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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CIVIL REVISION No.186 of 2024
CNR No. BRHC011250082024
1.
======================================================
Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Regional Office, Bhowesh
Bhawan, Khanjarpur, City and Dist- Bhagalpur- 612001.
2.
Vimlendu Vikash, the then Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India,
Zonal office, Bhagalpur, At Present AI.T.B Sales, Assistant General
Manager, Credit Monitoring Dept. (R and DB), Corporate Centre, State
Bank Bhawan, Madam Cama Road, Mumbai-400021.
3.
Sanjay Kumar Singh, the then Assist. General Manager, State Bank of India,
Regional office, Munger, At present Fraud Risk Management (S and I0 State
Bank of India, LHO Patna- 800001, emailed- sanjaykumarsingh@sbi.com.
Mobile No. 9771419353.
... ... Petitioners
Versus
Mantosh Prasad Sinha S/o Lt. Parmeshwari Prasad, Village- Baruata, POAmrath, Distt.- Jamui, At present residing at Mohalla- Nayatola, Station
Road, P.S./P.O and Distt. Jamui-811307.
... ... Opposite Party
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioners
:
For the Respondent
:
Mr. Chitranjan Sinha, Senior Advocate
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh, Advocate
Mr. Pankaj Kumar Sinha, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA
CAV ORDER
27-10-2026
Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
counsel for the opposite party.
2. This civil revision application under Section 115 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’)
has been filed against the order dated 17.10.2024 passed by
learned Sub-Judge-III, Jamui (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial
Court’), in Title (Defamation) Suit No. 137 of 2020. By that
order,
the
petition
dated
30.05.2024
filed
by
the
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defendants/petitioners under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC
for rejection of the plaint has been rejected.
3. The petitioners are officers of the State Bank of
India and are defendants in Title (Defamation) Suit No. 137 of
2020, filed by the opposite party.
4. The case of the plaintiff/opposite party, as stated in
the plaint, is that he was an empanelled advocate of the State
Bank of India for the Jamui Civil Court from 1983 to 2018. It is
alleged that a title deed on which he had submitted a title
investigation report was re-examined by another panel advocate,
Purnendu Kumar Singh, who opined that the document was not
genuine. It is further alleged that, on the basis of that opinion,
the plaintiff was de-panelled, and that this lowered his prestige,
dignity and reputation and caused him financial loss and mental
agony. The loss has been quantified at Rs. 25,00,000/-.
5. Prior to the suit, the plaintiff had filed a complaint
case, Case No. 1526C of 2019, on 26.09.2019 under Section
500 of the Indian Penal Code, making allegations relating to his
de-panelment. The learned Trial Court examined the complaint
under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
and dismissed it under Section 203 on 03.01.2020. Against that
order, the plaintiff preferred Criminal Revision No. 11 of 2020,
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which was allowed on 24.02.2020. The order dated 24.02.2020
was challenged before this Court in Cr. Misc. No. 11233 of
2021, in which it was stayed on 19.05.2022. The said
application is stated to be pending.
6. The plaintiff instituted Title (Defamation) Suit No.
137 of 2020 on 19.10.2020 seeking damages of Rs. 25,00,000/-.
The petitioners filed a written statement on 01.07.2021 denying
the plaint allegations. They stated, among other things, that the
plaintiff had not been de-panelled by them and that the decision
was taken by the competent authority. Thereafter, the petitioners
filed a petition dated 30.05.2024 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of
the CPC, praying for rejection of the plaint on the grounds that
its averments do not constitute defamation and that no cause of
action arose against them. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder on
14.06.2024 opposing the petition.
7. By the impugned order dated 17.10.2024, the
learned Sub-Judge-III, after recording the submissions of the
parties, referred to the scope of Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC
and to the decisions in M. Nelson Babu v. Kamlesh Babu, 2009
(5) CTC 814, and Dega Jayalakshmi v. Kapoor Enterprises,
2010 (1) MLJ 1167 (Mad). The learned Trial Court held that the
petitioners had not specifically mentioned the law by which the
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suit is barred, and that it was not clear from the averments in the
plaint whether the suit is barred by any law. It also held that the
petitioners’ contentions related to procedural irregularities,
which are curable in nature. The petition was accordingly
rejected, and the suit was fixed for 12.11.2024 for acceptance of
written statements. Being aggrieved by the order dated
17.10.2024, the petitioners have preferred the instant civil
revision application.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that
the plaintiff/opposite party, who had been a panel advocate of
the State Bank of India at the Jamui Civil Court, has instituted
proceedings against the petitioners only to harass them. It was
submitted that de-panelment of an advocate is neither a crime
nor does it harm the reputation of any advocate, and that
advocates of the State, the Central Government, corporations
and boards are changed from time to time, from the court below
up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, without any criminal or
defamation case being filed against the concerned authority. It
was further submitted that the Bank acts on the report of its
panel advocate and forms no independent view on the
inspection of a title deed. If the opposite party had any
grievance, it was submitted, his remedy lay against the advocate
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who gave the report and not against the Bank. It was also
submitted that the opposite party was de-panelled on
28.02.2019, about a year after the report of Advocate Purnendu
Kumar Singh, and that it is not the case that he was de-panelled
because of that report.
8. i. Learned counsel submitted that the opposite party
first filed Complaint Case No. 1526C of 2019, which the
learned court dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C.; that the
revision against that order was allowed on 24.02.2020; and that
the said order was stayed in the quashing application filed by
the Bank before this Court. It was submitted that the opposite
party then filed the title (defamation) suit on the same facts, in
which the petition under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was rejected
by the impugned order. Reliance was placed on R.D. Saxena v.
Balram Prasad Sharma, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 264 (para
15), for the proposition that a litigant must be free to change his
advocate, and that where a client does not wish to continue the
engagement of a particular advocate, it is a professional
requirement, consistent with the dignity of the profession, that
the advocate return the brief. On this basis, it was submitted that
a litigant has the freedom to change his advocate. Reference was
also made to Order III Rule 4 of the CPC on the appointment of
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a pleader. It was submitted that the opposite party, with an
ulterior motive, filed the complaint case and the defamation suit
against the higher officers of the Bank, alleging that they had
removed him from the panel, whereas the petitioners have no
authority to make a panel of advocates or to remove anyone
from it.
9. Learned counsel for the opposite party submitted
that the revision is without merit and the impugned order calls
for no interference. It was submitted that the Bank's letter dated
07.12.2018 described the opposite party as a fraud on account of
a title verification report of 2014, whereas that report was
correct. It was submitted that the deed was found genuine by the
police and the Dy.S.P., Munger, in Kotwali P.S. Case No. 404 of
2018; accordingly, the Bank’s later complaint case no. 453C of
2022 was dismissed on 22.09.2023. He submits that the Bank
had no authority to seek an explanation from a panel lawyer, as
it could only de-panel him. It was further submitted that the
letter was circulated to the court about two and a half months
before the letter of de-panelment was issued.
9. i. It was submitted that the petitioners filed their
written statement on 01.07.2021 without seeking a preliminary
issue, that issues were framed, that nine witnesses were
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examined for the plaintiff, of whom four were not crossexamined by the petitioners and were discharged, and that the
plaintiff's evidence was closed on 09.09.2026. It was submitted
that the petitioners and their counsel have not appeared for four
dates, that the petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC was
filed only after about four years, and that it was filed to harass
the opposite party and delay the trial. It was also submitted that
the revision has been filed in the name of the Bank authority by
a counsel who is not a panel lawyer of the Bank, which is
objectionable.
10. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and
perused the record, including the impugned order and the plaint
of Title (Defamation) Suit No. 137 of 2020.
11. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section
115 of the CPC is limited. In Madan Mohan (Dead) through
LRs. v. Thakar Dass (Dead) through LRs., reported in 2026
INSC 730, where it was observed:
“10.
It is well settled that the scope of
Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
is limited. We may refer to a few
pronouncements:
10.1 35 years ago, it was observed in
Masjid Kacha Tank, Nahan v.Tuffail
Mohammed, that:
“3. It is well settled position in law that
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under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure the High Court cannot
reappreciate the evidence and cannot set
aside the concurrent findings of the courts
below by taking a different view of the
evidence. The High Court is empowered
only to interfere with the findings of fact if
the findings are perverse or there has been
a non-appreciation or non- consideration of
the material evidence on record by the
courts below. Simply because another view
of the evidence may be taken, 10 1991 Supp
(2) SCC 270 is no ground by the High
Court to interfere in its revisional
jurisdiction.”
10.2 The Constitution Bench in Hindustan
Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh,
while dealing with this very question of the
scope of revisional power in the context of
rent acts, particularly in issue therein held
as under:
“…Revisional power is not and cannot
be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact
as a court of first appeal. Where the
High Court is required to be satisfied
that the decision is according to law, it
may examine whether the order
impugned before it suffers from
procedural illegality or irregularity.”
10.3 A three judge Bench of this Court
in Ambadas Khanduji Shinde v. Ashok
Sadashiv Mamurkar, while dealing
with a landlord-tenant dispute
observed as under:
“14. Apart from the factual aspect, order
lacks merit on the ground of jurisdiction.
The High Court cannot interfere with the
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concurrent factual findings while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code. It is settled law that
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is
restricted to cases of illegal or irregular
exercise of jurisdiction by the subordinate
courts. Under Section 115 of the Civil
Procedure Code, it is not open for the High
Court to correct errors of facts or law
unless they go to root of the issue of
jurisdiction. In the facts on hand, the courts
below have passed reasoned orders well
within the jurisdiction conferred upon them.
We arrive at the conclusion that the High
Court committed error in interfering with
the judgment and decree of the trial court.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
that the High Court, in revision, cannot reappreciate evidence or
correct errors of fact or law unless they go to the root of
jurisdiction, and that the jurisdiction is restricted to illegal or
irregular exercise of jurisdiction by the subordinate court. The
test, therefore, is not whether this Court would have decided
differently, but whether the court below failed to exercise a
jurisdiction vested in it, exercised one not vested in it, or acted
with material irregularity.
12. Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC provides, inter alia,
that the plaint shall be rejected “(a) where it does not disclose a
cause of action” and “(d) where the suit appears from the
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statement in the plaint to be barred by any law”. It is settled that
only the averments in the plaint and the documents filed with it
are to be looked at, and they are taken to be correct. The written
statement and the defendant's pleas or application are irrelevant
at this stage (as observed in Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557 (para 9); Dahiben v.
Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 366 (paras 12.6
and 12.7)). The plaint is read meaningfully and as a whole, not
by picking out isolated passages. The power may be exercised at
any stage of the suit, so the fact that the petition (dated
30.05.2024, filed by the defendants (the present petitioners)
before the learned trial court in Title (Defamation) Suit No. 137
of 2020, seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule
11(d) CPC) was filed in 2024 after the written statement of 2021
is no objection.
13. In the instant case, the petition dated 30.05.2024
raised two grounds, namely, no cause of action arose against the
petitioners (a ground does not cease to be a ground because the
application mentions a different clause) and barred by law. The
learned Trial Court, however, confined itself to clause (d) of
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. It held that the petitioners had
not specified the law by which the suit is barred, and it treated
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their contentions as procedural irregularities which are curable.
It did not read the plaint to see whether the averments, taken as
correct, disclose a cause of action at all. The objection of the
petitioners was not procedural. It went to the root of the suit,
namely whether any legal wrong is alleged in the plaint.
14. Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is couched in
mandatory terms: the plaint “shall be rejected” where any of the
stated conditions is fulfilled. The Court is to read the plaint
meaningfully and not formally. If clever drafting has created the
illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the
first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X
of the CPC. (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Asstt. Charity Commr.,
(2004) 3 SCC 137). The basic question is whether a real cause
of action has been set out or something purely illusory has been
stated with a view to get out of the Rule. For this purpose, it is
to be noted that when this Court is called upon to exercise
jurisdiction to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC,
the averments made in the plaint and the documents filed along
with the plaint, which form part thereof alone, will be taken into
consideration, and this Court cannot consider the defence, pleas
or materials submitted by the defendant for the purpose of
rejecting the plaint (Gunaseelan v. Valarmathi and 2 Ors,
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2009(5) CTC 693, para 13)
15. A trial court that does not undertake this exercise
on a ground specifically raised before it leaves undischarged a
duty which the law casts upon it. Resultantly, there is a failure to
exercise a jurisdiction vested in it and a material irregularity in
its exercise, within clauses (b) and (c) of Section 115(1) of the
CPC. The question whether the plaint discloses a cause of action
can be answered from the four corners of the plaint. It is a pure
question of law, needs no evidence and has been fully argued. A
remand would only prolong a suit that has been pending since
2020. Section 115(1) of the CPC empowers this Court to “make
such order in the case as it thinks fit”, and this Court therefore
proceeds to decide the question itself.
16. The suit is described as a suit for defamation, and
the plaintiff’s case is rested on the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code relating to defamation. Section 499 of the IPC provides
that whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or
by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person, intending to harm, or
knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will
harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
thereinafter excepted, to defame that person.
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17. The Supreme Court in Mohammed Abdulla Khan
v. Prakash K. (2018 (1) SCC 615, paras 10 and 11) observed
that to constitute defamation, there must be, first, an imputation
concerning a person; secondly, that imputation must be made
with the intention of harming, or with knowledge or reason to
believe that it will harm, the reputation of that person; and
thirdly, the imputation must be made or published, whether by
words, signs or visible representations. The Apex Court
explained the distinction between making and publishing: if X
tells Y that Y is a criminal, X makes an imputation; if X tells Z
that Y is a criminal, X publishes it. The essence of publication is
the communication of the defamatory imputation to persons
other than the person against whom it is made (para 11).
Whoever “either made or published” the imputation is the
person answerable (para 16). Defamation is thus an act of the
defendant, namely the making or publishing of an imputation. It
is not any and every event that leaves the plaintiff’s standing
diminished.
18. The word “imputation” is central to defamation.
Explanation 4 to Section 499 of the IPC states that no
imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation unless that
imputation, directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others,
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lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or
lowers his character in respect of his caste or calling, or lowers
his credit, or causes it to be believed that his body is in a
loathsome or disgraceful state. The statute thus ties harm to
reputation to an imputation, that is, to something said or shown
about the person. It follows that the law of defamation protects a
person’s reputation against false and harmful imputations
published to others. It does not compensate for every
reputational or financial consequence that follows from a lawful
act, such as the termination of a contract or of a professional
engagement. The act of ending a relationship is not, by itself, a
statement about the person with whom the relationship is ended.
19. The second indispensable element is ‘publication’.
A communication made only to the person concerned does not
defame him, for the harm which the law of defamation
addresses is the lowering of his reputation in the eyes of others.
This was the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad
High Court in Queen Empress v. Taki Hussain (ILR 7 All 205),
and it was accepted by the Bombay High Court in Navin
Parekh v. Madhubala Shridhar Sharma, (1992) 94 BLR 467
(paras 11, 13 and 14), where the correspondence had been
received directly by the complainant and it was nobody’s case
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that it was circulated. Nor does hurt to feelings amount to
defamation. In Navin Parekh (supra, para 9), the Bombay High
Court observed:
“It is not out of place to mention that
prosecutions for defamation are often
instituted, in a majority of cases
because of hurt-feelings, or damaged
egos but the parties invariably see
reason and conclude these skirmishes
amicably.”
20. The same learned Judge, in para 24 of the
same decision, cautioned that where parties from the legal
profession use the judicial process on the strength of
contrived super-sensitivity, and the motivation appears to
be personal rather than a genuine legal wrong, such
proceedings deserve to be ended at the threshold in the
interest of the Bar and of the Courts. That was said in a
petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, but the principle: that the machinery of the
courts is not to be spent on grievances that do not amount
in law to defamation, applies with equal force at the
threshold stage of a civil suit under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC.
21. The Bombay High Court further held in
Navin Parekh (supra para 11) that where a party, on the
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basis of sufficient material, arrives at a conclusion and
states its case and the course of action it contemplates, it is
wholly inappropriate to allege that an offence of
defamation has been committed, and that the basic
ingredients, namely a malicious intention and the
publication of a false imputation with the intention of
damaging reputation, were absent. The observation was
made in the context of legal correspondence, but it states a
principle of general application: the legitimate assertion of
one’s position, or the exercise of one’s lawful rights in
respect of another, is not defamation merely because the
other person is displeased.
22. It is necessary to be precise about the
relationship between the civil and the criminal law of
defamation, since the plaintiff has invoked the penal
provisions in a suit for damages. There is no statute in
India codifying the civil liability for defamation, and in its
absence such suits have been decided on the principles of
justice, equity and good conscience (B. Sumat Prasad
Jain v. Sheo Dutt Sharma, AIR 1946 All 213, para 15).
The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Chunni
Lal v. Narsingh Das (AIR 1918 All 69) held the English
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common law rule on privilege to be in accord with those
principles and applied it to a civil suit for defamation
(Sumat Prasad Jain, supra, para 14). Whether the claim is
tested against the definition in Section 499 of the IPC or
against the common law principles applied in civil actions,
a defamatory imputation and its publication to a third
person are indispensable. At the same time, the English
doctrine of absolute privilege applies to civil liability only.
In a criminal proceeding, the person prosecuted must bring
his case within the Exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC
(M.L. Ganesh v. CA V. Venkata Siva Kumar, (2021) 16
Comp Cas-OL 392, para 9, extracting the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in P.C. Gupta v. The State; Navin
Parekh, para 25, noticing Balraj Khanna v. Moti Ram).
23. The Exceptions are, ordinarily, matters of
defence. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, the
burden of bringing the case within an Exception lies on the
person claiming it, and it is a settled law that the
applicability of an Exception can ordinarily be gone into
only at trial (Navin Parekh, supra, para 25). This Court is
conscious of that position, and the decision in this revision
does not rest on the Exceptions. It rests on the logically
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prior question whether the plaint pleads the ingredients of
defamation at all. Where it does not, the question of an
Exception does not arise, and an examination of an
Exception would be redundant (Navin Parekh, supra, para
23).
24. Since the Exceptions bear on the nature of
the conduct complained of, it is useful to notice three of
them. The Seventh Exception under Section 499 of the IPC
provides that it is not defamation in a person having over
another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out
of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good
faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to
which such lawful authority relates; its illustrations include
a master censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in
service, and a banker censuring in good faith the cashier of
his bank for the conduct of such cashier as such cashier.
The Eighth Exception under Section 499 of the IPC
provides that it is not defamation to prefer in good faith an
accusation against any person to any of those who have
lawful authority over that person with respect to the
subject-matter of the accusation. The Ninth Exception
under Section 499 of the IPC provides that it is not
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defamation to make an imputation on the character of
another, provided the imputation is made in good faith for
the protection of the interests of the person making it, or of
any other person, or for the public good. “Good faith”, as
defined in Section 52 of the IPC, requires due care and
attention; nothing is said to be done or believed in good
faith which is done or believed without due care and
attention. Whether the requirements of an Exception are in
fact satisfied is, as noted, a question of fact to be
established by evidence. The three Exceptions are noticed
here only to bring out that the Penal Code itself recognises
that censure by a person in lawful authority under a
contract, accusations made to those competent to receive
them, and imputations made to protect the maker’s
legitimate interests lie outside the offence of defamation
when made in good faith. These are matters of everyday
institutional dealing, and they are to be kept in view when
the plaint is read.
25. The plaintiff has invoked his standing as an
advocate. Section 29 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides
that advocates are the only class of persons entitled to
practise the profession of law. Section 30 of that Act, which
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came into force on 15.06.2011, provides that every
advocate whose name is entered in the State roll is entitled
as of right to practise throughout the territories to which
the Act extends in all courts, before any tribunal or person
legally authorised to take evidence, and before any other
authority or person before whom he is by or under any law
entitled to practise. Both provisions define who may
practise and where. Neither creates a right to be engaged
by a particular client, and neither places any litigant or
institution under an obligation to brief, retain or continue to
retain a particular advocate. The right to practise is a right
to appear when engaged; it is not a right to be engaged.
26. The corollary is the freedom of the client.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a litigant must
have the freedom to change his advocate when he feels that
the advocate is not capable of espousing his cause
efficiently, or that his conduct is prejudicial to the interest
involved in the lis, “or for any other reason”, and that
where the client does not wish to continue the engagement
it is a professional requirement, consistent with the dignity
of the profession, that the advocate return the brief (R.D.
Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, (2000) 7 SCC 264,
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para 15). A vakalatnama is an authority in the nature of an
agency, and an agency is revocable by the principal (see
Section 203 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872). The
procedure under Order III Rule 4 of the CPC for
determining an appointment on the record of a pending
proceeding regulates the manner of its exercise before the
court; it does not curtail the substantive freedom of the
principal to choose counsel. No law requires a client to
give reasons for disengaging an advocate, and the exercise
of that freedom, whether by withdrawing a vakalatnama,
by engaging a fresh counsel or by removing an advocate
from a panel, is the exercise of a legal right. It is not, of
itself, an imputation upon the advocate.
27. The position of a bank and its panel
advocates has recently been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ajay Vijh v. Indian Banks’ Association, 2026
INSC 670 (decided on 07.07.2026). The Court held that the
relationship between a bank and its advocate is primarily
contractual and founded on trust and confidence, that an
advocate has “no right to be empanelled with a bank or to
be continued so”, and that a bank is entitled to assess
internally the quality of the services rendered by
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professionals engaged by it and, on that basis, to decide on
continuation or discontinuation of empanelment. In case,
where the bank is dissatisfied, it is always open to it to
discontinue
the
engagement
or
to
decline
future
empanelment (para 25; see also paras 2.3 and 11, where the
Court observed that de-empanelment by a bank may well
fall within the realm of a contractual relationship). The
Court further observed that where a bank considers that an
advocate is guilty of negligence or misconduct, the remedy
is to place the material before the competent State Bar
Council under the Advocates Act (paras 31, 32 and 36),
and it acknowledged the legitimate concern of banks
regarding the quality of legal opinions (para 38).
28. Ajay Vijh (supra) also draws a line which
this Court must respect. What was held to be beyond the
power of a bank, and illegal, was the inclusion of the
advocate’s name in the Caution List maintained by the
Indian Banks’ Association, accompanied by remarks on his
competence and circulated to all banks, which operated as
a public declaration about his competence and character
(paras 2.3, 26, 28 and 36). The Court made it clear that it
was not dealing with a case of alleged fraud, and that if
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fraud were alleged and prosecuted, entirely different
considerations would arise (para 27). The decision
therefore draws a distinction between two things. The
removal of an advocate from a bank’s panel is lawful. A
separate act of publicly declaring the advocate incompetent
or dishonest to others is not. The significance of the
distinction for the present case is considered below.
29. The Madras High Court has applied the same
principle in the context of the removal of a professional by
those who held the power to remove him. In M.L. Ganesh
(supra), a Resolution Professional who had been removed
on the application of the Committee of Creditors, which
comprised banks, prosecuted the officers of the banks and
their advocate for defamation. The High Court held that the
creditors, having the power to replace him, had acted
within it, that this did not attract Section 499 of the IPC
(para 7), and that the allegations made in the application
for his removal were not defamatory, particularly as the
removal had been carried in challenge up to the appellate
tribunal and had not been disturbed (para 10). It quashed
the complaint as an abuse of the process of the court (para
11). The power of removal in that case was statutory and in
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the present case it is contractual, but the reasoning, that the
lawful exercise of a power to remove a professional is not
defamation of him, applies equally.
30. Thus, a person is defamed not because he
suffers a loss of standing or livelihood, but because another
makes or publishes an imputation about him, to a third
person, in circumstances which the law does not excuse. A
client, including a bank, who ends a professional
engagement or removes an advocate from a panel exercises
a legal right and, without more, makes no imputation and
publishes nothing. If, in addition, a client separately makes
and publishes a defamatory imputation about the advocate
to third parties, liability, if any, arises from that separate
act, which must itself be pleaded and proved, and not from
the disengagement.
31. Accordingly, the case of the plaintiff, as it
appears from the plaint is that he was an empanelled
advocate of the State Bank of India for the Jamui Civil
Court from 1983 to 2018; that a title deed on which he had
submitted his title investigation report was re-examined by
another panel advocate, who opined that the document was
not genuine; that on the basis of that opinion the plaintiff
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was de-panelled; and that this lowered his prestige, dignity
and reputation and caused him financial loss and mental
agony, quantified at Rs. 25,00,000/-. The cause of action
pleaded is, therefore, the de-panelment itself and the
consequences said to flow from it.
32. First, de-panelment is not defamation. It is a
decision to discontinue a professional engagement. It says
nothing about the plaintiff and carries no imputation within
Section 499 of the IPC. The Bank may decide to
discontinue an advocate, and Sections 29 and 30 of the
Advocates Act, which secure the plaintiff’s right to appear
when engaged, do not secure his engagement. Loss of the
panel engagement and the resulting financial loss flow
from the removal itself, and the law of defamation does not
compensate for that. If the plaintiff has any other grievance
about his removal, it is a dispute about the termination of
an engagement, as to which no opinion is expressed.
Secondly, the statement said to have been exhibited is
attributed not to any defendant but to “the newly appointed
lawyer of the Bank”, who is not a party and is not named.
The only link to the petitioners is the phrase “on the
instance of the defendants”, with no material fact stating
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which defendant gave instructions, when, and in what
manner. The person answerable for defamation is the one
who made or published the imputation (Mohammed
Abdulla Khan v. Prakash K., 2018 (1) SCC 615, para 16).
A bare conclusion that a non-party, through his mobile,
started spreading the news of disengagement of the
opposite party from the bank is not a statement of material
facts under Order VI Rule 2(1) of the CPC, and does not
make out a cause of action against the petitioners. Thirdly,
the averments on publication are general. The plaint states
the gist of what was allegedly said, but not when it was
said, to whom, on what occasion, or by what means beyond
“exhibiting through his mobile”. The expressions “in the
court as well as in the Bar”, “spread like anything” and
“murmuring everywhere” identify no person to whom
anything was communicated. Publication to a person other
than the plaintiff is an essential ingredient (Mohammed
Abdulla Khan, supra, para 11), and it must be pleaded as a
fact. A general averment of this kind is of the sort which
the Bombay High Court noticed in Navin Parekh (supra,
para 11) as having been added to sustain a complaint
because publication was indispensable. The plaint thus
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pleads the consequence of publication, namely that the
statement spread, without pleading publication itself.
33. The learned counsel for the opposite party
also relied on the Bank’s letter dated 07.12.2018, said to
describe the plaintiff as a fraud and to have been circulated
to the court. The cause of action must be found in the plaint
and the documents filed with it, and it cannot be improved
by oral submissions or a rejoinder. The plaint, read as a
whole, is founded on the de-panelment and the averments
just considered, and not on that letter as a defamatory
publication. This Court is conscious of the limit drawn in
Ajay Vijh (supra, paras 26 to 28) that a bank may not
publicly declare an advocate incompetent, but no such
public declaration by the Bank is pleaded. Nothing here
expresses any view on the genuineness of the deed or the
competing title reports, which have no bearing on whether
a cause of action for defamation is disclosed. The later
police case and the Bank’s complaint case of 2022, which
post-dates the suit of 19.10.2020, likewise go only to the
merits of that dispute.
34. The Exceptions noticed earlier are also
naturally engaged by the case as pleaded. The Bank’s
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authority over its panel advocate arises out of a lawful
contract (Ajay Vijh, para 25); the Bank’s approach to the
police or a Magistrate, to the extent it did so, falls within
the Eighth Exception; and a bank’s interest in the integrity
of the title documents on which its advances are secured
(Ajay Vijh, para 38) is the kind of interest the Ninth
Exception protects. Good faith is, however, a matter of
evidence, and this Court does not decide on it. The plaint
fails on the prior ground that it does not plead the
ingredients of defamation.
35. The objections of the opposite party to the
petition do not assist him. Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
may be exercised at any stage of the suit, before the
conclusion of the trial. The Court does not doubt that the
loss of a panel engagement held for about thirty-five years
is a matter of real distress to an advocate. But hurt feelings
and damaged ego are not defamation. The pendency of Cr.
Misc. No. 11233 of 2021 has not weighed with this Court,
and the observations here are confined to whether the
plaint in Title (Defamation) Suit No. 137 of 2020 discloses
a cause of action. They are not an opinion on the merits of
that application or of the complaint case. The plaint
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therefore does not disclose a cause of action against the
petitioners, and Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC requires it
to be rejected.
36. Accordingly, the present civil revision
application is allowed. The order dated 17.10.2024 passed
by the learned Sub-Judge-III, Jamui, in Title (Defamation)
Suit No. 137 of 2020 is set aside. The petition dated
30.05.2024 is allowed, and the plaint in Title (Defamation)
Suit No. 137 of 2020 is rejected under Order VII Rule
11(a) of the CPC. The suit therefore stands disposed of
accordingly.
37. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Ramesh Chand Malviya, J)
Harshita/U
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