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Form No.J(2)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present : The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
&
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
FAT No. 533 of 2025
+
CAN 1 of 2025
Badrul Rahaman Mallick and another
-vsThe ADM(LAR), Nadia and others.
For the appellants
: Md. Sarwar Jahan,
Md. Ashraful Huq,
Ms. Tapati Sarkar,
Mr. Soumyajit Roy Choudhury,
Ms. Shalini Sen,
Ms. S. Parvin
For the respondent nos. 2 and 3: Mr. Partha Pratim Roy,
Mr. Sarbananda Sanyal,
Ms. Poulami Chakraborty.
For the respondent no. 4.
: Mr. Amit Meharia,
Ms. Paromita Banerjee,
Mr. Rohan Raj,
Mr. Sayan Dey,
Ms. Shristi Sharma
Heard on
: March 18, 2026.
Judgment on
: March 18, 2026.
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:
1. The affidavit-of-service filed in Court today be kept on record.
2. In the order dated March 5, 2026, the date of the order was
erroneously recorded as “March 5, 2025”.
3. Let such error be deemed to stand corrected by reading
“March 5, 2026” instead of “March 5, 2025” in the said order.
4. A question arises at the outset as to the maintainability of the
present appeal.
5. The appeal has been preferred against an order passed under
Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter
referred to as “the 1956 Act”).
6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants cites a Division
Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the
matter of Bollineni Srihari Rao Vs. Competent Authority and
Special Collector (L.A.) and others reported at 2025 Supreme
(AP) 498 in support of the proposition that the adjudication of
the disputes under the said provision is a deemed decree and
accordingly appeals would be maintainability under Section 96
of the Code of Civil Procedure despite the Act not explicitly
providing for such appeals.
7. Learned counsel, in his usual fairness, next hands over an
unreported judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal No(s). 10882-10888 of 2025 (Kalpataru Power
Transmission Ltd. Vs. Vinod and others).
8. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, although in
the context of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines
(Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962, took into
consideration several similar statutes, including the 1956 Act,
where the adjudication of disputes as to adequacy of
compensation is envisaged.
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, upon considering the said
provisions, came to the finding that there were several
anomalies in the provisions of law in different statutes in that
regard and observed that these issues need to be examined
by the Law Commission of India and the Ministry of Law and
Justice, Government of India, so as to determine whether a
statutory remedy of appeal should be provided against
judgments/orders passed under the Petroleum Act.
10.
It is submitted that, thus, the law is still fluid on such count.
11.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent nos.
2 and 3 cites a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High
Court in the matter of Nafeesa and Another Vs. Deputy
Collector & Special Land Acquisition Officer and another
reported at 2013 Supreme (Ker) 569 where the
Hon’ble
Division Bench had observed that there is no provision in the
1956 Act which provides a right of appeal against the decision
by the court on a reference under Section 3H(4) and such a
decision is also not given the status of a decree at least using
a deeming provision. Therefore, it was held, an appeal under
Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the
Code”) will not lie.
12.
It was also observed that appeal under Section 104 of the
Code also does not lie since such a decision does not fall
among those orders enumerated as appealable under the
provision of Order XLIII of the Code.
13.
The Division Bench also took note of Section 105(1) of the
Code, as per which, no appeal shall lie from any order made
by a court, that is to say, a civil court, in the exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction, save as otherwise expressly
provided.
14.
Upon a careful consideration of the aforesaid judgments
and the relevant provisions of law, we come to the following
conclusions:
15.
In the 1956 Act, there is no specific provision of appeal
against an adjudication under Section 3H(4) of the 1956 Act,
although such adjudication is done by a principal civil court of
original jurisdiction.
16.
It may be noted that all orders passed by civil courts are not
appealable.
It is a trite principle of law that appeal is a
creature of statute and unless specifically provided for in a
statute, no appeal lies against any adjudication, be it in the
nature of an order or a decree.
17.
Section 2(2) of the Code clearly defines a “decree” to mean
the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as
regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the
rights of the parties with regard to all any of the matters in
controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final.
18.
The decrees which are deemed to be included within the
said definition have been specifically mentioned to be rejection
of a plant and determination of any question under Section 144
of the Code itself.
19. On the other hand, any adjudication from which an appeal lies
as an appeal from an order and any order of dismissal for
default have been specifically excluded from the definition of
the decree.
20.
However, Section 2(2) of the Code operates within the
parameters of the Code of Civil Procedure itself.
21.
The use of the expression “suit” in Section 2(2) clearly
demarcates the zone of operation of the said definition being
restricted to a civil suit, adjudicated by a civil court. An
adjudication under Section 3H (4) of the 1956 Act, although by
a Civil Court, is not in connection with a suit as such. Thus,
such adjudication necessarily falls outside the purview of the
Code, thus precluding any appeal under Section 96 thereof
against such adjudication.
22.
Section 104 and Order XLIII of the Code specifically provide
for appeals against certain categories of orders. However, the
character of such adjudications as “orders”, as opposed to
“decrees” – deemed or regular – is retained.
23.
Apart from the two deemed decrees referred to in Section
2(2) of the Code itself, the only other circumstance where an
order is deemed as a decree is found in Rule 103 of Order XXI
of the Code which stipulates that where any application has
been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 of Order
XXI, the order made thereon “shall have the same force and
be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise
as if it were a decree”.
24.
If the intention of the Legislature was to include an order
under Section 3H (4) of the 1956 Act within the definition of
decree or a deemed decree as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure, nothing prevented the Legislature from specifically
incorporating such an adjudication within the purview of
decrees or deemed decrees, as provided in the above
illustrative cases.
25.
Having not done so, by specific exclusion, such an
adjudication has not been included within the periphery of a
decree passed by a civil court, nor has any provision of appeal
been provided in the 1956 Act itself against such an
adjudication.
26.
Thus, in our opinion, the ratio of the judgment delivered by
the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Nafeesa’s case
(supra) is more apt and tenable in the context of the present
discussion.
27.
On the contrary, the Division Bench judgment of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Bollineni Srihari’s case (supra) did not
take into consideration the cardinal principle of jurisprudence
that unless specifically provided by a statute, an appeal does
not lie from any adjudication at all.
28.
Moreover, we do not find anything within the four corners of
of the Code of Civil Procedure to bring an adjudication under
Section 3H(4) of the 1956 Act within the purview of either a
decree or a deemed decree or even an appealable order.
29.
Thus, the ratio of Bollineni Srihari (supra), with utmost
respect, is not tenable in the eye of law and accordingly we
differ with the view expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the same and accept the ratio laid down by the Kerala
High Court in Nafeesa’s case (supra).
30.
Although the anomaly recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Kalpataru Power (supra) cannot be brushed aside
inasmuch as pari materia provisions in some other statutes, for
adjudication regarding compensation
and apportionment
thereof, are supplemented by provisions of appeal, for
example, Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
like, fact remains that a similar provision is not found in the
1956 Act. Since the Legislature, in its wisdom, has not
provided for an appeal against an order under Section 3H (4)
of the 1956 Act, it is not for the Courts to carve out such a
provision, thereby traversing into the Legislature domain.
31.
Be that as it may, by necessary implication, even in
Kalpataru Power (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court accepted
the view that there is no present provision of appeal in the
Petroleum Act (just as in the 1956 Act), which prompted the
Hon’ble Supreme Court to recommend the introduction of such
a provision in the said Act by the Law Commission of India /
Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India.
32.
In such view of the matter, in the absence of any specific
provision, the impugned adjudication under Section 3H (4) of
the 1956 Act is held to be not appealable.
33.
Accordingly, FAT No. 533 of 2025 is dismissed as not
maintainable.
34.
Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2025 is also disposed of.
35.
It is made clear, however, that nothing in the above order
shall preclude the appellants from exploring appropriate
remedy available to the appellants in law against the impugned
order.
36.
For such purpose, leave is granted to the learned advocate
on record for the appellants to take back the certified copy of
the impugned order upon furnishing a photocopy thereof.
37.
There will be no order as to costs.
I agree.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
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