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HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case: CRM(M) No. 237/2019
Reserved on: 16.07.2026
Pronounced on: 11.08.2026
Uploaded on: 12.08.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
1) Ankur Kirtikumar Mehta age 38 years
S/o Dr. Kirtikimar Laxmidas Mehta,
R/o House No.A-1101, Satyam Insigniya,
Near Chadan Party Plot, Jodhpur.
Ahmadabad, Gujarat.
2) Dr. Kirtikimar Laxmidas Mehta
Age 72 years
S/o Sh. Lakshmi Das Nenschibahi Mehta
R/o House No.A-1101, Satyam Insigniya,
Near Chandan Party Plot, Jodhpur.
Ahmadabad, Gujarat.
3) Nirav Kirti Kumar Mehta Age 40 years
S/o Dr. Kirtikimar Laxmidas Mehta,
R/o House No.B-1101, Satyam Insigniya,
Near Chandan Party Plot, Jodhpur.
Ahmadabad, Gujarat.
..... Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Through :- Mr. Varut Kumar Gupta, Advocate with
Mr. Umar Javed, Advocate
Mr. Vikas Khair, Advocate
(Through Virtual Mode)
Vs
Bharti Bachloo
Drugs Inspector, Sub-Zone, Jammu
Central Drugs Standard Control
Organization,
C/o Office of Assistant Drugs Controller (I)
Indian Institute of Integrative Medicine,
Canal Road, Jammu
.....Respondent(s)
Through :- Mr. Prem N Sadotra, Advocate
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CRM(M) No. 237/2019
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE WASIM SADIQ NARGAL, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
Prayer:
1.
The petitioner, through the medium of the instant Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, has
sought the following relief:
“Set Aside the Complaint as well as Order dated 26.07.2018 by virtue of
which Learned Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Jammu has taken
cognizance of Offences under Section 18 (a) (i) read with Section 27 (d)
of Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and issued process against petitioners
in File No. 154/Complaint/2018 {Date of Institution 26.07.2018} titled
"Union of India through Drugs Inspector, Central Drugs Standards
Control Organization, Jammu Vs. Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors."
and also, set aside all orders passed therein against petitioners.”
Brief Facts:
2.
The petitioners are Directors of M/s Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd., accused
No. 1 in the impugned complaint. The Company is a private limited company
incorporated under the Companies Act and has its registered office and place of
business at C-Mondeal Business Park, Gurudwara S. G. Highway, Thaltej,
Ahmedabad. The Company holds a valid drug manufacturing licence issued by
the Licensing Authority, Himachal Pradesh for manufacture, sale and distribution
of various drugs at its manufacturing unit situated at Tehsil and District Solan,
Himachal Pradesh.
3.
The case arises out of the manufacture and supply of a drug, namely,
“Locipil Tablets”, Batch No. CHI15020, manufactured in September, 2015, with
an expiry date of May, 2018, by M/s Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. A sample of the
aforesaid drug was lifted by the Drugs Inspector, Central Drugs Standard Control
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
3|Page
Organization, from the premises of ESIC Model Hospital, Bari Brahmana,
Jammu, on Form No. 17. The sample was thereafter subjected to the statutory
process of testing and analysis under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the
Rules framed thereunder.
4.
The
Government
Analyst,
Regional
Drugs
Testing
Laboratory,
Chandigarh, vide report dated 31.08.2016 in Form No. 13, declared the aforesaid
drug to be “Not of Standard Quality”. Upon receipt of the said report, the Drugs
Inspector, on 09.09.2016, sought information from the Medical Superintendent,
ESIC Model Hospital, Bari Brahmana, Jammu, regarding the source of purchase
of the drug in question. The Medical Superintendent disclosed M/s Corona
Remedies Pvt. Ltd. as the source of purchase and supply of the said drug.
5.
Thereafter, the respondent-Department issued a statutory notice dated
22.09.2016 to the Company at its manufacturing unit in Himachal Pradesh,
informing it about the report of the Government Analyst and the declaration of
the drug as “Not of Standard Quality”. The Company, through its authorized
representative, submitted a reply dated 03.11.2016, informing the Department that
the sale of the concerned batch had been stopped and that no stock of the said
product remained with the Company. The Company also furnished the documents
sought by the Department along with its reply.
6.
Subsequently, a joint inspection of the manufacturing unit of the Company
was conducted on 04.11.2016 by two Drugs Inspectors. During the course of such
inspection, the manufacturing process and relevant records of the Company were
examined. The Joint Investigation Report, inter alia, recorded that the batch had
been manufactured under Good Manufacturing Practices and that the required
quantity of bulk drug had been used for manufacturing the said batch. The report,
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
4|Page
while taking note of the findings of the Government Analyst, ultimately
recommended that action be initiated in accordance with the applicable guidelines
governing cases where drugs are declared spurious or “Not of Standard Quality”.
7.
On the basis of the material collected during the aforesaid proceedings, the
respondent
instituted
the
criminal
complaint
bearing
File
No.
154/Complaint/2018, titled “Union of India through Drugs Inspector, Central
Drugs Standards Control Organization, Jammu v. Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. &
Ors.”, before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, alleging
commission of offences under Section 18(a)(i) read with Section 27(d) of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The petitioners herein were arrayed as accused
Nos. 2, 4 and 7 in the said complaint.
8.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, vide order dated
26.07.2018, took cognizance of the offences alleged in the complaint and issued
process against the accused persons, including the present petitioners. Aggrieved
of the aforesaid complaint and the order dated 26.07.2018, the petitioners have
approached this Court by way of the instant petition under Section 561-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, seeking, inter alia, setting aside of the
complaint, the aforesaid order taking cognizance and all orders passed therein
against the petitioners.
9.
The record reveals that when the matter was listed before this Court on
03.05.2019, the Court, upon being prima facie satisfied, stayed the proceedings
before the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu. The said
order continues to remain operative as on date.
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CRM(M) No. 237/2019
Arguments on behalf of the petitioners:
10.
Mr. Varut K. Gupta, learned counsel, has argued on behalf of the
petitioners, who are arrayed as accused Nos. 2, 4 & 7 in the impugned complaint.
11.
The petitioners are Directors of M/s Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd., accused
No. 1 in the impugned complaint. It is their case that, notwithstanding their
position as Directors, they were neither responsible for nor involved in the
manufacture or production of the drug in question and, therefore, cannot be held
criminally liable for the alleged offence.
12.
Learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Varut Kumar Gupta has
submitted that M/s Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. is a private limited company
incorporated under the Companies Act and has its registered office and place
of business at C-Mondeal Business Park, Gurudwara S. G. Highway, Thaltej,
Ahmedabad. The Company holds a valid drug manufacturing licence issued by
the Licensing Authority, Himachal Pradesh for manufacture, sale and
distribution of various drugs at its manufacturing unit situated at Tehsil and
District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. According to learned counsel, the licence
itself demonstrates that the manufacturing activities are carried out under the
direct technical supervision of qualified technical personnel whose names are
duly endorsed therein. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioners, who are
Directors of the Company, have no role in the actual process of manufacture or
production of the drugs
13.
It has further been submitted that the petitioners, being Directors, were
concerned only with the financial and policy decisions relating to the
management of the Company and were stationed at Ahmedabad, whereas the
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
6|Page
manufacturing unit was situated at Solan, Himachal Pradesh. According to
learned counsel, none of the petitioners was present or working at the
manufacturing unit when the inspection was conducted. The sample of the
drug in question, namely, “Locipil Tablets”, was collected by the Drug
Inspector from the premises of ESIC Model Hospital, Bari Brahmana, Jammu,
and the prosecution was thereafter instituted before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jammu.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the respondent has
instituted a criminal complaint under Section 18(a)(i) of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940, against the petitioners and other persons arrayed as
accused therein. Through the medium of the instant petition, the petitioners
seek to challenge the legality and maintainability of the proceedings arising out
of the said complaint, as well as the order dated 26.07.2018, whereby
cognizance was taken by the competent court.
15.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court
to the allegations contained in the impugned complaint. It is alleged therein
that the Drugs Inspector, CDSCO, lifted a sample of the drug “Locipil Tablets”
on Form No. 17 from the premises of ESIC Model Hospital, Bari Brahmana,
Jammu. The particulars of the drug, as recorded in the complaint, are as under:
16.
Drug in question
Locipil Tablets
Batch No.
CHI15020
Date of Mfg
09/2015
Exp. Dt
05/2018
Manufacture by
Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd.
It has further been alleged in the impugned complaint that the
respondent prepared Form No. 18 under Rule 57 of Drugs and Cosmetics
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
7|Page
Rules, 1945 and one sample portion of drug in question was sent to
Government
Analyst,
RDTL,
Regional
Drugs
Testing
Laboratories,
Chandigarh for testing and analysis. The Government Analyst, vide Report
dated 31.08.2016 in Form No. 13 issued in conformity with Rule 46 of the
aforesaid Act, declared the drug in question to be ‘Not of Standard Quality’.
17.
It is further submitted that, after receipt of the aforesaid report, the Drug
Inspector,
on
09.09.2016,
sought
information
from
the
Medical
Superintendent, ESIC Model Hospital, Bari Brahmana, Jammu, regarding the
source of purchase of the drug, whereupon the Medical Superintendent
disclosed Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. as the source of purchase and supply.
Thereafter, the respondent issued notice dated 22.09.2016 to the Company at
Himachal Pradesh, informing it about the Government Analyst’s report, to
which the Company submitted its reply dated 03.11.2016. It is further
submitted that the Department thereafter conducted a joint inspection of the
manufacturing unit on 04.11.2016 through two Drugs Inspectors. The
inspection found the manufacturing process and records to be in order and,
inter alia, recorded as under:
“(i) The test of Assay and uniformity of dosage units of Desogestral in
which the said batch has been declared as not of standard quality has
been performed at M/s Choksi Laboratories, Plot No. 362, Industrial
Area Phase-II, Panchkula, Haryana for which the firm has agreement
for contract analysis of raw material and finished products. The results
were found within limit.”
18.
On the strength of the aforesaid material, the Drug Inspector proceeded
against the Company without awaiting the outcome of the joint inspection,
despite the notice dated 22.09.2016 having already been issued. It is contended
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CRM(M) No. 237/2019
that the Joint Investigation Report does not attribute any criminal liability to
the petitioners or disclose any specific role played by them in the alleged
offence. Rather, according to learned counsel, the report records that the batch
had been manufactured in accordance with Good Manufacturing Practices and
that the requisite quantity of bulk drug had been used in its manufacture. It is,
therefore, urged that the report, coupled with the fact that none of the
petitioners were found present or working at the manufacturing unit, negates
the allegation that they were involved in the manufacture of the drug in
question.
19.
It is further submitted that the statutory procedure contemplated under
the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was not duly followed. According to Learned
Counsel for the petitioners, the Drug Inspector, by proceeding with the
prosecution without affording the petitioners an effective opportunity to
controvert the Government Analyst’s report, deprived them of their valuable
statutory right under Section 25(4) of the Act. It is also contended that one
portion of the sample was required to be produced before the Court in terms of
Section 23(4) of the Act and the Drug Inspector ought to have produced the
said sample before the learned trial Court taking cognizance.
20.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on Section 23(4)
of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 which, for facility of reference is
reproduced as under:“The Inspector shall restore one portion of a sample so divided or one
container, as the case may be, to the person from whom he takes It, and
shall retain the remainder and dispose of the same as follows:(I)
one portion or container he shall forthwith send to the
Government Analyst for test or analysis;
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
9|Page
(II)
the second he shall produce to the Court before which
proceedings, if any, are instituted in respect of the drug (or
cosmetics); and
(III) the
person,
other
third,
if
where
any,
particulars
taken,
whose
have
he
shall
name,
been
send
address
disclosed
to
the
and
under
section 18 A.”
21.
Relying upon the aforesaid statutory provisions, learned counsel for
the petitioners submits that an offence by a company is said to have committed
only where any person who, at the time of commission of offence, was incharge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of a company as well
as the company itself, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and only in
such circumstances, punishment can be imposed. However, the provisions
further stipulate that nothing contained in sub-section shall render any such
person liable to punishment under the Act if it was proved that the offence was
committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to
prevent commission of such offence.
22.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the
respondent was also required to arrive at the twin satisfaction mentioned supra,
before the process could be initiated by the competent court. However, he
submits that from a bare perusal of the allegations made in the complaint, no
such satisfaction has ever been done which could have given a justifiable cause
to the learned trial court to issue process against the petitioners.
23.
The petitioners further submits that had the respondent recorded the
requisite twin satisfaction that the offence had been committed by the company
with the active consent or connivance of or was attributable to any neglect on
the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company,
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CRM(M) No. 237/2019
only in that eventuality, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer
shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence and the proceedings could have
been initiated. In absence of any such satisfaction having been recorded,
learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the very initiation of process by
the court below is bad in the eyes of law and liable to be set aside.
24.
It is also the specific case of the petitioners that the respondent,
without
application
of
mind
and
without
conducting
any
proper
inquiry/investigation in terms of Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
has chosen to file the impugned complaint against the petitioners, who are
neither connected in any way with commission of alleged offence nor have any
role to play therein.
25.
Relying upon the aforesaid statutory provision, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the proceedings initiated against them are in direct
conflict with the mandatory procedure envisaged under Section 34, and, therefore,
suffer from non-application of mind and cannot withstand judicial scrutiny under
criminal law and the proceedings initiated against the petitioners by way of
issuing of process by the competent Court requires to be set aside.
26.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the stand
taken by the petitioners could be vindicated from a bare perusal of the Joint
Inspection Report, which nowhere imputes any liability to the petitioners nor
does it record any defect in respect of the test of Assay and uniformity of
dosage units of Desogestrel and said report was concluded by the investigating
team by holding that the drugs had been manufactured under GMP (Good
Manufacturing Practices) norms and the firm has added the required quantity
of bulk drug for manufacturing the said batch.
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27.
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
The further case of the petitioners is that the impugned complaint
otherwise lacks bona fides on the ground that the same has been filed after
more than one year from the date of receipt of permission by the Drug
Controller General, New Delhi and no explanation has been furnished for such
delay while filing the complaint before the competent court.
28.
Learned counsel further submits that apart from the absence of the
necessary allegations in the complaint, the impugned complaint also fails to
satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 23(4) of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, as the respondent did not produce the sample of the drug
before the competent court.
29.
It is specifically pleaded that the complainant has failed to establish
the specific role or responsibility played by the petitioners as required under
Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. According to Learned Counsel,
the petitioners have been sought to be held vicariously liable without following
the mandatory procedure or attributing any specific role to them.
30.
Since there is no allegation of any actual role played by the
petitioners in the alleged offence, which is a mandatory requirement of law, no
criminal proceedings could, accordingly, be initiated against the petitioners
and, therefore, the prayer of the petitioners is required to be allowed.
31.
Section 34 clearly stipulates that only persons shall be deemed to be
guilty of the offence or proceeded against and punished, if the following
conditions are satisfied:(a)
The principal accused company or as the case may be firm
or other association of individuals.
(b)
Every person who at the time the offence was committed,
was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the
conduct of business of the company.
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(c)
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
Any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the
company with whose consent and connivance, the offences
were committed.
(d)
Any director, manager, secretary or any other officer of
the company whose negligence resulted in the commission of
the offence.
32.
Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it follows that a
person, who is responsible for the conduct of a company can be held
vicariously liable only upon fulfilling the statutory requirements of
Section- 34.
33.
Relying upon the aforesaid principles of law, learned counsel
for the petitioners submits that the complaint must contain the necessary
and specific averments before a person can be subjected to criminal
process, particularly in view of settled principle of criminal jurisprudence
that, in the absence of a specific statutory provision vicarious criminal
liability cannot be fastened upon a person. He further submits that it was
incumbent upon the learned trial Court to have examined the averments
contained in the complaint with due application of mind and ought to have
issued process only upon being satisfied that the case falls within the ambit
of the aforesaid statutory provision. According to the learned counsel, this
exercise has not been undertaken and, therefore, the process initiated by the
learned trial Court is liable to be set aside.
34.
Thus, in light of what has been stated, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the process initiated by the learned Magistrate is
required to be set aside and it is a fit case where the Court can exercise the
power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for setting
aside the order issuing process passed by the learned trial Court.
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Submissions on behalf of the respondent:
35.
In rebuttal, learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Prem
Sadotra again drew the attention of this Court to Section 34 of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, which deals with offences committed by Companies. It
was submitted that Section 34(1) provides that where an offence under the
Act has been committed by a Company, every person who, at the time the
offence was committed, was in charge of and responsible to the Company
for the conduct of its business shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished, accordingly.
36.
Learned counsel laid much emphasis on the proviso to Section
34(1), which provides that nothing contained in said sub-section shall
render any person liable to punishment under the Act, if such person
proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he
had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
According to learned counsel, the proviso deals specifically with the
question of punishment and comes into operation only after the accused
appears before the Learned trial Court and is afforded an opportunity to
establish either of the aforesaid two contingencies provided in the statutory
provision. It was, therefore, argued that the accused is required to face trial
before claiming the benefit of the proviso.
37.
It was further submitted that, at this stage, it would be
premature for this Court to record any finding as to whether the Directors
were managing the affairs of the Company, whether they were in charge of
and responsible for the conduct of its business, whether the offence was
committed with their knowledge, or whether, they have exercised due
14 | P a g e
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. According to learned
counsel, these questions fall with the realm of questions of fact which can
only be adjudicated upon during the course of trial after the accused are
permitted to face the proceedings. Consequently, it was argued that the
petitioners have prematurely approached this Court by challenging the
issuance of process by the learned trial Court.
38.
Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn the attention of this
Court to the allegations levelled in the complaint filed by the Drug
Inspector against the accused persons. It was submitted that the complaint
specifically projects that the present petitioners, along with the other
Directors, were responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day business of
the Company at that relevant point of time. According to learned counsel,
allegations levelled in the impugned complaint satisfies the mandatory
requirement of Section 34(1) of the Act. Consequently, the contention of
the petitioners that there was no specific allegation against them warranting
issuance of process is wholly untenable. It was further argued that all the
statutory requirements contemplated under Section 34 have been duly
complied with and, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly issued the
process against the petitioners.
39.
Learned counsel further submitts that the allegations contained in
the impugned complaint relate to offences affecting public health and has
direct impact on public at large. Therefore, the Directors who were
managing the affairs of the Company cannot escape criminal liability by
shifting the onus upon the employees of the Company. According to
learned counsel, the Directors are infact responsible for the manufacturing
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CRM(M) No. 237/2019
decisions of the company and are the beneficiaries of the profits arising
from the manufacture and sale of the drugs. Hence, they cannot avoid their
liability by attributing responsibility to subordinate employees.
40.
Learned counsel for the respondent with a view to counter the
allegations of the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to a
statutory notice dated 22.09.2016 issued to the Company under Section
25(2) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, whereby the Company was
informed that the batch of the Drug in question had been declared as ‘Not
of Standard Quality’ and that the sample did not conform to the prescribed
assay content (70.0% of label claim), as reported by the Government
Analyst.
41.
The Company was also requested to furnish certified copies of the
relevant documents required under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and the
Rules framed thereunder. By way of the said notice, the Company was
categorically advised, in the interest of public health, to discontinue the use
and sale of the subject batch since the same had been declared ‘Not of
Standard Quality’ by the Government Analyst, Regional Drugs Testing
Laboratory, Chandigarh.
42.
Learned counsel further referred to the reply submitted by the
authorized signatory of the petitioner-company in response to the aforesaid
notice. It was submitted that the authorized signatory acknowledged receipt
of the notice and informed the authorities that the company had already
stopped the sale of the batch in question and that no stock of the said
product remained with it.
16 | P a g e
43.
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
According to learned counsel, what assumes significance in the
present case is that the Company accepted the findings of the Drug
Inspector and honoured the decision communicated through the notice. It
was submitted that nowhere in the reply did the petitioners dispute the
allegations contained in the notice. On the contrary, they accepted the
findings of the competent authority, namely the Drug Inspector.
44.
Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners, through their
authorized signatory, even requested the authorities to take a lenient view
in the instant matter, as reflected in the reply dated 03.11.2016. It was
argued that once, the petitioners neither disputed the allegations contained
in the notice nor challenged the findings recorded therein, but instead
admitted their fault and sought leniency, they are now estopped under law
from raising an altogether different stand in the present proceedings.
Consequently, the plea raised in the petition that the procedure prescribed
under Section 23(4) (iii) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was not followed
is factually incorrect and deserves outright rejection.
45.
Lastly, Mr. Sadotra has referred to the joint inspection report prepared
by the inspecting team. Although, the remarks column recorded that the batch
had been manufactured in accordance with Good Manufacturing Practices
(GMP) and that the required quantity of bulk drug had been used in its
manufacture but the operative part of the report was infact the conclusion
drawn on the basis of the Government Analyst’s findings. According to the
inspecting team, action was required to be initiated in accordance with the
applicable guidelines governing cases, where drugs are declared spurious or
17 | P a g e
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
‘Not of Standard Quality’ in the light of the enhanced penalties under the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act.
46.
Placing reliance upon the said report, learned counsel contended that the
report nowhere exonerates either the petitioners or the Company. Rather, it
reinforces the conclusion that the drug in question had been declared ‘Not of
Standard Quality’ on the basis of the Government Analyst’s report and that
appropriate action was required to be initiated under the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act. Accordingly, it was submitted that the respondent were fully justified in
proceeding against the petitioners and the other Directors in accordance with
Section 34 of the Act after following the procedure prescribed under law.
47.
In conclusion, learned counsel submitted that the entire procedure
contemplated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act had been followed in its
letter and spirit and that there had been no procedural violation, as alleged by
the petitioners. Consequently, it was urged that the cognizance taken by the
learned trial Court is perfectly legal and valid and that the interim order passed
by this Court deserves to be vacated so as to allow the respondent to proceed
against the petitioners and other co-accused strictly in accordance with law.
Legal Analysis:
48.
Having considered the rival submissions advanced at the Bar and upon
perusal of the pleadings, the material placed on record and the statutory
provisions governing the field, this Court proceeds to examine the controversy
arising for consideration in the present petition. The questions which arise for
determination are closely interlinked and, therefore, are being considered in the
following sequence:
“(i) Whether the plea of the petitioners disputing their responsibility for
the conduct of the Company and their involvement in the manufacture of
18 | P a g e
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
the drug in question can be accepted at the threshold, or is a matter to be
determined by the learned Trial Court under Section 34 of the Act?
(ii) Whether the petitioners, having accepted the findings of the
respondent-Department and requested a lenient view of the matter, can
subsequently challenge the very foundation of the proceedings by taking
altogether a different stand before this Court?
(iii) Whether, having regard to the public-health object of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and the allegation that the drug was of “Not of
Standard Quality”, the proceedings against the petitioners can be
quashed by adopting a technical approach at the threshold?
(iv)Whether the material placed on record discloses any such patent
illegality, jurisdictional error or abuse of the process of law as would
warrant exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section
561-A Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC
1973), and akin to the newly enacted Section 528 of the Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?”
Question No. 1: Whether the plea of the petitioners disputing their responsibility for the
conduct of the Company and their involvement in the manufacture of the drug in
question can be accepted at the threshold, or is a matter to be determined by the learned
Trial Court under Section 34 of the Act?
49.
In order to examine the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate, at
the outset, to notice the statutory scheme contained in Section 34 of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940, which reads as under:
“34. Offences by companies (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company,
every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of,
and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the
company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such
person liable to any punishment provided in this Act if he proves that the
19 | P a g e
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an
offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved
that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or
is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary
or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall
be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Explanation —
For the purposes of this section—
(a) “company” means a body corporate, and includes a firm or other
association of individuals; and
(b) “director” in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm.”
50.
A plain reading of the aforesaid provision makes it manifest that where
an offence under the Act has been committed by a Company, every person
who, at the relevant point of time, was in-charge of and responsible to the
Company for the conduct of its business shall also be deemed to be guilty of
such offence. Equally significant is sub-section (2), which further contemplates
liability where the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance
of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any Director, Manager,
Secretary or other officer of the Company. Whether the ingredients
contemplated under either of the aforesaid provisions ultimately stand
established is a matter which necessarily requires appreciation of evidence and
cannot ordinarily be determined at the threshold while exercising jurisdiction
under Section 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to section 482
CrPC 1973), and akin to the newly enacted section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The proviso to sub-section (1) also makes it evident
that the defense of absence of knowledge or exercise of due diligence is a
matter available to the accused to be established in accordance with law. The
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said defense cannot be adjudicated merely on the basis of the pleadings while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A Code of Criminal
Procedure (corresponding to section 482 CrPC 1973), and akin to the newly
enacted section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
51.
The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Dinesh B. Patel and
Others v. State of Gujarat and Another’, (2010) 11 SCC 125, is of particular
relevance to the present case. The said case also concerned prosecution of
Directors under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, where a contention was raised
regarding the absence of specific averments as to their role. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court declined to adopt a technical approach to the pleadings, having regard, inter
alia, to the public-health implications of the offence, and left it open to the
Directors to establish before the trial Court that they had no role in the
manufacturing process. Paragraph 10 of the judgment reads as under:
“10. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case and realising the
seriousness of the allegations, we would not take a technical view
based on pleadings in the complaint. Mr Raichura contended that as
per the settled law by this Court in complaints under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against a company and its
directors also specific averment about the active role of directors in
running the company has to be made, failing which the directors
cannot be proceeded against. The same logic should apply even in the
present case. We cannot agree. Firstly, the language of Section 34(2)
of the Act substantially differs from the language of Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Secondly, here we are dealing with an
offence which has a direct impact on public health. We, therefore,
would choose not to interfere with the order of the High Court. It will
be open for the Directors to show to the trial court that they had
nothing to do with the manufacturing process and, therefore, they
should not be held liable under Section 34(2) of the Act.”
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At this stage, it would be profitable to notice the recent judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in ‘State of Kerala & another v. M/s Panacea Biotec
Ltd. & another’, 2026 INSC 200 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
occasion to consider an identical issue arising under Section 34 of the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act. For facility of reference, paragraph 59 of the said judgment
is reproduced hereunder:
“On the aspect of Section 34 of the Act, we are of the opinion that the
High Court’s view per se was premature. The Respondents-Directors
were in the accused-Company’s management. Whether or not, they
were ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to the company for the conduct of
the business of the company’ are questions of fact. To our mind,
bearing in mind a holistic conspectus of the case, these questions are
best left to be determined by the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage.
Accordingly, the instant appeal also stands allowed by setting aside the
impugned judgment.”
53.
The submission of the petitioners that they were not personally involved
in the manufacture of the drug in question or that the manufacturing process
was carried out by technical personnel cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for
quashing the proceedings at this stage. Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act specifically contemplates circumstances in which persons in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company may also be
proceeded against. Whether the petitioners ultimately incur such vicarious
liability is a matter to be determined by the learned Trial Court upon
appreciation of the evidence that may be led by the parties during the trial.
54.
Likewise, merely because the manufacturing activity was carried out
under the supervision of qualified technical personnel does not, ipso facto,
absolve the Directors from the rigour of Section 34 of the Act. The Directors
cannot, merely by attributing the manufacturing activity to subordinate or
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technical personnel, seek to completely disassociate themselves from the
affairs and responsibilities of the Company. The extent of their responsibility,
the nature of their control over the affairs of the Company and the question
whether they satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 34 are matters
requiring appreciation of evidence. Whether the petitioners can ultimately
avoid liability by establishing that they had no role or responsibility in relation
to the manufacture of the drug in question or the offence was committed
without their knowledge or that they have exercised all due diligence to
prevent the commission of such offence are matters which are required to be
determined by the learned Trial Court once trial is allowed to commence in
accordance with law.
55.
Keeping the aforesaid statutory position in view, this Court has also
examined the allegations levelled in the complaint. It is contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent that the allegations levelled in the impugned
complaint specifically vindicate that the present petitioners, along with the
other Directors, were responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day business of
the Company at the relevant point of time. The relevant extract of the
complaint is reproduced as under:“4. That the accused no.-2, accused no.-3, accused no.-4, accused no.-5,
Accused no.-6, Accused no.-7 are the Directors of accused no.-1, i.e., M/s
Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd., Village Jatoli, Post Office Oachghat, Tehsil
Solan, District-Solan (H.P)-173223 and accused no. 2 to 7 by virtue of
holding the post/office of Director, all are responsible to conduct
business of accused no.-1 at the time when the drug was manufactured,
i.e., Sept. 2015. (Copy of Memorandum of Association and List of
Directors as on 03.11.2016, is attached as Annexure-2)
16. That accused no.-1 is a Manufacturing Company which has
manufactured for sale Not of Standard Quality drug declared by
Government Analyst and accused no.-2, accused no.-3, accused no.-4,
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accused no.-5, accused no.-6 & accused no.-7 are the Directors of the
Company and responsible persons for the conduct of the day-to-day
business of the Company at the relevant time.”
56.
In view of the allegations levelled in the impugned complaint by the
complainant, Drug Inspector this court is of the considered view that whether
the petitioners were, in fact, in charge or responsible for the conduct of the day
to day business of the Company and whether they can ultimately be held liable
thereunder, are matters which require appreciation of evidence and are best left
to be determined by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law if the trial
is allowed to commence and issuance of process by the learned trial court is a
step towards that.
57.
On consideration of the complaint as a whole, this Court finds that the
petitioners cannot, at this stage, avoid the operation of Section 34 of the Act
merely by disputing their responsibility for the conduct of the Company's
business or by asserting that they had no role in the actual manufacturing
process. Whether such averment is ultimately established by leading evidence,
whether the petitioners were in fact in charge and responsible for the conduct
of the Company's business and whether their individual roles attract liability
under Section 34 are matters requiring detailed adjudication upon evidence
during trial.
Accordingly, the first question is, answered in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioners.
Question No. 2- Whether the petitioners, having accepted the findings of the respondentDepartment and requested a lenient view of the matter, can subsequently challenge the
very foundation of the proceedings by taking altogether a different stand before this
Court?
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Another significant aspect which cannot be overlooked by this Court in
the instant matter is the stand adopted by the Company itself before the
respondent-Department. The record reveals that upon receipt of the statutory
notice dated 22.09.2016, the Company, through its authorized representative,
submitted the following reply:
“Sir, we acknowledge the receipt of your letter and find our compliance
as follows:
1. We had stopped the sale of the batch in question.
2. As on date, we don't have stock of above said product. Find enclosed
copy of Batch Distribution Record & Stock Transfer Note along with
confirmation of stock from C & F.
We admire your findings and honor your judgment. Your esteemed
Directorate is requested to take a lenient view in this concern.”
59.
The aforesaid reply assumes considerable significance in the present
case. Upon receipt of the statutory notice dated 22.09.2016, the Company,
through its authorized representative, did not dispute the findings
communicated by the respondent-Department. On the contrary, the Company
informed the Department that it had already stopped the sale of the batch in
question and that, as on the date of the reply, no stock of the said product
remained with it. Thus, the response of the Company was not one of denial of
the findings recorded by the Department or of questioning the very basis of the
proceedings initiated against it, rather it tantamount to admission on their part
and applauding the role of respondent department to have arrived at such
finding and honoured the judgment while also seeking leniency.
60.
What is of particular significance is the further stand expressly taken by the
Company in the very same reply. After informing the Department that the sale of
the batch had been stopped and that no stock remained with it, the Company
stated, “We admire your findings and honor your judgment”, and thereafter
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requested the Directorate to “take a lenient view in this concern.” The request for
a lenient view assumes considerable significance because the Company, instead
of disputing the findings or asserting that the proceedings were without any basis,
sought indulgence from the very authority which had communicated the adverse
findings. The tenor of the reply, therefore, shows that, at the relevant stage, the
Company proceeded on the basis of the findings communicated by the
Department and sought a favourable or lenient consideration of the matter. The
aforesaid conduct of the Company, and the inconsistent position now sought to be
taken in the present proceedings, has to be considered in the light of the settled
principle governing approbation and reprobation.
61.
The petitioner, therefore, are estopped under law to challenge the
compliant and the process issued by competent Court. After having accepted the
finding and judgment of the respondent department, without any demur, the
petitioners are estopped under law to question the findings, allegations or process
issued by learned Court in compliant. The law of “estoppel by conduct” holds
good against the petitioners.
62.
The same principle has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
‘Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and
Another v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Limited and
Another’, (2013) 5 SCC 470, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
considering the doctrine of approbation and reprobation, observed as under:
“10. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of
estoppel- the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent
in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of
estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this
law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or
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silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would
have otherwise had.”
63.
The aforesaid principle, therefore, makes it clear that a party cannot, by
its own conduct, accept a position or seek the benefit arising therefrom and
thereafter resile from the same position so as to challenge the very foundation of
the proceedings. The principle assumes particular significance in the present
case, where the stand adopted before the respondent-Department is sought to be
departed from in the proceedings before this Court.
64.
The principle governing such inconsistent stands is well settled by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Union of India v. N. Murugesan’, (2022) 2 SCC
25, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only
mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and
thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of
election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again,
it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law.
Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not
get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the
fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A
person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while
questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the
transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a
common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully
and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the
other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a
species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party….”
65.
The contemporaneous stand adopted by the Company before the
respondent-Department is a relevant circumstance while examining the
challenge raised in the present proceedings. On the one hand, the Company
accepted the findings communicated by the Department, acted upon the
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consequential direction by discontinuing the sale and confirmed that no stock
remained with it, while also seeking a lenient view of the matter. On the other
hand, the petitioners now seek to question the very foundation of the
proceedings and contend that the complaint was deficient for want of further
particulars regarding their responsibility as Directors. The principle that a party
cannot approbate and reprobate, or blow hot and cold at the same time, is
attracted where the Company has adopted a particular stand before the
Department and sought indulgence on that basis. Having adopted such a stand,
it cannot subsequently seek to take an inconsistent position. The
contemporaneous stand of the Company, therefore, cannot be ignored while
considering the challenge raised in the present petition.
Accordingly, the second question is answered in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioners.
66.
The contention of the petitioners that the mandatory procedure
contemplated under Sections 23 and 25 of the Act was not followed also does
not, on the material presently available, furnish a ground for quashing the
proceedings at this stage. The record prima facie reveals that the statutory notice
was issued, the report of the Government Analyst was communicated to the
Company and the Company submitted its reply thereto. Whether there has been
complete compliance with every procedural requirement or whether any
prejudice has been caused to the petitioners are matters which can appropriately
be examined by the learned Trial Court upon appreciation of the material and
evidence. Prima facie, therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent
completely bypassed the statutory procedure prescribed under the Act.
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In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the relevant statutory
provisions governing the procedure for taking and dealing with samples and the
evidentiary effect of the report of the Government Analyst. Section 23 of the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, provides as under:
“23. Procedure of Inspectors.—
(1)Where an Inspector takes any sample of a drug or cosmetic under this
Chapter, he shall tender the fair price thereof and may require a written
acknowledgement therefor.
(2) Where the price tendered under sub-section (1) is refused or where the
Inspector seizes the stock of any drug or cosmetic under clause (c) of
section 22, he shall tender a receipt therefor in the prescribed form.
(3) Where an Inspector takes a sample of a drug or cosmetic for the
purpose of test or analysis, he shall intimate such purpose in writing in
the prescribed form to the person from whom he takes it and, in the
presence of such person unless he wilfully absents himself, shall divide
the sample into four portions and effectively seal and suitably mark the
same and permit such person to add his own seal and mark to all or any
of the portions so sealed and marked:
Provided that where the sample is taken from premises whereon the drug
or cosmetic is being manufactured, it shall be necessary to divide the
sample into three portions only:
Provided further that where the drug or cosmetic is made up in containers
of small volume, instead of dividing a sample as aforesaid, the Inspector
may, and if the drug or cosmetic be such that it is likely to deteriorate or
be otherwise damaged by exposure shall, take three or four, as the case
may be, of the said containers after suitably marking the same and, where
necessary, sealing them.
(4) The Inspector shall restore one portion of a sample so divided or one
container, as the case may be, to the person from whom he takes it, and
shall retain the remainder and dispose of the same as follows:—
(i)one portion or container he shall forthwith send to the Government
Analyst for test or analysis;
(ii)the second he shall produce to the Court before which proceedings,
if any, are instituted in respect of the drug or cosmetic; and
(iii)the third, where taken, he shall send to the person, if any, whose name,
address and other particulars have been disclosed under section 18A.
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(5) Where an Inspector takes any action under clause (c) of section 22,—
(a)he shall use all despatch in ascertaining whether or not the drug or
cosmetic contravenes any of the provisions of section 18 and, if it is
ascertained that the drug or cosmetic does not so contravene forthwith
revoke the order passed under the said clause or, as the case may be,
take such action as may be necessary for the return of the stock seized;
(b)if he seizes the stock of the drug or cosmetic, he shall as soon as
may be, inform a Judicial Magistrate and take his orders as to the
custody thereof;
(c)without prejudice to the institution of any prosecution, if the alleged
contravention be such that the defect may be remedied by the possessor
of the drug or cosmetic, he shall, on being satisfied that the defect has
been so remedied, forthwith revoke his order under the said clause.
(6) Where an Inspector seizes any record, register, document or any other
material object under clause (cc) of sub-section (1) of section 22, he shall,
as soon as may be, inform a Judicial Magistrate and take his orders as to
the custody there.”
68.
Section 25 of the Act further prescribes the evidentiary effect of the
report of the Government Analyst and the statutory mechanism available to the
person from whom the sample was taken or the person whose particulars have
been disclosed under Section 18-A to controvert such report. Section 25 reads
as under:
“25. Reports of Government Analysts. —
(1)The Government Analyst to whom a sample of any drug or cosmetic
has been submitted for test or analysis under sub-section (4) of section 23,
shall deliver to the Inspector submitting it a signed report in triplicate in
the prescribed form.
(2)The Inspector on receipt thereof shall deliver one copy of the report to
the person from whom the sample was taken and another copy to the
person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been
disclosed under section 18A, and shall retain the third copy for use in any
prosecution in respect of the sample.
(3)Any document purporting to be a report signed by a Government
Analyst under this Chapter shall be evidence of the facts stated therein,
and such evidence shall be conclusive unless the person from whom the
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sample was taken or the person whose name, address and other
particulars have been disclosed under section 18A has, within twentyeight days of the receipt of a copy of the report, notified in writing the
Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings in respect of the
sample are pending that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of
the report.
(4)Unless the sample has already been tested or analysed in the Central
Drugs Laboratory, where a person has under sub-section (3) notified his
intention of adducing evidence in controversion of a Government
Analyst's report, the Court may, of its own motion or in its discretion at
the request either of the complainant or the accused: cause the sample of
the drug or cosmetic produced before the Magistrate under sub-section (4)
of section 23 to be sent for test or analysis to the said Laboratory, which
shall make the test or analysis and report in writing signed by or under
the authority of, the Director of the Central Drugs Laboratory the result
thereof, and such report shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated
therein.
(5)The cost of a test or analysis made by the Central Drugs Laboratory
under sub-section (4) shall be paid by the complainant or accused as the
Court shall direct.”
69.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that the Act
itself prescribes a specific statutory mechanism for dealing with the sample,
the report of the Government Analyst and any proposed challenge thereto. The
objection of the petitioners regarding non-compliance with the said procedure,
therefore, cannot be examined merely on the basis of an alleged procedural
omission. It would also require examination as to whether the statutory
opportunity contemplated under Section 25 of the Act was availed of by the
petitioners within the prescribed period and whether any prejudice has, in fact,
been occasioned to them.
70.
It is also necessary to notice the statutory consequence attached to the
report of the Government Analyst under Section 25 of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940. Sub-section (3) thereof provides that a document
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purporting to be a report signed by a Government Analyst shall be evidence of
the facts stated therein and shall be conclusive unless the person from whom
the sample was taken or the person whose name, address and other particulars
have been disclosed under Section 18-A, within twenty-eight days of receipt of
a copy of the report, notifies in writing the Inspector or the Court before which
proceedings in respect of the sample are pending of his intention to adduce
evidence in controversion of the report. The statutory scheme further
contemplates, in the circumstances prescribed therein, that the sample may
thereafter be sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory for test or analysis, whose
report is to have the evidentiary effect provided by the Act.
71.
In the present case, the record does not, at this stage, disclose that the
Company, upon receipt of the Government Analyst's report, exercised the
statutory right of notifying the Inspector or the Court within the prescribed
period of its intention to adduce evidence in controversion of the said report.
On the contrary, the contemporaneous reply submitted by the Company
referred to the findings communicated by the Department, stated that the sale
of the concerned batch had been stopped and requested that a lenient view be
taken. In these circumstances, the plea now raised by the petitioners that they
were deprived of an opportunity to controvert the Government Analyst's report
cannot, by itself, furnish a ground for quashing the proceedings at this stage.
Whether the statutory requirements stood fully complied with and whether any
prejudice was caused to the petitioners are matters which can be examined by
the learned trial Court in accordance with law.
72.
Much emphasis has also been laid by the petitioners upon the Joint
Investigation Report. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said report
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cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read together with the report of the
Government Analyst, on the basis whereof the drug in question was declared
to be "Not of Standard Quality". Although the Joint Investigation Report
records that the batch had been manufactured in accordance with Good
Manufacturing Practices and that the requisite quantity of bulk drug had been
used, the report does not exonerate either the Company or its Directors. Rather,
it ultimately recommends initiation of action in accordance with the applicable
statutory guidelines. The relevant remarks recorded in the Joint Investigation
Report are reproduced as under:
“On the basis of above observations the inspecting team is of opinion that
said batch has been manufactured under GMP norms and the firm has
added the required quantity of bulk drug for manufacturing of the said
batch. However, considering the results as per the reports of Government
Analyst, Inspecting team is of the opinion that action may be initiated as per
‘Guideline for taking action on samples of drugs declared spurious or not of
standard quality in the light of enhanced penalties under the Drugs and
Cosmetics (Amendment) Act, 2008’ as deemed fit.”
73.
The Joint Investigation Report, therefore, cannot be construed as a
document exonerating the petitioners at the threshold so as to warrant quashing
of the complaint.
Question No. 3: Whether, having regard to the public-health object of the Drugs and
Cosmetics Act, 1940, and the allegation that the drug was of “Not of Standard Quality”,
the proceedings against the petitioners can be quashed by adopting a technical approach
at the threshold?
74.
Having dealt with the statutory objections raised by the petitioners, it is
also necessary to bear in mind the object sought to be achieved by the Drugs
and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The enactment is intended to regulate the
manufacture, import, sale and distribution of drugs and cosmetics and to
ensure that the drugs made available to the public conform to the prescribed
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standards of quality, safety and efficacy. The statutory scheme is thus directed
towards preventing the manufacture and distribution of sub-standard,
adulterated or otherwise unsafe drugs and, consequently, bears a direct and
vital nexus with the protection of public health and safety. This legislative
object assumes particular significance in the present case, where the allegation
concerns a drug which has been declared to be of “Not of Standard Quality”.
75.
The object of the enactment also has to be viewed in the context of the
fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. The right to life is not confined to mere physical existence, but
encompasses the right to live with dignity and includes within its ambit the
protection of health and well-being. Every person, as a consumer of medicines,
is entitled to expect that drugs made available for human consumption conform
to the prescribed standards of quality and are not sub-standard or otherwise
unsafe. The manufacture and distribution of drugs which fail to meet the
prescribed standards, therefore, carries a direct bearing upon public health and,
consequently, implicates the constitutional concern underlying Article 21. The
statutory safeguards contained in the Drugs and Cosmetics Act must
accordingly be understood as serving not merely a regulatory purpose, but also
as an important legislative mechanism for protecting the health and life of
persons who may be required to consume such drugs.
76.
The public-health dimension of the enactment has also been noticed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in ‘Vikas Rambal vs. State’, Crl.O.P.
No.11184/2019, decided on 12.10.2022, wherein the Court observed as under:
“21. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 came into force on 10.04.1940. It
is an existing law when the Constitution came into force. In the year 1982
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there was an amendment to this Act, the statement of Objects and Reasons
for the said Amendment, explains the purpose of the Act as below:“Amendment Act 68 of 1982- Statement of Objects and Reasons:The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, regulates the import into,
manufacture, distribution and sale of drugs and cosmetics in the
country. The problems of adulteration of drugs and also of
production of spurious and sub-standard drugs are posing
serious threat to the health of the community. It is, therefore
considered necessary to amend the Drugs and Cosmetics, Act, so
as to impose more stringent penalties on the anti- social elements
indulging in the manufacture or sale of adulterated or spurious
drugs or drugs not of standard quality which are likely to cause
death or grievous hurt to the user. This opportunity is also being
availed of to incorporate certain other provisions on the other
aspects https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis of effective control on the
manufacture, distribution, sale of drugs and cosmetics on the
basis of experience gained in the working of the Act.”
77.
The aforesaid consideration assumes significance in the present case, as
the allegations relate to a drug declared to be of ‘Not of Standard Quality’. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Dinesh B. Patel (supra), while dealing with a
challenge by Directors under the very provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics
Act, also declined to adopt a technical approach to the pleadings, particularly
having regard to the direct impact of such offences on public health. The
Court, at the same time, left it open to the Directors to establish before the
Trial Court that they had no role in the manufacturing process. Viewed in this
background, this Court does not find that the proceedings against the
petitioners can be quashed by adopting a hyper-technical approach at the
threshold.
Accordingly, the third question is answered in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioners.
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Question No. 4: Whether the material placed on record discloses any such patent illegality,
jurisdictional error or abuse of the process of law as would warrant exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding
to section 482 CrPC 1973), and akin to the newly enacted Section 528 of the Bhartiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023?
78.
The scope of interference under Section 561-A Code of Criminal
Procedure (corresponding to section 482 CrPC 1973), and akin to the newly
enacted Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is equally
well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘State of Karnataka v. M.
Devendrappa and another’, (2002) 3 SCC 89, while delineating the scope and
limitations of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the
Code, has held as under:
“9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful
to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of
a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision
in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so
when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the
Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without
sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid
down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of
the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such
premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be
quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and
conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a
proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent
powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where
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the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint
do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken
by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same
in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.
It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous
analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case
would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read
as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in
the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no
material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for
interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at
the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides
of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence led in
court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations
of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings.”
79.
The aforesaid principles have been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in ‘Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and
others’, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, wherein it has been emphasized that,
though the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wide, its exercise calls for
greater caution and that interference with criminal proceedings is warranted
only in exceptional cases.
80.
The aforesaid principles assume particular significance in the present
case. The challenge raised by the petitioners requires this Court to examine,
inter alia, their alleged non-involvement in the manufacturing process, the
extent of their responsibility in the affairs of the Company, the effect of the
Joint Investigation Report and the alleged deficiencies in the statutory
procedure. Determination of such matters would necessarily involve an
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examination and appreciation of the factual and evidentiary aspects of the case.
Exercise of the inherent jurisdiction cannot be converted into a roving or
fishing enquiry into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the material
forming the basis of the complaint and these questions raised by the petitioners
are capable of being adjudicated by the learned Trial Court in accordance with
law. The petitioners cannot, therefore, seek a re-appreciation of the material or
a determination of disputed questions of fact at this stage in proceedings under
Section 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to section 482 CrPC
1973), and akin to the newly enacted Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
81.
Examined from the aforesaid perspective, the complaint cannot be said to
suffer from any such fundamental deficiency as would justify exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The statutory objections raised by the
petitioners, including the alleged non-compliance with the procedure
contemplated under the Act and the reliance placed upon the Joint Investigation
Report, do not, at this stage, demonstrate that the proceedings are legally barred
or that the allegations in the complaint, even if taken at their face value, fail to
disclose the alleged offences. No patent illegality, jurisdictional error or
perversity, therefore, is discernible in the order dated 26.07.2018 passed by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu.
Accordingly, the fourth question is answered in favour of the
respondent and against the petitioners.
Conclusion:
82.
In view of the foregoing discussion and the findings recorded on the
questions formulated hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that
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the petitioners have failed to make out any ground warranting interference with
the impugned complaint or the order dated 26.07.2018 passed by the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu. The objections raised by the petitioners,
including those relating to their alleged non-involvement in the manufacturing
process, the statutory procedure, the Joint Investigation Report and the
sufficiency or effect of the material relied upon by the prosecution, either
involve disputed questions of fact or matters which can appropriately be
examined by the learned Trial Court while conducing trial in accordance with
law. No patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity or abuse of the process
of law is, therefore, discernible so as to warrant exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A Code of Criminal Procedure
(corresponding to section 482 CrPC 1973), and akin to the newly enacted
section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 of the Code.
83.
Accordingly, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.
The interim order dated 03.05.2019, whereby further proceedings before the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, were stayed, shall stand vacated.
The learned Trial Court shall proceed with the matter in accordance with law
and shall adjudicate the same in the trial independently on its own merits,
uninfluenced by any observation made in the present judgment, which shall be
construed as confined to the consideration of the petitioners' prayer for
interference at the present stage.
84.
It is, however, clarified that nothing contained in this judgment shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the ultimate guilt or innocence of the
petitioners or on any issue which is required to be determined by the learned
CRM(M) No. 237/2019
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Trial Court upon appreciation of the evidence. All such questions shall remain
open for consideration by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.
85.
Disposed of accordingly, along with all connected applications, if any.
(WASIM SADIQ NARGAL)
JUDGE
JAMMU
12.08.2026
Mihul
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