Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) vs Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority

ss. 2(15) – Tax exemption, claim of by the Statutory corporations, authorities or bodies; Statutory regulatory bodies/authorities; Trade Promotion bodies, councils, associations or organizations; Non-statutory bodies-ERNET, NIXI and GS1 India; State Cricket Associations;and Private trusts as a General Public Utility charity – Certain kinds of income or receipts, may not be characterized as derived from trade, commerce or business in relation to activities of General Public Utility, for a consideration – Held: As regards, Statutory Authorities, corporations, or bodies receipts are prima facie to be excluded from the mischief of business or commercial receipts, since their objects are essential for advancement of public purposes/functions – However, if the consideration or amounts charged are significantly higher than the cost and a nominal mark-up, then the receipts would indicate that the activities are in fact in the nature of “trade, commerce or business” and would have to comply with the quantified limit in the proviso to s. 2(15) – For the Statutory regulators, to be considered as one with ‘charitable purpose’ eligible for exemption under the IT Act, the overall quantitative limit prescribed in the proviso to s. 2(15) (as amended from time to time) has to be complied with – Trade promotion bodies involved in advancement of objects of general public utility can claim exemption – However, income or receipts for providing the additional services would be business or commercial in nature – As regards, non-statutory bodies performing public functions, such as ERNET and NIXI are engaged in important public purposes – Fees or consideration charged by them for the purposes provided are nominal – However, their claim have to be ascertained on year to year basis – Further, GSI India is involved in advancement of general public utility, its services are for the benefit of trade and business, from which they receive significantly high receipts – Therefore, GSI India is not eligible for the exemption – Private Trusts-Tribune Trust cannot benefit from exemption offered to entities covered by s. 2(15) as the income received from advertisements, constituted business or commercial receipts – Limit prescribed in the proviso to s. 2(15) has to be adhered to for the Trust’s claim of being as a charity eligible for exemption – So far as Sports associations is concerned, matter requires further scrutiny.

Interpretation of Statute : Aids to Interpretation – History of legislation, other extrinsic aids to construction of the statute, viz, speeches in Parliament and departmental circulars – Relevance of – Explained.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 As regards the general test under Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, it is clarified that an assessee advancing general public utility cannot engage itself in any trade, commerce or business, or provide service in relation thereto for any consideration (“cess, or fee, or any other consideration”). However, in the course of achieving the object of general public utility, the concerned trust, society, or other such organization, can carry on trade, commerce or business or provide services in relation thereto for consideration, provided that (i) the activities of trade, commerce or business are connected (“actual carrying out...” inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2016) to the achievement of its objects of GPU; and (ii) the receipt from such business or commercial activity or service in relation thereto, does not exceed the quantified limit, as amended over the years (Rs. 10 lakhs w.e.f. 01.04.2009; then Rs. 25 lakhs w.e.f. 01.04.2012; and now 20% of total receipts of the previous year, w.e.f. 01.04.2016). Generally, the charging of any amount towards consideration for such an activity (advancing general public utility), which is on cost-basis or nominally above cost, cannot be considered to be “trade, commerce, or business” or any services in relation thereto. It is only when the charges are markedly or significantly above the cost incurred by the assessee in question, that they would fall within the mischief of “cess, or fee, or any other consideration” towards “trade, commerce or business”. Iit is clarified as to what kind of services or goods provided on cost or nominal basis would normally be excluded from the mischief of trade, commerce, or business. Section 11(4A) must be interpreted harmoniously with Section 2(15), with which there is no conflict. Carrying out activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or service in relation to such activities, should be conducted in the course of achieving the GPU object, and the income, profit or surplus or gains must, therefore, be incidental. The requirement in Section 11(4A) of maintaining separate books of account is also in line with the necessity of demonstrating that the quantitative limit prescribed in the proviso to Section 2(15), has not been breached. Similarly, the insertion of Section 13(8), seventeenth proviso to Section 10(23C) and third proviso to Section 143(3) (all w.r.e.f. 01.04.2009), reaffirm this interpretation and bring uniformity across the statutory provisions. [Para 253][1058-C-H; 1059-AC]

1.2 The amounts or any money whatsoever charged by a statutory corporation, board or any other body set up by the state government or central governments, for achieving what are essentially ‘public functions/services’ (such as housing, industrial development, supply of water, sewage management, supply of food grain, development and town planning, etc.) may resemble trade, commercial, or business activities. However, since their objects are essential for advancement of public purposes/functions (and are accordingly restrained by way of statutory provisions), such receipts are prima facie to be excluded from the mischief of business or commercial receipts. However, at the same time, in every case, the assessing authorities would have to apply their minds and scrutinize the records, to determine if, and to what extent, the consideration or amounts charged are significantly higher than the cost and a nominal mark-up. If such is the case, then the receipts would indicate that the activities are in fact in the nature of “trade, commerce or business” and as a result, would have to comply with the quantified limit (as amended from time to time) in the proviso to Section 2(15) of the IT Act. [Para 253 B.1, B.2][1059-C-G]

1.3 In clause (b) of Section 10(46) of the IT Act, “commercial” has the same meaning as “trade, commerce, business” in Section 2(15) of the IT Act. Therefore, sums charged by such notified body, authority, Board, Trust or Commission (by whatever name called) will require similar consideration – i.e., whether it is at cost with a nominal mark-up or significantly higher, to determine if it falls within the mischief of “commercial activity”. However, in the case of such notified bodies, there is no quantified limit in Section 10(46). Therefore, the Central Government would have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether and to what extent, exemption can be awarded to bodies that are notified under Section 10(46). For the period 01.04.2003 to 01.04.2011, a statutory corporation could claim the benefit of Section 2(15) having regard to the judgment of this Court in the Gujarat Maritime Board’s case. Likewise, the denial of benefit under Section 10(46) after 01.04.2011 does not preclude a statutory corporation, board, or whatever such body may be called, from claiming that it is set up for a charitable purpose and seeking exemption under Section 10(23C) or other provisions of the Act. [Para 253, B-3, B-4][1059-G-H; 1060-A-D]

1.4 The income and receipts of statutory regulatory bodies which are for instance, tasked with exclusive duties of prescribing curriculum, disciplining professionals and prescribing standards of professional conduct, are prima facie not business or commercial receipts. However, this is subject to the caveat that if the assessing authorities discern that certain kinds of activities carried out by such regulatory body involved charging of fees that are significantly higher than the cost incurred (with a nominal mark-up) or providing other facilities or services such as admission forms, coaching classes, registration processing fees, etc., at markedly higher prices, those would constitute commercial or business receipts. In that event, the overall quantitative limit prescribed in the proviso to Section 2(15) (as amended from time to time) has to be complied with, if the regulatory body is to be considered as one with ‘charitable purpose’ eligible for exemption under the IT Act. Like statutory authorities which regulate professions, statutory bodies which certify products (such as seeds) based on standards for qualification, etc. will also be treated similarly. [Para 253, C.1, C.2][1060-D-G]

1.5 Bodies involved in trade promotion (such as AEPC), or set up with the objects of purely advocating for, coordinating and assisting trading organisations, can be said to be involved in advancement of objects of general public utility. However, if such organisations provide additional services such as courses meant to skill personnel, providing private rental spaces in fairs or trade shows, consulting services, etc. then income or receipts from such activities, would be business or commercial in nature. In that event, the claim for tax exemption would have to be again subjected to the rigors of the proviso to Section 2(15) of the IT Act. [Para 253, D][1060-G-H; 1061-A-B]

1.6 Non-statutory bodies performing public functions, such as ERNET and NIXI are engaged in important public purposes. The materials on record show that fees or consideration charged by them for the purposes provided are nominal. In the circumstances, it is held that the said two assessees are driven by charitable purposes. However, the claims of such non- statutory organisations performing public functions, will have to be ascertained on a yearly basis, and the tax authorities must discern from the records, whether the fees charged are nominally above the cost, or have been increased to much higher levels. It is held that though GS1 India is in fact, involved in advancement of general public utility, its services are for the benefit of trade and business, from which they receive significantly high receipts. In the circumstances, its claim for exemption cannot succeed having regard to amended Section 2(15). However, the Court does not rule out any future claim made and being independently assessed, if GS1 is able to satisfy that what it provides to its customers is charged on cost-basis with at the most, a nominal markup. [Para

253 E.1, E.2][1061-B-F]

1.7 So far as the state cricket associations are concerned (Saurashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Baroda, and Rajkot), the matter requires further scrutiny. Accordingly, a direction is issued that the AO shall adjudicate the matter afresh after issuing notice to the concerned assessees and examining the relevant material indicated in the previous paragraphs of this judgment. Furthermore, if any consequential order needs to be issued, the same shall be done and resulting actions, including assessment orders shall be passed in accordance with the law under relevant provisions of the IT Act. [Para 253, F][1061-F-H]

1.8 So far as the appeal by assessee-Tribune Trust is concerned, despite advancing general public utility, the Trust cannot benefit from exemption offered to entities covered by Section 2(15) as the records reveal that income received from advertisements, constituted business or commercial receipts. Consequently, the limit prescribed in the proviso to Section 2(15) has to be adhered to for the Trust’s claim of being as a charity eligible for exemption, to succeed. Therefore, despite differing reasoning, the impugned judgment of the High Court does not call for interference. [Para 253, G][1062-A-C]

2.1 The limited relief, given by the second proviso to s. 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to ‘general public utility’ – GPU charities (for the period 2009-2015) was that in case such GPU category charities did carry on activities undertaken in the course of actual carrying out of their GPU objects that were in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or rendered any service in relation to trade, business, etc., and collected fee, cess, or other consideration, such income could still be exempt, if it did not exceed 10,00,000 (and later, 25,00,000). By the amendment of 2015, the second proviso was deleted and two conditions were introduced, with respect to permissibility of carrying on trade, commerce, etc: (i) such activity is undertaken in the course of actual carrying out of such advancement of any other object of general public utility; and (ii) the aggregate receipts from such activity or activities during the previous year, do not exceed twenty percent of the total receipts, of the trust or institution undertaking such activity or activities, of that previous year. [Para 136][997-C-F]

2.2 Parliamentary endeavour, was to alter the regime applicable to taxation of GPU category charities, under the IT Act. The absolute bar imposed on GPU charities from carrying on activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, evidences this intent. The original Section 2(15) did not allude to trade, commerce or business, or any service in relation to such activities. It only enjoined the GPU charities from involving themselves from carrying on of any activity for profit 127 (which was interpreted in Surat Art Silk). This substantial change brought about by the amendments of 2008 -2012 and 2015 is the prohibition from engaging in any kind of activity in the nature of business, commerce, or trade or any rendering any service in relation thereto, and earning income by the way of cess, fee or consideration. The express deletion of the reference to ‘activity for profit’ on the one hand, and the enactment of an expanded list of what cannot be done by GPU charities if they are to retain their characteristic as charities, is an emphatic manner in which Parliament wished to express itself. [Para 138][998-A-D]

2.3 Not every state activity resembling commerce can be considered per se exempt from union taxation, in the context of Article 289. Mere sale or lease of government property does not imply trade or business. The crucial or determinative element in the venture, so to say, is whether performance of a function is actuated by profit motive. The careful analysis of the amended proviso to Section 2(15), reveal that the prohibition applies in a four-fold manner- (a) The bar to engaging in trade, commerce or business, (b)The bar to providing any service in relation to trade, commerce or business, (c) wherein “for a fee, cess or any other consideration” is the controlling phrase for both (a) and (b) (which are collectively referred to as “prohibited activities” for brevity)

(d) irrespective of the application of the income derived from such ‘prohibited activities’. [Para 141, 142][1001-F-H; 1002-AB]

2.4 The impermissibility of any trade, or commercial activity or service, and income, from them, was intended to be conveyed through the prohibition, in the first part of the definition of GPU charities. The necessary implication which arises is that income (received as fee, cess, or any other consideration) derived from such ‘prohibited activities’ is necessarily motivated by profit. The ordinary meaning of fee or consideration would be synonymous with something of value, usually in monetary terms. However, the use of the expression “cess” facially lends a different colour to all the three expressions. [Para 143][1002-B-D]

2.5 “Fee, cess and any other consideration” has to receive a purposive interpretation, in the present context. If fee or cess or such consideration is collected for the purpose of an activity, by a state department or entity, which is set up by statute, its mandate to collect such amounts cannot be treated as consideration towards trade or business. Therefore, regulatory activity, necessitating fee or cess collection in terms of enacted law, or collection of amounts in furtherance of activities such as education, regulation of profession, etc., are per se not business or commercial in nature. Likewise, statutory boards and authorities, who are under mandate to develop housing, industrial and other estates, including development of residential housing at reasonable or subsidized costs, which might entail charging higher amounts from some section of the beneficiaries, to crosssubsidize the main activity, cannot be characterized as engaging in business. The character of being ‘state’, and such corporations or bodies set up under specific laws (whether by states or the centre) would, therefore, not mean that the amounts are ‘fee’ or ‘cess’ to provide some commercial or business service. In each case, at the same time, the mere nomenclature of the consideration being a “fee” or “cess”, is not conclusive. If the fee or cess, or other consideration is to provide an essential service, in larger public interest, such as water cess or sewage cess or fee, such consideration, received by a statutory body, would not be considered “trade, commerce or business” or service in relation to those. Non-statutory bodies, on the other hand, which may mimic regulatory or development bodies - such as those which promote trade, for a section of business or industry, or are aimed at providing facilities or amenities to improve efficiencies, or platforms to a segment of business, for fee, whether charged by subscription, or specific fee, etc, may not be charitable; when they claim exemption, their cases would require further scrutiny. [Para 144][1002-D-H; 1003-A-B]

2.6 What Parliament intended – through the amendments in question was to proscribe, involvement or engagement of GPU charities, from any form (“in the nature of”) of activities that were trade, business or commerce, or engage or involve in providing services in relation to trade, business or commerce- for a fee, cess or other consideration. The inclusion of the term “in the nature of” was by design, to clarify beyond doubt, that not only business, trade or commerce, but all activities in the nature of, or resembling them, were proscribed. Likewise, service in relation to such activities, i.e., services relating, or pertaining to, such proscribed activities, too were forbidden. The reference to fee or cess, is in the opinion of the court, only to emphasize that even a statutory consideration, for a service to business, trade or commerce, would take the activity outside the definition of a GPU charity. The sense in which the expressions “cess, fee or other consideration” are used, is that if any amount, is received for trading, or business or commercial activity, or any services to such activity, then, notwithstanding their nomenclature (as fee or cess, i.e. that they are fixed under a law) the GPU charity cannot claim tax exempt status. To bring home this even more pointedlyand underline a break from the past, the application of such amounts (received in the course of trade, commerce, or business, or towards services in relation thereto) would be irrelevant, as evidenced by the term “irrespective”, in the fourth limb of reading Section 2(15). [Paras 150, 151][1006-D-H]

2.7 Section 2(15) - in the wake of its several amendments between 2008 and 2015 - can be juxtaposed with the interpretation of the unamended Section 2(15) by this Court. In Surat Art Silk’s case, the principle enunciated was that so long as the predominant object of GPU category charity is charitable, its engagement in a non-charitable object resulting in profits that are incidental, is permissible. Profits and gains from such activities which were non-charitable had to be deployed or “fed” back to achieve the dominant charitable object. The paradigm change achieved by Section 2(15) after its amendment in 2008 and as it stands today, is that firstly a GPU charity cannot engage in any activity in the nature of trade, commerce, business or any service in relation to such activities for any consideration (including a statutory fee etc.). This is emphasized in the negative language employed by the main part of Section 2(15). Therefore, the idea of a predominant object among several other objects, is discarded. The prohibition is relieved to a limited extent, by the proviso which carves out the condition by which otherwise prohibited activities can be engaged in by GPU charities. The conditions are; that such activities in the nature of trade, commerce, business or service (in relation to trade, commerce or business for consideration) should be in the course of “actual carrying on” of the GPU object, and the quantum of receipts from such activities should be exceed 20% of the total receipts. Both parts of the proviso: (i) and (ii) (to Section 2 (15)) have to be read conjunctively-given the conscious use of “or” connecting the two of them. This means that if a charitable trust carries on any activity in the nature of business, trade or commerce, in the actual course of fulfilling its objectives, the income from such business, should not exceed the limit defined in sub-clause (ii) to the proviso. [Paras 152, 153][1007-A-G]

2.8 What has to be examined, therefore, is whether the business itself is held under trust or is carried on by and on behalf of the trust. Importantly Section 11(1) of the Act starts with the expression “subject to the provisions of Sections 60 to 63........”. Those provisions are in Chapter V of the Act. Section 60 provides for the consequences of a transfer of income where there is no transfer of assets. It says that where a person transfers merely the income from an asset without transferring the asset itself, he would continue to be chargeable to income tax. Section 61 provides for the consequences of a revocable transfer of assets and says that the same would be the position where a person is in receipt of income by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets. Section 62 provides for the consequences of a transfer of assets for a specified period, and serves as an exception to Section 61. An assessee has to be divested of the asset before ceasing to be assessable in respect of the income from it. A mere direction that the income from the business shall be applied to the charitable objects of a trust, without there being a settlement of the business itself upon trust, does not result in any trust or legal obligation. [Para 163][1012-F-H; 1013-A-B]

2.9 The journey which began with Surat Art Silk’s case was interpreted in Thanthi Trust’s case to mean that the carrying on of business by GPU charity was permissible as long as it inured to the benefit of the trust. The change brought about by the amendments in questions, however, place the focus on an entirely different perspective: that if at all any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or a service in the nature of the same, for any form of consideration is permissible, that activity should be intrinsically linked to, or a part of the GPU category charity’s object. Thus, the test of the charity being driven by a predominant object is no longer good law. Likewise, the ambiguity with respect to the kind of activities generating profit which could feed the main object and incidental profit-making also is not good law. What instead, the definition under Section 2(15) through its proviso directs and thereby marks a departure from the previous law, is – firstly that if a GPU charity is to engage in any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, for consideration it should only be a part of this actual function to attain the GPU objective and, secondly – and the equally important consideration is the imposition of a quantitative standard - i.e., income (fees, cess or other consideration) derived from activity in the nature of trade, business or commerce or service in relation to these three activities, should not exceed the quantitative limit of 10,00,000 (w.e.f. 01.04.2009), 25,00,000 (w.e.f. 01.04.2012), and 20% (w.e.f. 01.04.2016) of the total receipts. Lastly, the “ploughing” back of business income to “feed” charity is an irrelevant factor – again emphasizing the prohibition from engaging in trade, commerce or business. [Para 167][1014-A-F]

2.10 If one understands the definition in the light of the above enunciation, the sequitur is that the reference to “income being profits and gains of business” with a further reference to its being incidental to the objects of the Trust, cannot and does not mean proceeds of activities incidental to the main object, incidental objects or income derived from incidental activities. The proper way of reading reference to the term “incidental” in Section 11(4A) is to interpret it in the light of the sub-clause (i) of proviso to Section 2(15), i.e., that the activity in the nature of business, trade, commerce or service in relation to such activities should be conducted actually in the course of achieving the GPU object, and the income, profit or surplus or gains can then, be logically incidental. The amendment of 2016, inserting sub clause

(i) to proviso to Section 2(15) was therefore clarificatory. Thus interpreted, there is no conflict between the definition of charitable purpose and the machinery part of Section 11(4A). Further, the obligation under Section 11(4A) to maintain separate books of account in respect of such receipts is to ensure that the quantitative limit imposed by sub-clause (ii) to Section 2(15) can be computed and ascertained in an objective manner. [Para 168][1014-F-H; 1015-A-B]

2.11 The conclusion recorded is also supported by the language of seventh proviso 142 to Section 10(23C). Whereas Section 2(15) is the definition clause, Section 10 lists out what is not income. Section 10(23C) – by sub-clauses (iv) and (v) exempt incomes of charitable organisations. Such organisations and institutions are not limited to GPU category charities but rather extend to other types of charities (i.e. the per se kind as well). The controlling part of Section 10(23C) along with the relevant clauses (iv) and (v) seek to exclude income received by the concerned charities. However, the provisos hedge such exemption with conditions. The seventh proviso - much like Section 11(4A) and the definition - carve out an exception, to the exemptions such that income derived by charities from business, are not exempt. The seventh proviso virtually echoes Section 11(4A) in that business income derived by a charity (in the present case, the GPU charities) which arises from an activity incidental to the attainment of its objective is not per se excluded. [Para 169][1015-B-E]

2.12 Classically, the idea of charity was tied up with eleemosynary. However, “charitable purpose” – and charity as defined in the Act have a wider meaning where it is the object of the institution which is in focus. Thus, the idea of providing services or goods at no consideration, cost or nominal consideration is not confined to the provision of services or goods without charging anything or charging a token or nominal amount. Therefore, pure charity in the sense that the performance of an activity without any consideration is not envisioned under the Act. If one keeps this in mind, what Section 2(15) emphasizes is that so long as a GPU’s charity’s object involves activities which also generates profits (incidental, or in other words, while actually carrying out the objectives of GPU, if some profit is generated), it can be granted exemption provided the quantitative limit (of not exceeding 20%) under second proviso to Section 2(15) for receipts from such profits, is adhered to. Yet another manner of looking at the definition together with Sections 10(23) and 11 is that for achieving a general public utility object, if the charity involves itself in activities, that entail charging amounts only at cost or marginal mark up over cost, and also derive some profit, the prohibition against carrying on business or service relating to business is not attracted - if the quantum of such profits do not exceed 20% of its overall receipts. [Para 170-172][1015-E-G; 1016-C-E]

2.13 The insertion of Section 13(8), the seventeenth proviso to Section 10(23C) and third proviso to Section 143(3) (all of which were inserted by Finance Act, 2012, but w.r.e.f. 01.04.2009), further reinforces the interpretation of this Court, of “charitable purpose”. These provisions, form the machinery to control the conditions under which income is exempt. The effect of the seventeenth proviso to Section 10(23C) is to impose the same condition i.e., that that the trade, commerce or business activity or service relating to trade, business or commerce, should be part of the GPU’s activities, to achieve its object of advancing general public utility. The other condition– which is drawn in as part of the exemption condition, is that if such trading or commercial activity takes place the receipts should be confined to a prescribed percentage of the overall receipts. Section 13(8) too reinforces the same condition. [Para 174][1017-B-D]

2.14 The change intended by Parliament through the amendment of Section 2(15) was sought to be emphasised and clarified by the amendment of Section 10(23C) and the insertion of Section 13(8). This was Parliaments’ emphatic way of saying that generally no commercial or business or trading activity ought to be engaged by GPU charities but that in the course of their functioning of carrying out activities of general public utility, they can in a limited manner do so, provided the receipts are within the limit spelt out in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 2(15). [Para 175][1017-D-F]

3. The conclusions arrived at by way of this judgment, neither precludes any of the assessees (whether statutory, or non-statutory) advancing objects of general public utility, from claiming exemption, nor the taxing authorities from denying exemption, in the future, if the receipts of the relevant year exceed the quantitative limit. The assessing authorities must on a yearly basis, scrutinize the record to discern whether the nature of the assessee’s activities amount to “trade, commerce or business” based on its receipts and income (i.e., whether the amounts charged are on cost-basis, or significantly higher). If it is found that they are in the nature of “trade, commerce or business”, then it must be examined whether the quantified limit (as amended from time to time) in proviso to Section 2(15), has been breached, thus disentitling them to exemption. [Para 253, H][1062-C-E]

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2 SCR 743; Chameli Singh v. State of U.P & Ors. (1996)

2 SCC 549 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 827; Sri. P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors. 1995 (1) SCALE 653; P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras & Ors. [1965] 1 SCR 614; Dalco Engineering Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye & Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 378 : [2010] 4 SCR15; State of A.P v. H. Abdul Bakhi & Bros. [1964] 7 SCR 664; ICAI Accounting Research Foundation v. DGIT(E) 321 ITR 73 (Del); Bureau of Indian Standards v. DGIT(E) 358 ITR 78 (Del); GS1 India v. DGIT(E) 360 ITR 138 (Del); Dir. Of Supp. & Disp. v. Board of Revenue [1967] 3 SCR 778; Barendra Prasad Ray v. ITO [1981] 3 SCR 387; State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1967] 1 SCR 618; Customs & Excise Commissioner v. Lord Fisher (1981)

2 All ER 147; Nabha Power Limited v. Punjab SPCL (2018) 11 SCC 508: [2017] 14 SCR 301; State of Gujarat v. Maheshkumar Dhirajal Thakkar (1980) 2 SCC 322; Saurashtra Education Foundation v. CIT [2005] 273 ITR 139 (Guj.); Gujarat State Co-operative Union v. CIT [1992] 195 ITR 279 (Guj.); American Hotel and Lodging Association v. CBDT (2008) 10 SCC

509 : [2008] 8 SCR 117

Victoria Technical Institute v CIT [1991] 188 ITR 57 (SC); Aditnar Educational Institution v. Addl. CIT (1997) 3 SCC 346 : [1997] 1 SCR 948; Thiagarajar Charities v. ACIT (1997) 4 SCC 724 : [1997] 3 SCR965; Director of Income Tax v. Bharat Diamond Bourse [2003] 259 ITR 280 (SC); Visvesvarya

Technological University v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2016) 12 SCC 258 :[2016] 4 SCR 362; J.K Synthetics & Another v. Union of India & Ors. 1981 SCC OnLine Del 457; Ellerman Lines v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1972) 4 SCC 474 : [1972] 2 SCR 168; Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority v. Union of India (2006) 5 SCC 100 : [2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 757; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries [1981]

3 SCR 489; Duparquet Co. v. Evans 297 U.S. 216 (1936); Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd. & Ors. v. Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Bd. & Ors. [2009] 16 SCR 618; Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu & Ors. [1979) 1 SCR 26; Lohia Machines Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1985] 2 SCR 686; Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company & Ors. 2018 (9) SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 1191; State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964]

1 SCR 371; Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1972] 2 SCR 168; K.P. Verghese v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1982] 1 SCR 629; Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan [2003] Supp 4 SCR 222; CIT v. Vatika Township (2015) 1 SCC 1 : [2014]

12 SCR 1037; Keshavji Ravji & Co. and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1992) 2 SCC 231;

Commissioner of Customs v. Indian Oil Corporation [2004] 2 SCR 511; S.K. Gupta & Anr. v. K.P. Jain & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 54 : [1979] 2 SCR 1184; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain and Anr. (1975) Supp. SCC 1; Kalya Singh v. Genda Lal and Ors. [1975] 3 SCR 783; Vanguard Fire and Insurance Company Ltd. v. M/s. Fraser and Ross and Anr. [1960] 3 SCR 837; N.K. Jain and Ors. v. C.K. Shah and Ors. [1991] 1 SCR 938;G. Venkataswami Naidu v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1959] Supp 1 SCR 646; State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Oil Storage Distribution Company of India Ltd. [1973] 2 SCR 636; State of Tamil Nadu v. Shakti Estates [1989] 1 SCR 408; Director of Civil Supplies v. Member Board of Revenue [1967] 3 SCR 778;

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [1985] 1 SCR 432; Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale [1995] 1 SCC 996; Doypack System (P) Ltd. v. Union of India 1988 (2) SCC 299 : [1988] 2 SCR 962; Physical Research Laboratory v. K. G. Sharma (1997) 4 SCC 257 : [1997] 3 SCR 733; Town

Investments v. Department of Environment 1977 1 ALLER 813; Brothers Etc. v. Deputy Commissioner, Raichur and Ors. [1967] 1 SCR 548; India Cement Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. [1989] Supp 1 SCR 692; Vijayalashmi Rice Mill and Ors. v.

Commercial Tax Officers, Palakol & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC

763 : [2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 279; The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow v. U.P. Forest Corporation [1998]

2 SCR 22; Union of India & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [2007] 12 SCR 792; Union of India v. Purna Municipal Corporation [1991] Supp 1 SCR 183;

Municipal Corporation, Amritsar v. Senior

Superintendent of Post Offices, Amritsar Division & Anr. [2004] 1 SCR 913; Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai v. Fiat India (P) Ltd. & Ors. [2012]12 SCR 975; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Dawoodi Bohara Jamat (2014) 16 SCC 222; S.RM.M.CT.M. Tiruppani Trust v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1998) 2 SCC 584 : [1998] 1 SCR 653; Gadodia Swadeshi Stores v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab [1944] 12 ITR 385; J.K. Trust v. CIT [1985] 1 SCR 65; Thiagesar Dharma Vanikam v. CIT [1963] 50 ITR 798 Madras; Raja P.C. Lall Choudhary v. CIT, Bihar & Orissa [1957]

31 ITR 226 Patna; Director of Income Tax v. Bharat Diamond Bourse (2002) 10 SCC 392; Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Undertaking v. A Rajappa (1978)

2 SCC 213:[1978] 3 SCR 207; Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Union of India (hereafter “GNIDA”) [2018] 406 ITR 418; CIT v. Yamuna

Expressway Industrial Development Authority (2017)

395 ITR 18; Tamil Nadu Cricket Association v. Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) & Ors. [2014] 360 ITR 633; Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1997] Supp 4 SCR 189; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ponni Sugars 2008 (9) SCC 337 : [2008] 13 SCR570 – referred to.

Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 32 para 487