Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors.

Information Technology Act, 2000 – s.67C – Held: General directions issued to cellular companies & internet service providers, to be followed by courts dealing with electronic evidence, till rules and directions u/s.67(C) are formulated for compliance by telecom and service providers – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.39, 45A and 65B. Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B – Acrimony behind – Reason for – Held: Per V. Ramasubramanian J. (Supplementing) s.65B(1) starts with a non-obstante clause excluding the application of the other provisions and makes the certification a precondition for admissibility – Such admissibility as the first check post, coupled with the fact that a number of ‘computer systems’ (defined in s.2(l), 2000 Act) owned by different individuals, may get involved in the production of an electronic record, with the ‘originator’ (defined in s.2(za), 2000 Act) being different from the recipients or the sharers, has created lot of acrimony behind s.65B – Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.2(l), (za) – Federal Rules of Evidence (USA) – rr.901,

902 – UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968 – s.5 – Civil Evidence Act, 1995(UK) – Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (UK) – s.69 – Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 – s.60 – Canada Evidence Act, 1985 – s.31.1-31.3, 31.5 & 31.6. Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(4) – Certificate under – When unnecessary – Discussed.

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.65B(2)(a) to (d) and 65B(4) – Conditions mentioned under – Held: Conditions mentioned in subsections 2(a) to 2(d) of s.65B must be satisfied cumulatively – Further, conditions mentioned in sub-section (4) are also cumulative.

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(1) – Non-obstante clause – Purport of – Discussed.

Maxims – lex non cogit ad impossibilia; impotentia excusat legem – Application of – Discussed – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(4). Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(4) – Certificate under – Stage of production – Held: So long as the hearing in a trial is not yet over, the requisite certificate can be directed to be produced by the Judge at any stage – Criminal Law – Criminal Trial – Stage of admitting evidence – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.91, 207, 311.

Words & Expressions –”doing any of the following things” – Held: Aforesaid expression must be read as doing all of the following things – “any” can mean “all” given the context – Interpretation of Statutes – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(4).

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.65B(4), 165 – Certificate under – Production of – Inability of persons not in possession of – Held: Major premise of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 that such certificate cannot be secured by persons who are not in possession of an electronic device is wholly incorrect – An application can always be made to a Judge for production of such a certificate from the requisite person u/s.65B(4) in cases in which such person refuses to give it – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XVI – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.91. Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(1) – Deeming fiction – Operation of – Held: Sub-s. (1) of s.65B begins with a non-obstante clause and then mentions information contained in an electronic record produced by a computer, which is made a “document” by a deeming fiction – This deeming fiction only takes effect if the further conditions mentioned in the section are satisfied in relation to both the information and the computer in question – If such conditions are met, the “document” shall then be admissible in any proceedings.

Representation of the People Act, 1951 – s.100(1)(d)(i) – Held: Where the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the returned candidate himself, the conclusion has to be that the result of the election would be “materially affected”, without there being any necessity to plead and prove the same.

Answering the reference and dismissing the appeals with costs, the Court

HELD: Per R.F. Nariman, J. (for himself, S. Ravindra Bhat and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.)

1.1 The subject matter of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act is proof of information contained in electronic records. The marginal note to Section 65A indicates that “special provisions” as to evidence relating to electronic records are laid down in this provision. The marginal note to Section 65B then refers to “admissibility of electronic records”. Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records. Section 65B(2) then refers to the conditions that must be satisfied in respect of a computer output, and states that the test for being included in conditions 65B(2(a)) to 65(2(d)) is that the computer be regularly used to store or process information for purposes of activities regularly carried on in the period in question. The conditions mentioned in sub-sections 2(a) to 2(d) must be satisfied cumulatively. [Paras 20-22][209-A-E]

1.2 Under Sub-section (4), a certificate is to be produced that identifies the electronic record containing the statement and describes the manner in which it is produced, or gives particulars of the device involved in the production of the electronic record to show that the electronic record was produced by a computer, by either a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device; or a person who is in the management of “relevant activities” – whichever is appropriate. What is also of importance is that it shall be sufficient for such matter to be stated to the “best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it”. Here, “doing any of the following things…” must be read as doing all of the following things, it being well settled that the expression “any” can mean “all” given the context. This being the case, the conditions mentioned in sub-section (4) must also be interpreted as being cumulative. [Para 23][209-E-G; 210-A]

Bansilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar [1962] 1 SCR 33; Om Parkash v. Union of India (2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010]

2 SCR 447 – relied on.

1.3 The sub-section (1) of Section 65B begins with a nonobstante clause, and then goes on to mention information contained in an electronic record produced by a computer, which is, by a deeming fiction, then made a “document”. This deeming fiction only takes effect if the further conditions mentioned in the Section are satisfied in relation to both the information and the computer in question; and if such conditions are met, the “document” shall then be admissible in any proceedings. The words “…without further proof or production of the original…” make it clear that once the deeming fiction is given effect by the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in the Section, the “deemed document” now becomes admissible in evidence without further proof or production of the original as evidence of any contents of the original, or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. However, Section 65B(1) clearly differentiates between the “original” document - which would be the original “electronic record” contained in the “computer” in which the original information is first stored - and the computer output containing such information, which then may be treated as evidence of the contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily shows that Section 65B differentiates between the original information contained in the “computer” itself and copies made therefrom – the former being primary evidence, and the latter being secondary evidence. [Paras 30, 31][220-G-H; 221-A-D]

1.4 Despite the law so declared in Anvar P.V., wherein this Court made it clear that the special provisions of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are a complete Code in themselves when it comes to admissibility of evidence of information contained in electronic records, and also that a written certificate under Section 65B(4) is a sine qua non for admissibility of such evidence, a discordant note was soon struck in Tomaso Bruno. The judgment of Anvar P.V. was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P.V. Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno following Navjot Sandhu that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P.V., and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled. [Paras 34, 35][222-G; 223-A-B; 224-B-C]

Tomaso Bruno and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2015)

7 SCC 178 : [2015] 1 SCR 721 – overruled.

1.5 Quite apart from the fact that the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad states the law incorrectly and is in the teeth of the judgment in Anvar P.V., following the judgment in Tomaso Bruno - which has been held to be per incuriam hereinabove - the underlying reasoning of the difficulty of producing a certificate by a party who is not in possession of an electronic device is also wholly incorrect. As a matter of fact, Section 165 of the Evidence Act empowers a Judge to order production of any document or thing in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts. Likewise, under Order XVI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which deals with ‘Summoning and Attendance of Witnesses’, the Court can issue orders for the production of documents. Similarly, in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Judge conducting a criminal trial is empowered to issue the orders for production of documents. Thus, it is clear that the major premise of Shafhi Mohammad that such certificate cannot be secured by persons who are not in possession of an electronic device is wholly incorrect. An application can always be made to a Judge for production of such a certificate from the requisite person under Section 65B(4) in cases in which such person refuses to give it. [Paras 39-43][228-C-E; 229-B; 230-C; 231-C]

1.6 The facts of the present case show that despite all efforts made by the Respondents, both through the High Court and otherwise, to get the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act from the authorities concerned, yet the authorities concerned wilfully refused, on some pretext or the other, to give such certificate. In a fact-circumstance where the requisite certificate has been applied for from the person or the authority concerned, and the person or authority either refuses to give such certificate, or does not reply to such demand, the party asking for such certificate can apply to the Court for its production under the provisions aforementioned of the Evidence Act, CPC or CrPC. Once such application is made to the Court, and the Court then orders or directs that the requisite certificate be produced by a person to whom it sends a summons to produce such certificate, the party asking for the certificate has done all that he can possibly do to obtain the requisite certificate. Two Latin maxims become important at this stage. The first is lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. the law does not demand the impossible, and impotentia excusat legem i.e. when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of the law is excused. On an application of the aforesaid maxims to the present case, it is clear that though Section 65B(4) is mandatory, yet, on the facts of this case, the Respondents, having done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate, which was to be given by a third-party over whom the Respondents had no control, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said sub-section. [Paras 45, 49][231-E-H; 236-C-D]

Re: Presidential Poll (1974) 2 SCC 33; Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and Ors. (1999) 8 SCC

266 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 754; Special Reference 1 of 2002 (2002) 8 SCC 237 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 366; Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth and Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 601 : [2005] 2 SCR 670 – relied on.

2.1 Section 65B does not speak of the stage at which such certificate must be furnished to the Court. In Anvar P.V., this Court did observe that such certificate must accompany the electronic record when the same is produced in evidence. This is so in cases where such certificate could be procured by the person seeking to rely upon an electronic record. However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons. This, the trial Judge ought to do when the electronic record is produced in evidence before him without the requisite certificate in the circumstances aforementioned. This is, of course, subject to discretion being exercised in civil cases in accordance with law, and in accordance with the requirements of justice on the facts of each case. When it comes to criminal trials, it is important to keep in mind the general principle that the accused must be supplied all documents that the prosecution seeks to rely upon before commencement of the trial, under the relevant sections of the CrPC. The stage of admitting documentary evidence in a criminal trial is the filing of the charge-sheet. When a criminal court summons the accused to stand trial, copies of all documents which are entered in the charge-sheet/final report have to be given to the accused. Section 207 of the CrPC, which reads as follows, is mandatory. Therefore, the electronic evidence, i.e. the computer output, has to be furnished at the latest before the trial begins. In a criminal trial, it is assumed that the investigation is completed and the prosecution has, as such, concretised its case against an accused before commencement of the trial. The prosecution ought not to be allowed to fill up any lacunae during a trial. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be placed to an accused before commencement of the trial. Thus, the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or irreversible prejudice to the accused. A balancing exercise in respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court, in examining any application by the prosecution under Sections

91 or 311 of the CrPC or Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Depending on the facts of each case, and the Court exercising discretion after seeing that the accused is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such certificate at a later point in time. If it is the accused who desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence, this again will depend upon the justice of the case - discretion to be exercised by the Court in accordance with law. [Paras 50, 52-54][236-D-G; 237-E-F; 238-C, F; 239-A-B]

2.2 So long as the hearing in a trial is not yet over, the requisite certificate can be directed to be produced by the learned Judge at any stage, so that information contained in electronic record form can then be admitted, and relied upon in evidence. It may also be seen that the person who gives this certificate can be anyone out of several persons who occupy a ‘responsible official position’ in relation to the operation of the relevant device, as also the person who may otherwise be in the ‘management of relevant activities’ spoken of in Sub-section (4) of Section 65B. Considering that such certificate may also be given long after the electronic record has actually been produced by the computer, Section 65B(4) makes it clear that it is sufficient that such person gives the requisite certificate to the “best of his knowledge and belief” (Obviously, the word “and” between knowledge and belief in Section 65B(4) must be read as “or”, as a person cannot testify to the best of his knowledge and belief at the same time). The certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V., and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose. [Paras 57-59][243-B-G]

Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D 426 – referred to.

3. While on the subject, it is relevant to note that the Department of Telecommunication’s license conditions [i.e. under the ‘License for Provision of Unified Access Services’ framed in 2007, as also the subsequent ‘License Agreement for Unified License’ and the ‘License Agreement for provision of internet service’] generally oblige internet service providers and providers of mobile telephony to preserve and maintain electronic call records and records of logs of internet users for a limited duration of one year. Therefore, if the police or other individuals (interested, or party to any form of litigation) fail to secure those records - or secure the records but fail to secure the certificate within that period, the production of a post-dated certificate (i.e. one issued after commencement of the trial) would in all probability render the data unverifiable. This places the accused in a perilous position, as, in the event the accused wishes to challenge the genuineness of this certificate by seeking the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 45A of the Evidence Act, the electronic record (i.e. the data as to call logs in the computer of the service provider) may be missing. To obviate this, general directions are issued to cellular companies and internet service providers to maintain CDRs and other relevant records for the concerned period (in tune with Section

39 of the Evidence Act) in a segregated and secure manner if a particular CDR or other record is seized during investigation in the said period. Concerned parties can then summon such records at the stage of defence evidence, or in the event such data is required to cross-examine a particular witness. This direction shall be applied, in criminal trials, till appropriate directions are issued under relevant terms of the applicable licenses, or under Section 67C of the Information Technology Act. [Paras 61, 62][244-A-F]

3.1 In the present case, by the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2017, Election Petition 6/2014 and Election Petition 9/2014 have been allowed and partly allowed respectively, the election of the RC being declared to be void under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, inter alia, on the ground that as nomination papers at serial numbers 43 and 44 were not presented by the RC before 3.00 p.m. on 27.09.2014, such nomination papers were improperly accepted. However, by an order dated 08.12.2017, this Court admitted the Election Appeal of the Appellant, and stayed the impugned judgment and order. This matter has been heard after the five year Legislative Assembly term is over in November 2019. This being the case, ordinarily, it would be unnecessary to decide on the merits of the case, as the term of the Legislative Assembly is over. However, having read the impugned judgment, it is clear that the learned Single Judge was anguished by the fact that the Election Commission authorities behaved in a partisan manner by openly favouring the Appellant. Despite the fact that the reason given of “substantial compliance” with Section 65B(4) in the absence of the requisite certificate being incorrect in law, yet, considering that the Respondent had done everything in his power to obtain the requisite certificate from the appropriate authorities, including directions from the Court to produce the requisite certificate, no such certificate was forthcoming. [Paras 64-66][245-A-G; 246-A-C]

3.2 It is clear that apart from the evidence in the form of electronic record, other evidence was also relied upon to arrive at the same conclusion. The High Court’s judgment therefore cannot be faulted. None of the earlier judgments of this Court referred to in Mairembam Prithviraj have been adverted to in Rajendra Kumar Meshram cited by Shri Adsure. In particular, the judgment of three learned Judges of this Court in Vashist Narain Sharma has specifically held that where the person whose nomination has been improperly accepted is the returned candidate himself, it may be readily conceded that the conclusion has to be that the result of the election would be “materially affected”, without there being any necessity to plead and prove the same. The judgment in Rajendra Kumar Meshram, not having referred to these earlier judgments of a larger strength binding upon it, cannot be said to have declared the law correctly. As a result thereof, the impugned judgment of the High Court is right in its conclusion on this point also. [Paras 68, 71][247-D; 249-H; 250-A-C]

Rajendra Kumar Meshram v. Vanshmani Prasad Verma (2016) 10 SCC 715 : [2016] 9 SCR 74 – held not correct law.

Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem Sharatchandra Singh (2017) 2 SCC 487 : [2016] 9 SCR 687; Durai

Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan and Ors. (1973) 2 SCC

45 : [1974] 1 SCR 40 – referred to.

4. The reference is answered by stating that:

(a) Anvar P.V., as clarified hereinabove, is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno, being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment in SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of 2011 reported as Shafhi Mohammad and the judgment dated 03.04.2018 reported as (2018) 5 SCC 311, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled.

b. The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). The last sentence in Anvar P.V. which reads as “…if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act…” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…” With this clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. does not need to be revisited.

c. The general directions issued in paragraph 62 shall hereafter be followed by courts that deal with electronic evidence, to ensure their preservation, and production of certificate at the appropriate stage. These directions shall apply in all proceedings, till rules and directions under Section 67C of the Information Technology Act and data retention conditions are formulated for compliance by telecom and internet service providers. d. Appropriate rules and directions should be framed in exercise of the Information Technology Act, by exercising powers such as in Section 67C, and also framing suitable rules for the retention of data involved in trial of offences, their segregation, rules of chain of custody, stamping and record maintenance, for the entire duration of trials and appeals, and also in regard to preservation of the meta data to avoid corruption. Likewise, appropriate rules for preservation, retrieval and production of electronic record, should be framed as indicated earlier, after considering the report of the Committee constituted by the Chief Justice’s Conference in April, 2016. [Para 72][250-C-H; 251-A-C]

Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018)

2 SCC 801; Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311 : [2018] 3 SCR 1096; K. Ramajyam v. Inspector of Police (2016) Crl. LJ 1542 – overruled.

Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 473 : [2014] 11 SCR 399 – clarified.

Kundan Singh v. State 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13647; Paras Jain v. State of Rajasthan 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 8331 – approved.

Cochin State Power and Light Corporation v. State of Kerala [1965] 3 SCR 187; Raj Kumar Dubey v.

Tarapada Dey and Ors. (1987) 4 SCC 398 : [1988] 1 SCR 118; M/s B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick and Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 401; Hira Tikoo v. U.T., Chandigarh and Ors. (2004) 6 SCC 765 : [2004]

1 Suppl. SCR 65; State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 : [2019] 8 SCR 713; Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra [1955] 1 SCR 509 – relied on.

Vikram Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2017)

8 SCC 518 : [2017] 8 SCR 177; State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79; Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate (2010) 4 SCC

329 : [2010] 2 SCR 396; Central Bureau of

Investigation v. R.S. Pai (2002) 5 SCC 82 : [2002] 2 SCR 889; Jagjit Singh v. Dharam Pal Singh (1995) Supp (1) SCC 422 – referred to.

Per V. Ramasubramanian, J. (Supplementing)

1.1 Section 65B(1), Indian Evidence Act, 1872 starts with a non-obstante clause excluding the application of the other provisions and it makes the certification, a precondition for admissibility. While doing so, it does not talk about relevancy. In a way, Sections 65A and 65B, if read together, mix-up both proof and admissibility, but not talk about relevancy. Section 65A refers to the procedure prescribed in Section 65B, for the purpose of proving the contents of electronic records, but Section 65B speaks entirely about the preconditions for admissibility. As a result, Section 65B places admissibility as the first or the outermost check post, capable of turning away even at the border, any electronic evidence, without any enquiry, if the conditions stipulated therein are not fulfilled. The placement by Section 65B, of admissibility as the first or the border check post, coupled with the fact that a number of ‘computer systems’ (as defined in Section 2(l) of the Information Technology Act, 2000) owned by different individuals, may get involved in the production of an electronic record, with the ‘originator’ (as defined in Section 2(za) of the Information Technology Act, 2000) being different from the recipients or the sharers, has created lot of acrimony behind Section 65B, which is evident from the judicial opinion swinging like a pendulum. [Paras 10, 11][254-B-E]

1.2 It is a matter of fact and record that courts all over the world were quick to adapt themselves to evidence in analogue form, within the framework of archaic, centuries old rules of evidence. It was not as if evidence in analogue form was incapable of being manipulated. But the courts managed the show well by applying time tested rules for sifting the actual from the manipulated. The felicity with which courts adapted themselves to appreciating evidence in analogue form was primarily due to the fact that in analogue technology, one is able to see and/ or perceive something that is happening. In analogue technology, a wave is recorded or used in its original form. In digital technology, the analogue wave is sampled at some interval and then turned into numbers that are stored in a digital device. Therefore, what are stored, are in terms of numbers and they are, in turn, converted into voltage waves to produce what was stored. Further, Without looking up to the law makers to come up with necessary amendments from time to time, the courts themselves developed certain rules, over a period of time, to test the authenticity of these documents in analogue form and these rules have in fact, worked well. But the facility of operating in anonymity in the cyber space has made electronic records more prone to manipulation and consequently to a greater degree of suspicion. Over a period of time, certain jurisdictions have come up with reasonably good solutions. [Paras 12, 13, 17 and 22][254-F-H; 255-A-B; 257-C; 258-E]

1.3 ConclusionThe major jurisdictions of the world have come to terms with the change of times and the development of technology and fine-tuned their legislations. Therefore, it is the need of the hour that there is a relook at Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, introduced 20 years ago, by Act 21 of 2000, and which has created a huge judicial turmoil, with the law swinging from one extreme to the other in the past 15 years from Navjot Sandhu to Anvar P.V. to Tomaso Bruno to Sonu to Shafhi Mohammad. [Para 46] [282-D-E]

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC

600 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79; Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 : [2014] 11 SCR 399; Tomaso Bruno vs. State of UP (2015) 7 SCC 178 : [2015] 1 SCR 721; Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570 : [2017] 8 SCR 151; Shafhi Mohammad v. The State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 : S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab [1964] 4 SCR 753; Yusaffalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra [1967] 3 SCR 720; N. Sri Rama Reddy v. V. V. Giri AIR 1972 SC 1162; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157 : [1973] 2 SCR 417; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra (1976) 2 SCC 17 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 281; Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh AIR 1986 SC 3 : [1985] Suppl. SCR 399; Tukaram S. Dighole v.

Manikrao Shivaji Kokate (2010) 4 SCC 329 : [2010] 2 SCR 396 – referred to.

Harry Parker v. Mason [1940] 2 KB 590; R. v. Burr and Sullivan [1956] Crim LR 442; Hopes and Lavery v. H. M. Advocate [1960] Crim LR 566; R. v. Mills [1962] 3 All ER 298; R. v. Maqsud Ali [1965] 2 All ER 464; The Statute of Liberty, Sapporo Maru M/S (Owners) v. Steam Tanker Statute of Liberty (Owners) [1968] 2 All ER 195; R. v. Pettigrew [1980] 71 Cr. App. R. 39; Castle v. Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372; R v. Robson Mitchell and Richards [1991] Crim LR 360; Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. 241 FRD 534 (2007) – referred to.