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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
…….
LPA no.145/2026
Reserved on: 20.08. 2026
Pronounced on: 24.09.2026
Uploaded on: 25.09.2026
Whether the operative part or
full judgment is pronounced: Full
Anwar Jan (Choudhary) Age 49 years S/o Mohd. Sardar R/o Anderwan
Sagam Tehsil Kokernag District Anantnag A/P Palth Tehsil and District
Samba through brother namely Fiyaz Ahmad age 35 years S/o Mohd Sardar
R/o Anderwan Sagam Tehsil Kokernag District Anantnag
…….Appellant(s)
Through: Mr. M.A.Goni, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Tanveer Ahmad, Advocate
Versus
1. Union Territory of J&K through Commissioner/Secretary Home
Department, Civil Secretariat, Jammu-180001
2. District Magistrate, Anantnag 182202
3. Senior Superintendent of Police, Anantnag 182202
4. Superintendent District Jail Bhaderwah 182204
…. Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Ilyas Laway, GA
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Per: Sanjeev Kumar-J:
1. This intra court appeal arises from an order and judgement dated 30 th
June 2026, passed by learned Single Judge [“Writ Court”] in HCP
no.01/2026 titled ‘Anwar Jan (Choudhhary) v. UT of J&K and others ’,
whereby the Writ Court has dismissed the said habeas corpus writ
petition filed by appellant to throw challenge to his detention made by
District Magistrate, Anantnag [“detaining authority”] under Section 8 of
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LPA no.145/2026
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J&K Public Safety Act, 1978 [“the Act of 1978”] vide Order
no.32/DMA/PSA/DET/2025 dated 1st December 2025 (hereinafter
referred to as “impugned order of detention”)
2. The judgement impugned is assailed by appellant on several grounds.
However, before adverting to the grounds of challenge urged by
Mr. M. A. Goni, learned senior counsel appearing for appellant, we deem
it appropriate to take note of few facts germane to the disposal of this
appeal.
3. The appellant is stated to be involved in various criminal activities and,
therefore, was arrested many a times in connection with cases – FIR nos.
201/2015; 256/2015; 100/2017; 45/2021; 60/2021; 28/2022. Earlier,
appellant was detained vide Order no.06/PSA/2018 dated 8th October
2018. The said detention order was challenged by him in HCP
no.11/2019. By virtue of order/judgement dated 22nd April 2019 aforesaid
detention order was quashed and as a corollary thereof the appellant/
detenu was released from custody. In addition to these FIRs, the
appellant is said to be involved in bovine smuggling, which resulted in
registration of seven FIRs, viz. FIR nos. 126/2022, 127/2022, 128/2022,
129/2022, 132/2022, 134/2022, 137/2022. All these FIRs have been
registered under Section 188/109 IPC, and 11 of Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act, 1960. Given those activities, District Magistrate, Samba,
issued detention order no.02/PSA/2023 dated 3rd January 2023.
Challenge thereto was thrown by appellant in WP(C) no.352/2023 and in
terms of order dated 20th February 2023, the said detention order was
stayed. Nevertheless, he is stated to have again indulged in criminal
activities resulting in registration of FIR nos.55/2025 and 121/2025.
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LPA no.145/2026
25.09.26
According to petitioner, bail in FIR no.55/2025 has been granted in his
favour by court of law whereas application for grant of bail in FIR
no.121/2025 has been dismissed, but no reference to this extent has been
made by detaining authority in impugned order of detention and, that
detenu was already in custody in connection with case FIR no.121/2025
since 14th November 2025.
4. Perusal of record abundantly makes it clear, as is also discernible from
bare reading of impugned order of detention, that the dossier and other
connected documents in respect of detenu had been produced by Senior
Superintendent of Police, Anantnag, before detaining authority vide letter
no.CS/71/2025/12487-92 dated 15th July 2025, seeking detention of
appellant/detenu under the Act of 1978. The detaining authority having
gone through the material brought to his notice by Senior Superintendent
of Police, Anantnag, formed an opinion that with a view to prevent
appellant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public order of
State/UT, it had become imperative to place him under preventive
detention in exercise of powers conferred under Section 8 of the Act of
1978. As a result whereof, the detaining authority, vide Order no.32/
DMA/PSA/DET/ 2025 dated 1st December 2025, has placed appellant
under preventive detention. The grounds of detention, running into four
pages, besides other material, are also claimed to have been served upon
appellant.
5. Feeling aggrieved by his detention, appellant preferred HCP no.01/2026,
seeking issuance of writ of certiorari to quash order of detention. The
petition was resisted by respondents. In Reply Affidavit filed by
respondent no.2, the stand was taken that all the procedural safeguards as
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LPA no.145/2026
25.09.26
envisaged under the Act of 1978 and the Constitution of India, had been
observed in letter and spirit, and that the order of detention was perfectly
legal, justified and in consonance with detention law.
6. The Writ Court, having considered rival contentions of parties and
material on record, came to the conclusion that the order of detention was
legally sound and did not suffer from any legal or procedural infirmity.
The Writ Court, accordingly, dismissed the petition filed by appellant.
This is how the instant appeal is before us, and appellant seeks his release
from preventive detention of respondents.
7. Mr. M. A. Goni, learned senior counsel appearing for appellant, in
recapitulation of the grounds taken in the memo of appeal, has stoutly
urged that: the order of detention has been passed while appellant was
already in custody since 14th November 2025 in connection with case
FIR no.121/2025, without recording any compelling reasons or likelihood
of his release; that detaining authority did not show any awareness of the
fact that appellant had been admitted to bail in case FIR no.55/2025 by
competent court, and no reference to the pendency of bail application in
FIR no.121/2025 was made in grounds of detention; that the detention
order wrongly mentions five sections of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(BNS), viz. 109, 126(2), 115(2), 309(4), 351 (3) in FIR no.121/2025,
whereas, as a matter of fact, FIR contains only three sections, viz. 126(2),
109, 309 (4) of BNS, which is a patent factual error demonstrating nonapplication of mind; that the order of detention dated 1st December 2025
was executed on 19th December 2025 after an unexplained delay of
eighteen days, which severs the live-link between the prejudicial
activities and the order of detention; that before passing the order of
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LPA no.145/2026
25.09.26
detention, the detaining authority had written a letter to the Director
General of Prisons (DGP) with regard to the jails, whereby permission to
lodge the appellant at District Jail, Bhaderwah, had already been sought,
which reflects predetermination and total non-application of mind on the
part of the detaining authority; that the grounds of detention are a
verbatim reproduction of the police dossier; and that the appellant, being
a semi-literate person, was not supplied with translated copies of the
grounds of detention and material, rendering his right of effective
representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution nugatory.
8. Per contra, Mr. Ilyas Laway, learned Government Advocate, has sought
to support the impugned judgment and contended that all statutory
safeguards had been complied with; that the entire material was supplied
to the detenu on the very day of execution of the warrant of detention;
and that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could not be
subjected to judicial review.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record,
including the detention record produced by learned counsel for
respondents.
10.At the outset, it needs to be noticed that though subjective satisfaction of
detaining authority is not amenable to judicial review on its correctness
or sufficiency, the same is certainly subject to judicial scrutiny on the
grounds of non-application of mind, non-consideration of relevant
material, consideration of irrelevant material, mala fides and violation of
constitutional and statutory safeguards. In this regard, we are fortified by
the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rekha v.
State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244, in which it has been
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authoritatively held that a detention order founded on vague grounds or
passed without application of mind cannot be sustained.
11.Coming first to the fact that appellant was already in custody in
connection with case FIR no.121/2025 since 14th November 2025, we
find that neither grounds of detention nor order of detention disclose any
awareness of detaining authority about the custody of detenu, nor has any
compelling reason been recorded so as to justify the invocation of
extraordinary power of preventive detention against a person who was
already behind bars and available to the authorities.
12.It is trite law, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases
of Kamarunnissa v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 128 and Vijay Narain
Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14, that preventive detention
cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary law of the land and that when
a person is already in custody, detaining authority must, on the basis of
cogent material, be satisfied that there is a real possibility of his release
and of his indulging in prejudicial activities thereafter. No such
satisfaction is discernible from the impugned order of detention. The
learned Writ Court has glossed over this vital aspect of the matter.
13.Similarly, the fact that appellant/detenu had been admitted to bail in
connection with case FIR no.55/2025 by competent court, and his bail
application in FIR no.121/2025 dismissed by learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Anantnag, was pending before this Court at the time of passing of
the impugned order of detention, in which he having been subsequently
admitted to bail on 16th February 2026, finds no mention in the grounds
of detention. The detaining authority has not shown any awareness of bail
granted in FIR no.55/2025 and dismissal of bail application in FIR
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LPA no.145/2026
25.09.26
no.121/2025. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) the Hon’ble
Supreme Court quashed a detention order in identical circumstances,
holding that where the detaining authority was not even aware whether
the bail application of the accused was pending, the subjective
satisfaction stands vitiated and detention order cannot be sustained.
14.Yet another infirmity which strikes at the root of the impugned detention
order is that it wrongly mentions five Sections of the BNS, i.e., 109,
126(2), 115(2), 309(4), 351(3) as having been invoked in FIR
no.121/2025, whereas the FIR contains only three Sections, i.e., 109,
126(2) and 309(4). Such a patent factual error, going to the very
substance of allegations against detenu, palpably establishes that
detaining authority acted mechanically on police dossier without
applying its independent mind. This also seriously prejudiced the
constitutional right of detenu to make an effective representation against
his detention as guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of
India. In terms of Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, AIR
1969 SC 43, a detention order founded on factually incorrect material is
unsustainable in law.
15.So far as the delay in execution of detention is concerned, though the
detention order was passed on 01.12.2025, yet it was executed only on
19.12.2025. The respondents have failed to furnish any explanation for
this unexplained delay of 18 days. The learned Writ Court has, however,
confined the issue merely to the fact that the grounds of detention were
supplied on the same day on which the warrant was executed, without
examining the unexplained delay in execution of order of detention itself,
more particularly when the detenu was available and in custody in
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LPA no.145/2026
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connection with case FIR no.121/2025. Such unexplained delay severs
live and proximate link between alleged prejudicial activities and
necessity of preventive detention and renders detention illegal, as held in
by the Supreme Court in Sk. Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, (1974)
4 SCC 358.
16.What, however, tilts the scales conclusively against respondents is the
material on the detention record itself which reveals that before passing
impugned order of detention, District Magistrate, Anantnag, had already
written a letter to Director General of Prisons (DGP) with regard to the
jails, pursuant to which the office of the Director General of Prisons,
J&K, issued a communication no.DS/PSA dated 26th November 2025,
specifically directing that appellant/detenu be lodged at District Jail,
Bhaderwah, under preventive detention laws. The said communication
was issued on the very same day as the proposal of District Magistrate
and five days prior to passing of order of detention dated 1st December
2025, whereas detention order itself came to be executed on 19th
December 2025. Issuance of a prison allotment direction, pursuant to the
letter of detaining authority, much before detention order was even
passed, unmistakably establishes that the decision to detain appellant had
already been taken in advance and that the detention order was passed as
a mere formality. This reflects gross non-application of mind on the part
of detaining authority and demonstrates that subjective satisfaction,
mandated under the Act of 1978, was neither genuine nor independently
arrived at. The impugned detention order is, therefore, vitiated in law.
17.Before parting with the judgment, we consider it necessary to observe
that India’s animal protection laws have changed over time. These
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changes show how relationship between humans and animals has
evolved, and how people’s views on animal care have also shifted. The
idea of protecting animals in India is very old. Ancient legal texts and
religious scriptures taught people to treat animals with kindness. Two
important ideas from Indian thought are “ahimsa”, viz. non-violence, and
“dharma” viz. duty. These ideas still shape how people in India see
animals. Cows, elephants, and buffalo are respected in a special way,
which is a unique part of Indian culture. The Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act, 1960, was a very important law. It was made to stop
unnecessary pain and suffering to animals. This law also gave police and
other officials the power to punish people who are cruel to animals.
18.Besides, the smuggling of bovine animals is not only a criminal offence
but it is also an act which hurts the religious sentiments of the largest
population of India. Such activities, if established against any person, are
highly objectionable and have the potential to disturb public tranquillity,
and, therefore, the law enforcement agencies are expected to deal with
such offenders with a firm hand in accordance with law.
19.The animals also feel pain, stress, and fear just like humans do, but our
legal system still treats them like objects or property instead of living
beings. Because of this, the rules made to protect them are extremely
weak.
20.It is under India’s main animal protection law written back in 1960, viz.
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, that someone who tortures, beats,
or kills an animal can be fined as little as 10 to 50 rupees. Since these
fines are so low, there is almost no fear of the law, which is why we see
people committing acts of abuse just to post videos on social media for
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views. While the courts have agreed that animals deserve to live without
suffering, the written law has not changed enough yet. For real change to
happen, the law needs to officially recognize the animal feelings and
replace those tiny fines with strict jail time and heavy penalties.
21.Now coming to the case in hand, even in respect of such activities, the
constitutional safeguards governing preventive detention are mandatory
and not directory, and any infraction thereof vitiates the detention. The
answer to such criminality lies in diligent and expeditious prosecution
under the ordinary criminal law and not in throwing to winds the
procedural safeguards enshrined under Article 21 and 22 of the
Constitution.
22.Viewed from any angle, we do not find the impugned order passed by the
Writ Court sustainable in law.
23.For all these reasons, we find merit in this appeal, and the same is
accordingly allowed. Resultantly the petition, being HCP no.01/2026 is
also allowed and the order of detention bearing no.32/DMA/PSA/DET/
2025 dated 1st December 2025, passed by the District Magistrate,
Anantnag, is quashed. The appellant shall be set at liberty, if he is not
required in any other case.
24.Disposed of along with connected CM(s).
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI)
JUDGE
(SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE
SRINAGAR
24.09.2026
“Mir Arif”
Whether the judgment is reportable? Yes/No
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LPA no.145/2026
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