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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CRMC No. 658/2016
Reserved on: 03.03.2026
Pronounced on : 12.03.2026
Uploaded on : 12.03.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
Ankur Jain
….Petitioners
Through:-
Mr. G.S. Thakur, Advocate
V/s
Ashwani Khajuria
Through:-
…..Respondents
Mr. Gagan Kohli, Advocate.
\
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
01.
The petitioner, through the medium of the present
petition, has challenged the complaint filed by the respondent
against him alleging commission of offence under Section 138
of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter to be referred
to as “Act”), which is stated to be pending before the Court of
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udhampur (hereinafter to be
referred to as “trial Magistrate”).
Challenge has also been
thrown to order dated 22.09.2016 whereby cognizance of
CRMC No. 658/2016
offence has been taken and summons have been issued to the
petitioner.
02.
As
per
the
impugned
complaint,
the
petitioner/accused is the Managing Director, incharge and
responsible for the conduct of business of M/s Noida Software
Technology Park Ltd, which is running the business to provide
service of satellite paid channels under the name and style of
“Jainhits”.
It has been alleged that the respondent is a
customer of the said business and the parties have business
relations for the last two years.
On 15.04.2016, the
petitioner/accused is stated to have demanded a loan for an
amount of Rs. 23,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lacs) from
the respondent/complainant for carrying out his business for
a period of one month and he had agreed that he will repay the
loan amount along with interest of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two
Lacs).
03.
The respondent/complainant is stated to have paid
an amount of Rs. 23,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lacs)
from his bank account maintained with UCO Bank Branch
Udhampur by transferring the said amount in the account of
the petitioner/accused maintained with HDFC Bank, Bikaji
Cama Place, New Delhi. It is alleged that on the same day i.e.,
on 16.04.2016, the petitioner/accused issued a cheque in
favour of the respondent/complainant for an amount of
CRMC No. 658/2016
Rs. 23,00,000/- drawn on his account at HDFC Bank Branch,
Bikaji Cama Place, New Delhi and its due date of honour was
fixed as 15.05.2016.
04.
When the respondent/complainant deposited the
said cheque in his account on 29.06.2016, it was returned
unpaid for the reason “account blocked”.
On 20.07.2016,
the respondent/complainant again deposited the said cheque
with his banker at UCO Bank, Udhampur but it was
dishonoured
on
21.07.2016
for
the
“account
reason
blocked”.
05.
A notice of demand dated 18.08.2016 was served by
the respondent/complainant upon the petitioner/accused
through his advocate and as per the delivery certificate, the
same was received by the petitioner/accused on 22.08.2016.
The petitioner did not respond to the said notice nor did he
liquidate
the
amount
of
the
cheque.
Thus,
the
respondent/complainant was compelled to file the impugned
complaint before the learned trial Magistrate.
06.
The
learned
trial
Magistrate
after
recording
preliminary evidence of the petitioner/accused took cognizance
of the offence and issued process against the petitioner in
terms of impugned order dated 27.09.2016.
07.
The
petitioner
has
challenged
the
impugned
complaint and the order whereby process has been issued
CRMC No. 658/2016
against him on the grounds that without arraigning the
company as an accused in the impugned complaint, the same
cannot be proceeded with.
It has been contended that the
cheque has been bounced due to account being blocked, which
does not form a ground for filing a complaint under Section
138 of the Act. It has also been contended that the petitioner is
not a signatory to the cheque, which is subject matter of the
impugned
complaint,
as
such,
without
arraigning
the
signatories of the cheque, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted.
It has further been contended that the complaint has been
filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation as the cheque
was initially dishonoured on 29.06.2016 whereas, the demand
notice has been issued on 18.08.2016. It has also been
contended that there are no specific averments qua role of the
petitioner in the impugned complaint.
08.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused record of the case including record of the trial court.
09.
Although
grounds
as
the
narrated
petitioner
hereinbefore
has
for
raised
numerous
challenging
the
impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom
yet during the course of arguments, he has laid much
emphasis on the ground that without impleading the company
of which the petitioner is stated to be the Managing Director,
prosecution against him is not sustainable.
CRMC No. 658/2016
10.
In order to test the merits of the contention raised
by the petitioner, it would be apt to notice the provisions
contained in Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
which deals with offences by companies. It reads as under:
“141. Offences by companies. —
(1)If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a
company, every person who, at the time the offence was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company, as
well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had
exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence:
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a
Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or
employment in the Central Government or State Government or
a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central
Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he
shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
(2)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
where any offence under this Act has been committed by a
company and it is proved that the offence has been committed
with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any
neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or
other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary
or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence
CRMC No. 658/2016
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished
accordingly.
11.
From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it appears
that when an offence has been committed by a company, every
person who, at the time when the offence was committed, was
incharge of and was responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company as well as the
company shall be deemed to be a guilty of the offence. This
provision extends the concept of vicarious liability to the
person responsible for conduct of the business of the company
in a case where the offence has been committed by the
company.
In criminal law, there is no concept of vicarious
liability and it is only if there is a statute, which makes a
person vicariously liable for the acts of another person, that
such a person can be prosecuted for a criminal offence.
Section 141 of the Act makes the person incharge of and
responsible for conduct of business of the company vicariously
liable for offences committed by the company. However, it has
been made clear in the said provision that not only those
persons, who are responsible for conduct of the business of the
company but even the company would be deemed to be guilty
of the offence.
12.
The question, whether prosecution against the
directors or persons incharge of the affairs of the company can
CRMC No. 658/2016
be launched without impleading the company as an accused in
a case where the statute provides for vicarious liability of the
persons incharge of the company for the offences committed by
the company, was subject matter of discussion before the
Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather
Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd, 2012 (5) SCC 661. In the said
case, the court has, after interpreting the provisions contained
in Section 141 of the Act and after considering its earlier
decisions on the subject, held as under:
“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of
the considered opinion that commission of offence by the
company is an express condition precedent to attract the
vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words “as well as the
company” appearing in the Section make it absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be
prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other
categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject
to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic
person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is
recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its
reputation. There can be situations when the corporate
reputation is affected when a director is indicted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the
irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution
under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an
accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can
only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of
vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the
CRMC No. 658/2016
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid
down in C.V. Parekh, which is a three-Judge Bench
decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal
does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled
with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi
Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts
as has been explained by us hereinabove.”
13.
The aforesaid position of law was relied upon by the
Supreme Court in the case of Anil Gupta Vs. Star India
Private Limited and Anr (2014) 10
SCC 373 and it was
observed as under:
13. In the present case, the High Court by impugned
judgment dated 13th August, 2007 held that the complaint
against respondent no.2-Company was not maintainable
and quashed the summon issued by the Trial Court against
respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company being not
a party
to
the
proceedings
under Section
138 read
with Section 141 of the Act and in view of the fact that
part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in Anil
Hada (supra) has been overruled by three Judge Bench of
this Court in Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option
but to set aside the rest part of the impugned judgment
whereby the High Court held that the proceedings against
the appellant can be continued even in absence of the
Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the
impugned judgment dated 13th August, 2007 passed by
the High Court so far it relates to appellant and quash the
summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case No.698
of 2001 qua the appellant.”
CRMC No. 658/2016
14.
From the aforesaid discussion of legal position on
the subject, it is clear that without impleading the company as
an accused, its Directors or Incharge officers or the persons
responsible for the conduct of its day to day business cannot
be prosecuted for an offence, which is deemed to have been
committed by the company.
15.
Turning to the facts of the present case, the cheque,
which is subject matter of the impugned complaint, has been
issued on behalf of the company, namely, M/s Noida Software
Technology Park Limited.
It is signed by two persons
purported to be the authorized signatories of the company.
The petitioner has specifically pleaded that the cheque in
question does not bear his signatures.
In the impugned
complaint, the respondent has alleged that he was having
business dealings with the aforesaid company.
Since the
petitioner is not drawer of the cheque and he has been
arraigned as an accused only in his capacity as Managing
Director of the company on whose behalf the cheque in
question has been issued, as such, he has no individual
liability. If at all the petitioner was to be impleaded as an
accused, the same could have been done only if the company
on whose behalf the cheque has been issued was impleaded as
an accused. Without impleading the company M/s Noida
Software
Technology
CRMC No. 658/2016
Park
Limited
as
an
accused,
the
complaint against the petitioner, who is stated to be the
Managing Director of the said company and who is not even
the signatory to the cheque in question, is not maintainable.
16.
Learned counsel for the respondent by placing
reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Bhupesh Rathod Vs. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia and
anr., (2022) 2 SCC 335 has argued that a too technical view
of the matter cannot be taken. It has been contended that in
the title of the impugned complaint, the name of the company
is mentioned below the name of the petitioner/accused, as
such, it can be stated that the company has been impleaded
as an accused.
17.
I am afraid, the ratio laid down in Bhupesh
Rathod’s case (supra) cannot be made applicable to the
present case. In the said case, the issue involved was „whether
a complaint filed on behalf of the company by the Managing
Director is maintainable‟. It is in those circumstances that the
Supreme Court held that when the Managing Director has filed
the complaint on behalf of the company even if his name is
described first, it cannot be stated that there is a fundamental
defect in the complaint. In the present case, the offence is
alleged to have been committed by the company, which has
not been impleaded as an accused at all. It is not a case where
the complaint has been filed on behalf of the company but it is
CRMC No. 658/2016
a case where the company itself is an accused. Therefore, in
view of the provisions contained in Section 141 of the Act, the
complaint against the Managing Director without impleading
the company as an accused cannot proceed.
The
provisions contained in Section 141 of the Act have application
in deciding as to who should be impleaded as an accused if the
offence is committed by the company. The said provision has
no applicability to a case where the complainant happens to be
the company.
18.
For what has been discussed hereinbefore, the
impugned
complaint
as
against
the
petitioner
without
impleading M/s Noida Software Technology Park ltd., as an
accused, is not maintainable.
The same is, therefore, liable to
be quashed.
19.
Accordingly,
the
petition
is
allowed
and
the
impugned complaint and the proceedings emanating therefrom
against the petitioner are quashed.
20.
Disposed of accordingly.
(SANJAY DHAR)
JUDGE
JAMMU
12.03.2026
Naresh/Secy.
Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable: Yes
Naresh Kumar
2026.02.25 03:57
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
CRMC No. 658/2016
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