The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
10. In view of the aforesaid, the petition deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. FIR registered at Crime No.0136/2023 in Police Station Narayangarh, District Mandsaur as well as the consequent proceedings pursuant thereto in respect of the petitioner are hereby quashed and the petitioner is discharged for offences punishable under Sections 8/18, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
11. The petition is accordingly allowed and disposed off.
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
--1--
IN THE
HIGH COURT
OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT I N D O R E
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA
ON THE 4th OF JANUARY, 2024
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 53673 of 2023
BETWEEN:ARJUN S/O PRABHULAL DHAKAD, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: AGRICULTURE R/O VILLAGE HINGORIYA
BADA TEHSIL MALHARGARH DISTT. MANDSAUR
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPLICANT
(BY SHRI PALASH CHOUDHARY, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT)
AND
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH STATION HOUSE
OFFICER THROUGH POLICE STATION NARAYANGARH
DISTT. MANDSAUR (MADHYA PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI ANENDRA SINGH PARIHAR – P.L. FOR RESPONDENT/STATE)
This application coming on for admission this day, the court passed the
following:
ORDER
Heard.
2.
This petition has been preferred by the petitioner/accused for quashing
the FIR registered at Crime No.0136/2023 at Police Station – Narayangarh,
District – Mandsaur and all consequential criminal proceedings pursuant
thereto which are in respect of offence punishable under Sections 8/18, 25, and
29 of the N.D.P.S. Act.
3.
As per the prosecution, on 13.04.2023, on receipt of a secret
information, the Police party reached Jharda Bhudha Road in front of Balaji
--2-Mandir at Khejdi Fanta and recovered total 31 kg. contraband Opium from the
possession of co-accused Shyam Singh which was being transported by him in
a Swift car bearing registration No.MP-44-CA-3998 without a valid license.
Thereafter, him memorandum under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was
recorded from which it transpired that he had procured contraband from the
present petitioner who was also piloting the vehicle in which contraband was
being transported on the basis of which, he was implicated for the present
offence. After completion of the investigation, charge-sheet has been filed by
the Police before the Court concerned.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is
innocent and has falsely been implicated in the case. He was neither present on
the spot nor was any contraband recovered from his possession. The petitioner
is not the owner of the vehicle. His implication is only on the basis of the
disclosure statement of co-accused person recorded under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act in which he deposed that he had procured the contraband
from the present petitioner and was also piloting the vehicle in which
contraband was being transported. However, no fact as such could be
discovered on the basis of the aforesaid statement therefore there is no legally
admissible evidence within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act amounting to discovery of fact. Apart from this, there is no other evidence
available on record to connect the petitioner with the present crime. It is hence
submitted that the FIR against the petitioner deserves to be quashed.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State has supported the
impugned FIR and has prayed for rejection of the petition submitting that there
is sufficient material available on record against the petitioner.
6.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
--3-7.
From perusal of the material available on record, it appears that no
recovery has been made from the possession of the petitioner. Neither is he the
owner of the vehicle in which the contraband was being transported nor was
he present in the vehicle at the time of the alleged incident. He was not
apprehended from the spot. He has been implicated only on the basis of
disclosure statement of co-accused recorded under Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act in which he deposed that he had procured contraband from the
present petitioner who was also piloting the vehicle in which contraband was
being transported. The call details available on record are not in respect of the
petitioner hence there is nothing to demonstrate that he has been in contact
with the other co- accused. No recovery of any phone or SIM card has been
made from the petitioner. None of the co-accused have stated that they were in
contact with the petitioner.
8.
Recently, this Court in the case of Dilip Kumar Vs. State of M.P.,
M.Cr.C. No.2748/2022 decided on 12.04.2022 has held in paragraph No.15
to 18 as under:“15. A close scrutiny of the charge sheet reveals that apart from the aforesaid
memo and the bank statement of Dangi brothers, there is no other material
available on record to suggest that the present petitioner Deelep had also
facilitated the sale of fake fertilizer which was prepared by Suresh Dangi and
other accused persons. There is also no evidence available on record to
suggest that the present petitioner Deelep obtained from Suresh Dangi any
amount over and above the requisite amount of the sale of gypsum granules
to him, which can be said to be connected with the sale of fake fertilizer.
16. Regarding admissibility of the confessional statement given by a coaccused and of the petitioner, a reference may be had to the decision
rendered by the Supreme Court, authored by Vivian Bose, J. in the case of
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), the relevant paras 8, 9,
10 and 11 of the same read, as under:
“8. Gurubachan‟s confession has played an important part in
--4-implicating the appellant, and the question at once arises, how far
and in what way the confession of an accused person can be used
against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not evidence in the
ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in
Bhuboni Sahu v. King. “It does not indeed come within the
definition of „evidence‟ contained in Section 3 of the Evidence
Act., It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of
the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination.”
Their Lordships also point out that it is
“obviously evidence of a very weak type … It is a much weaker
type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not
subject to any of those infirmities.” They stated in addition that
such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a conviction
and can only be used in “support of other evidence”. In view of
these remarks it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but
we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension
still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of
other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be
used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a
witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same
category regarding credibility because the Judge refuses to believe
him except insofar as he is corroborated?
9. In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir Lawrence
Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chucker-butty where he said
that such a confession can only be used to “lend assurance to other
evidence against a co-accused” or, to put it in another way, as Reilly
J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan
“the provision goes no further than this--where there is evidence
against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his
conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may
be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that
evidence”.
10. Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to
this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to
marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession
altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a
--5-conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary
to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the Judge is
not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if
believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an
event the Judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend
assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing
what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to
accept.
11. Then, as regards its use in the corroboration of accomplices and
approvers. A co-accused who confesses is naturally an accomplice
and the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to
corroborate another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is
in no way lessened when the “evidence” is not on oath and cannot
be tested by cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the same rule
of caution in the case of a witness who though not an accomplice is
regarded by the Judge as having no greater probative value. But all
these are only rules of prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a
conviction can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice provided the Judge has the rule of caution, which
experience dictates, in mind and gives reasons why he thinks it
would be safe in a given case to disregard it. Two of us had
occasion to examine this recently in Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan. It follows that the testimony of an accomplice can in law
be used to corroborate another though it ought not to be so used
save in exceptional circumstances and for reasons disclosed. As the
Privy Council observe in Bhuboni Sahu v. King:
“The tendency to include the innocent with the guilty is peculiarly
prevalent in India, as judges have noted on innumerable occasions,
and it is very difficult for the court to guard against the danger …
The only real safeguard against the risk of condemning the innocent
with the guilty lies in insisting on independent evidence which in
some measure implicates such accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Testing the facts of the case at hand on the anvil of the aforesaid dictum
of the Supreme Court, this Court finds that the only material evidence
--6-against the present petitioner is the memo prepared under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act by the co-accused and certain bank transactions of the coaccused in which he has sent certain amount to the present petitioner through
NEFT. In such facts and circumstances of the case, if the petitioner who is in
the business of manufacturing Gypsum Granules and Allied products, and if
in the legitimate business transaction the aforesaid granules were purchased
by the other accused persons and in turn they use it in the manufacture of
fake fertilizer, such act, in the considered opinion of this Court, would not
amount to an offence for the present petitioner and he cannot be held guilty
for the aforesaid act of the co-accused persons in the absence of any other
material available on record to connect the petitioner with the offence, as has
already been observed above.
18. Resultantly, the petition stands allowed and the charge sheet, so far as it
relates to the present petitioner is concerned, as also the further proceedings
initiated in the trial Court against him stands quashed.”
9.
On a perusal of the case diary as well as the charge-sheet filed in the
matter, this Court is of the opinion that against the present petitioner, there is
no tangible evidence collected by the prosecution except the memos prepared
under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act at the instance of other coaccused person.
10.
In view of the aforesaid, the petition deserves to be and is accordingly
allowed. FIR registered at Crime No.0136/2023 in Police Station
Narayangarh, District Mandsaur as well as the consequent proceedings
pursuant thereto in respect of the petitioner are hereby quashed and the
petitioner is discharged for offences punishable under Sections 8/18, 25 and 29
of the NDPS Act.
11.
The petition is accordingly allowed and disposed off.
(PRANAY VERMA)
JUDGE
MAHADEV SUKHDEVE
Date: 2024.01.05 13:38:58 +05'30'
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