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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 05.03.2026
Pronounced on: 24.03.2026
Uploaded on: 25.03.2026
OWP No. 554/2009
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
Arjun Kumar Sharma, Aged 35 years,
S/o Sh. Dharam Chand,
R/o Village Pakhlai,
Tehsil & District Udhampur
Through:-
…. Petitioner/Appellant(s)
Mr. Ankush Manhas, Advocate.
Vs.
1. State of J&K,
Through Principal Secretary
to Government,
Power Development Department,
Jammu, J&K
2. The Managing Director,
Power Development Department,
Jammu, J&K
3. The Executive Engineer,
Generation Division, PDC,
Udhampur, J&K
4. Deputy Commissioner, Udhampur
5. Tehsildar, Udhampur
Through:-
…..Respondent(s)
Mr. Raman Sharma, AAG.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Prayer:
1.
Petitioner, through the medium of the instant writ petition, has sought
the following relief:
“Mandamus commanding the respondents to make payment of
compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Fifteen Lakh Rupees) arising out of
the unfortunate death of three infants of the petitioner viz. Anu Devi
(8 years), Preeti Devi (6 years) and Sunil (3 years), by drowning in
unfenced forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel Project at Village
Pakhlai, Tehsil and District Udhampur, on 09.06.2008, only because
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of the lapses of respondents 2 and 4, with further directions to the
respondents to make proper safety measures for the public at large
inhabiting the area so as to prevent any future untoward incidents.”
Brief Facts:
2.
The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner (father of
the deceased children) invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court seeking compensation for the unfortunate death of his three minor
children who allegedly drowned in the forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel
Project situated in Village Pakhlai, District Udhampur.
3.
It is the specific case of the petitioner that the said forebay tank was left
unfenced and without adequate protective measures despite being a
hazardous structure with steep plastered slopes, thereby posing a constant
threat to the inhabitants of the surrounding area. It is alleged that due to the
negligence and failure of the authorities of the Chenani Hydel Project to
provide necessary safety measures, the petitioner‟s three minor children
accidentally slipped into the tank on 09.06.2008 and drowned.
4.
The petitioner contends that the incident occurred solely due to the
failure of the authorities to secure the reservoir area by adequate fencing or
protective barriers and therefore, seeks compensation from the respondents
for the loss of three innocent lives.
5.
The respondents have opposed the petition on the ground that no
negligence can be attributed to them and that the incident occurred due to
lack of supervision on the part of the parents of the deceased children. It is
further contended that the writ petition is not maintainable as it involves
disputed questions of fact which ought to be adjudicated in appropriate
civil proceedings.
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Submissions on behalf of the petitioner:
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner
belongs to a poor family residing in Village Pakhlai and survives
primarily on agricultural activities. It is submitted that the income derived
from cultivation of wheat and maize is barely sufficient to sustain the
family for a limited period during the year and for the remaining months,
the petitioner is compelled to work as a labourer in Udhampur city,
thereby living under Below Poverty Line conditions.
7.
It is further submitted that the petitioner had four children (three
daughters and one son). On the unfortunate day of 09.06.2008, when the
petitioner along with his wife had gone to their agricultural fields, three of
their minor children, namely Anu Devi aged about 8 years, Preeti Devi aged
about 6 years and Sunil aged about 3 years, followed them towards the
fields. Being of tender age and lacking sufficient understanding, the children
accidentally slipped into the forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel Project
situated in the village. It is submitted that the said tank had steep plastered
slopes and contained deep water, making it impossible for any person falling
into it to escape, as a result of which all the three children drowned.
8.
Learned counsel further submitted that the incident was duly reported
to Police Station Udhampur and cases were registered bearing FIR Nos.
329/2008, 330/2008 and 331/2008. It is also submitted that the matter was
examined by the Revenue authorities, who acknowledged the plight of the
petitioner and recommended grant of compensation from State funds.
9.
It is contended that the deaths of the children occurred solely due to the
negligence of the respondent authorities in failing to secure the forebay tank
despite its hazardous nature. It is further submitted that the reservoir area was
Page |4
left unprotected and that no effective safety measures, such as proper fencing
or protective barriers, were put in place. It is also pleaded that similar
incidents involving animals had occurred earlier, thereby putting the
respondents on notice of the dangerous condition of the site.
10. The petitioner further submitted that two of the deceased children were
school-going students of Government Middle School, Manglian and were
performing well in their studies. The petitioner had high hopes for their future,
which were tragically extinguished due to the negligence of the respondents.
11. It is further submitted that despite service of legal notice dated
14.06.2008 calling upon the respondents to install adequate safety
measures and to grant compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/-, no action was
taken by the respondents.
Submissions on behalf of the respondents:
12. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has opposed the
writ petition and raised preliminary objections regarding its maintainability.
13. It is submitted that no fundamental, legal or statutory right of the
petitioner has been violated. According to the respondents, the violation of
such rights is a sine qua non for invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
In the absence of any such violation, the present writ petition is not
maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.
14. It is further contended that the present case involves disputed questions
of fact which cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. The respondents submit that such factual disputes require
proper evidence and examination, which can only be undertaken in a civil
suit before a competent civil court.
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15. The respondents have also denied any negligence on their part and
contend that the unfortunate incident occurred due to the negligence and
carelessness of the parents of the deceased children.
16. It is submitted that the forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel Project,
Stage-I, was constructed prior to the year 1971 after taking into consideration
all necessary precautionary and safety measures. According to the
respondents, the reservoir area has been properly fenced and is surrounded
by a continuous parapet wall of about two feet in height, which provides
adequate safety to inhabitants and livestock.
17. The respondents further submit that, since the construction of the
reservoir, no untoward incident has been reported to their office and no
complaint has ever been received from the inhabitants of the area regarding
any danger posed by the reservoir.
18. It is also contended that the land belonging to the petitioner is situated
at a considerable distance from the reservoir and that no private land exists
adjoining the reservoir area.
19. The respondents further submit that the accident occurred solely due to
the negligence and lack of supervision on the part of the parents of the
children, who had failed to keep watch over them.
20. With regard to the report of the Revenue Department recommending
compensation, the respondents contend that the said recommendation was made
merely on humanitarian grounds, considering the poor financial condition of the
petitioner, and does not attribute any negligence to the respondents.
Legal Analysis:
21. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed
on record.
Page |6
22. The factual matrix emerging from the pleadings and the material placed
on record reveals a deeply unfortunate incident in which the petitioner lost
three of his minor children, namely Anu Devi, Preeti and Sunil, who
drowned in the forebay tank constructed as part of the Chenani Hydel
Project. As pleaded by the petitioner, the children had followed their parents
towards the agricultural fields situated in the vicinity of the said project and
during the course of their movement in the area, accidentally slipped into the
forebay tank, which contained deep water and steep plastered slopes.
23. The petitioner has consistently asserted that the reservoir area was not
secured by adequate fencing or proper safety mechanisms and that the only
protective measure adopted by the respondent authorities was a parapet wall
of about two feet in height which, according to the petitioner, was wholly
insufficient to prevent accidental entry into such a hazardous structure. The
respondents, on the other hand, have denied negligence and have attempted
to attribute the incident to the alleged lack of supervision by the parents of
the deceased children.
24. The respondents have further raised a preliminary objection regarding
the maintainability of the writ petition by contending that the petitioner
ought to have approached the civil court for determination of damages.
25. At the outset, the objection raised by the respondents with regard to the
maintainability of the present petition deserves to be addressed. The law on
the subject is no longer res integra. It is settled law that where the negligence
or inaction of State authorities results in the deprivation of life, the
constitutional courts are not powerless to grant relief merely because a civil
remedy may also be available. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article
Page |7
226 of the Constitution is wide enough to provide an effective remedy where
the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 stands violated.
26. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in “Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita
Behera (Through The Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee) Vs. State
Of Orissa And Others”, 1993 AIR SC 1960, while explaining the nature
and ambit of the remedy of compensation in proceedings under Articles 32
and 226 of the Constitution held as under :
“35. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil
liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also
an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim
whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State
to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the
citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a
civil suit or criminal proceedings. ..... The decisions of this Court in the
line of cases starting with Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141,
(1983) 3 SCR 508 granted monetary relief to the victims for deprivation
of their fundamental rights in proceedings through petitions filed under
Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights
available under the civil law to the aggrieved party where the courts
found that grant of such relief was warranted. It is a sound policy to
punish the wrongdoer and it is in that spirit that the courts have moulded
the relief by granting compensation to the victims in exercise of their writ
jurisdiction. In doing so the courts take into account not only the interest
of the applicant and the respondent but also the interests of the public as
a whole with a view to ensure that public bodies or officials do not act
unlawfully and do perform their public duties properly particularly where
the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 is concerned. Law is in
the process of development and the process necessitates developing
separate public law procedures as also public law principles. It may be
necessary to identify the situations to which separate proceedings and
principles apply and the courts have to act firmly but with certain amount
of circumspection and self-restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or
226 are misused as a disguised substitute for civil action in private law.
Page |8
Some of those situations have been identified by this Court in the cases
referred to by Brother Verma, J.”
27. The aforesaid principle has also been reiterated by various High Courts
while dealing with cases involving negligence on the part of public
authorities resulting in loss of life. The Delhi High Court in “Ram Kishore
v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi” , 2007 (97) DRJ 445, held as under:
“15. In view of the above settled position in law, there can be no
question that in its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 this Court can
grant the relief of compensation based on the strict liability principle in
a situation where there is a breach of a public duty. On the given facts
of a case, liability would lie with the state if the claimant is able to show
that the state acted negligently or that the “State or its instrumentality
failed to discharge the duty of care cast upon it, resulting in deprivation
of life or limb of a person.” In discharging the burden of proving
negligence it would be open to the claimant, if the facts and
circumstances so permit, to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.”
28. Thus, once it is demonstrated that the death of the petitioner‟s children
occurred due to negligence attributable to the authorities responsible for
maintaining a hazardous public installation, the writ jurisdiction of this Court
can undoubtedly be invoked. The availability of an alternative remedy in the
form of a civil suit cannot operate as a bar in a case where the violation of
the fundamental right to life is prima facie established.
29. In the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position, it is necessary to
examine whether any disputed question of fact arises in the present case. The
respondents, in their reply, have themselves admitted that the forebay tank
was surrounded by a parapet wall of approximately two feet in height. The
relevant para of the reply affidavit reads as under:
“8(i)….The reservoir situated at prohibited area has been properly
fenced and is surrounded by 2 feet height continuous parapet which
provides complete safety to the inhabitants and also to livestock.
Page |9
Further since the date of construction of reservoir till date no
untoward incident has been reported to this office much less any
inhabitants/locals of the area complained regarding any danger to
their life or to their livestock due to the functioning of reservoir in the
area. It is also submitted that around the reservoir there exists no
private land in as much as of the said Arjun Kumar which is located
at a quite distance away from the reservoir.”
30. This admission on the part of the respondents assumes considerable
significance. Once, the respondents themselves acknowledge that only a
two-feet parapet wall existed around a hazardous reservoir, the
foundational facts giving rise to the present petition stand admitted.
Therefore, no disputed question of fact survives for adjudication through a
civil trial. The issue which requires consideration is only with regard to
the adequacy of the safety measures adopted by the respondents, which
can appropriately be examined in exercise of writ jurisdiction. A parapet
wall of merely two feet in height, by no reasonable standard, can be
regarded as an adequate safety measure to prevent access to a hazardous
water reservoir. Such minimal protection, from any yardstick, is wholly
insufficient and reflects lack of due care on the part of the respondents.
The objection raised by the respondents regarding the existence of
disputed questions of fact is, therefore, without merit.
31. Another aspect which requires examination is whether the circumstances
of the present case disclose negligence on the part of the respondent authorities.
A perusal of the record reveals that the forebay tank of the Chenani Hydel
Project is a reservoir containing deep water with steep plastered slopes, which
makes it extremely difficult for any person who falls into it to escape. Structures
of this nature are inherently hazardous and therefore, require strict safety
measures to prevent accidental access. It is the categorical case of the petitioner
P a g e | 10
that the tank was surrounded merely by a low parapet wall measuring
approximately two feet in height and that no proper fencing, barricading or
warning mechanisms had been installed around the reservoir.
32. This Court is of the considered opinion that such a minimal protective
measure cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be regarded as an adequate
safeguard against such accidents. The authorities responsible for maintaining
hazardous installations owe a duty of care to the public at large to ensure that
effective precautions are taken to prevent foreseeable harm.
33. In the present case, the very fact that three minor children were able to
access the forebay tank and accidentally fall into it clearly indicates that the
safety measures adopted by the respondents were grossly inadequate. A twofeet parapet wall is insufficient for preventing entry into a dangerous
reservoir, particularly in a rural area, where agricultural activities and
movement of villagers, including children, are common.
34. The failure of the respondents to adopt such elementary safety
precautions clearly reflects a lack of due care on their part. Thus, the doctrine
of „res ipsa loquitur‟ squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The
doctrine, which literally means „the thing speaks for itself,‟ applies in
situations where the circumstances of the accident themselves provide
evidence of negligence. The drowning of three minor children in a reservoir
maintained by the respondents is not an occurrence which would ordinarily
take place if adequate safeguards had been in place. The incident, therefore,
speaks for itself and raises a presumption of negligence against the
authorities responsible for the maintenance of the structure. In such
circumstances, the burden shifts upon the respondents to establish that they
had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent such an occurrence. Apart
P a g e | 11
from making a bald assertion regarding the existence of a low parapet wall,
the respondents have failed to place any material on record to demonstrate
that effective safety measures were, in fact, implemented.
35. This Court also fails to understand the object behind the construction of
a parapet wall of merely about two feet in height around a hazardous
structure such as the forebay tank. A wall of such insignificant height can
hardly be regarded as an effective safety measure, as it can be easily crossed
or climbed over by any person, much less by children, who are unaware of
the risks involved. The very purpose of installing a protective barrier is to
prevent access to a dangerous area, however, a two-feet parapet wall, by no
stretch of imagination, can serve such purpose. In the considered opinion of
this Court, if the respondents were genuinely conscious of the safety of the
inhabitants, the reservoir ought to have been secured by a proper boundary
wall or fencing of sufficient height and strength which could reasonably
prevent ingress. The failure to adopt such basic and necessary precautions
reflect a clear lack of due care on the part of the respondents in discharging
their duty to safeguard human life.
36. The Delhi High Court in “Darshan And Others v. Union Of India
And Others”, 2000 ACJ 578, while dealing with a situation where the
negligence of State authorities in failing to ensure safety in a public place led
to loss of human life, applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and held that
where the circumstances themselves clearly point towards negligence on the
part of the authorities responsible for maintaining public premises, the
affected parties are entitled to seek compensation under the writ jurisdiction
for violation of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution by holding as under:
P a g e | 12
“11.....Coming to instant case, it is one of res ipsa loquitur, where the
negligence of the instrumentalities of the State and dereliction of duty is
writ large on the Red Fort in leaving the manhole uncovered. The
dereliction of duty on their part in leaving a death trap on a public road
led to the untimely death of Skattar Singh. It deprived him of his
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
scope and ambit of Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It would,
undoubtedly, cover a case where the State or its instrumentality failed
to discharge its duty of care cast upon it, resulting in deprivation of life
or limb of a person. Accordingly, Article 21 of the Constitution is
attracted and the petitioners are entitled to invoke Article 226 to claim
monetary compensation as such a remedy is available in public law,
based on strict liability for breach of fundamental rights.
12. From the foregoing, it is clear that the present writ petition for
grant of compensation in the case of breach of public duty by
instrumentality of the State resulting in the deprivation of life, would be
maintainable under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”
37. Furthermore, the attempt of the respondents to attribute negligence to
the parents of the deceased children also does not merit acceptance. It is a
well recognized principle that when hazardous structures are located in areas
accessible to the public, the authorities maintaining such structures must
anticipate the possibility of children approaching them. Children, by reason
of their tender age, are incapable of appreciating the risk involved and,
therefore, the law expects a higher degree of care from those responsible for
maintaining dangerous premises. The respondents cannot, therefore, escape
liability by shifting the blame onto the grieving parents.
38. In circumstances where hazardous structures such as water tanks or
reservoirs are left unprotected in places accessible to children, courts have
consistently held the authorities responsible for failing to discharge their duty
of care. The Madras High Court in “Kanagaraj @ Ammasai V. The
District Collector, Tiruppur & Others”, Writ Petition No. 27179 of 2005,
P a g e | 13
decided on 23.09.2019, dealing with a similar situation involving the
drowning of minor children due to an uncovered water storage tank
maintained by public authorities held as under:
“13. Now, it is the contention of the respondent that the deceased
children were neither enrolled in the school nor child welfare center
and there was no necessity for the children to enter into the premises at
all. Since the parents had failed to take care of the children and left
them unattended in the village, they fell into the water tank and died
drowning and no negligence can be attributed to the respondents. The
said contention of the respondents cannot be accepted for the simple
reason that the accident took place near child welfare center which is
public premises meant for children and the deceased children who were
playing there fell into the ground level water storage tank which was
kept open by the respondents negligently. The respondents cannot
simply escape from the liability by saying the deceased children were
neither enrolled in the child welfare centre nor in the school. We
cannot expect such tender aged children to know that they had no right
to enter into the premises. In the instant case, the respondents 1 to 3
ought to have taken steps to either to close the ground level water tank
or cover it up by fencing so as to avoid any untoward incidents in the
premises. It is only due to the negligence of the respondent the accident
took place. The State has an obligation to ensure the safety of its
citizens and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India is a basic human right and the negligence on the
part of the respondent infringed Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
14. Even though it is stated that it was the 4th respondent, a civil
contractor, who had constructed the buildings for child welfare center
and he is also liable to pay to pay compensation, in the counter
affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, it is stated that the construction
work was done by department itself and no contractor was engaged for
the construction activities. Even assuming that the 4th respondent, the
civil contractor, was engaged for the purpose of construction, the
construction work was over long ago and the building was handed over
to the respondents, but, the ground level water tank was left unattended
and kept open by the government authorities. As stated earlier, the
official respondents ought to have taken appropriate steps either to
P a g e | 14
close the ground level open water tank or to fence it. but, they did not
do so. The failure on their part now claimed the lives of the two
innocent tender aged sons of the petitioner. Thus, the deaths of the
children are attributable only to the gross negligence on the part of the
official respondents and therefore, they are alone liable to compensate
the petitioner adequately.”
39. In the facts of the present case, the respondents have contended that the
incident occurred due to lack of supervision on the part of the parents and the
children had themselves ventured into a dangerous area. Such a contention,
in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be accepted so as to dilute the
responsibility of the authorities maintaining a hazardous installation. The
victims in the present case were children of very tender age who, by reason
of their immaturity and lack of judgment, cannot reasonably be expected to
comprehend the dangers posed by structures such as a deep water reservoir.
The law has consistently recognized that children do not possess the same
degree of discretion, foresight and ability to appreciate risk as adults.
Consequently, the doctrine of contributory negligence, which may
sometimes apply to adults, cannot ordinarily be invoked against children of
tender age. When a dangerous structure is maintained in an area where the
presence of children is reasonably foreseeable, a higher degree of care is
expected from the authorities responsible for its maintenance. Any lapse in
adopting adequate safeguards in such circumstances cannot be justified by
attributing negligence to the children themselves.
40. The Delhi High Court in “Subramanium v. Delhi Metro Rail
Corporation Ltd.”, WP(C) 5024/2007 decided on 02.07.2013 reiterated the
well-settled principle that „children of tender age cannot be attributed with
contributory negligence‟. The Court observed as under:
P a g e | 15
“Issue No. (iii)
14. As indicated above, in Kishan Lal's case and as rightly pointed out
by Ms. Mehta in the case of Kumari Alka.…Plaintiff; v. Union Of India
& Others.…., this court, has held that children of tender age cannot be
imputed with contributory negligence. A similar view has been taken by
a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Sunadra Shetty's
case. The relevant observations, for the sake of convenience, are culled
out herein below:“…28. The facts of the present case demanded greater care on the part
of the driver of the care because children of tenders years cannot even
be imputed with contributory negligence. They have not attained that
age of discretion and what generally the adults can understand as rash
or negligent acts cannot even be imputed to them as they are not in a
position to understand the consequences of their acts. Many dangers
which are open and obvious to the adults may be concealed and secret
traps for the children…”
41. In similar facts and circumstances, the Delhi High Court in “Gopalpur
Victim Association V. Delhi Jal Board & Ors.”, WP(C) 5027 of 2010,
decided on 02.02.2011 has held as under:
“12. On a perusal of the same, there should be no shadow of doubt.
It was obligatory on the part of the Delhi Jal Board to ensure that
nobody enters into the said area. The said care was not taken. Care
being not taken, the life span of four young children got
extinguished. The plea advanced by the respondents, namely,
GNCTD and Delhi Jal Board or its agency that children may have
played mischief or gone for a swim is mercurial and specious in
nature. For the sake of dispute, a question is not to be raised to
bring it in the realm of disputed question of fact. In our considered
opinion both the State and the Delhi Jal Board are vicariously liable
for not maintaining the area in question. We may say with profit that
the Delhi Jal Board may have engaged contractors/agencies for
maintaining the area but there has been a failure. Hence, we can say
without any iota of doubt both the State and Delhi Jal Board have
failed to maintain the area as a consequence of which the children
lost their lives. As a sequitur compensation has to be awarded.”
P a g e | 16
42. The aforesaid observations reinforce the principle that where minors of
tender age are involved, the responsibility of ensuring safety lies
predominantly upon those who control or maintain potentially dangerous
premises or instrumentalities. Applying the same principle to the facts of the
present case, it is evident that the respondents cannot escape liability by
attempting to attribute contributory negligence to the deceased children, who
were incapable of appreciating the risk posed by the forebay tank maintained
by the authorities.
43. The issue also assumes a constitutional dimension when examined in the
light of Article 21 of the Constitution. The right to life guaranteed under
Article 21 places a corresponding duty upon the State to safeguard and protect
the lives of its citizens. The authorities engaged in hazardous activities owe an
absolute and non-delegable duty to ensure that no harm results to members of
the public and that where hazardous installations are maintained, the
responsible authorities must adopt the highest standards of safety.
44. The principle that the State and its instrumentalities bear strict
responsibility where their actions or omissions lead to the violation of the
right to life has been emphatically recognized by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in “Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v. Uphaar Tragedy Victims
Association & Ors.”, 2012 AIR SC 100, held as under:
“96. Courts have held that due to the action or inaction of the State or
its officers, if the fundamental rights of a citizen are infringed then the
liability of the State, its officials and instrumentalities, is strict.
97. This Court in Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008)
9 SCC 527, extended the principle to cover public utilities like the
Railways, electricity distribution companies, public corporations and
local bodies which may be social utility undertakings not working for
private profit. In Prabhakaran (2008) 9 SCC 527 a woman fell on a
P a g e | 17
railway track and was fatally run over and her husband demanded
compensation. The Railways argued that she was negligent as she tried
to board a moving train. Rejecting the plea of the Railways, this Court
held that her “contributory negligence” should not be considered in
such untoward incidents—the Railways has “strict liability”. A strict
liability in torts, private or constitutional do not call for a finding of
intent or negligence. In such a case the highest degree of care is
expected from private and public bodies, especially when the conduct
causes physical injury or harm to persons. The question as to whether
the law imposes a strict liability on the State and its officials primarily
depends upon the purpose and object of the legislation as well. When
activities are hazardous and if they are inherently dangerous the statute
expects the highest degree of care and if someone is injured because of
such activities, the State and its officials are liable even if they could
establish that there was no negligence and that it was not intentional.”
45. Viewed in this backdrop, the failure of the respondents to secure the
forebay tank with proper protective measures constitutes a clear breach of
their constitutional obligation to safeguard life. The tragic death of the
petitioner‟s children is therefore not merely an unfortunate accident but a
consequence of the failure of the authorities to discharge their duty of
care. Once, such negligence resulting in loss of life is established, the
liability of the State to compensate the victim becomes inevitable. Even
though the children may not have begun earning, their lives possess
immense value and their untimely death results in profound emotional and
social loss to their parents.
46. In the present case, the magnitude of the tragedy suffered by the
petitioner cannot be understated. The petitioner, who belongs to agricultural
background, lost three of his minor children in a single incident. The
emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the family is beyond
quantification. At the same time, the negligence attributable to the
P a g e | 18
respondent authorities in failing to provide adequate safety measures around
a hazardous reservoir cannot be overlooked.
47. For all the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the
considered view that the petitioner has been able to establish that the death of
his three minor children occurred due to the negligent maintenance of the
forebay tank by the respondent authorities and such negligence has resulted
in violation of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be compensated by the
respondents in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
48. This Court is conscious of the fact that no amount of monetary
compensation can ever adequately recompense the irreparable loss suffered by
the petitioner, who has been deprived of the lives of his three minor children
in a single tragic incident. The pain, anguish and emotional devastation caused
by such a loss transcend all pecuniary considerations and cannot be measured
in terms of money. Human life is invaluable, and the loss of young children,
who represent not only the present but the very hope and future of a family,
leaves behind a void that can never be filled. The award of compensation in
such cases, therefore, is not intended to place a monetary value on human life,
but is a means to provide some measure of solace to the bereaved family and
to acknowledge the wrong done by the State due to its failure to discharge its
duty of care. It also serves as a reminder to public authorities of their
constitutional obligation to safeguard the lives of citizens. Thus, while no
compensation can truly undo the tragedy or restore what has been lost, the
grant of monetary relief remains the only available means in law to partially
redress the harm caused and to uphold the rule of law.
P a g e | 19
49. The next question which arises for consideration is with regard to the
method to be adopted for determination of compensation. Ordinarily, in
cases arising out of motor accident claims, the Courts apply the multiplier
method for assessing compensation based on the income of the deceased and
the dependency of the claimants. However, the present case does not arise
out of a claim under private law but pertains to grant of compensation in
exercise of writ jurisdiction for violation of the fundamental right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
50. In the considered opinion of this Court, the multiplier method would
not be an appropriate yardstick in the facts of the present case. The deceased
were minor children of tender age and had no independent source of income,
and therefore any attempt to assess future earnings would be wholly
speculative. The compensation awarded in such cases is not intended to be a
precise equivalent of pecuniary loss but is a public law remedy to redress the
infringement of a fundamental right.
51. This Court also finds merit in the reasoning adopted by the Madras
High Court in case titled as “Rajakumar vs. The State Of Tamil Nadu”,
WP(MD) No. 14252 of 2023 c/w WMP(MD) Nos. 12059 & 12141 of 2023,
decided on 01.07.2025, wherein it was observed that:
“93. If I were to apply the multiplier method, it would amount to
varying compensation for each of the petitioners. The pain and
suffering that the writ petitioners have undergone would have been
more or less the same. Therefore, in the light of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Balram's case and in the light of this reasoning, I am
not inclined to adopt the said method.”
52. This Court is in agreement with the aforesaid view that the
application of the multiplier method would result in variation in the
P a g e | 20
quantum of compensation among similarly placed claimants, whereas the
pain, suffering and loss occasioned to the parents on account of the death
of their children would, in essence, remain the same. This Court,
therefore, does not find it appropriate to adopt the multiplier method and
instead deems it proper to award uniform compensation. The loss of a
child is incapable of being measured in terms of money, and any
mathematical formula would fail to capture the magnitude of such loss. In
the considered opinion of this Court, what can be done in such
circumstances, is to award a just and reasonable amount which may
provide some measure of solace to the bereaved family and at the same
time serve as a reminder to the State of its constitutional obligations.
53. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to adopt the multiplier method
for determination of compensation in the present case. Instead, it deems it
appropriate to award a compensation which is just, fair and reasonable,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, including the tender
age of the deceased children, the nature of negligence attributable to the
respondents, and the socio-economic condition of the petitioner.
54. This Court cannot shut its eyes to the larger ground reality that such
incidents are not isolated, but reflect a recurring pattern of neglect in matters
concerning public safety. Instances of persons, including children, losing
their lives after falling into uncovered manholes, open drains, unsecured
water bodies, or suffering electrocution due to exposed and poorly
maintained high-tension wires, are, unfortunately common. These recurring
tragedies point towards systemic deficiencies and maintenance of public
infrastructure and a failure to adopt timely preventive measures. Such an
approach, where corrective steps are undertaken only after the occurrence of
P a g e | 21
damage, is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional mandate and the
obligations cast upon the State under the Directive Principles of State Policy
to ensure the welfare, safety and well-being of its citizens.
55.
The responsibility of the State in the present case must also be viewed
in the broader constitutional framework which not only guarantees
fundamental rights but also casts corresponding obligations upon the State to
secure and protect those rights. This obligation finds clear reflection in the
Directive Principles of State Policy, particularly Article 38, which mandates
the State to secure a social order promoting the welfare of the people, and
Article 39(e) and (f), which require the State to ensure that the health and
strength of individuals are not put to risk and that children are protected
against neglect and exploitation. Further, Article 47 of the Constitution of
India casts a duty upon the State to improve public health and raise the
standard of living of its people. Though not enforceable by themselves, these
principles are fundamental in the governance of the country and serve as
guiding beacons for State action. When read harmoniously, these provisions
impose a clear duty of care upon the State and its instrumentalities to take all
necessary measures to safeguard the lives of its citizens, especially in
situations involving hazardous activities or installations under its control.
Any failure on the part of the State to discharge this obligation, resulting in
loss of life, cannot be treated as a mere lapse but amounts to a breach of its
constitutional duty, thereby attracting liability to compensate the victims or
their families.
Conclusion:
56. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, and upon a careful perusal
of the material placed on record, this Court is persuaded to hold that the
P a g e | 22
present case is not merely one of an unfortunate accident, but one which
discloses a clear failure on the part of the respondent authorities in
discharging their duty of care in respect of a hazardous public installation.
57. The objection raised by the respondents with regard to the
maintainability of the writ petition is found to be devoid of merit in view of
the settled legal position that where the right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution stands infringed due to the negligence or inaction of State
authorities, the constitutional courts are fully empowered to grant relief in
exercise of their writ jurisdiction. The availability of an alternative remedy
by way of a civil suit does not operate as a bar in such circumstances.
58. This Court is further of the considered opinion that the doctrine of „res
ipsa loquitur‟ squarely applies to the facts of the present case. The very
occurrence of the incident, resulting in the drowning of three minor children
in a reservoir maintained by the respondents, raises a presumption of
negligence which the respondents have failed to rebut by placing any cogent
material on record. The attempt to attribute negligence to the parents of the
deceased children is neither legally sustainable nor morally tenable,
particularly when the victims were of tender age and incapable of
appreciating the risks posed by such a structure.
59. This Court observes that the alleged safety measure of a parapet wall of
about two feet in height is wholly inadequate and illusory in nature. A barrier
of such negligible height cannot, by any reasonable standard, be expected to
prevent access to a hazardous reservoir. It is beyond comprehension as to how
such a minimal structure could serve the purpose of safeguarding human life,
when it can be easily crossed by any person without any difficulty. The very
object of providing protective measures stands defeated. In the considered
P a g e | 23
view of this Court, the respondents ought to have ensured proper fencing or
construction of a boundary wall of sufficient height and strength so as to act as
a real and effective barrier preventing access to the hazardous area.
60. This Court is further of the view that, apart from proper fencing or
boundary walls, the respondent authorities ought to have installed
adequate warning signboards at conspicuous places around the reservoir,
cautioning the public of the inherent danger. The absence of such basic
precautionary measures demonstrates a casual and indifferent approach
towards public safety.
61. This Court cannot shut its eyes to the recurring lapses and systemic
deficiencies in the maintenance and supervision of public utilities and
hazardous installations. Instances of electrocution due to exposed or poorly
maintained high-tension wires are common, where innocent persons, including
daily wage workers, have either lost their lives or have been rendered
permanently disabled. Such recurring incidents reflect systemic deficiencies
which require urgent attention at the highest level of administration.
62. It must be emphasized that no amount of compensation can ever be an
adequate substitute for human life. Monetary relief, at best, is only a means
to provide solace to the affected families, it can neither restore the life lost
nor truly compensate for the irreversible loss and suffering endured. This
Court, therefore, reiterates that the primary focus of the State must be on
prevention rather than post-incident compensation.
63. The facts on record clearly establish that the respondents failed to adopt
adequate safety measures to secure the forebay tank, thereby exposing the
inhabitants of the area to a foreseeable risk. Such failure constitutes a breach
P a g e | 24
of the duty of care owed by the respondents and results in violation of the
fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
64. This Court thus deems it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the
Union Territory to take cognizance of the issue and formulate a
comprehensive policy ensuring proper fencing, installation of warning
signboards, and adoption of adequate safety measures around reservoirs,
water bodies, and other hazardous installations. Such measures are
imperative to safeguard human life and to ensure that tragedies of the present
nature are not repeated in future.
65. In view of the settled legal principles governing the grant of
compensation in public law for violation of fundamental rights, and having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, particularly the grave
and irreparable loss suffered by the petitioner on account of the untimely death
of his three minor children, this Court finds that the petitioner is entitled to
compensation as a measure of redress for the loss of life resulting from the
negligent acts of the respondent authorities.
66. This Court cannot remain oblivious to the magnitude of the tragedy,
where the petitioner has lost three young children in a single incident, which
could have been prevented had adequate safety measures been put in place.
The failure of the authorities to adopt even basic precautions reflects a
serious lapse in the discharge of their public duty. While no amount of
monetary compensation can compensate for the loss of human life
particularly that of children, the award of compensation in such cases serves
as a necessary public law remedy to acknowledge the wrong and to provide
some measure of solace to the bereaved family.
P a g e | 25
67. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed
to pay compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) for each
deceased child, amounting in total to Rs. 6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs), to
the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of this order. The
respondents are further directed to take immediate and effective steps to
ensure proper fencing, installation of warning signboards, and adequate
safeguarding of the forebay tank, as well as all similar hazardous
installations, so as to prevent recurrence of such tragic incidents in future.
68. Disposed of accordingly.
(Wasim Sadiq Nargal)
Judge
Jammu:
24.03.2026
Michal Sharma/PS
Whether the judgment is speaking
Whether approved for reporting
Michal Sharma
2026.03.25 13.09
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Jammu
:
:
Yes
Yes
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