr. Anukul Gaurav, Advocate
For the State
:-
Mr. Prashant Vidyarthi, Senior Panel Counsel
Mr. Romit Kumar, Advocate
----
6/29.09.2026
Heard learned counsel for the appellants/ applicants
M.A. No.449 of 2023
2026:JHHC:29615
as well as Mr. Prashant Vidyarthi, the learned Senior Penal Counsel
appearing on behalf of the sole-respondent/ Union of India, through
General Manager, South Eastern Railway, Kolkata.
2.
This appeal has been preferred under section 23(1) of
railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 challenging the validity of the
judgment dated 12/09/2023 passed by Member (Judicial) and
Member (Technical) at Railway Claims Tribunal, Ranchi in Case No.
OA(IIU)/RNC/165/2018. Check List no.-2909180016 in application
under section 124A of Railway Claim Tribunal Act 1987, wherein the
Tribunal has dismissed the claim application seeking Compensation
amounting of Rs 8 Lakhs with @ 12% interest from the date of
filling of application on account of death claim of the deceased.
3.
Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Malityar, the learned counsel for the
appellants submits that on 01.09.2017 deceased Banmali Gope fter
purchasing a valid Train Ticket from Jhinkpani to Kendposi Railway
station boarded Tata Barbil passenger train at Jhinkpani with copassenger Kailash Gope and started his journey as a bonafide
passenger. He next submits that the bogie /compartment was full of
passengers and due to rush of passengers, the deceased Banmali
Gope was standing inside the bogie and as soon as the train was
about to reach kendposi, the passengers intending to get down,
started moving towards the gate and due to push and pressure of
the said passengers and due to heavy jerk of the train, the
deceased could not hold his balance and grip and, consequently,
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accidentally fell down from the running train at Kendposi railway
station. In the said incident both the legs of deceased were cut and
the deceased died at the spot and the ticket was lost in the
incident. He next submits that UD case no. 03/2017 being
Dangwaposi P.S case was registered and enquest report was carried
out, however the tribunal has rejected the claim of the appellants
only on the point that railway tickets were not found from the body
of the deceased. He submits that the learned Tribunal has wrongly
held that deceased was not a bonafide passenger and according to
him brother of the deceased, Harish Gope has gone to see off the
deceased to the station and he stayed there and has purchased
ticket in favour of the deceased and thereafter left the station which
has come in his evidence who has been examined as AW(2). He
next submits that this case is coming within the definition of
untowards incident as defined under section 123(c)(2) of the
Railways Act 1889. He next submits that the learned Tribunal has
wrongly rejected the claim of the appellant and in view of that said
order may kindly be set aside and the award may kindly be passed
in favour of the appellants who happened to be legal heirs/
successors of the deceased namely Banwali Gope.
4.
Mr. Prashant Vidyarthi, the learned counsel for the
respondent Railways vehemently opposed the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants and submits that the learned
Tribunal has given clear cut finding on the basis of the materials and
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there is no illegality in the impugned award. He next submits that
the ticket from the body of the deceased has not been found and
that has been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal. He
next submits that no case is made out as one passenger was also
there along with the deceased namely Kailash Gope and he has
neither deposed before the Tribunal and he has not informed first
about the said incident to the railway authority or the police
authority. He next submits that the alleged incident is said to be at
7.30 p.m. whereas dead body was found at 10.30 p.m in night on
the same day which further casts suspicion and in view of that the
learned Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim. He next submits that
the body was found cut into three parts which is further doubtful
and that has been considered by the Tribunal and the learned
Tribunal has rightly passed the order and hence, this appeal may
kindly be dismissed.
5.
In view of the above submission of the learned counsels
appearing for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials
on record as well as the averments made in the appeal and further
the judgment of the learned Tribunal by which it transpires that the
incident took place on 01.09.2017 which is fortified in light of the
aforesaid U.D.Case. In the trial court records, post mortem report is
there and cause of death is said to be cut of the body due to train
accident which further fortify the case of the appellants about the
incidental fall from the train.
The body has cut into three parts
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which has come in the post mortem report and the Station
Manager letter addressed to OG/GRD/DPS South Eastern Railways
further suggest that the body was found at 20.25 hours at loop line
of ANP KM 346-11-13 and he has requested to look into that and
investigate and dispose of the body. Thus, death from the train is
proved in light of these documents and further brother of the
deceased, Harish Gope has been examined as AW-2 and he has
stated that he has gone to the railway station and has purchased
the ticket for his brother which further fortifies that deceased was
travelling in the train.
6.
There may not be any eye witness to the incident,
however, investigation was conducted and after investigation the
final form has been submitted and post mortem report also speaks
about the cause of death and cut of the body into to pieces. The
AW-2 examined also stated that he has dropped the deceased at
the railway station and he has also purchased the ticket.
7.
A reference may be made to the case of“Union of India v.
Rina Devi” reported in (2019) 3 SCC 572 at paragraph nos.25, 26
and 29 it has been held as under:
25. We are unable to uphold the above
view as the concept of “self-inflicted injury” would
require intention to inflict such injury and not mere
negligence of any particular degree. Doing so
would amount to invoking the principle of
contributory negligence which cannot be done in
the case of liability based on “no fault theory”. We
may in this connection refer to the judgment of
this Court in United India Insurance Co.
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Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar [United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Sunil Kumar, (2019) 12 SCC 398 : 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 1443 : (2017) 13 Scale 652] laying
down that plea of negligence of the victim cannot
be allowed in claim based on “no fault theory”
under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988. Accordingly, we hold that death or injury in
the course of boarding or de-boarding a train will
be an “untoward incident” entitling a victim to the
compensation and will not fall under the proviso to
Section 124-A merely on the plea of negligence of
the victim as a contributing factor.
“26. Conflict of decisions has been
pointed out on the subject. As noticed from
the statutory provision, compensation is
payable for death or injury of a “passenger”.
In Raj Kumari [Raj Kumari v. Union of India,
1992 SCC OnLine MP 96 : 1993 ACJ 846]
referring to the scheme of the Railways Act,
1890, it was observed that since travelling
without ticket was punishable, the burden
was on the Railway Administration to prove
that passenger was not a bona fide
passenger. The Railway Administration has
special knowledge whether ticket was issued
or not. The 1989 Act also has similar
provisions being Sections 55 and 137. This
view has led to an inference that any person
dead or injured found on the railway premises
has to be presumed to be a bona fide
passenger so as to maintain a claim for
compensation. However, the Delhi High Court
in Gurcharan Singh [Gurcharan Singh v. Union
of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 101 : 2015
ACJ 171] held that initial onus to prove death
or injury to a bona fide passenger is always
on the claimant. However, such onus can shift
on the Railways if an affidavit of relevant facts
is filed by the claimant. A negative onus
cannot be placed on the Railways. Onus to
prove that the deceased or injured was a
bona fide passenger can be discharged even
M.A. No.449 of 2023
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in absence of a ticket if relevant facts are
shown that ticket was purchased but it was
lost. The Delhi High Court observed as follows
:
(Gurcharan
Singh
case [Gurcharan
Singh v. Union of India, 2014 SCC OnLine Del
101 : 2015 ACJ 171] , SCC OnLine Del para 4)
“4. … (ii) In my opinion, the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant
claimants is totally misconceived. The
initial onus in my opinion always lies with
the appellant claimants to show that there
is a death due to untoward incident of a
bona fide passenger. Of course, by filing of
the affidavit and depending on the facts of
a particular case that initial onus can be a
light onus which can shift on the Railways,
however, it is not the law that even the
initial onus of proof which has to be
discharged is always on the Railways and
not on the claimants. I cannot agree to
this proposition of law that the Railways
have the onus to prove that a deceased
was not a bona fide passenger because no
such negative onus is placed upon the
Railways either under the Railways Act or
the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and the
Rules or as per any judgment of the
Supreme Court. No doubt, in the facts of
the particular case, onus can be easily
discharged such as in a case where the
deceased may have died at a place where
he could not have otherwise been unless
he was travelling in the train and in such
circumstances depending on the facts of a
particular case it may not be necessary to
prove the factum of the deceased having a
ticket because ticket as per the type of
incident of death can easily be lost in an
accident. I at this stage take note of a
judgment of a learned Single Judge of this
Court in Pyar Singh v. Union of India [Pyar
M.A. No.449 of 2023
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Singh v. Union of India, (2007) 8 AD Del
262] which holds that it is the claimant
upon whom the initial onus lies to prove
his case. I agree to this view and I am
bound by this judgment and not by the
ratio of the case of Leelamma [Union of
India v. Leelamma, 2009 SCC OnLine Ker
903 : (2009) 1 KLT 914] .”
29. We thus hold that mere presence of a
body on the railway premises will not be
conclusive to hold that injured or deceased
was a bona fide passenger for which claim for
compensation could be maintained. However,
mere absence of ticket with such injured or
deceased will not negative the claim that he
was a bona fide passenger. Initial burden will
be on the claimant which can be discharged
by filing an affidavit of the relevant facts and
burden will then shift on the Railways and the
issue can be decided on the facts shown or
the attending circumstances. This will have to
be dealt with from case to case on the basis
of facts found. The legal position in this
regard will stand explained accordingly.”
8.
In view of the above paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgment and further considering the facts of the present
case, it is crystal clear that the appellants have been able to
prove that the deceased was travelling in the train as a
bonafide passenger. The deceased fell due to jostling and
death has occurred and it will amount to accident and it
cannot be said to be that it was a case of suicide or it is not a
self-inflicted injury, neither due to his own criminal act nor he
was in a state of intoxication or insanity nor due to any natural
cause or disease and, moreover, the Railway has also failed to
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prove death has occurred due to his own negligence. Thus, it
can be safely said that his falling down from the train was
accidental and the said accident not falling under the
exception of section 124-A of the proviso and identical was the
issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
“Jameela and Others v. Union of India”, reported in (2010) 12
SCC 443, wherein it has been held in paragraph no.10 of the
said judgment as under:
“10. It is not denied by the Railways
that M. Hafeez fell down from the train and
died while travelling on it on a valid ticket. He
was, therefore, clearly a “passenger” for the
purpose of Section 124-A as clarified by the
Explanation. It is now to be seen, that under
Section 124-A the liability to pay
compensation is regardless of any wrongful
act, neglect or default on the part of the
Railway Administration. But the proviso to the
section says that the Railway Administration
would have no liability to pay any
compensation in case death of the passenger
or injury to him was caused due to any of the
reasons enumerated in clauses (a) to (e)”.
9.
If section 123 and 124-A of the Indian Railways Act
are read conjointly for the purpose of interpretation is made
taking into account the intention of the legislature to protect
the passengers sustaining injuries in untoward incidents the
term accidental fall from the train. It is well settled that if the
words used in a beneficial or welfare statute are capable of
two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with
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the object be preferred. More elaborately it can be said that
the beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and
not literal or strict interpretation. In the
case of “Union of
India V. Nand Lal Ghaley” (2014 SCC Online All 16072) the
case of ‘Hindustan Liver Limited V. Ashok Vishnu Kate’ was
considered in para 15 of the said judgment which is quoted
here-in-below:-
“15. In Hindustan
Lever
Ltd. v. Ashok
Vishnu Kate [(1995) 6 SCC 326 (vide para 42);
1995 (71) FLR 1040 (SC).] , this Court observed:
“In this connection, we may usefully turn to the
decision of this Court in Workmen v. American
Express International Banking Corporation, wherein
Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has
made the following observations:
“The principles of statutory construction are well
settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal
import such as social welfare legislation and human
rights’ legislation are not to be put in Procrustean
beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In
construing these legislations the imposture of
literal construction must be avoided and the
prodigality of its misapplication must be recognized
and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned
with the ‘colour’ the ‘content’ and the ‘context’ of
such statutes (we have borrowed the words from
Lord Wilberforce's opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds).
In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out
that law is not to be left behind in some island of
literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the
language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in
which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted
purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one
of the cases cited before us, that is, Surender
Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunalcum-Labour Court we had occasion to say:
M.A. No.449 of 2023
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“Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the
interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes.
Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad
interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give
relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is
not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions.” Francis Bennion in his Statutory
Interpretation Second Edn., has dealt with the
Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book.
The nature of purposive construction is dealt with
in Part XX at p. 659 thus:
“A purposive construction of an enactment is one
which gives effect to the legislative purpose by—
(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment
where that meaning is in accordance with the
legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposiveand-literal construction) or
(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal
meaning is not in accordance with the legislative
purpose (in the Code called a purposive and
strained construction).”
At p. 661 of the same a book, the author has
considered the topic of “Purposive Construction” in
contrast with literal construction. The learned
author has observed as under:
“Contrast with literal construction.—Although the
term purposive construction’ is not new, its entry
into fashion betokens a swing by the Appellate
Courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock
said in 1975: ‘If one looks back to the actual
decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions of
statutory construction over the last 30 years one
cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend
away from the purely literal towards the purposive
construction of statutory provisions’. The matter
was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way—
……I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive
construction where to apply the literal meaning of
the legislative language used would lead to results
which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act.
But in doing so the task on which a Court of justice
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is engaged remains one of construction, even
where this involves reading into the Act words
which are not expressly included in it”
14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive
meaning to the expression accidental falling of a
passenger from a train carrying passengers’ in
section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be
depriving a large number of railway passengers
from getting compensation in railway accidents. It
is well known that in our country there are crores
of people who travel by railway trains since
everybody cannot afford traveling by air or in a
private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow
meaning to the expression we will be depriving a
large number of victims of train accidents
(particularly poor and middle class people) from
getting compensation under the Railways Act.
Hence, in our opinion, the expression ‘accidental
falling of a passenger from a train carrying
passengers’ includes accidents when a bona fide
passenger i.e. a passenger traveling with a valid
ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train
and falls down during the process. In other words,
a purposive, and not literal, interpretation should
be given to the expression.
15. Section 2 (29) of the Railways Act defines
‘passenger’ to mean a person traveling with a valid
pass or ticket. Section 123(c) of the Railways Act
defines ‘untoward incident’ to include the
accidental falling of any passenger from a train
carrying passengers. Section 124-A of the Railways
Act with which we are concerned states:
“124-A. Compensation on account of untoward
incident.—When in the course of working a Railway
an untoward incident occurs, then whether or not
there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default
on the part of the Railway administration such as
would entitle a passenger who has been injured or
the dependant of a passenger who has been killed
to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, the Railway administration shall,
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notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent
as may be prescribed and to that extent only for
loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to, a
passenger as a result of such untoward incident:
Provided that no compensation shall be payable
under this section by the Railway administration if
the passenger dies or suffers injury due to—
(a) suicide or attempted suicide by him;
(b) self-inflicted injury;
(c) his own criminal act;
(d) any act committed by him in a state of
intoxication or insanity;
(e) any natural cause or disease or medical or
surgical treatment unless such treatment becomes
necessary due to injury caused by the said
untoward incident.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
“passenger” includes—
(i) a Railway servant on duty; and
(ii) a person who has purchased a valid ticket for
traveling by a train carrying passengers, on any
date or a valid platform ticket and becomes a
victim of an untoward incident”.
10.
In a country where crores of people who travel by
railway trains since everybody cannot afford traveling by air or in
a private car by giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the
expression it will amount to deprive a large number of victims of
train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from
getting compensation under the Railways Act. Thus, travelling in
train is proved and said occurrence has taken place which has
been found to be genuine in view of the aforesaid U.D. Case,
investigation and post mortem report which has further supported
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by one witness and it will come within untoward incident under
the Railways Act.
11.
In view of the above facts and evidence and reasoning it
is evident that the Tribunal has taken hyper technical view and
the evidence and materials have not been properly considered in
dismissing the claim of the appellants. There are sufficient
materials on record to show that the deceased was travelling in
train which has been supported by one of the witness and no
suggestion has been made by the railways in cross examination of
the said witness, thus, it is proved that the deceased was
travelling in train. The Court comes to the conclusion that the
appellants are entitled to compensation under section 124 A of
the said Act and moreover, there is no DRM’s report produced in
light of Railway Passenger( Manner of Investigation of untowards
Incident) Rules, 2003 and in view of the Rule 13 of the said rules,
it is statutory provision to submit the said report.
12.
In the case of “Union of India Vs. Rina Devi”
reported in (2019) 3 SCC 572 the Railway Act, 1989 has
been considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court and that what will be
amount of compensation and interest under the said Act was
considered and it was held at para 19 and 30 as under:-
“19. Accordingly, we
conclude
that
compensation will be payable as applicable on the
date of the accident with interest as may be
considered reasonable from time to time on the
M.A. No.449 of 2023
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same pattern as in accident claim cases. If the
amount so calculated is less than the amount
prescribed as on the date of the award of the
Tribunal, the claimant will be entitled to higher of
the two amounts. This order will not affect the
awards which have already become final and where
limitation for challenging such awards has expired,
this order will not by itself be a ground for
condonation of delay. Seeming conflict in Rathi
Menon [Rathi Menon v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC
714, para 30 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1311] and Kalandi
Charan Sahoo [Kalandi Charan Sahoo v. South-East
Central Railways, (2019) 12 SCC 387 : 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 1638] stands explained accordingly. The
four-Judge Bench judgment in Pratap Narain Singh
Deo [Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata,
(1976) 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 52] holds the
field on the subject and squarely applies to the
present situation. Compensation as applicable on
the date of the accident has to be given with
reasonable interest and to give effect to the
mandate of beneficial legislation, if compensation as
provided on the date of award of the Tribunal is
higher than unrevised amount with interest, the
higher of the two amounts has to be given.
30. As already observed, though this Court
in Thazhathe Purayil Sarabi [Thazhathe Purayil
Sarabi v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 372 : (2009)
3 SCC (Civ) 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 408 : 2010 TAC
420] held that rate of interest has to be @ 6% from
the date of application till the date of the award and
9% thereafter and 9% rate of interest was awarded
from
the
date
of
application
in Mohamadi [Mohamadi v. Union of India, (2019)
12 SCC 389 : 2010 SCC OnLine SC 19] , rate of
interest has to be reasonable rate on a par with
accident claim cases. We are of the view that in
absence of any specific statutory provision, interest
can be awarded from the date of accident itself
when the liability of the Railways arises up to the
date of payment, without any difference in the
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stages. Legal position in this regard is on a par with
the cases of accident claims under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988. Conflicting views stand resolved
in this manner.”
13.
In light of the above judgment compensation as
applicable on the date of accident has to be given with reasonable
interest.
14.
In view of above facts, it is evident that the appeal
deserves to succeed for the reasons that the appellant has
successfully proved the entitlement to compensation under the
provisions of the said Act due to death occurred in an ‘untoward
incident’ and the appellant is entitled to compensation of
Rs.8,00,000/- (Eight Lakhs) as per the last Rules in view of Rule3 Schedule-II of Railway Accident and
Untoward Incidents
(Compensation) Rule, 1990. The said amount will carry interest
@ 6 % from the date of application till date of the award.
15.
As such, judgment dated 12/09/2023 passed by Member
(Judicial) and Member (Technical) at Railway Claims Tribunal,
Ranchi in Case No. OA(IIU)/RNC/165/2018 is set aside and the
appeal is allowed in above terms and disposed of. The trial court
records be sent back to the learned court concerned forthwith.
( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Dated: 29.09.2026
SI/
A.F.R.
Uploaded/7.10.2026
M.A. No.449 of 2023
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